Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
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REVUE DE PRESSE-PRESS REVIEW.;BERHEVOKA ÇAPÊ-RNISTA STAMPA-DENTRO DE LA PRENSA-BASIN ÖZETÎ<br />
THE ECONOMIST SEPfEMBER 25TH 1993<br />
Armsto Iraq<br />
Unexplo<strong>de</strong>d bomb<br />
Who was responsible for misleading parliament<br />
, A S SCANDALS go, this one could still<br />
fi prove <strong>de</strong>vastating. Among the allegations:<br />
secr<strong>et</strong> government encouragement of<br />
arms sales to a dictator who gases civilians;<br />
ministers misleading parliament; perhaps<br />
a quarterof the cabin<strong>et</strong> implicated,' But,<br />
Lord Justice Scott, the appeal-court judge<br />
charged with establishing the truth, is swimming<br />
against a ti<strong>de</strong> of well-honed excuses<br />
and Whitehall obfuscation. On September<br />
22nd and 23rd, William Wal<strong>de</strong>grave, the<br />
first serving cabin<strong>et</strong> minister to testify, put<br />
on a dazzling display of semantic agility.<br />
The scandal began unravelling last November.<br />
The trial of executives from Matrix<br />
Churchill, a machine-tool company, had<br />
collapsed. They were accused of breaching<br />
an arms embargo to Iraq. Ministers had<br />
tried, and failed, to suppress evi<strong>de</strong>nce<br />
which showed that Whitehall had encouraged<br />
them all along. An embarrassed John<br />
Major or<strong>de</strong>red an inquiry by Lord Justice<br />
"Scott. Having grilled bureaucrats and diplomats,<br />
the inquiry is now summoning ministers.<br />
This week Tim Renton, David Mellor<br />
and William Wal<strong>de</strong>grave, all Foreign Office<br />
ministers during the mid- to late 19805,took<br />
the stand. In November comes Lady<br />
Thatcher, in January Mr Major himself.<br />
The inquiry has established the broad<br />
story. During the late 1980s Britain was the<br />
world's third-biggest arms exporter, and the<br />
Middle East one ofits main mark<strong>et</strong>s. But in<br />
1985 the government banned the export of<br />
l<strong>et</strong>hal equipment to Iran and Iraq in response<br />
to the war raging b<strong>et</strong>ween them.<br />
When the two agreed a ceasefire in 1988,an<br />
internal Whitehall war started up. The Department<br />
of Tra<strong>de</strong> and Industry and th~<br />
Ministry of Defence argued that Britain's<br />
<strong>de</strong>fence companies, eager to export, should<br />
be l<strong>et</strong> off the leash. At first, the Foreign Officewanted<br />
to maintain the gui<strong>de</strong>lines. Like<br />
everyone else, its officials knew Saddam<br />
Hussein was ~assing Kurdish civilians.<br />
and public?<br />
But the diplomats were also keen to establish<br />
Iraq as a bulwark against fundamentalism<br />
in Iran, especially after Iran issued<br />
itsfatwa against Salman Rushdie. So<br />
the Foreign Officeagreed to a fudge. No new<br />
policy was announced. Ministers told pärliament<br />
after 1988 that gui<strong>de</strong>lines on exports<br />
to Iraq and Iran were being applied<br />
rigorously to both countries. But b<strong>et</strong>ween<br />
1988and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990,<br />
Saddam managed to buy £2S0m ($380m) of<br />
British <strong>de</strong>fence equipment. Few British<br />
arms got to Iran.<br />
There were two ways of selling to Iraq.<br />
First, ministers privately agreed late in 1988<br />
to interpr<strong>et</strong> the gui<strong>de</strong>lines liberally. They<br />
would permit the export of equipment<br />
which could be used for both military and<br />
civilian purposes, provi<strong>de</strong>d the Iraqis<br />
claimed to be using them for the latter. So<br />
equipment such as machine tools, which<br />
can make anything from cars to warheads,<br />
often got in. Once in, enforcement was<br />
som<strong>et</strong>imes lax, more often nonexistent. As '<br />
early as 1987,the inquiry was told, intelligence<br />
reports revealed that British lathes<br />
were being used to make shell casings. After<br />
the Gulf war, Matrix Churchill machinery<br />
was found in a 'factory producing components<br />
essential for nuclear weapons.<br />
The second m<strong>et</strong>hod was to route ship- ,<br />
ments via J()rdan. Ordtech, a British company,<br />
attempted to sell 300,000 artilleryshellfuses<br />
to Iraq using certificates<br />
indicating their <strong>de</strong>stination was Jordan.<br />
One Ordtech executive says MISknew about<br />
his firm's intentions and did not try to stop<br />
it. Intelligence reports (which reached the<br />
Foreign Office) revealed that Jordan was<br />
known to be a path for arms to Iraq. Never-<br />
, theless, the government failed to extend its<br />
arms-export ban to Jordan.<br />
Diplomats told the enquiry that Britain<br />
feared American criticism for, exporting<br />
equipmenHo Ira.q.In fact, the BuslJ.administration<br />
itself was helping to finance<br />
Saddam's arms build-up. There is a more<br />
plausible reason why Britain's change in<br />
policy was kept qui<strong>et</strong>: ministers and bureaucrats<br />
wanted to avoid public scorn.<br />
The difficulty for Lord Justice Scott is<br />
where to pin the blame. Witnesses, including<br />
the three former Foreign Office ministers<br />
questioned this week, often complain of<br />
lapses in memory. Diplomats disclaim<br />
responsibility. Ministers claim ignorance.<br />
Mr Mellor" for example, explained that<br />
intelligence reports about the end-use of<br />
machine tools never reached him.<br />
Mr Wal<strong>de</strong>grave had the bumpiest ri<strong>de</strong> of<br />
the ministers. He was at the Foreign Office<br />
in 1988-90, when questionable exports to<br />
Iraq were at their height. Defending himself,<br />
he proved that heis adroit, if nothing<br />
else. The relaxation of controis on exports to<br />
Iraq did not require a public announcement,<br />
he argued, because the gui<strong>de</strong>lines remained<br />
the same, only their "interpr<strong>et</strong>ation<br />
was more flexible". The inquiry was,<br />
unconvinced. Nor was parliament misled, ,<br />
argued Mr Wal<strong>de</strong>grave. The gui<strong>de</strong>lines were'<br />
"scrupulously applied"; they only happened<br />
to favour Iraq over Iran "for reasons<br />
ofwi<strong>de</strong>r policy". And the Iraqis "<strong>de</strong>ceived'<br />
us" about the use of the exports. Mr'<br />
Wal<strong>de</strong>grave is un<strong>de</strong>rstood to have spent'<br />
much ofhis summer preparing his response'<br />
to the inquiry.<br />
The inquiry may do more damage when<br />
Lord Justice Scott turns to the Matrix Churchill<br />
trial. Kenn<strong>et</strong>h Clarke (nowchancellor),<br />
Michael Heseltine (now industry secr<strong>et</strong>ary)<br />
and, Malcolm Rifkind (now <strong>de</strong>fence secr<strong>et</strong>ary),<br />
all signed "public interest immunity"<br />
certificates to withhold classified documents.<br />
The judge overruled them. Had he<br />
not, the <strong>de</strong>fendants might now be in jail. In<br />
November four executives from Ordtech<br />
will appeal against their convictions for selling<br />
arms to Iraq. P<strong>et</strong>er Lilley(now social security<br />
secr<strong>et</strong>ary) and Kenn<strong>et</strong>h Baker (then<br />
home secr<strong>et</strong>ary, nowa backbencher) signed<br />
certificates for their trial. One of the documents<br />
withheld was a SOO-pageForeign Of- '<br />
fice report about Jordan's contribution<br />
Iraq's arms build-up. Stay tuned.<br />
to<br />
.<br />
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