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Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Basm Ozeti ably one of the most popular leaders in the country. He is also its most dangerous, for he has the means to wage pohtical or actual war against any solution that is not precisely to his liking. He is driven by forces America has long misread in Iraq: religious sentiment, economic resentment and enduring sectarian passions. And he is now a primary target of Sunni insurgents bent on provoking ali-out civil war. Last Thursday, Sunni militants carried out their deadliest attack since 2003. Multiple car bombs, accompanied by mortars, killed more than 200 people in Sadr City, a Shiite slum of 2 million people in Baghdad that is dominated by the Mahdi Army. Shiite forces responded immediately by firing mortars at a revered Sunni mosque in Baghdad, and by torching other holy places. Only the presence of US. troopsand a wide curfew over the city-prevented far bloodier revenge attacks. More than anyone, Sadr personifies the dilemma Washington faces: If Arnerican troops leave Iraq quicldy, militia leaders like Sadr will be unleashed as never before, and full-scale civil war could follow. But the longer the American occupation lasts, the less popular America gets-and the more popular Sadr and his ilk become. To many, Sadr's brand of Shiite politics-homegrown, populist and ruthlessseems a natural outgrowth of the min left in Saddam Hussein's wake, and a powerful part of what Iraq has become. The United Nations calculates that an unprecedented 3,709 Iraqi civilians were killed in October. Death squads connected to the Mahdi Army, as weil as to other Shia and Sunni groups, capture and execute civilians in cold bloOO,sometimes dragging Ùlem out of hospitals or govemment ministries. Corpses tum up on the street with acid burns on their backs, or electric-drill holes in their knees, stomachs and heads. Among ordinary Iraqis, the United Sl:
Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Bastn Ozeti over the keys to the tomb of Imam Ali, the Prophet Muhammad's son-in-law. A gilded cage surrounding the tomb contains a box for pilgrims' donations, a huge and vital source of income for religious leaders. As al-Khoei and a colleague visited the shrine on the morning of April 10, 2003, an angry mob attacked them with ,grenades, guns and swords. "Long live Moqtada al-Sadr!" the mob cried out. Al-Khoei was stabbed repeatedly, then tied up and dragged to the doorstep of Sadr's headquarters in Najaf, where he was still alive. A subsequent investigation by an Iraqi judge found that Sadr himself gave the order to finish him off: "Take him away and kill him in your own special way." Yet it wasn't clear at the time of the killing what Sadr's personal role was, and "we didn't want one of our first acts in country to be taking out one of the most popular leaders," says a U.S. military officer familiar with Army intelligence on Sadr. The officer, who did not want to be named discussing intelligence matters, says the Army was worried about provoking riots. When Sadr's father was killed in 1999, Saddam violently crushed protests by angry Shia mobs. "We thought that tens of thousands would take to the streets in Nasiriya, Karbala and Baghdad. It always cornes back to that-not enough guys on the ground." One courageous Iraqijudge, RaidJuhi, doggedly investigated the case. He exhumed the bodies of al-Khoei and his colleague, and wrote up a confidential arrest warrant for Sadr in August 2003. "From that moment through April 2004, the issue was whether we were going to enforce the arrest warrant," says Dan Senor, a senior official in the Coalition Provisional Authority at the time. The CPA, the Pentagon and the military on the ground were in disagreement. The Marines in southern Iraq were particularly wary of stirring up trouble. As it was, the United States was preparing to hand off the area around Najaf to a multinational force with troops from Spain and Central America. Still, the Coalition had a secret arrest plan, and momentum toward nabbing Sadr was building. "The pivotal moment was Aug. 19, 2003:' says Senor. "We were down to figuring out the mechanisms of ensuring that the operation was seen as Iraqi, executed on an Iraqi arrest warrant. 1 remember it was late afternoon and we had just received a snowflake from [US. Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld ... with nine different questions, rehashing how we were going to do this, to make sure it was TO BREAK A STALEMATE ln his search for allies, Chalabi (center) helped persuade Sadr to join the political system. Many argue that to do otherwise would disenfranchise a key bloc of poor Shia. not seen as an American operation." CA "snowflake" was a Rumsfeld memo.) Suddenly word came that insurgents had detonated a massive truck bomb at the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad. Senor recalls rushing to the scene with Hume Horan, a top US. diplomat and Arabist. Horan leaned over to Senor and said, "We should take down Sadr now, when no one's looking." But there was enough chaos to deal with already. The UN. bombing was "a huge distraction;' says Senor, "and the Sadr operation was forgotten." TAKING ON IRAQ'S NEWTALIBAN THE U.S. INVASION HAD DESTROYED AN economy already crippled by years of international sanctions. Countless young men were unemployed, invigorated by the atmosphere of violent change but also poor and fearful. They wanted to be part of the new order-whatever it would be. The country was also awash in guns and other weapons, induding those looted from Saddam's vast and unsecured arms depots. The Sadrist network was perfectly positioned to capitalize on the situation. Sadr himself was determined to lead a national movement-using a potent mixture of antioccupation militancy and rnillennial preaching about the coming of the mysterious 12th imam, who Shiites believe will save mankind. "Moqtada is absolutely hooked on the concept of the reappearance of the Mahdi;' says Amatzia Baram, the director of the Ezri Center at Haïfa University. The first sighting of black-dad militiamen identitying themselves as part of Mahdi Army seems to have come in September 2003 in the southern town of Kufah. "1 do not care what the Americans have to say about this, and 1 never did;' said Sadr when asked about the new militia by reporters later that month. "Only the Iraqi people can choose who they want to protect their country:' The US. military, fighting an ever-growing insurgency by the minority Sunnis, who had lost power with Saddam's downfall, didn't want to instigate a twofront war. But that left the United States without a strategy. If American forces weren't going to fight Sadr, it made sense to try to entice him into a political process: But other Iraqi leaders, induding prominent Shiites, may have opposed that idea. ln the winter of 2004, a senior adviser to Ambassador Paul Bremer, the American proconsul in Iraq, was traveling in the south, meeting with friendly derics and community leaders. "1could see how frightened they were of [Sadr] and his Mahdi Army;' recalls the aide, Larry Diamond. "1 '1WANTED TO GO AFTER HlM WHEN HE HAD 200 FOLLOWERS,' SAYS BREMER. 'THE MARINES RESISTED DOING ANYTHING.' 8
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