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Team 30 v 36
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, Appellant, v. DEIDRE
RUBENSTRUNK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Erin Clark and Hannah Crosby, for
Appellant.
Lauren Navarro and Jenna Maxwell for
Respondent.
JUDGES: Englemann, Walker, Dole, Galusha,
Muthig
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the respondent, Deidre
Rubenstrunk. Although, the respondent failed to
persuade the court that all factors of the Salemi
test were met, they proved that the judges
original ruling was supported by precedent case
law. The respondents also made clear to the
Court that this ruling was made in the interest of
justice and was supported by trustworthy
evidence.
The test for this case was outlined in the matter
of People v. Salemi. “( 1) such as will probably
change the result if a new case is granted; (2)
discovered since trial; (3) not discoverable
before trial by due dilligence; (4) material to the
issue; (5) not cumulative to the former issue; (6)
not merely impeaching or contradicting former
evidence.” The appellants adequately pointed
out that several factors of that Salemi case were
not met. First, the evidence of Logan Murphy's
dementia was clearly cumulative because
Murphy was extensively cross examined on his
injuries in the original trial so this new evidence
would be merely building on that. Additionally,
the evidence as presented to the court is merely
impeaching former testimony because Murphy's
medical status serves only to discredit his
original testimony.
The prevailing argument in this case became
whether or not the Salemi Test is necessary in
determining if new evidence is sufficient
grounds for a new trial. On this issue, the
respondents cited the case of People v. Balan
which allows a new trial even if the Salemi test
is not met as long as it is in “the interest of
justice” and complies with the statute for new
evidence, CPL 440.10(g). The first part of the
statue requires that the evidence be “such that
would probably change the outcome of the
case.” The respondents made apparent to the
Court that Jane's admission of guilt coupled with
Murphy's dementia was likely to change the
outcome of the case. The second prong
stipulates that it must be such that could not
have been discovered before the trial. Once
again, the respondent's proved that the evidence
supported this because dementia is a condition
that progresses over time and would therefore
could not have been diagnosed before hand. The
sworn statements were given only after Jane
Henderson had admitted to the murder and the
trial was over. Inasmuch, there was absolutely
no way for the court to reasonably expect the
respondents to uncover this beforehand even
with due diligence. In People v. Powell the court
noted that the Salemi case ”sets forth the criteria
which must be satisfied to meet the newl
discovered evidence standard of the statute.”
Despite that legal precedent, we are compelled
to agree with the respondent's argument that the
matter of People v. Balan is the controlling
precedent because it is the most recent case.
The appellants compared our case to that of
People v. Macon. However, we must recognize
the clear distinctions between the two cases. In
Macon, one of the major reasons a new trial was
not granted was because they lacked sworn
statements. Conversely, in the case at hand, as
stated by the respondents, there were two sworn
statements. The additional evidence of Murphy's
dementia was obviously trustworthy because it
was determined by a medical professional. In
this matter, we find that there was not a lack of
“trustworthy evidence” sufficient to necessitate a
new trial
We agree that “where there's smoke, there must
be fire” as stated by the original trial judge and
so in the interest of justice order a new trial be
granted to Deidre Rubenstrunk.
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