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2012 Conference Executive Record Report.pdf - YMCA of Greater ...

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material, and there was no certainty that he would attend a later trial date. Also, the defense did<br />

not exercise due diligence in order to guarantee his appearance. Finally, the denial <strong>of</strong> a second<br />

recess was appropriate and did not violate the Appellant’s Constitutional Rights because the<br />

appellant had already been given plenty <strong>of</strong> time to confer with counsel.<br />

ARGUMENT<br />

I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT<br />

ORTEGA A THIRD ADJOURNMENT TO LOCATE HIS ALIBI WITNESS, NOR DID IT<br />

VIOLATE APPELLANT ORTEGA’S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT.<br />

When reviewing the appropriateness <strong>of</strong> a denial <strong>of</strong> an adjournment request, the appellate<br />

court defers “to the discretion <strong>of</strong> the court, which is consistent with the general rule that the<br />

granting or denial <strong>of</strong> any adjournment by a Trial Judge is a matter <strong>of</strong> discretion.” People v. Foy,<br />

32 N.Y.2d 473, 476 (N.Y. 1973); citing People v. Jackson (111 N. Y. 362); also citing People v.<br />

Oskroba, 305 N. Y. 113, 117.) A trial judge must consider three factors in making the decision to<br />

allow a continuance: “‘(1) that the witness is really material and appears to the court to be so; (2)<br />

that the party who applies has been guilty <strong>of</strong> no neglect; (3) that the witness can be had at the<br />

time to which the trial is deferred.’” People v. Foy, supra at 477; citing King v. D’Eon (1 W.<br />

Black. 510). A review <strong>of</strong> the above cited three prong test in consideration <strong>of</strong> this case clearly<br />

shows that the lower court judge did not abuse her discretion.<br />

(1) Atrion Raimundi is not a material witness. It is obvious that the judge did not believe<br />

the witness was material, as she denied a material witness warrant request. It is a judge’s duty to<br />

consider all possibilities when making decisions on the materiality <strong>of</strong> witness and whether a<br />

subpoena should be issued to ensure their appearance at the court. “The decision whether to grant<br />

an adjournment lies in the sound discretion <strong>of</strong> the trial court, and the exercise <strong>of</strong> that discretion<br />

‘in denying a request for an adjournment will not be overturned absent <strong>of</strong> showing prejudice’.”<br />

People v. Adair, 84 A.D.3d 1752, 1754 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2011); citing People v.<br />

Arroyo, 161 AD2d 1127, 1127. The judge in this case made her decision regarding Atrion’s lack<br />

34

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