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Revue <strong>de</strong> Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro <strong>de</strong> la Prensa-Baszn Ozeti<br />
litralb:;t;ëribunt<br />
December 9-10, 2006<br />
The Iraq report • By Kenneth M. Pollack<br />
Don't count on Ir~n<br />
WASHINGTON however, not to exaggerate Iran's influence.<br />
The problems in Iraq ;were not<br />
As anticipated, the Iraq Study<br />
Group has recommen<strong>de</strong>d that caused by the Iranians, nor can Iran<br />
the United States begin talks solve them a11.<br />
with Iran to solieit its assistance<br />
Most Iraqis dislike the Iranians. ln<br />
in stabilizing Iraq. This recom-<br />
fact, "dislike" is too mild a term. ln 2004<br />
men dation seems so sensible that the and early 2005,when it still seemed as if<br />
Bush administration's past reluctance the United States-led reconstruction of<br />
to fo11owit is hard to fathom. Still, administration<br />
Iraq might succeed, Shiite politicians<br />
officiaIs are right to were bending over backward to <strong>de</strong>mon-<br />
counter that talking to Iran is not a strate thàt they were in<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt of<br />
policy, let alone a solution to America's Iran for fear their constituents would<br />
problems in Iraq.<br />
not support them otherwise.<br />
The real questions are these: What do Furthermore, while Iranian support<br />
we Americans say to the Iranians if we<br />
can get them to the table? What can<br />
they do in Iraq? What would they be<br />
is no doubt gratefu11yreceived, the evi<strong>de</strong>nce<br />
suggests that it is now more a<br />
supplement than a necessity for the m~jor<br />
willing to do in Iraq? And what will they<br />
militias. At this point, the ma1!l<br />
want in return?<br />
Shiite groups - the Supreme Councd<br />
We should have engaged Iran in Iraq for the Islamie Revolution in Iraq, the<br />
years ago. Before and during the war in Mahdi Army, and the Fadhila Party<br />
Afghanistan, the Iranians were quite among others - have consi<strong>de</strong>rable suphelpful<br />
to the United States. They<br />
shared our hatred of Al ~eda and the<br />
Taliban, and they provi<strong>de</strong>d us with extensive<br />
assistance on intelligence, logistics,<br />
The limits on Iranian<br />
diplomacy and Afghan internaI influence in Iraq are a<br />
politics. After we turned our sights on<br />
Saddam Hussein, the Iranians suggested<br />
double-edged<br />
that they would be willing to co.<br />
operate on that too. Unfortunately, the<br />
sword.<br />
Bush administration <strong>de</strong>clined the offer,<br />
preferring to lump Tehran with Baghdad<br />
and Pyongyang in the "axis of port among the population and are accused<br />
evil,"<br />
of making enormous amounts of<br />
None of this should suggest that Iran<br />
was helping us for reasons other than<br />
blatant self-interest, or that it had sud<strong>de</strong>nly<br />
given up its antipathy toward us.<br />
money off oil smuggling and organized<br />
crime.<br />
So Tehran can influence the behavior<br />
of the Shiite groups, but it probably<br />
But it was <strong>de</strong>monstrating real pragmatism<br />
wou Id have a hard time forcing them to<br />
and being very helpful on issues of do things they do not want to do - like<br />
mutual concern, which should have disbanding their militias, accepting a<br />
been good enough.<br />
national reconciliation agreement, participating<br />
Today, large numbers ofIranian intelligence<br />
in an equitable oil-sharing<br />
agents have infiltrated Iraq, scheme or accepting any of the other<br />
where they seem to be providing major changes that the Bush administration<br />
money, weapons and other supplies to<br />
is seeking. If Iran were to<br />
virtually a11 of Iraq's Shiite militias. threaten to end its support for these<br />
There are reports that Hezbollah is groups, they would most likely tell<br />
training Iraqi Shiite militiamen in Lebanon<br />
Tehran to get lost. What's more, the Ira-<br />
at Iran's behest. And the Shiite nians seem to un<strong>de</strong>rstand this, having<br />
warlords all know that in an alI-out civil so far proven reluctant to try to force<br />
war, Iran would be their only backer. any of the Shiite groups to radica11y<br />
AlI of that gives the Iranians influence<br />
change course.<br />
over the Shiite militias - influ-<br />
The limits on Iranian influence are a<br />
ence that could be helpful to the United double-edged sword. They mean that<br />
States as it tries to forge a new strategy we cannot count on Iran to solve Iraq's<br />
toward Iraq. We should be careful, problems, but they also mean that we<br />
need not offer the Iranians the world in<br />
return for their assistance. Right now,<br />
Tehran and its bombastie presi<strong>de</strong>nt are<br />
riding high in the Middle East, and they<br />
will doubtless want something in return<br />
for helping America <strong>de</strong>al with Iraq.<br />
For instance, they may <strong>de</strong>mand that the<br />
United States drop its objections to<br />
their nuclear program or cave in to<br />
Hezbo11ah's <strong>de</strong>mands for a greater say<br />
inLebanon.<br />
Especia11y given the likely limits on<br />
what Iran can <strong>de</strong>liver in Iraq, these<br />
would not be prices worth paying. Instead,<br />
the United States should emphasize<br />
a shared interest in preventing<br />
Iraq's further implosion, as chaos there<br />
could easily spread to Iran - a danger<br />
most of Tehran's leaâers seem to appreciate.<br />
ln exchange for Iran's assistance,<br />
America should recognize Iran's legitimate<br />
interests in Iraq, keep it (gener-<br />
, ally) apprised of military operations,<br />
and possibly even <strong>de</strong>velop a liaison relationship<br />
with the Iranian military and<br />
intelligence serviees by whieh the two<br />
si<strong>de</strong>s could exchange limited information,<br />
thereby dampening Iranian fears<br />
of malign Ameriean intentions.<br />
Much of this could be accomplished<br />
by forming a standing contact group<br />
ma<strong>de</strong> up of Iraq's neighbors - similar<br />
to the international support group proposed<br />
by Baker-Hamilton. The Iraqi<br />
government and the coalition forces<br />
would regularly brief this group and<br />
seek its advice, whieh should be ignored<br />
only with good reason. ln return, the<br />
members of the contact group would<br />
commit to providing specific kinds of<br />
economie, political, diplomatie and<br />
even military support.<br />
There are at least three good reasons<br />
to try this approach. First, no neighboring<br />
state is likely to significantly alter<br />
strategy unless they all do. Second, U.S.<br />
efforts to work with Iran in Iraq cannot<br />
come at the expense of our traditional<br />
allies among the Sunni states ofthe region:<br />
Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and<br />
Turkey. Finally, the problems in Iraq<br />
have become so daunting and so intertwined<br />
that we need every ounce of<br />
help we can get.<br />
We can't simply expect Iran to save<br />
Iraq for us. We Americans need a new,<br />
feasible plan of our own. Only then will<br />
we know how best Iran can help, and<br />
what we are willing to pay for that help.<br />
Talking to Iran without such a plan<br />
would be fruitless, if not fo11y.<br />
Kenneth M. Pollack is the director of research<br />
at the Saban Center for Middle<br />
East policy at the Brookings <strong>Institut</strong>ion<br />
and the author of "The Persian Puzzle:<br />
The Confliet Between Iran and America.~:<br />
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