2012 Conference Executive Record Report.pdf - YMCA of Greater ...

Team 16 v 23
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Beth Crimi and Brianna
Connolly, for Appellant.
Mary Stephenson and Krista
Barbeau, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Englemann, Walker, Dole, Galusha,
Muthig
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the respondent, the people
of the State of New York. The respondent was
able to clearly establish that the amount of time
given to the defendant by Judge Murtagh
infringed upon neither the defendant’s right to
call a witness on his behalf nor his right to
affectively confer with his co-council. The
respondent was also able to sufficiently attack
the veracity of the materiality of Atrion
Raimundi to justify the denial the third
adjournment on the grounds that he was not
sufficiently important to the case as applied to
People v. Foy.
Crucial to this case was the 3 prong Foy test, in
which it is clearly outlined that the criteria for a
new trial to be granted in regard to a lack
witness testimony require: (1) That the witness
is really material and appears to the court to be
so; (2) that the party who applies has been guilty
of no neglect (3) that the witness can be had at
the time to which the trial is deferred.
As to the first prong of the test, the respondent
was able to cast a reasonable doubt on the
materiality of Atrion Raimundi as a witness with
numerous statements by attendees of the
wedding that contended that Atrion and Raphael
had minimal interaction during the wedding, and
Atrion was therefore not material enough to
warrant a third adjournment even if he could
have been marginally important to the trial in
question.
As to the second prong of the test, the
respondent was able to prove that the defendant
was guilty of neglect, by arguing that the
defendant should have been able to get to the
court room in the time allotted due to the
flexibility of the New York City transit system.
In regard to the third prong of the test, though
the defendant’s contention that Atrion’s
attendance on the wrong day demonstrated his
capacity to be in the courtroom on time was well
received. The respondent was successfully able
to demonstrate that this contention alone was not
enough to justify a new trial. The defendant also
attempted to contend that the Judge Murtagh’s
mutterings during the case were a showing of
prejudice, similar to People v. Spears. However,
the respondent was able to demonstrate that this
matter, in which the Judge was only alleged to
have whispered a predatory statement, is very
different from Spears, in which the defendant
was berated and abused by the judge.
Finally the defendant argued that the denying of
the adjournment by judge Murtagh infringed
upon the right of the defendant to affectively
confer with his co-council. However the court
agrees that all defendants should have had plan
“A, B, C, D, and E” in case of a problem and the
right was not infringed upon.
While the defendant’s contention that the
discretion of Judge Murtagh was “not unlimited”
as stated in People v. Singleton was well
received, the arguments of the respondent
clearly showed that the lower court judge did not
abuse her discretion. Therefore we find that the
decision of the lower court should be upheld and
no new trial to be granted.
Order affirmed, Justices Muthig, Engelmann,
Galusha, and Dole concur.
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