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August 2009 - The Police Association Victoria

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12<br />

Black Saturday<br />

Who was in charge?<br />

On Black Saturday <strong>2009</strong>, more than 100,000 emergency services staff and volunteers<br />

stood ready to defend the community against Australia’s worst recorded natural disaster.<br />

<strong>The</strong> frightening picture emerging<br />

from the Royal Commission is<br />

that there was no particular<br />

individual in charge.<br />

<strong>The</strong> question about whether<br />

the role of the Country Fire<br />

Authority’s Chief Fire Officer was<br />

to “co-ordinate” or take the lead in<br />

relation to fire warnings on the day<br />

has been well debated in the media<br />

and the commission will make its<br />

finding in due course.<br />

But other submissions have raised<br />

questions about the role of <strong>Victoria</strong>n<br />

police on the day. <strong>The</strong> submission<br />

by Jonathan Beach QC, and others,<br />

on behalf of electricity distributor<br />

SP AusNet, accuses <strong>Victoria</strong> <strong>Police</strong><br />

of abandoning “their responsibility to<br />

warn the public” and of “abdicating<br />

or assigning to others” its statutory<br />

responsibility to monitor the<br />

timeliness of warnings to the public.<br />

SP AusNet said the <strong>Victoria</strong> <strong>Police</strong>’s<br />

failure to release any warnings to<br />

the communities around Kinglake<br />

and Kilmore was “a breach of the<br />

Emergency Management Manual<br />

<strong>Victoria</strong> and therefore a breach of the<br />

Emergency Management Act 1986”.<br />

<strong>The</strong> SP AusNet submission says<br />

the newly-formed Integrated<br />

Emergency Co-ordination Centre<br />

(IECC) was more like a co-location<br />

of the CFA and the Department<br />

of Sustainability on the day of the<br />

fires. But no-one was in charge of<br />

the IECC and there was no common<br />

integrated system between them,<br />

using common information. It was<br />

therefore “dysfunctional”.<br />

<strong>The</strong> submission says<br />

Superintendent Collins was in<br />

charge of the police-run State<br />

Emergency Response Co-ordination<br />

Centre (SERCC) but not in charge<br />

of the IECC. (Rod Collins is an<br />

experienced, professional and<br />

highly regarded police officer of<br />

more than 37 years experience).<br />

<strong>The</strong> IECC did not regard itself as<br />

responsible generally for the issue<br />

of warnings and did not monitor<br />

warnings. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Victoria</strong> <strong>Police</strong> told the<br />

Royal Commission (through Deputy<br />

Commissioner Kieran Walshe) that<br />

they did not regard themselves as the<br />

responsible entity for warnings and<br />

they were not asked to issue warnings.<br />

<strong>The</strong> SP AusNet submission refers<br />

to a guideline on the establishment<br />

of the IECC on a “trial” basis.<br />

Superintendent Collins gave evidence<br />

that one effect of the establishment<br />

of the IECC was to move the<br />

warnings function from police to the<br />

IECC. But the evidence revealed that<br />

the Emergency Management Manual<br />

<strong>Victoria</strong> was not changed and the<br />

IECC guideline was never authorized.<br />

SPAusnet said, “If the <strong>Police</strong> had<br />

abided by their responsibilities as<br />

recorded by the Manual they would<br />

have issued warnings according to the<br />

information the CFA had given them<br />

through Collins at the IECC and through<br />

information flowing from the Kilmore<br />

Incident Control Centre and the Kangaroo<br />

Ground Incident Control Centre. And they<br />

would have ensured that consideration<br />

was being given to alerting the public to<br />

existing and potential danger … either<br />

direct or through the media, and to<br />

the need for evacuation. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Victoria</strong>n<br />

<strong>Police</strong> did none of these things.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> submission says there was a<br />

way to address the dysfunctional<br />

communication between the CFA,<br />

the DSE and <strong>Victoria</strong> <strong>Police</strong>, but<br />

it was not used. SPAusNet said,<br />

“Relevant legislation permits a State<br />

of disaster to be declared. This would<br />

have simplified command lines and<br />

should have occurred on 7 February<br />

<strong>2009</strong>. No-one on 7 February <strong>2009</strong><br />

turned their mind to this.”<br />

It is clear, pursuant to Section 23<br />

of the Emergency Management Act<br />

1986, that the Minister and Chief<br />

Commissioner may advise the<br />

Premier, who may then declare a<br />

State of Disaster. What is not clear<br />

is whether or not the Premier was<br />

advised by either that the situation<br />

on ‘Black Saturday’ was one which<br />

“…constitutes or is likely to constitute a<br />

significant and widespread danger to<br />

life or property in <strong>Victoria</strong>.” (Sec.23[1])<br />

Was he so advised and, if not,<br />

why not? If he was advised, why<br />

was there not a State of Disaster<br />

declared? Wide powers over all<br />

government agencies are conferred<br />

upon the Chief Commissioner once<br />

Sergeant Jon Ellks in Kinglake.<br />

<strong>August</strong> <strong>2009</strong> <strong>The</strong> <strong>Police</strong> <strong>Association</strong> Journal<br />

www.tpav.org.au

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