2012 Conference Executive Record Report.pdf - YMCA of Greater ...

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MARK RUTKOWSKI, Appellant, v. THE
YMCA, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Thomas Hendrix, Cody Shaner, and
Zech Yaw, for Appellant.
Matthew Scanlon and Brendan
Conneely, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Mallone, Al-Ajmi, Dhami, Vanini, King,
Finan
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of he State of New York rule
in favor of the respondent, the YMCA. The
respondent provided sufficient evidence to prove that
the decision of the lower court to uphold termination
was justified. The respondent also provides such
evidence as to justify the revocation of Mark’s
pension.
The first issue debated within this case was whether
or not Mark Rutkowsky’s actions were a result of
moral turpitude or were detrimental to a government
agency, thus justifying the termination of his
employment. The respondent does this by using
Muraik v. Landi in which it was found there was
insufficient evidence to support either of these
claims. However, the respondent then compares the
facts of the cases to show that, through Mark’s
submission of fraudulent records, he is indeed
committing an act of moral turpitude. The court
finds that this is dissimilar to the acts of fraud within
Muraik due to the fact that Mark’s actions also had
an adverse affect on a government agency, whereas
the acts in Muraik did not. The respondent then
moved to explore the differences between our case
and that of Alston v. Morgan. Alston is used by the
respondent to expose the ruling that “the failure to
report to work and to provide documentation for
absences as an employee is directed to do, is a
rational basis for finding misconduct.” These
findings of misconduct are then augmented by the
respondents showing that the actions committed by
Mark were much more severe than in the Alston case.
The respondent provided sufficient evidence to prove
that Mark’s transgressions were of moral turpitude as
well as detrimental to a government agency, thus we
find termination to be an appropriate punishment.
The second issue in this case similarly addresses the
acts of moral turpitude and those detrimental to a
government agency when compared to the reputable
career of Mark Rutkowsky in order to determine the
appropriateness of the revocation of pension. The
respondent highlights the variations between our case
and that of Iarocci v. West Haverstraw in order to
emphasize the severity of the circumstances of
Mark’s actions. The respondent successfully argued
that, unlike Iarocci, Mark’s absences were
unauthorized and no documentation was provided,
thus the rulings of Iarocci should not apply. This
argument sufficed in negating the mitigating factors
that would ordinarily apply due to Mark’s extensive
career with the YMCA. Mark’s immoral crime of
fraud and stealing from another YMCA program for
his own interests strongly overrode any career
accolade he received throughout his lifetime.
Following that point, the respondent proceeded to
contrast our case to that of Goudy v. Schaffer, in
which “the evidence did not establish, nor does the
respondent suggest, that the petitioner’s misconduct
was one of moral turpitude or motivated by malice or
selfishness.” While the appellants attempted to argue
that Mark’s actions were on behalf of the students,
we agree with the respondents that Mark was, in fact,
acting out of selfishness. We agree with the
respondent in this regard due to Mark’s connection to
the success of the program and the fact that the
greater the amount of students who attended this
program, the greater the benefits to Mark’s
reputation. Due to these findings, we conclude that
the revocation of Mark’s pension is the appropriate
punishment given the circumstances of the case.
We concur with the respondents and move to uphold
the decision of the trial court.
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