14.09.2014 Views

linked - Institut kurde de Paris

linked - Institut kurde de Paris

linked - Institut kurde de Paris

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Revue <strong>de</strong> Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro <strong>de</strong> la Prensa-Baszn Ozeti<br />

litralb:;t;ëribunt<br />

December 9-10, 2006<br />

The Iraq report • By Kenneth M. Pollack<br />

Don't count on Ir~n<br />

WASHINGTON however, not to exaggerate Iran's influence.<br />

The problems in Iraq ;were not<br />

As anticipated, the Iraq Study<br />

Group has recommen<strong>de</strong>d that caused by the Iranians, nor can Iran<br />

the United States begin talks solve them a11.<br />

with Iran to solieit its assistance<br />

Most Iraqis dislike the Iranians. ln<br />

in stabilizing Iraq. This recom-<br />

fact, "dislike" is too mild a term. ln 2004<br />

men dation seems so sensible that the and early 2005,when it still seemed as if<br />

Bush administration's past reluctance the United States-led reconstruction of<br />

to fo11owit is hard to fathom. Still, administration<br />

Iraq might succeed, Shiite politicians<br />

officiaIs are right to were bending over backward to <strong>de</strong>mon-<br />

counter that talking to Iran is not a strate thàt they were in<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt of<br />

policy, let alone a solution to America's Iran for fear their constituents would<br />

problems in Iraq.<br />

not support them otherwise.<br />

The real questions are these: What do Furthermore, while Iranian support<br />

we Americans say to the Iranians if we<br />

can get them to the table? What can<br />

they do in Iraq? What would they be<br />

is no doubt gratefu11yreceived, the evi<strong>de</strong>nce<br />

suggests that it is now more a<br />

supplement than a necessity for the m~jor<br />

willing to do in Iraq? And what will they<br />

militias. At this point, the ma1!l<br />

want in return?<br />

Shiite groups - the Supreme Councd<br />

We should have engaged Iran in Iraq for the Islamie Revolution in Iraq, the<br />

years ago. Before and during the war in Mahdi Army, and the Fadhila Party<br />

Afghanistan, the Iranians were quite among others - have consi<strong>de</strong>rable suphelpful<br />

to the United States. They<br />

shared our hatred of Al ~eda and the<br />

Taliban, and they provi<strong>de</strong>d us with extensive<br />

assistance on intelligence, logistics,<br />

The limits on Iranian<br />

diplomacy and Afghan internaI influence in Iraq are a<br />

politics. After we turned our sights on<br />

Saddam Hussein, the Iranians suggested<br />

double-edged<br />

that they would be willing to co.<br />

operate on that too. Unfortunately, the<br />

sword.<br />

Bush administration <strong>de</strong>clined the offer,<br />

preferring to lump Tehran with Baghdad<br />

and Pyongyang in the "axis of port among the population and are accused<br />

evil,"<br />

of making enormous amounts of<br />

None of this should suggest that Iran<br />

was helping us for reasons other than<br />

blatant self-interest, or that it had sud<strong>de</strong>nly<br />

given up its antipathy toward us.<br />

money off oil smuggling and organized<br />

crime.<br />

So Tehran can influence the behavior<br />

of the Shiite groups, but it probably<br />

But it was <strong>de</strong>monstrating real pragmatism<br />

wou Id have a hard time forcing them to<br />

and being very helpful on issues of do things they do not want to do - like<br />

mutual concern, which should have disbanding their militias, accepting a<br />

been good enough.<br />

national reconciliation agreement, participating<br />

Today, large numbers ofIranian intelligence<br />

in an equitable oil-sharing<br />

agents have infiltrated Iraq, scheme or accepting any of the other<br />

where they seem to be providing major changes that the Bush administration<br />

money, weapons and other supplies to<br />

is seeking. If Iran were to<br />

virtually a11 of Iraq's Shiite militias. threaten to end its support for these<br />

There are reports that Hezbollah is groups, they would most likely tell<br />

training Iraqi Shiite militiamen in Lebanon<br />

Tehran to get lost. What's more, the Ira-<br />

at Iran's behest. And the Shiite nians seem to un<strong>de</strong>rstand this, having<br />

warlords all know that in an alI-out civil so far proven reluctant to try to force<br />

war, Iran would be their only backer. any of the Shiite groups to radica11y<br />

AlI of that gives the Iranians influence<br />

change course.<br />

over the Shiite militias - influ-<br />

The limits on Iranian influence are a<br />

ence that could be helpful to the United double-edged sword. They mean that<br />

States as it tries to forge a new strategy we cannot count on Iran to solve Iraq's<br />

toward Iraq. We should be careful, problems, but they also mean that we<br />

need not offer the Iranians the world in<br />

return for their assistance. Right now,<br />

Tehran and its bombastie presi<strong>de</strong>nt are<br />

riding high in the Middle East, and they<br />

will doubtless want something in return<br />

for helping America <strong>de</strong>al with Iraq.<br />

For instance, they may <strong>de</strong>mand that the<br />

United States drop its objections to<br />

their nuclear program or cave in to<br />

Hezbo11ah's <strong>de</strong>mands for a greater say<br />

inLebanon.<br />

Especia11y given the likely limits on<br />

what Iran can <strong>de</strong>liver in Iraq, these<br />

would not be prices worth paying. Instead,<br />

the United States should emphasize<br />

a shared interest in preventing<br />

Iraq's further implosion, as chaos there<br />

could easily spread to Iran - a danger<br />

most of Tehran's leaâers seem to appreciate.<br />

ln exchange for Iran's assistance,<br />

America should recognize Iran's legitimate<br />

interests in Iraq, keep it (gener-<br />

, ally) apprised of military operations,<br />

and possibly even <strong>de</strong>velop a liaison relationship<br />

with the Iranian military and<br />

intelligence serviees by whieh the two<br />

si<strong>de</strong>s could exchange limited information,<br />

thereby dampening Iranian fears<br />

of malign Ameriean intentions.<br />

Much of this could be accomplished<br />

by forming a standing contact group<br />

ma<strong>de</strong> up of Iraq's neighbors - similar<br />

to the international support group proposed<br />

by Baker-Hamilton. The Iraqi<br />

government and the coalition forces<br />

would regularly brief this group and<br />

seek its advice, whieh should be ignored<br />

only with good reason. ln return, the<br />

members of the contact group would<br />

commit to providing specific kinds of<br />

economie, political, diplomatie and<br />

even military support.<br />

There are at least three good reasons<br />

to try this approach. First, no neighboring<br />

state is likely to significantly alter<br />

strategy unless they all do. Second, U.S.<br />

efforts to work with Iran in Iraq cannot<br />

come at the expense of our traditional<br />

allies among the Sunni states ofthe region:<br />

Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and<br />

Turkey. Finally, the problems in Iraq<br />

have become so daunting and so intertwined<br />

that we need every ounce of<br />

help we can get.<br />

We can't simply expect Iran to save<br />

Iraq for us. We Americans need a new,<br />

feasible plan of our own. Only then will<br />

we know how best Iran can help, and<br />

what we are willing to pay for that help.<br />

Talking to Iran without such a plan<br />

would be fruitless, if not fo11y.<br />

Kenneth M. Pollack is the director of research<br />

at the Saban Center for Middle<br />

East policy at the Brookings <strong>Institut</strong>ion<br />

and the author of "The Persian Puzzle:<br />

The Confliet Between Iran and America.~:<br />

33

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!