Dowry Demand Case's Judgement

In the Court of 5 th Judicial Magistrate at Bankura, Dist. – Bankura 

PRESENT: Mr. Sk. Md. Arif Hasan, 5 th J.M., Bankura. 

GR Case No.293 /09 

TR. No. 329T/09 

State of West Bengal 

V/s 

1. Santanu Banerjee, 

2. Atul Krishna Banerjee, 

3. Smt. Kamala Banerjee, 

4. Buddhabeb Mukherjee. ………..Accuseds 

JUDGEMENT DELIVERED ON: September 29, 2014 

Author: Mr. Sk. Md. Arif Hasan, 5 th J.M., Bankura 

Charges: U/S 498A Indian Penal Code [hereinafter referred to as IPC], and under Section 

3 & 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 [hereinafter referred to as D.P. Act]. 

J U D G E M E N T 

Fact behind this action: 

1. This is another typical case of bridal torture in India. Chaitali Banerjee, the victim, and 

Santanu Banerjee got married on June 30, 2008; but their conjugal life lasted for two 

months only. If her story is correct, Santanu’s conduct was altogether deplorable; and she 

was well justified in bringing their family matter up to a criminal court. Her father, Nimai 

Ghosal, claimed that for their marriage, he gave a handsome dowry, so far he could afford, 

to Santanu. But Santanu and the other accuseds above named, who are his relatives, did not 

satisfy with it. They, according to Nimai, tortured his daughter a lot on demand of a bike, 

the additional dowry. They demanded either bike or ₹70,000/- for purchasing the same. 

Finally, Chaitali had been driven out of her matrimonial home. 

2. Nimai, the de-facto complainant, ultimately approached the Bankura P.S and lodged one 

FIR against the accuseds above named. After the investigation was over, the I/O charge 

sheeted all the accuseds above named u/s 498A of IPC and S.3 & 4 of D.P Act. After 

supplying copies to them u/s 207 of Criminal Procedure Code [hereinafter referred to as 

Cr.P.C], the case was transferred to my court for trial and disposal. Accordingly, Ld. 

Predecessor P.O had framed charges under aforesaid Sections. To those charges the accuseds 

pleaded their innocence and claimed trial. 

Defence: 

3. Coming now to the defence stand, what their defence was? It was only that they are 

innocent and has falsely been framed. They never demanded any dowry; nor had they 

tortured Chaitali. She in fact is a psychic patient, who only led two months marital life and 

then left consortium of Santanu. Now, after a long delay of almost one year Chaitali's father 

brought this action. 

Trial: 

4. The prosecution, during trial, produced only three witnesses, namely Nimai Ghosal, Lila 

Ghosal & Chaitali Banerjee. They were examined as P.W-1, 2 & 3 respectively. The 

prosecution did not produce the rest C.S.Ws. 

5. The prosecution proved the following documentary evidences also: a) The written 

complaint dt. 28-04-2009 (Exbt-1), b) Signature of P.W-1 on the Exbt-1 (Exbt-1/2). 

Dictated & Corrected by me: 5 th J.M., Bankura. Page 1 of 10 

e-court info: Case Code- 201600031712014, Registration no- 2823/2014; (http://ecourts.gov.in/services)

6. In the end, I had examined the accuseds U/S 313 Cr. P.C. When they were asked for 

defence evidence, if any, they declined. 

POINTS FOR DETERMINATION 

7. With reference to factual matrix, I would frame the following points for deciding this 

case: 

(i) Are the accused persons guilty of committing crimes u/s 498A of IPC and S.3 & 

4 of D.P Act or under any of the sections? 

(ii) Has the prosecution been able to prove them guilty beyond all reasonable 

doubts? 

DECISION WITH REASONS 

8. For convenience, I would take both the points together. 

9. So far as the evidence on record is concerned, the prosecution could able to produce three 

witnesses only, out of whom P.W-1 was the de-facto complainant of this case and P.W-3, 

Chaitali, is the victim. This case, I think, requires analysis from two angles: first, the angle 

of bridal torture; and second, the angle of dowry demand. I would first proceed with the 

angle of bridal torture. On this issue, all these three witnesses unanimously said in their 

evidence that Chaitali had been tortured by the accuseds for further dowry demand. The 

cross examination of Nimai and Lila, I think, is not, in anyway, beneficial for the accuseds 

above named. But, though the Ld. Defence counsel did not argue, yet I think, both Nimai 

and Lila are mere hearsay witnesses with respect to the allegations about bridal torture. I 

have the reason for it. In Indian culture, I think, the daughters are supposed to be at their 

matrimonial home, the knowledge of her parents about the affairs of which are supposed to 

be derived from the oral account of their daughter or in other words the bride of the 

matrimonial home. Nimai and Lila also did not intend, in their evidence, to show that this 

case is an exception to this Indian culture. I think, it would be very unjust to rely on such 

hearsay evidences about the bridal torture for criminalising someone. I do not, however, say 

that the evidences of Nimai and Chaitali about the bridal torture should be thrown into the 

dustbin. They, I think, could be used to corroborate the evidence of Chaitali u/s 157 of the 

Evidence Act. I would, therefore, proceed to examine Chaitali's evidence. 

10. The gist of Chaitali's evidence is that she had been tortured by the mother-in-law, 

Kamala, the father-in-law, Atul, and Santanu, the husband as well as Buddhadeb, the 

husband of her sister-in-law, on demand of a bike and further money, the demanded 

additional dowries. It is important to notice that none of the witness narrated while their 

evidence about the detail of the torture. Having read Chaitali's cross examination, it seems 

to me that the conjugal life of Chaitali lasted for two months only from her marriage. No 

lady, especially in Indian society would, I think, leave her matrimonial home without any 

compelling circumstances. I have no doubt that some torture was perpetrated upon Chaitali. 

But the crucial question is not if any torture was perpetrated on Chaitali or not. It is, rather, 

what was the torture? Was it of the nature made punishable u/s 498A of IPC? 

11. Let me say at once that it is not every torture, which is punishable u/s 498A IPC. Only 

those tortures which push the bride in a state of depression, which compels the bride to think 

about terminating her life or in other words, it is the torture, which pulls the bride towards 

suicidal tendency making an impression on her mind that she could not escape the situation 

except her death. If such torture poses any serious threat to her life or limb, such torture 

would also become punishable u/s 498A of IPC. Any other torture, which fall short of 

aforesaid category would, I think, be out of the scope of S.498A of IPC. It would, therefore, 

not be sufficient that a bride felt certain words or act hurting; it must really be hurting 



enough to push the bride in a state of depression and suicidal thought and the same must be 

placed for judicial scrutiny. [See, explanation of S.498A IPC, S. Hanumantha Rao v. S. 

Ramani AIR 1999 SC 1318, AIR 2000 SC 3559, Girdhar Shankar Tawade v. State of 

Maharashtra AIR 2002 SC 2078]. 

12. Returning back to this case, the nature of torture on Chaitali is impossible to trace out 

from the evidence. None of the witnesses gave any detailed account of the torture. Having 

read the entire evidence, I could not infer the nature and extent of the torture perpetrated on 

Chaitali. Having come across with such situation, I think, it would be very unjust to hold the 

accuseds guilty u/s 498A of IPC, even though I have no doubt that some torture had been 

perpetrated on Chaitali; but I am not sure, if such torture was objectively sufficient to push 

Chaitali to suicidal thoughts. I would, therefore, hold that the prosecution could not prove 

the accuseds guilty u/s 498A of IPC beyond reasonable doubts. 

13. I would, now, proceed to determine this case from the angle of dowry demand or in 

other words from the angle of S. 3 & 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. So far as the evidence 

on the issue of dowry demand is concerned, all the three witnesses are unanimous about the 

demand of bike by Santanu and for not meeting with this demand about the torture upon 

Chaitali, though the nature of torture was not said by any of them. It is important to read 

the description about the demand given by Chaitali. “Initially, my matrimonial relatives”, 

Chaitali said, “behaved well, but since one month of marriage they started torturing me. 

Mother-in-law Kamala Banerjee, father-in-law Atul Banerjee, husband Santanu Banerjee 

and sister-in-law’s husband Baddhadeb Mukherjee used to assault me. They used to assault 

me for demand of a bike and further money”. Then she continued, “My father in poor 

person. So my father could not give the dowry as demanded.” I see no reason to disbelieve 

Chaitali. It is important to notice that Chaitali did not speak anything against her sister-inlaw 

but she spoke out against her sister-in-law’s husband. Why? If she wanted to falsely 

implicate her matrimonial relatives in false allegations, she could very well speak against 

her sister-in-law also. But she did not. Let me say that there is no law which directs a Judge 

to doubt a witness from the very beginning raising eyebrow on its evidence. It directs rather 

to believe it unless there is some circumstances or unless some material discrepancy in the 

evidence dictates the conscience of a Judge to doubt the evidence of a witness. [see, Kartik 

Malbar v. State of Bihar, 1995 (3) All India Crl. Law Reporter, Page 622; Pandurang 

Sitaram Bhagwat v State of Maharastra 2005 (1) RCR (criminal) 858; Bharwada 

Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v State of Gujrat AIR 1983 SC 753]. I would not hesitate to make it 

clear that I did not find any material discrepancy, on the issue of this demand of bike as 

additional dowry, in the entire evidences of either Chaitali or her parents. They are rather 

corroborative with each other and are free from any significant discrepancy. I had been 

referred to the fact that Nimai & Lila are the parents of Chaitali. Referring this Ld. defence 

counsel tried to advance an argument that these two witnesses are interested witness. This 

argument did not appeal to me in the least even. Let me say that a witness could not be 

marked with the blame of partisan witness simply because he or she happens to be a relative 

of the victim. The only circumstance where, a witness could be marked as partisan witness, 

is the circumstance where the defence successfully established such animosity of the 

witness with accuseds that the witness wants to secure conviction of the accuseds at any 

cost. [see, Alamgir v. State(NCT, Delhi) 2003 (1) SCC 21, Rameshwar v. State of 

Rajasthan AIR 1952 SC 54]. I have no doubt that such animosity has not been established 

in this case. Rather no story or plea of animosity of the accuseds with any of the witnesses 

were taken by the defence. I would, therefore, dismiss the argument of partisan witness 



aised by Ld. defence counsel. 

14. After this, what was the argument of Ld. Defence counsel? Only this, that there is no 

instance of convicting a person in a case where only three witnesses were examined. This 

argument also not appeal to me in the least. Simply because there is no previous instance of 

convicting a guilty man on the basis of evidence of three witnesses, it would not be just to 

let a guilty man escape, when the witnesses found to be otherwise trustworthy. Let me say at 

once that the Court should concern with the quality of evidence and not with the quantity of 

it. If we, the Judges, never do anything which has not been done before, we shall never get 

anywhere. If a Court is to go by with the previous instances only, and to fold its hands in the 

absence of any previous instance, then the law would stand still, while rest of the world goes 

on, and that would be bad for both. There would hardly remain any scope of having a 

previous instance, if no Court does a new. Nevertheless, there are instances of convicting an 

accused on the basis of evidence of a sole witness. [see, Kartik Malbar v. State of Bihar, 

1995 (3) All India Crl. Law Reporter, Page 622]. 

15. However, having read the entire evidence of these three witnesses, if I reconstruct the 

scene, it would be like the following: 

After marriage Chaitali was treated normally till one month of marriage. After that Santanu 

started insisting Chaitali for having one bike for him and asked her to bring it from her 

father. A few days after it, he started creating pressure on Chaitali for the demanded bike. 

Finally, he demanded either bike or ₹70,000/- for purchasing it. He then started torturing 

Chaitali to create pressure on her, so that Chaitali’s parents meet with his demand. Kamala, 

Atul and Buddhadeb joined Santanu in mounting such pressure and they all started 

assaulting Chaitali in connection with that demand of dowry. Finally, the situation became 

so much deplorable that the conjugal life of Chaitali came to an end within two months of 

her marriage and she had to be brought back to her paternal home. 

16. I have no doubt that the demand of the bike was in connection with or in reference to 

Chaitali’s marriage and it does amounts to dowry demand. I am also sure that the act of 

Kamala, Atul and Buddhadeb, as aforesaid, really does amount to abetting Santanu, who 

demanded the Bike. But, still my conscience made me think more about this case. The more 

I thought about this case, the more complex legal questions do I find it involving: was this 

much evidence sufficient for criminalizing a person? Or, more stringent proof is necessary? 

17. I find it extremely difficult to answer. On one hand the question of interfering with the 

liberty of a person, the right u/art 21 of the Constitution, is concerned; whilst, on the other 

hand the demand of dowry normally happens inside four walls of a matrimonial home for 

which the direct evidence of it is extremely hard to get. Therefore, to find its answer, I think, 

it is legitimate to explore the development of anti-dowry law. 

18. Under the old law as it existed until 60 years ago, the bride had no right of protest. She 

was treated more like a muted slave of her husband than anything else. The husband and its 

relatives could extort as much dowry, as they wish, from her parents. The law did not say 

them nay. It encouraged them rather. [see, Manu, Book (XI), Verse 118; Manu (IX, 194); 

Mandal 10, Sukta 85, verses 9 and 11 of Rig Veda (Wilson’s Rig Veda, Vol. VI, page 220- 

224); Churaman Sahu & anr v. Gopi Sahu & Ors. 1 Indian Cases 945]. If her parents 

fail to meet with their demands, they could torture her as much as they wants. The criminal 

law, even, did not say them nay. 

19. But the law was not standing still. Soon after independence, the legislators realized the 

necessity to stop this evil, the disgusting practice of dowry. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 



1961 was enacted. The husband could no more legally extort dowry. The bride now has an 

equal right of protest against this evil, as any other human being have. But the law was not 

proved to be effective. The disgusting practice still continued to go on, but inside four walls. 

This made the condition of brides much more deplorable. They were then started to be 

tortured inside four walls of their matrimonial home for this dowry demand and this went on 

for a decade without any criminal remedy. Finally, our Penal Code was amended in 1983 

making certain types of bridal torture for dowry demand punishable u/s 498A. But the rate 

of ‘bridal torture’ and ‘bride burning’ could not be controlled. Ultimately, the legislators 

discovered that the reason of this situation was not any shortcoming of the anti-dowry laws, 

but the protective principle of Criminal Justice System called ‘benefit of doubt’. The 

legislators soon after this enacted the Act 43 of 1986. By S.10 of it IPC was again amended 

inserting S. 304B for dowry death with a legal presumption against the accused. By the 

same Act, Section-8A was inserted in the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. I would read the 

section in full: 

“Where any person is prosecuted for taking or abetting the taking of any dowry under 

section 3, or for demanding of dowry under Section 4, the burden of proving that he 

had not committed an offence under those sections shall be on him. 

20. Having read this with reference to the mischief aforesaid, for suppression of which this 

section was enacted and keeping in mind the dictum of US Supreme Court [see, re Winship 

397 U.S. 358 (1970)], I think, the section really does reverse the burden of proof on the 

suspect’s shoulder provided that the prosecution discharged its initial burden by proving the 

basic elements of the crime or by establishing the basic facts highly probable. Then, it 

would be the suspect who is to prove that he is not guilty. [see, Pawan Kumar & ors. v. 

State of Haryana (1998) 3 SCC 309]. Now, returning back to this case, I think, the 

evidence on record, which I already discussed, is more than sufficient to discharge the initial 

burden of prosecution and to shift the burden, u/s 8A of D. P. Act, on accuseds. I do not say 

that for this the accused is to produce witnesses in the witness-box. He could discharge his 

burden of proving that he is not guilty under D. P. Act, by preponderance of probability rule, 

through cross examination also. But, in this case, I am sorry to say, the accuseds were over 

confident. They neither produce any witness; nor, they bother to discharge their burden 

through cross examination. They did not ask a single question even to any of the witnesses 

touching the evidences, about the crime u/s 4 of D. P. Act, given against them. They did not 

even care to explain, at least while their 313 Cr.P.C. examination. Such being the situation, I 

must, in the end of the day, hold Santanu Banerjee, the accused no.1, guilty of committing 

crime u/s 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 for the reasons aforesaid, especially those I 

discussed in para-13 to 16 and 19 to 20. I have no doubt that Kamala, Atul and Buddhadeb, 

all these three accuseds had abetted such demand of dowry by joining with Santanu in 

creating pressure upon Chaitali, but, I cannot convict them because of a shortcoming of the 

Dowry Prohibition Act, which this case has pointed out very clearly. Unlike S.3 of D. P. Act, 

S.4 of it does not cover the act of abetting the dowry demand. Most surprisingly the phrase 

‘or abets’ is absent in S.4 unlike S.3 where it occurs. This leads to an abnormal situation 

where the abettors, who abets the demand of dowry could escape the punishment until the 

demanded dowry is paid. No doubt, S. 109 IPC could be bridge the gap to some extent, but 

in that case the ‘reverse burden’ benefit of S.8A would not be available against the abettors. 

This, I think, is a shortcoming of the D. P. Act in its fight against the evil of dowry. 

Nevertheless, it is for the legislators to make the necessary amendments and not the job of 



judiciary. In the end, I have to acquit Kamala, Atul and Buddhadeb for the shortcoming 

aforesaid, but I would, as I already said, hold Santanu guilty u/s 4 of D. P. Act. 

Non-examination of I/O, if fatal for this action? 

21. It is true that the I/O has not been examined in this case. I must, at the end of the day, 

determine its effect on this case. Let me say at once that the non-examination of I/O, no 

doubt, is a serious fault on the part of the prosecution, but for this fault the prosecution case 

may not fail always. It would not, I think, be correct to contend that if the Investigating 

Officer is not examined the entire case would fail on the ground that the accused was 

deprived of the opportunity to effectively cross-examine the witnesses and bring out 

contradictions. The case of prejudice likely to be suffered depends upon the facts of each 

case and no universal strait-jacket formula could, I think, be laid down that non-examination 

of Investigating Officer per se vitiate a criminal trial. [see, Behari Prasad v. State of Bihar 

AIR 1996 SC 2905]. The effect of non-examination of Investigating Officer has been 

considered by our Supreme Court in a series of cases. One of such case is Ram Dev v. State 

of U.P. 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 547. In this case it was held that it is always desirable for the 

prosecution to examine the Investigating Officer. However, non-examination of the 

Investigating Officer not in any way create any dent in the prosecution case much less affect 

the credibility of otherwise trustworthy testimony of the eye witnesses. 

25. This view was approved in Ambika Prasad v. State (Delhi Admn.) AIR 2000 SC 718, 

where it was held that the criminal trial is meant for doing justice, not just to the accused but 

also to the victim and the society so that law and order is maintained. A Judge, as held in 

this case, does not preside over the criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is 

punished. A Judge presides over criminal trial also to see that guilty man does not escape. 

Both are public duties which the judges have to perform. It was unfortunate that the 

Investigating Officer had not stepped into the witness box without any justifiable ground. 

But this conduct of the Investigating Officer could not be a ground for discarding the 

evidence of other witnesses whose credibility was established beyond any reasonable doubt. 

22. This issue was again considered in Bahadur Naik v. State of Bihar 2000 Cri.L.J. 2466, 

where it was held that non-examination of an Investigating Officer is of no consequences 

when it could not be shown as to what prejudice had been caused to the appellant by such 

non-examination. 

23. So, the principle is well established. Let me say, all that the examination of I/O could 

serve is that he could give evidence about the P/O and its surroundings and the defence 

could get an opportunity to contradict the evidences of witnesses with their earlier 

statements which they made u/s 161 Cr.P.C. In this case, I do not think that the I/O could 

give any better description of the P/O, which is the matrimonial home of Chaitali, than what 

is given by Chaitali and her parents (PW-1 &2). It was the place where Chaitali endured the 

mental coercion in connection with the additional dowry demand, the bike, and, therefore, 

was present at P/O from beginning to the end of the entire drama. The I/O, no doubt, 

reached there much later when the entire drama of dowry demand was over. One must not, I 

think, overlook the fact that this case is not a case involving any normal crime, but a 

matrimonial crime. All the three witnesses aforesaid has already given believable evidence 

and described the P/O with sufficient certainty. I would, therefore, hold that the Defence 

party did not suffer any prejudice on this account of P/O. I would have held that the 

accuseds had been prejudiced to some extent, if anything had been recovered in this case u/s 

27 Evidence Act. But the circumstances of this case does not admit any such scope of 



ecovery. So far as the question of opportunity to contradict the witnesses with their earlier 

statements recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. is concerned, I do not think the accuseds had been 

prejudiced on this score in any manner whatsoever. So far as the scope of contradicting 

Chaitali or her parents with their statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. is concerned, I had, as a 

precaution, gone through the 161 statements of the witnesses of this case. But, interestingly, 

I find no significant discrepancy in their evidence with their earlier statements recorded u/s 

161 Cr.P.C. The failure of the I/O of this case to step into witness box is, no doubt, a fault 

on his part. But for this derelictions of duty by the I/O, I think, it would not be proper to 

acquit Santanu when Chaitali, Nimai and Lila gave otherwise believable evidence 

establishing him guilty. [see, Karnel Singh v. State of MP (1995) 5 SCC 518; see also, 

Alamgir v. State(NCT, Delhi) 2003 (1) SCC 21]. The Judgements of the Supreme Court to 

which I particularly desire to refer in support of my above decision are Ram Bihari Yadav 

v. State of Bihar [(1998) 4 SCC 517] and Paras Yadav and others v. State of Bihar 

[(1999) 2 SCC 126]. In the former this was held: 

“In such cases, the story of the prosecution will have to be examined ‘dehors’ such 

omissions and contaminated conduct of the officials otherwise the mischief which was 

deliberately done would be perpetuated and justice would be denied to the complainant 

party and this would obviously shake the confidence of the people not merely in the lawenforcing 

agency but also in the administration of justice.” 

While in the later this was held: “It may be that such lapse is committed designedly or 

because of negligence. Hence the prosecution evidence is required to be examined ‘dehors’ 

such omissions to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not.” 

24. So, the position of law is clear. No one would even dare to throw any doubt on it. To my 

mind, as a final conclusion of all that I have said, the accused persons, has not been 

prejudiced in any manner due to non-examination of the I/O. 

25. Coming now to the charge u/s 3 of D. P Act, I could not, after reading the entire 

evidence, especially Chaitali’s evidence, get sure if the gifts given at the time of marriage 

were simple nuptial gifts, which are permissible under section 3(2) of D. P Act or were 

dowries. I would, therefore, not spend much words for the charge under that section and 

would acquit the accuseds from this charge, for benefit of doubt, since the basic facts for the 

crime u/s 3 of D.P. Act were not established with high probability so as to invite the 

application of S. 8A of the Act. 

26. Hence, as a final decision, I do hereby 

O R D E R 

that, the accused persons above named were not proved guilty of committing crime u/s 

498A of IPC, and therefore, I do hereby acquit them all from the charge u/s 498A of IPC. 

None of them were proved guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of committing crime u/s 3 of 

Dowry Prohibition Act also, and hence, I do hereby acquit them all from the said charge. 

Santanu Banerjee, the accused no.1, proved guilty of committing crime u/s 4 of Dowry 

Prohibition Act, 1961, and hence, I do hereby convict him u/s 4 of the said Act. I do hereby 

cancel his bail bond and take him in judicial custody. 

Kamala Banerjee, Atul Banerjee and Buddhadeb Mukherjee were not proved guilty u/s 4 of 

D. P. Act, since their proved actus reus are not covered by the said provision, and hence, I 

do hereby acquit them of the charge u/s 4 of D. P. Act. I do hereby discharge their sureties, 

and set them at liberty. 



Let the seized alamats, if any, be returned to the persons entitled thereto after expiry of the 

appeal period. 

Nevertheless, hearing Santanu, the convict, on the point of sentence is necessary. Hence, I 

do hereby defer the pronouncement of sentence for the next two hours. 

(Sk. Md. Arif Hasan) 

Judicial Magistrate of 1 st Class, 

5 th Court, Bankura. 

Later: 

Santanu, the convict, was produced from J/C. 

Ld. App and Ld. Defence Counsel both were present. 

Hd. both the counsels as well as Santanu, the Convict, on sentence issue. Considered. 

I had been requested for invoking Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 for Santanu, the 

convict. So far as the issue of punishment is concerned, Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 

has always been my first choice. Had the proved crime not been the disgusting social evil 

called dowry demand, I would have invoked the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 for 

Santanu, the convict. It is the evil, which had took lives of uncountable numbers of brides in 

India. The bride burning cases are scaling new peaks day after day. The situation became so 

worse that no father of any prospective bride could think that his daughter would be safe in 

her matrimonial home. This is not because of any shortcoming of the statute, but for the 

liberal attitude towards the convicts and because of this, I think, the law is failing to create 

required deterrence in the society. In case of matrimonial crime like dowry demand, I do not 

think that the convict deserves any second chance. Such crimes are, I do not think, 

committed because of any psychological disorder so as to necessitate any reform, but due to 

this baseless and greedy societal attitude: the grooms (male) are superior than, the brides 

(female). This evil, I think, cannot be eradicated from the society, unless the judiciary come 

down heavily without any sympathy towards the convicts and punish them without any 

sympathetic leniency. I would, therefore, not invoke the noble statue called Probation of 

Offenders Act, 1958 for Santanu, the convict. 

Coming now to the task of assessing sentence which Santanu, the convict, deserves, I think, 

the passion to gain something without labour and free of cost is a basic human psychology 

build-in with the subconscious mind of every human being and is one of their basic instinct. 

It is the self-restraint, and only the self-restraint which restricts the human beings from 

indulging in any criminal activity. Those, whose self-restraint fails to overpower their basic 

wild instincts, indulges themselves in criminal activity for satisfying their immoral or illegal 

desires without caring for anyone else’s right or liberty. But this rule, I think, is not 

applicable for all crime situations. Take a hypothetical situation for example: Suppose the 

situation of a poor father, who begs on the street, and his son, who immediately needs 

medicine, is dying. He rushes to the medicine stores, but the medicine’s price was beyond 

his financial capacity and none of the pharmacists agreed to give him medicine on credit. 

Now, if he snatches the required medicine from any of the pharmacist and run, he is, I 

should have thought, guilty of theft, even though he intended to save his son’s life. But, at 

the end of the day, when I would assess for his punishment, I would – definitely would - 

take a very lenient view, for I would think him to have done the crime in a compelling 

situation. Well, in this case, I cannot believe that Santanu, the convict, to have committed 

the crime of dowry demand in any compelling situation. At least, he could not bring 



anything or give any explanation, suggesting such compelling situation. How could he? I do 

not think any compelling situation could exist for making a dowry demand, the disgusting 

evil practice. Santanu, the convict, have done wrong – very wrong – in demanding the bike, 

the additional dowry, mounting pressure on Chaitali. I have no doubt that he is a man of 

weak self-restraint. What he did was a deliberate interference with the course of law – the 

Dowry Prohibition Act, - the law which trying hard since last 50 years to vanish the evil 

called dowry from this land. It is, I think, necessary for the Judiciary to show – to show all 

the husbands everywhere and their relatives – that this kind of thing cannot be tolerated. Let 

the husbands gain, if they want, in the way they pleases. Let them acquire a bike or a car, if 

they are so passionate for it. But they must acquire it by lawful means and not by unlawful. 

They must acquire it of their own earning and not by extorting dowry mounting pressure on 

their helpless brides. If they demand or extort, they strike at the very course of law – the 

anti-dowry law, and if they strike at the course of the laws of this land, they strike at the 

roots of society itself, and they bring down that which protects them. It is only their wives 

for which they are privileged to be husbands. But, if they demand dowry, or torture their 

wives for it, be physically or emotionally, - and I speak for the entire India – they will not be 

excused. 

But now what is to be done? He already had suffered. He has been attending this court since 

August, 2009 – day after day – and, had to see his old father in prison (pre-trial), and all this 

for his fault only - what an emotionally disastrous situation for a son. This, I think, is the 

mitigating factor in his favour, though the only one, yet a strong one. Well, at the end of the 

day, I have to balance this mitigating factor with the aggravating factors aforesaid, the social 

need for deterrence and necessity to eradicate this disgusting evil practice called Dowry, the 

evil which took the lives of so many brides in India. Before that, I think, it would be proper 

to read the penal section once again, under which I found Santanu, the convict, guilty. I 

would read the Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, as it stands after Act 63 of 1984, 

deleting the words not necessary in the context right now I am dealing with: 

“If any person demands ……….. any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a 

term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with 

fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees: 

Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the 

judgement, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.” 

So, in general, the minimum sentence is of six months, but I could, in any particular case, 

impose sentence of imprisonment below six months, of course for special and adequate 

reasons. The mitigating factor, to which I have referred to above, does not appeal me to be 

such a special factor which demands any reduction of the minimum prescribed punishment 

invoking proviso of the section aforesaid, even though the same is a strong one. Having 

balanced every realistic factors, and considering the need of ‘dowry free India’, I think, 

Santanu Banerjee, the convict should be punished with the minimum prescribed term i.e six 

months imprisonment u/s 4 of D. P. Act. Since, imposition of fine is mandatory, I think, the 

just amount of fine would be ₹7,000/-, the one tenth of the money demanded from Chaitali’s 

parents as an alternative of the demanded Bike. Having considered the mental pressure, 

which Chaitali, the victim, had suffered, for the dowry demand, in Santanu’s home, the 

place which was absolutely new for her – a place surrounded by persons whom she was 

acquainted for two months only, I would award her the entire fine amount as compensation. 

Before parting with this case, I must say that a copy of this judgement, I think, should be 



supplied to Nimai Ghosal, the defacto-complainant also u/s 363 (5), proviso of Cr.P.C in 

addition to supply of the same to Santanu Banarjee, the convict. I would give two reasons 

for this. 1 st , his daughter has been awarded with compensation in this Judgement, the 

reasons of which, I think, she should know. 2 nd , every defacto-complainant has, I think, a 

right to know the fate of his complaint and the reason of such fate. 

In the end, as a conclusion of my decision, I do hereby, 

O R D E R 

that, I do hereby sentence Santanu Banerjee, the convict, to serve simple imprisonment for a 

term of six (6) months in Correctional Home. He shall also pay fine @ ₹7,000/-. He shall 

suffer both these punishments for his crime u/s 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 

I do further order that the entire fine amount, as aforesaid, after its recovery or payment by 

the convict, as the case may be, shall be disbursed to Chaitali Banerjee, the victim, as 

compensation. If Santanu Banerjee, the convict, fails to pay the fine aforesaid within 15 

days henceforth, it shall be recovered as per S. 421 Cr.P.C. State of West Bengal is directed 

to take necessary steps in this regard. 

Inform the State of West Bengal through the Collector, Bankura. Inform Chaitali Banerjee, 

the victim, also. 

Let Santanu Banerjee, the convict, be supplied, at once, with a copy of this Judgement free 

of cost. 

Let Nimai Ghosal, the defacto-complainant, be supplied with another copy of this 

Judgement u/s 363 (5), Proviso of Cr.P.C. 

Let the seized alamats, if any, be returned to the person entitled thereto after expiry of the 

appeal period. 

The case is thus disposed of on contest. 

Note in concern registers. 

(Sk. Md. Arif Hasan) 

Judicial Magistrate of 1 st Class, 

5 th Court, Bankura.

Dowry Demand Case's Judgement

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