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• 4 • Information and liaison bulletin n° 261 • December 2006 states that Turkey, on the orders of the then Prime Minister, Turgut Ozal, had rejected this offer. The former ambassador added, however, that the document undoubtedly referred to another Turco-Iraqi security agreement, signed early in the 80s, authorising both countries to cross their common border in pursuit of Kurdish fighters. In the course of this hearing, the Iraqi Public Prosecutor, Munkith al-Farun, had exhibited documents from the General Staff, dated April 1988, ordering the destruction of “the saboteurs’ bases” by air and artillery bombardment using “the special weapon”, a reference to the use of chemical weapons. The Prosecutor had ordered, on four occasions, that the microphones be switched off so as the continue, in camera, discussion of the documents regarding “Iraq- Turkish relations” at the time and then showed the court a memo ordering Iraqi officers to “cooperate with the Turkish party, in accordance with the terms of a protocol of cooperation providing for the turning back of Kurdish refugees”. A letter dated 28 April 1988 demanding “the destruction of all the houses” of a village and concluded with “inform the President, may God bless him,” was also presented. Another document, from then Chief of the General Staff Nazar Abdel Kareem and dated 21 August of the same year, ordered “deal with the populations with strikes using the special weapon so as to create panic” and expressing the hope of “the total destruction of the Northern zone (…) before the possibility of a fresh conflict with Iran”. Finally a circular dated April 1988 ordered the Iraqi forces “to use the special ammunition against the enemy forces for as long as possible and to strike the saboteurs’ bases as hard as necessary”. This letter is “initialled by a signature that we believe is that of Saddam Hussein”, according to the Prosecutor. “This is the first time in history that an army has used chemicals against its own people”, he concluded. THE BAKER-HAMILTON REPORT ON IRAQ: REJECTED BY BOTH THE KURDS AND THE SHIITES A long expected report, the fruit of eight months work by the Iraq Study Group (ISG), on the United States’ strategy in Iraq recommends a gradual disengagement, the US Army having, henceforth, to focus its mission on training, equipping and supporting the Iraqi forces rather than on fighting. The commission, co-chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Democrat Congressman Lee Hamilton, thus published its report on 6 December without proposing either a precipitous retreat or a limitless deployment. “The military priorities must change”. The independent commission, composed of five Republicans and five Democrats opt rather for “completing the mission of training and equipping” before the end of March 2008. To this end it calls for increasing the number of US troops allocated to training Iraqi troops from the present 3-4,000 to a final figure of10-20,000, this increase coming from units already in Iraq. On the other hand it suggests that Washington reduce its “political, military and economic support” for Iraq if the Baghdad government fails to show substantial progress in the area of security. During a Press Conference, Mr. Baker considered that there was no “magic formula” for resolving the crisis in Iraq. “A slide to chaos could bring about the collapse of the Iraqi government and a humanitarian crisis. Neighbouring countries might intervene”, according to the report. “Clashes between Sunnis and Shiites could spread and Al-Qaida could win a propaganda victory and broaden its operational base”, warned the Commission. At regional level, it recommended a diplomatic offensive, and, above all, directs discussions with Teheran and Damascus “to try and secure their commitment to conducting constructive policies towards Iraq and other regional problems”. It recommends “dissuasive” and “incentive” measures. The day after the publication of the report, US President George W. Bush recognised the necessity for a “new approach” during a discussion with British Prime Minister Tony Blair aimed at reviewing the different strategies open to them. Following a discussion with Tony Blair, he admitted that the situation in the country was “bad”. Moreover, the reactions to this report and to its recommendations only served to underline the sectarian divisions of the new Iraq. Divergences centred on certain of the most sensitive themes in present day Iraq: national reconciliation, the sharing of the wealth in oil and the role of neighbouring countries in the efforts to extricate the country from the present chaos. The Kurds sharply criticised the report. “Unrealistic and
n° 261 • December 2006 Information and liaison bulletin • 5• unacceptable”, thundered Massud Barzani, President of Iraqi Kurdistan, in a communiqué published on 8 December, criticising the ISG report. “We will, in no circumstances, conform to this report”, insisted Mr. Barzani in a communiqué published 8 December. “Despite our gratitude to President George W. Bush and his Administration for having overthrown the old regime and for their efforts to build a new Iraq, we think that several of the recommendations of the Study Group are unrealistic and inappropriate”, he added. Mr. Barzani criticised the fact that the reports authors had never visited Kurdistan during the nine months they worked prior to drawing up the report. “The report contradicts what James Baker told us over the phone two days ago, assuring us that the special status of Kurdistan was taken into account”, the President of Kurdistan further stressed. The report suggests delaying the application of Article 140 of the Constitution, which envisages a referendum to decide the future of the oil-producing province of Kirkuk that the Kurds claim. “Any delay would have serious consequences and will not be accepted by the people of Kurdistan”, warned Mr. Barzani, rejecting the recommendations for sharing the revenues from oil discovered in Kurdistan. 'r. Barzani also protests against the return to office of ex-members of the Baath or that Iraq’s neighbours should have a say (in Iraq’s affairs). Similarly, on 10December, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani sharply rejected the report, considering that it “was an attack on Iraq’s sovereignty”. “The Hamilton-Baker report is unjust. It contains some dangerous articles that attack the sovereignty of Iraq and its Constitution. I reject it as a whole”, the Iraqi President stated, without beating about the bush, before journalists at his official residence. The Iraqi President showed particular hostility at several key points of the report. Thus he attacked the implied will to involve former Baathists in the political process in Iraq, “which is part of a long struggle of the Iraqi people against the dictatorship”, and the increase in the number of American advisors integrated into the Iraqi units. Mr. Talabani also criticised the recommendation, contained in the report, of threatening the withdrawal of aid in the event of lack of progress. “This amounts to treating Iraq like a new colony on which any conditions can be imposed, by denying the fact that we are a sovereign and respected country”, he considered. As for General Wafiq al-Samarrai, President Jalal Talabani’s adviser on security questions, he considered, when speaking in a broadcast on the Pan-Arab television channel Al-Jezeera, that the date of 2008, when the Iraqi Army could become totally autonomous, was realistic “and even earlier if suitable measures are taken meanwhile”. The Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Barham Saleh, considered, for his part, that the conclusions in the Iraq Study Group’s report, “were no surprise” and stressed that the Iraqis should assume responsibility for their own security. “The situation is serious, very serious in fact, and cannot be tolerated”, declared Barham Saleh on the Al- Arabiya satellite television channel. “Absolute dependence on foreign soldiers is not possible. The priority must be to strengthen the Iraqi security forces”. “In fact, the recommendations are, at least in principle, in accordance with an Iraqi national vision that hopes for the strengthening of Iraqi capacity, the handing over of security files to the Iraqis and respect for the will of the Iraqis”, added the Deputy Prime Minister. He pointed out, however, that “there could well be details about which our views diverge”. For Dr. Mahmud Othman, head of the Kurdish alliance in the Iraqi Parliament, Washington wants gradually to withdraw its support for the Iraqi government so as to put pressure on it to increase its efforts to dismantle the different militias and to fight against sectarian violence. “This is a twoedged weapon and could prove to be negative because, under the Geneva convention, the occupier is responsible for the country in all its aspects and they should be facing up to their responsibilities not abandoning them”, he had stated before the publication of the report. “On the other hand, this could make the Iraqi government face reality and the necessity of acting to stop this chaos”. Furthermore, Abdul-Aziz al- Hakim, head of the SCIRI (Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) and the principle Shiite political figure, judges that the report includes “inexact information based on dishonest sources”. He also rejected the connection made between Iraq and the settling of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Another Shiite leader considered that the Baker- Hamilton report’s conclusions were partial and biased in favour of the Sunni Arabs. “We are all in the same boat, we are not only fighting internal criminals but international terrorists. We need help for this”, was the view of Haidar al-Ibadi, a Member of Parliament from the Prime
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