linked - Institut kurde de Paris

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Baszn Ozeti was driven past an area, a kind of compound where his black-c1adarmywas training for the upcoming revolution to seize power and take over. Itjust dawned on me that these people were going to make this place an authoritarian hell of a new sort, Thliban style, and would murder a lot of our allies in the process." Diamond went to Bremer and gave him his assessment: the United States urgently needed to act against Sadr. Bremer responded that he was waiting for a new plan from Coalition forces. "1 first wanted to go after him when he had probably fewer than 200 followers;' Bremer recalled in an interview with NEWSWEEK last week. "1 couldn't make it happen ... the Marines were resisting doing anything." But in the meantime, on March 28, 2004, Bremer suspended publication of Sadr's newspaper after it ran an editorial praising the 9/11 attacks on America as a "blessing fromGod:' The response was swift: mass demonstrations, which led to the first of two Sadr uprisings in 2004. ln a final meeting between Diamond and Bremer on April l, Diamond pressed the point that the United States needed more troops in Iraq. It was around 8 p.m., and Bremer's dinner was sitting on a tray uneaten. He looked exhausted. '~d he just didn't want to hear it," says Diamond. "ln retrospect, 1 think he had gone to the well on this issue of more troops during 2003, had gotten nowhere ... and had just resigned himself to the fact that these troops just weren't going to come. 1 think the tragedy is that everyone just gave up:' When fighting did break out, American forces hammered the Mahdi Army in Baghdad and Najaf-first in the spring and then again, after a broken ceasefire, in the late summer. Sorne of the worst fighting came in August, as Sadr's militiamen made their stand around the Imam Ali Shrine in Naja£ They turned the area into a no-go zone, sniping at any sign of movement. U.S.forces retaliated by laying waste to large swaths of central Naja£ ln the end, Ayatollah Sistani brought his influence to bear on the renegade cleric and encouraged a ceasefire. Attempts to enforce the arrest warrant against Sadr and severa!aides were dropped, and Sadr's forces disarmed in Najaf or headed out of town. They were badly bloodied, and sorne militants were shellshocked. Others bragged about how they had fought back tanks with AK-47s, or disabled Humvees with a single grenade. Scores of militiamen were dead, but Sadr's prestige was, if anything, enhanced: he had fought the mighty United States to a stalemate. GETTING SADR INSIDE THE TENT SADR NEEDED A NEW STRATEGY, HOWever. He wasn't strong enough to defeat the occupier head-on, nor could he eliminate his Iraqi rivals. So he took up what he calls GET OUT OF JAIL FREE Prime Minister Maliki (Ieft) has torced the U.S. military to remove roadblocks trom Sadr City's perimeter and to release detainees who were jailed in sweeps against death squads "political resistance"-working from within the system. Chalabi played an important role here. Washington's favorite lraqi had found that he had little popularity in his homeland, so he was seeking alliances. Chalabi also felt, as did many other lraqis and Americans, that it was better to bring Sadr inside the process than to have him trying to destroy it. "Sadr is respected because of his lineage and because he speaks for the disenfranchised, the scared and the angry:' says a Chalabi aide, who did not want to be named because of the sensitivity of the subject. "ln that sort of situation, it makes absolute sense to try to get him inside the system:' Sadr made the most of the opening. Politicians in rus Sadr bloc won 23 of 275 seats in the January 2005 elections and, after fresh voting nearly a year later, now hold 30 seats. ln both cases, because of divisions between other large Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni parties, Sadr was able to play kingmaker. 1\\'0 prime ministers since 2005- Ibrahim Jaafari and the current Iraqi leader, Nuri al- Maliki-have depended on his swing votes for their majority. But Sadr himself stayed out of government, and kept his distance. That way he could pursue a dual strategyrebuilding his militia even as he capitalized on his control of key ministries, like Health and 1hmsportation, to provide services to the poor and jobs ta his followers. The Sunni insurgents were pursuing a new strategy, too. ln early 2004, U.S. forces had intercepted a worried letter from the Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, to Osama bin Laden. Zarqawi fretted thathis fight against American forces was going poorly. But he had a plan: "If we succeed in dragging [the Shiites] into the arena of sectarian war, it will become possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent danger:' he wrote. Throughout 2005, Sunni insurgents launched increasingly vicious attacks on Shiite civilians and holy places. Sistani regularly called on his followers to exercise restraint, which they did with remarkable forbearance. But Sadr, who had long positioned himself as an Iraqi nationalist-and who had cooperated with Sunni fighters in the early stages of the insurgency-now publicly called for Sunnis to disavow Zarqawi. New battle lines were being drawn. The tuming point came on Feb. 22, 2006, when assailants bombed the goldendomed Askariya Shrine in Samarra. This was the burial place of the lOth and nth imams, and one of the holiest sites of the Shia faith. After the Samarra bombing, many Shiites felt compelled to lash back. Caught in a vicious street fight against Sunnis, they decided that they'd rather have a dirty brawler in their corner (like Sadr) than a gray-bearded holy man (like Sistani). "We have courage, large amounts of ammunition, good leaders, and it is a religious duty:' saysAli Mijbil, a 26-year-old mechanic who serves in the Mahdi Army. "So why don't we fight them? We've been kept under Sunni ~~rn)2Click on our map of casualties in Irallat xtra.Newsweek.com W 9
Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Basm Ozeti ___ 1".- _ JOli Ut .J rule for more than 14 centuries. It is the proper time to rule ourselves now." Sadr still insists his main fight is with foreign invaders. He's the one Shia leader who has opposed the US. occupation from the beginning, and who has continued to calIfor a strict timetable for American withdrawal. An overwhelming majority of Iraqis now agree with him. A September polI by WorldPublicOpinion.org found that 63 percent of 501 Iraqi Shiites surveyed supported attacks against Americans. Even in Baghdad, where ethnic tensions are worst, Shiites agree with Sunnis on one thing: the polI found that 80 percent of the capital's Shiites wanted U.S. forces to leave within a year. That number has changed dramatically in a matter of months. AJanuary poil found that most Shiites wanted US.-Ied troops to be reduced only "as the security situation improves." ln Washington, sorne politicians still talk about "victory:' while others aim only to stabilize the country and leave with sorne semblance of dignity. Many in the US. capital are dusting off yesterday's proposals for tomorrow's problems-more training, more troops, disarming the militias, more stability in Baghdad. The GOP presidential front runner for 2008, John McCain, would prefer to increase the number of US. troops in Iraq by 20,000, at least temporarily. He has also called for Sadr to be "taken out." But it may be too late. The rnovernent may now be more important than the man. Sadr "is faced with a cornmon problem," says Toby Dodge of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. "He can't control the use ofhis brand name, the use of his legitimacy:' Sorne eIder followers of Sadr's father have broken away, disillusioned with the son. And sorne young toughs seem to be freelancing where they canoRenegade factions could eventually threaten Sadr's power. If he were to fall, "you'll end up with 30 different movements:' says ValiNasr, a scholar and author who has briefed the Bush administration on Iraq. "There are 30 chieftains who have a tremendous amount of local power. If you remove hirn, there will be a scramble for who will inherit this movement ... It's a great danger doing that. You may actually make your life much more difficult." HOW THE MAHDI ARMYWORKS FOR NOW, SADR AND HIS MAHDI ARMY have the initiative. They can stir up trouble without much fear of retribution. A case in point: When kidnappers grabbed an Iraqi-American translator in Baghdad How He CaTIs the Shots With a growing private army and a pivotai group of parliamentary seats at his command, the radical Shiite c1eric Moqtada al-Sadr continues his rise as one of the country's most powerful figures. A look at his influence-and his competitors: UNITED IRAQI ALLIANCE The UIA, an alliance of conservative Shiite groups-including Sadr'sholds 128 parliamentary seats, slgnificantly more than any other bloc. The Supreme Couneil for Islamie Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) ISc10sely tled to-and reportedly tunded by-Iran The party of lraql Prime Mmister Mallkl, Dawa possesses no organized mllitia. It also has fewer eleries than SCIRI IRAOI PARUAMENT SEATS last month, US. soldiers sealed off the Sadr City neighborhood where they believed he was being held. But Prime Minister Maliki-who depends on Sadr for political support-quickly ordered the Americans to remove their roadblocks. Maliki has also forced the US. military to release men picked up during raids in Sadr City on suspicion of belonging to Shiite death squads. Though its Ideology IS close to that of the Sadnsts, Fadhila has ilS own agenda and has sometlmes elashed wlth Sadr's camp When the U.S. fails to respond to provocation, it loses credibility. And when it does respond, it can also lose. Last "'t'ck, before the massive car-bomb attacks, U.S. and Iraqi forces carried out a pinpnck raid in Sadr City to get intelligence on the kidnapped military translator, Ahmed Qusai al-Taayie. Like sa many othe!' US. military strikes in Iraq, however, it came at a price. American forces capturcd Sc\ en militia- 10
Page 1 and 2: KURDE INSTITUT DE PARIS Information
Page 3 and 4: Bulletin 261 (Dec. 06) Contents:
Page 5 and 6: n° 261 • December 2006 Informati
Page 21 and 22: Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhev
Page 27: Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhev
Page 79 and 80:
Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhev
Page 81 and 82:
Page 83 and 84:
Page 85 and 86:
Page 87 and 88:
Page 89 and 90:
Page 91 and 92:
Page 93 and 94:
Page 95 and 96:
show all

linked - Institut kurde de Paris

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?