2012 Conference Executive Record Report.pdf - YMCA of Greater ...

PROGRAM SPONSORED BY:
PROGRAM SPONSORED BY: BY:
YMCA of Greater Rochester NY State YMCA Foundation
YMCA of Long Greater Island Rochester NY Capital State District YMCA YMCA Foundation
YMCA of Greater Long Island New York Program Capital District Alumni YMCA
YMCA of Greater New York Program Alumni
Legislative Sponsor
Senator Dean G. Legislative Skelos, Senate Sponsor Majority Leader
Senator Dean G. Skelos, Senate Majority Leader
Assembly Sponsor Joseph D. Morelle
Assembly Sponsor Joseph D. Morelle
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April 2012
Dear Reader,
In her opening remarks for the 76 th annual New York State YMCA Youth and Government Conference Youth
Governor Paige Hughes stated “outside the walls of the chamber you and I are standing in right now, a revolution
has taken place. A revolution driven by the ability to use the most powerful thing a human being possesses: their
voice. This weekend, there is a new group of individuals occupying Albany. But this group does not come with an
abundance of tents and protest signs. Instead, they come with an abundance of new ideas and perspectives on the
pressing issues they face as New York State citizens.”
The following pages contain the ideas and summary of work these 555 selected teens delegates from across NY
State have been engaged in since September
Teen attorneys are responsible for developing a brief, arguing their case before an Appellant Court bench of teen
justices. Using four courtrooms the eighteen justices heard each case rendering their decisions. Enclosed is a copy
of each case, an addendum that includes the justice decisions and the Brief they deemed to be “the best.” The teen’s
case assignment contained their select case references.
During the weekend thirty chose to participate as lobbyists researching topics and bills of their interest which
included a deviation from traditional government where they were afforded opportunities to speak for or against a
bill on the chamber floor promoting their speaking/presentation skills. Dependent upon the persuasive arguments of
the lobbyist one was recognized by their peers as “the best” lobbyist in the Senate and in each of the two
Assembly’s.
Integral to government is the reporting of issues, opinions of Bill Sponsors and an overall review of the program.
Inserted you will find a copy of The Dialectic newspaper that was developed by twenty journalism students.
Included as well are copies of the pre and post conference newspaper (The Posti).
This program is sponsored by the YMCA’s in New York State affording a special leadership opportunity for young
people where they nurture their appreciation for the diversity of others while engaging in civic issues that may
include collaborative working relationships with local high schools. In reviewing just one positive impact this
program has on young people a Indiana University Study concluded that Youth and Government graduates when
compared with the general population were much more engaged in civic issues:
• 96 % are Registered voters vs.66 % General Population
• 35 % Contribute to a campaign vs.24 % General Population
• 43% Worked on community issues vs. 17% General Population
• 15 % are Members’ of a local community board vs. 3% General Population
To learn more about this program we welcome you to visit our web site: www.nystateymcayag.org, to contact your
local YMCA or the programs State Director Mark Rutkowski at the host association: YMCA of Greater Rochester,
444 East Main Street, Rochester, NY 14604 or 585-341-3235.
“DEMOCRACY MUST BE LEARNED BY EACH GENERATION”
YMCA of Greater Rochester • Association Office • 444 East Main Street • Rochester, NY 14604
Phone: (585) 546-5500 5500 • Fax: (585) 454-1328 • www.rochesterymca.org• www.nystateymcayag.org
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2012 New York State YMCA Youth & Government YMCA Representation
District 1 Represents the YMCA’s of Greater Rochester including clubs at:
Lady of Mercy High School
Southwest Y Branch
McQuaid High School
District Coordinator and State Director Mark Rutkowski, Association Office YMCA of Greater Rochester.
District 2 Represents the YMCA’s of the Capital District with clubs affiliated with the:
Troy Branch
North Albany Branch
District 3 Represents the following YMCA’s and High School Clubs:
Glen’s Falls YMCA,
Johnsburg High School
Glens Falls High School
Newcomb High School
Bolton High School
Ticonderoga High School
Minerva High School
District Coordinator Jackie Palandrani, Silver Bay Association YMCA Conference Center of the
Adirondacks
District 4 Represents the following YMCA’s and High School Clubs
White Plains YMCA,
Rockland County YMCA, with school clubs in:
Middletown YMCA
Pearl River HS, North River HS, Nyack HS
District Coordinator: Charles Maze, CEO Rockland County YMCA
District 5 Represents the YMCA’s of Greater New York and School Clubs:
Bedford Stuyvesant Y Branch
Harlem Y Branch
Bronx Y Branch
Long Island City Y Branch
Archimedes Academy
North Brooklyn Y Branch
Chinatown Y Branch
Prospect Park Y Branch
Cross Island Y Branch
Staten Island Y Branch
Dodge Y Branch
Vanderbilt Y Branch
Flushing Beacon Y Branch
District Coordinator: Tiffany Younger, Association Office YMCA of Greater New York
District 6 Represents the Cortland and Syracuse YMCA’s and High School Clubs:
Homer High School
North Area Syracuse Y Branch
Cortland High School
East Area Syracuse Y Branch
District Coordinator: Janine Giordano, Cortland YMCA volunteer and Social Studies teacher at Homer
High School
District 7 Represents the Long Island YMCA’s and High School Club:
Mastic Y Branch,
William Floyd High School
District Coordinator: Helene Purdoski, Mastic YMC, supported by program volunteer Robert Feeney
former Principal William Floyd High School
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2012 New York State YMCA Youth & Government State Conference
Friends of Youth & Government
• The Honorable Andrew Cuomo, Governor, New York State
• Honorable Robert Duffy, Lieutenant Governor New York State
• Honorable Dean Skelos, Senate Majority Leader, Conference Sponsor
• Honorable Sheldon Silver, Speaker of the Assembly
• Assembly Member Joseph Morelle, Assembly Sponsor
• John Rappaport, Executive Director, McBurney YMCA
• New York State YMCA Foundation, Charles Clark, Chairperson
• Kyle Stewart, Director of YMCAs of NYS Inc.
• Greater Rochester YMCA
• George Romell, President and CEO
• Youth & Government Conference Staff
• Mark Rutkowski, State Director
• Connie Angeles, Conference Assistant
• Michele Palandrani, Conference Assistant
• Flynn Jebb, Conference Assistant
• Laura Bolan, Conference Assistant
• John Catto, Program Consultant
• Edgar Caldwell, Program Consultant
• Jackie LaNoir, Program Consultant
• Federal Prosecutor Joseph Depadilla, Judicial Program Director
• Kathryn Boardman, Judicial staff volunteer
• Deidra Rubenstrunk Judicial staff volunteer
• Raphael Ortega, Judicial staff volunteer
• Chris Butino, EMT / Night Duty
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New York State YMCA Foundation, Inc.
Whose financial supportive commitment to the NY State Youth and Government creates an
opportunity for every participant to grow in spirit, mind, and body.
Board Members
Charles Clark
David Roman
Jack Young
Peter Pink
Barbara Folkemer
Peggy LoPresti
John MacDougall
Chuck Maze
Norman Moore
Earl S. Miller
Laurie O’Shaugnessy
John C. Travers
Chair
Vice Chair
Secretary
Treasurer
Honorary Board Members
Michael Grammatico
Michael J. Fogarty
John Alan Ramsdell, MD
Mary E. Lane
Robert J. Daly
Chairman
William P. Epke
Treasurer
William A. Roos, IV
Legal Counsel & Secretary
Charles Clark, Ex Offico
William Mausert
Brent Stephans
Trustees Emeritus
Richard E. Kaeyer
Frank J. Keeler
Nancy W. Lester
Arthur B. McComb
New York State YMCA Foundation Trustees
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Advisors
DISTRICT 1
Peter Wegman
Demond Meeks
Jay Polston
Mark Rutkowski - District Coordinator / State Director
Emily Bolan *
Kathryn Maxwell *
Kelli Barnes *
DISTRICT 2
Daniel Trinh
- District Coordinator
Charles Smith
DISTRICT 3
Bocinski Barry
Clark Denise
Hughes Danielle
Kane Dan
Gereau Candice
Larkin Katherine
Jackie Palandrani - District Coordinator
McCarthy Scott
Murtagh Colleen
Schoder Tamara
Showers Stephen
Taylor Daphne
Wells Matthew *
DISTRICT 4 Chuck Maze - District Coordinator
Lisa Bernardo
Lynette
Michael Burrauno
Charlie
Bruno Estrada*
Shawn
Brian Fitzgibbons
Peter
John Gerace
Jean
Mary Johnson
Marshall
Sith
Thomas
Wa
Willock
DISTRICT 5 Tiffany Younger * - District Coordinator
Maame Agyeiwaah
Yoko Liriano
Jason Aubin *
Dana Mantella
Anabel Batista
Jackelyn Mariano
Tasia Brown
Tariqua Morrison
Howard Caretto
Ariana Moy
Justin Carroll
Morissa Paul
Jermaine Daley
Jawaan Ramsay
Spencer Ellis
Deismond Rosa *
Jaqueline James
Marie Turenne
Sadyia Khalique
Octavio Villegas*
Anthony Librera
Continued….
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DISTRICT 6
Clark Cayla
Kenney Tess
Dowgiallo Matthew
Advisors Continued
Janine Giordano – District Coordinator
Reed *
Buttino *
Thomas
Kelsie
Christopher
Henry
DISTRICT 7
Feeney
Allo
Castilo*
Costell
Coudrey
Helene Purdoski - District Coordinator
Robert
Lauro
Kevin
Reformato
Jerri
Rega
Patricia
Shapiro
Kerri
Tator
Joanne
Kathy
Savannah
Eric
Charles
State Office Judicial Team Safety Team
Connie Angeles Joseph DePadilla Christopher Buttino *
John Catto Deidra Rubenstrunk * Jackie Palandrani
Edgar Caldwell Kathryn Boardman * Helene Purdoski
Flynn Jebb * Atrion Raimundi * Octavio Villegas
Jacqueline LaNoir Raphael Ortega *
Michele Palandrani Aaron Taggart *
Mark Rutkowski Kelsy Willford *
Laura Bolan * Molly Warren *
Jane Henderson *
Allison Bugenis *
Logan Murphy *
Overall Conference College Advisors
Kelsie Reed *
Matt Dowgallo *
Emily Bolan *
Kathryn Maxwell *
Kelli Barnes *
Bruno Estrada *
Aaron Taggart *
Logan Murphy *
Kelsey Willford *
Allison Bugenis *
Jane Henderson *
* Program Alum
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2012 PRESIDING OFFICERS
Governor…………………….………. Paige Hughes
Lieutenant Governor……………….. Hans Lueders
President Pro Tempore……………... Maria Henry
Speaker of Assembly Freedom …….. Sebastian Franco
Speaker of Assembly Liberty………. Adam Henn
Deputy Speaker Assembly Freedom.. Taylor Goodspeed
Deputy Speaker Assembly Liberty… Chelsea Smart
Chief Justice………………...……….. Halle-Ann Orr
Editor-in-Chief…………...…………. Hannah Reed
Head Lobbyist………………………. Nicholas Speleotes
2012 COMMITTEE CHAIR’S
SENATE
Senate 1
Senate 2
Senate 3
Senate 4
Madlyn Wilson
Emily Stepper
Breeanna Dexter
Casey Clemens
ASSEMBLY FREEDOM
Committee 1 Spencer DuBoff
Committee 2 Tyler Nappo
Committee 3 Leah Strassburg
Committee 4 Rebecca Bolan
Committee 5 Kelsey Mensch
Committee 6 Claire Greenwood
Committee 7 Kaylin Parisi
ASSEMBLY LIBERTY
Committee 8 Marisa Parotta
Committee 9 Rebecca Kelly-Lyons
Committee 10 Kelsey Barnett
Committee 11 Michael Vasiliou
Committee 12 Linnea Chesman
Committee 13 Donavan Swanson
Committee 14 Emily Wixted
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New York State YMCA
Youth and Government Program
2011 - 2012 EXECUTIVE CABINET
Governor
Lt. Governor
Secretary of State
Chief of Staff
Press Secretary
Executive Clerk
Comptroller
Senate Liaison
Liberty Assembly Liaison
Freedom Assembly Liaison
TR House Liaison
Lobbyist Liaison
Paige Hughes
Hans Leuders
Emily Vigliotta
Joseph Gonyeau
Ben Chapman
Kaliel Williamson
Ani Marellapudi
Dalton Blue
Molly Schoder
Jordan Schroeder
Nicholas Marshall
Pat Brosnan
DEPARTMENT HEADS
Commissioner of Consumer of Protection
Commissioner of Environmental Protection
Commissioner of Health
Commissioner of Labor
Commissioner of Children & Family Services
Commissioner of Transportation
Commissioner of Education
Commissioner of Correctional Services
Commissioner of Taxation and Finance
Commissioner of Agriculture
Commissioner of Homeland Security
Michael Anderson
Sean Steele
Ravyn Santiago
Helen Dillingham
Precious Asiedu
Joseph Franzino
Arrianna Hart
James Johnson
DeVar Jones
Erik Gustafson
Morgan Knudsten
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Fosdick - San Antonio
Memorial Scholarship
In late January 1992, Meegan Fosdick and Shannon San Antonio from the Silver Bay
Association, YMCA Conference and Training Center tragically lost their lives in a car accident.
These active participants in the New York State YMCA Youth & Government Program
demonstrated qualities that all young people should emulate: they were involved in other
community activities/ organizations, school and/or YMCA activities, coupled with a
demonstrated passion of serving others.
In memory of their spirit and enthusiasm, the New York State Youth and Government
established a memorial scholarship fund. Proceeds from the fund are used to award annual
scholarships to the YMCA Youth & Government Albany Conference defraying a teens State
Program fee expense.
Alison Collins
Ashley Domagola
Maria Henry
Recipients in 2011 for the 2012 Conference:
Paige Hughes
Halle-Anne Orr
Recipients in 2012 for the 2013 Conference
Dina Al Ajmi
Karman Saini
Fatounmata Makadji
Chelsea Smart
Kayleigh Martin
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Clement A. Duran
Delegate Scholarship Award
A scholarship program supported by the New York State YMCA Executive Committee honoring
the vision and tireless commitment of YMCA Director Clement A. Duran to the purpose of
affording teenagers an opportunity to have a voice in their community.
A senior in High School
Participation in the Youth & Government program for a minimum of two years
A participant who has exemplified the conduct expected as spelled out in the Code of Conduct
Leadership involvement in local community and the Youth & Government program
Qualify as a participant to the Youth & Government Spring Leadership Conference
Assure the State Executive Committee that the award will be used for educational expenses.
The $1,000 cash award is presented at the closing banquet of the State Conference.
Raul Sanchez 2011
Kathryn Maxwell 2010
Alaina Ryan 2009
Michaela Jebb 2009
Emma Corey 2008
Kristen Rafferty 2007
Newton Kwan 2006
Past Recipients Include:
LaRelle Gee 2005
Emilie Kershaw 2004
Jerry Castillo 2003
Leigh Arsenault 2002
Lazaro Chavez 2001
Ellie Gardner 2000
2012 Recipient: Maria Henry District 4
Cleveland E. Dodge
Collegiate Advisor Award
Collegiate Advisor Leadership (Cleveland E. Dodge Memorial Award)
A scholarship program supported by the New York State YMCA Executive Committee redesigned in
2006 to support volunteer collegiate students instrumental in sustaining the vision of this civic
engagement program in memory of the dedicated voluntary commitment rendered by Mr. Cleveland
E. Dodge to the YMCA’s of New York.
A former delegate that has participated in a Youth & Government State Conference.
A college volunteer who exemplifies servant leadership to the Youth & Government program in areas
of program implementation, program development, or leadership development.
Demonstrated leadership with the local or State program endorsed by a YMCA Director.
The $1,000 cash award is intended to assist with educational expenses being presented at the closing
banquet of the State Conference.
Past Recipients Include:
Matthew Dowgiallo (LeMoyne College) 2011
Michele Palandrani (HVCC) 2010
Raphael Ortega (Indiana University School of Law) 2009
Mike Couzens (Syracuse University) 2008
Kate Harvey (Seton Hall Law School) 2007
Leigh Arsenault (Middlebury College) 2006
2012 Recipient: Emily Bolan SUNY at Geneseo
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YMCA Youth Conference on National Affairs
Purpose
The purpose of sending a delegation of teens from the New York State YMCA Youth &
Government program to National Affairs is to allow outstanding student leaders from New York to
share in an extraordinary national teen leadership experience. From the more than 55,000 teens
annually participating in this program across the country 600 gather for a week of debate and
learning where they present proposals they deem of National importance. Through this experience
delegates gain a respectful appreciation for others, the issues presented, and nurture their
commitment to be civically engaged citizens.
Philosophy
The State office of the New York State YMCA Youth & Government program believes it is
a great honor to attend the National Affairs conference. The committee of advisors that choose the
delegates strive to send from New York only the most committed teen leaders who exemplify the
values upon which the New York YMCA Youth & Government program is based. It is the
intention to send delegates to National Affairs who want to be there and who are willing to put
forth the effort necessary to demonstrate their leadership abilities at the North Carolina conference.
Delegate Selection
The National Affairs selection committee shall select the New York State delegation to the
YMCA Youth Conference on National Affairs held in North Carolina. The committee will be
comprised of adult advisors selected by the State Director and the district coordinators, with one
representative from each District. The committee will select delegates upon merit and diversity to
represent the State of New York realistically. The delegates will be observed at the State conference
and recommendations are received from all youth committee chairpersons, Adult committee
advisors, chamber participants and Presiding officers in the selection consideration process.
Conference Dates: June 30 – July 6, 2012 at the YMCA Blue Ridge Assembly Conference Center in
Black Mountain North Carolina
Criteria for selection
1. Knowledge of topic
2. Knowledge and use of parliamentary procedure
3. Ability to speak in public
4. Contribution to political process and interaction with other delegates
5. Evidence of preparation for State Conference
6. Decorum during sessions
7. Strict adherence to the Code of Conduct during the entire conference (Teens who
cannot conduct themselves properly during social hours will not be considered).
8. Self motivation and enthusiasm for YMCA programs, specifically Youth and
Government.
9. Leadership ability and potential
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Selected delegates to represent New York State at the National
YMCA teen Conference On National Affairs in North Carolina
June 30 – July 6, 2012
Delegates in 2012 include:
Tom Jacobs District 1
Halle Orr District 1
Leah Strassburg District 1
Devar Jones District 2
Rebecca Bolan District 3
Paige Hughes District 3
Marissa Parrotta District 3
Daniel Schwartz District 3
Maria Henry District 4
Lowell Hunt District 4
Emily Stepper District 4
Madlyn Wilson District 4
Nana Apraku District 5
Christopher Walker District 5
Hellen Dillingham District 6
Erik Gustafson District 6
Kelsey Barnett District 7
Cassey Clemens District 7
Erin Engelman District 7
Kelsey Mensch District 7
Emily Vigliotta District 7
Alternate Delegates in 2012 include:
Ben Chapman District 1
Nora Hanna District 1
Erik Quitter District 1
Kaliel Williamson District 2
Peter Fritz District 3
Tara Galusha District 3
Partick Harrison District 3
Mike Vasilliou District 3
Caitlin Yandon District 3
Claire Greenwood District 4
Kevin Parakkaku District 4
Michele Reichmann District 4
Moesha Clark District 5
Sebastian Franco District 5
Rocco Graziano District 5
Noor Ismail District 5
Rebecca DeWitt District 6
Ellen Wixted District 6
Adam Henn District 7
Morgan Knudtsen District 7
Chelsea Smart District 7
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Marina Vanini
Christopher Walker
Officer Candidates for 2012 - 2013
GOVERNOR
Emily Vigliotta
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR
Erik Gustafson Ani Marellapudi Tyler Nappo
Amanda Santaferra-McCarthy Michael Vasiliou
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE
Nana Apraku Casey Clemens Breeanna Dexter
Emily Stepper
Madlyn Wilson
SPEAKER OF THE ASSEMBLY - Liberty
Asiedu Precious
DeVar Jones
Jonathan Kelly
Chelsea Smart
SPEAKER OF THE ASSEMBLY - Freedom
Morgan Knudtsen
Kaylin Parisi
Molly Schoder
DEPUTY SPEAKER OF THE ASSEMBLY - Liberty
Kelsey Barnett
Sidney Marino
DEPUTY SPEAKER OF THE ASSEMBLY - Freedom
Ravyn Santiago
Robert Vecchio
Caitlyn Yandon
CHIEF JUSTICE
Dina AlAjmi Carl Ciccarelli Erin Engelmann
Tom Jacobs
Kevin Parakkatu
Emily Freud
Ethan Cooper
Paige O’Flynn
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
HEAD LOBBYIST
Katy Delgado
Nora Hanna
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Delegates elected by their teen peers as:
2011-2012 ELECTED OFFICERS
Governor…………………….… Christopher Walker
Lieutenant Governor…………. Tyler Nappo
President Pro Temp…………... Nana Apraku
Speaker of the Assembly Liberty Chelsea Smart
Speaker of the Assembly Freedom Morgan Knudtsen
Deputy Speaker Assembly Liberty Kelsey Barnett
Deputy Speaker Assembly Freedom Caitlyn Yandon
Chief Justice………………...… Erin Engelmann
Editor-in-Chief……………….. Emily Freud
Head Lobbyist………………… Paige O’Flynn
BEST DEBATER – SENATE
Nana Apraku District 5
BEST DEBATER – ASSEMBLY LIBERTY
Donavan Swanson District 5
BEST DEBATER – ASSEMBLY FREEDOM
Kelsey Mensch District 7
BEST BILL IN SENATE
S 08 “Amend Section 661 of the New York State Education Law to allow for illegal immigrants
the right to apply for financial aid for college. ”
Carolina Fuentes, Kassandra Santiago,
BEST BILL IN ASSEMBLY – LIBERTY
AL - 01 “amend Education Law §313 in order to eliminate racial bias towards the
admittance of students into state colleges.”
Michael Anderson, Marisa Parrotta
and
AL – 08 “Amend §3-0313of the Environmental Conservation law by adding subsection
8 to illegalize Hydraulic Fracturing”
Kelci Henn Zoey Gliksman
BEST BILL IN ASSEMBLY – FREEDOM
AF - 07 “Allow registered independents to vote in primary elections.”
Tyler Nappo, Daniel McDowell, Jolien VanNieuwenhuizen
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BEST LOBBYIST SENATE
Christopher O’Connor District 3
BEST LOBBYIST – ASSEMBLY LIBERTY
Thomas Mullally District 7
BEST LOBBYIST – ASSEMBLY FREEDOM
Christopher O’Connor District 3
OUTSTANDING TEDDY ROOSEVELT (Jr. High/First Year) DELEGATE
Moesha Clark District 5
Megan Stacey District 3
BEST PRESS DELEGATE
Darien Ward District 5
BEST ATTORNEY
Court 1 Lindsay Springman District 7
Court 2 Mary Stephenson District 1
Court 3 Ethan Deabren District 7
Court 4 Emily Collins District 1
BEST BRIEF
Team 24 Colton Bishop, Rebecca Sung, Daniel Schwartz District 3
JUDICIAL EXEMPLAR
Ashley Baudier
Maxwell Beebe
Emily Collins
Briana Connolly
Ethan Deabreu
Mike Eyerman
Kali Hoppe
Emily LaSpisa
Daniel Leisner
Mikhail Lindsay
Kathryn Lippa
Ceejay Lofland
Fatoumata Makadji
Alex Mauro
Jenna Maxwell
Liam McGurl
Alvin Moreira
Mallory Nargi
Alana Narine
John Nelson
Diogenes Nunez
Michelle Reichman
Katthryn Rowan
Matthew Scanlon
Daniel Schwartz
Lindsay Springman
Mary Stephenson
Vimbai Ushe
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#1 Best Firm – B Respondent Mary Stephenson 1
Firm Name: Carroll Daniel Schwartz 3
Advisor: Justin Carroll Jasmine Somers 7
Firm Leader: Ceejay Lofland Diogenes Nunez 5
Maxwell Beebe 3
Ethan Deabreau 7
Krista Barbeau 1
Colton Bishop 3
Koraly Adams 5
Ceejay Lofland 3
Jeff Gao 7
Rebecca Sung 3
#2 Best Firm – A Respondent Nicole Rubertone 3
Firm Name: Murphy Katie Roxstrom 1
Advisor: Logan Murphy Ashley Hampson 7
Firm Leader: Kathryn Rowan Matthew Scanlon 4
Liam McGurl 3
Lynsey Springman 7
Stephen Viele 3
Kathryn Rowan 1
Brian Shiminski 7
Brendan Conneely 4
Jordin O’Reilly 7
#3 Best Firm – D Respondent Emily Collins 1
Firm Name: Bugenis John Nelson 7
Advisor: Allison Bugenis Danielle Frohnhoefer 7
Firm Leader: Adrianna Wurster Allen Perry 6
Nikita Mehta 4
Alana Narine 5
Alex Mauro 7
Adrianna Wurster 1
Ferdousi Jahan 7
Joseph Mineo 7
Grace Kockubinski 4
Sarah Griffin 7
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2012 STATE OF THE STATE
Paige Hughes, Youth Governor
Mr. Speaker, Mr. Lieutenant Governor, honorable members of the legislature, distinguished
guests, and my fellow New Yorkers: allow me to formally welcome you, yet again, to our 76th annual
New York State YMCA Youth and Government state conference.
Over the past six months with the turn of each newspaper page and with the click of the remote to
our television sets, we have seen headline after headline informing us of the importance of the Occupy
Wall Street movement. From Oakland, to Dallas, from Washington to Chicago, and even outside the
walls of the chamber you and I are standing in right now, a revolution has taken place. A revolution
driven by the ability to use the most powerful thing a human being possesses: their voice.
This weekend, there is a new group of individuals occupying Albany. But this group does not
come with an abundance of tents and protest signs. Instead, they come with an abundance of new ideas
and perspectives on the pressing issues they face as New York State citizens. This group, my fellow
delegates, is you and I, because this weekend, we are occupying Albany.
Contrary to what many adults believe, we the youth of New York State have a voice. In fact, over
55,000 teens across the country who participate in this program have a voice. It is a voice that is powerful
beyond measure. And even better, we have opinions, too! Together, we are able to overcome the
obstacles of today’s negative society and make a significant mark on the history our of state. Together,
we are able to see past each other’s differences and realize that there actually is a solution to every
problem. Together, we are able to grasp and fully understand the concept of the four core values of the
YMCA and how we can incorporate these into our day-to-day lives. Together, we are able to utilize our
passions and join as one large extended family striving toward one common goal. Our goal is to make
change; to make our own revolution.
For the state leadership team, we knew that 2012 was a year for reevaluation; a year for revision;
and a year for remembering the sole purpose of why six hundred teenagers gather in Albany for one
weekend in March every year. As a team, we strived to incorporate as many initiatives as possible that
would benefit the wants and needs of the delegates in this program, rather than our own personal desires.
For the first time in many years, we were able to create fairness and equal representation within the
leadership development amongst seven districts. We helped guide an advocacy component to our program
that helps capitalize the concerns the young people of our state deem important and integral for our
legislators to hear. We have introduced a new service learning project known as Operation Gratitude that
helps drive home the concept of servant leadership and the appreciation we have for those men and
women fighting to keep our freedom alive. But realistically, our laundry list of accomplishments would
not have been possible without each of you.
In the beginning of 2011, New York State had seen some of its worst times. In fact, many were
asking when enough is enough. The economy was hurting, our government was in turmoil, and valued
systems were quickly deteriorating before our very eyes. We were divided and uncertain of how to unite
with such burdens resting on our shoulders; but as we entered 2012, we came with a different mindset and
a different way of approaching each issue because we came to realize that things were looking up for New
York.
As a whole, the Executive Cabinet created an agenda that targeted two of what we felt were were
the most significant areas that were in dire need of reform and renovation. By doing so, we entered our
2012 state conference looking for ideas to create a stronger educational system for future generations and
how we can boost the economy so it can gradually grow to become one of the strongest in our nation.
First, we began by evaluating public education. As a state, we must realize the importance of
putting the students first and rising above the public education bureaucracy that has been set forth over
the years. New York State spends more money than any other state in the country for education, yet we
are still lingering 38th in graduation rates. It simply does not make sense. So where do we start?
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Let’s take a look at a fairly controversial topic you and I can easily recognize: abolishing teacher
tenure. The tenure law has existed in New York State since 1917, but it was not until 1980 that all public
school teachers and teaching assistants were included under the protections. In 2010, the federal
government enacted legislation to qualify for Race to the Top, but this failed and left New York in search
for a more allusive teacher evaluation system.
Our current system makes it extremely difficult to reward our exceptional teachers and remove
the under-performing ones. The time has come for New York to set precedence and move forward to a
better and brighter future for our students. If we can hold our government accountable for their actions,
then why should we not hold our public school teachers accountable, too?! Especially after the billions of
dollars we spend trying to do so with a faulty system.
With that, I strongly urge the passage of Bill #9 in the Senate. Not only will this bill eliminate
teacher tenure, but it will also create a new evaluation system that will act as building blocks to a stronger
system in years to come.
In 1966, New York State approved a constitutional amendment that allowed for a government-run lottery.
Originally, the proceeds were to be “applied exclusively to, or in aid or support of, education.” Although
this still remains true, the breakdown in the percentage of funds allocated to each area must be revised
since the amount of money that was promised to go toward education has significantly decreased over
time. Thus, I urge you to pass Bill #13 in Assembly Liberty.
With this bill, we would be looking to amend Section 1612 of the New York State Tax Law, to increase
and cap the percentage of money from the New York State lottery dedicated to education. By reducing the
prize money for all lottery drawings from 51% to 40% and the administrative costs from 3% to 2%, we
could easily increase education aid from 38% to 50%. This 12% increase is simple, it is effective, and it
ensures that the original intentions of the lottery are to be upheld under every circumstance.
A final bill regarding education that I ask you to support is Bill #25 in Assembly Freedom. This bill
proposes an amendment to Section 3202 of the New York State Education Law, which would eliminate
the funding for charter schools across the state. Each year, portions of public school district budgets are
used to fund charter schools. Although these schools are are not required to follow the same stipulations
as public schools, they are still funded in the same way - does this really seem fair?
In the economic crisis our state is facing, we must take every available opportunity to save
money, and in this case, making charter schools self-sustaining would save New York an abundance of
money. In fact, we could be saving up to $435.5 million per year. Additionally, we must understand that
if this bill is passed, charter schools would not fail to operate seeing as though many heavily rely on a
determined tuition and the support of benefactors in conjunction to the state funding.
Moving forward to the second point on the Executive Agenda, I would like to call your attention
to casino gambling. Over the years, we have gone back and forth on whether or not we should legalize
this act across our state. But the fact of the matter is this: New York currently has five casinos on Native
American reservations and nine racinos on our racetracks. Additionally, New York has 29,000 electronic
gaming machines which total more than Atlantic City and any other state in the Northeast. That is why I
am urging you to pass Bill #14 in Assembly Freedom and Resolution #20 in Assembly Liberty.
Both pieces of legislation will legalize casino gambling, but in an effective way, to move our state
into the right direction. Not only would we be generating excessive sums of money, but we would also be
creating jobs and attracting tourists to our great state of New York.
According to the Department of Labor, New York holds an unemployment rate of 8%. At the end
of last year, the number of unemployed New Yorkers increased by 8,700 people from November to
December. One major factor in this unemployment rate is illegal immigration. Currently, there are
645,000 illegal immigrants within our state borders, and 374,000 of these immigrants are active in the
workforce. This is creating fierce job competition between the illegals of our state and the struggling New
York taxpayers. Thus, I strongly urge you to pass Bill #32 in Assembly Liberty.
With this piece of legislation, we will be punishing businesses who knowingly or unknowingly
hire illegal immigrants. By doing so, we will deter businesses from eying a cheap source of labor,
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increase the availability of jobs for New Yorkers, and essentially aim to decrease the number of illegal
immigrants within the American workforce.
Finally, the last piece of legislation that coincides with the Executive Agenda is Bill #11 in the
Senate. In a time where many families across New York are struggling to make ends meet, it is not
uncommon for minors to contribute to the family income. In the context of this bill, minors aged sixteen
and seventeen would be allowed to work a maximum of thirty-five hours a week when school is in
session and fifty-four hours a week when school is out of session. Compared to Article 4, Section 134 of
the current New York State Labor Law, this would only result in a seven hour increase when school is in
session, and a six hour increase when school is out of session. This bill by, no means, would interfere
with the minor’s education since the proposed amendment leaves more than four hours per night to
partake in other said activities.
During chamber sessions today, I ask that you please be mindful of these seven bills and listen to each
side of the argument before developing your own stance.
One year ago, I stood before you at the Desmond Hotel and posed a challenge for each and every
delegate in this program. A challenge that would not be easily accepted by many young adults our age
throughout the world today. This challenge was to let your voice be heard.
Again, I return to the program for another consecutive year to pose the same challenge for you.
No matter which part of the program you represent this weekend, do not be afraid to speak up; do not be
afraid to express your opinions; and do not be afraid to step out of your comfort zones. I assure you that if
you use your voice, you will be successful.
This weekend as Occupiers of Albany we are here to prove that New York’s next generation will
be its greatest. As the honorable Governor Andrew Cuomo said in his 2012 State of the State Address,
“Last year, we learned to walk - this year, we run... We have only begun to explore the capacity of our
partnership and the limits of our imagination.”
With that being said, let’s smile, let’s have fun, and let’s get to work! Thank you all for your
ongoing attention and support, good luck in your endeavors for the course of this weekend, and may God
bless the great State of New York!
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Executive Bill Decisions
Governor Paige Hughes
2011 – 2012
Signed
S - 04 A Cap funding for correctional services and allocate the money towards educational
facilities.
S – 04 B Add subsection 14 to section 220.16 of the New York State Penal Law to ban “bath
salts”, the manufacture, sale, and distribution of bath salts in New
S – 11 extend the hours of work available for minors sixteen and seventeen years of age beyond
the set maximum in § 134 of article 4 of New York State Labor Law in order to allow
them to further support their families financially.
S – 12 This bill will address flaws in the current system of criminal probation.
S – 13 Amend the New York State Penal Law by adding section 125.30, to require parental
permission for a minor to have an abortion.
S - 20 Regulate in-store tobacco advertisement
AL-01 Amend Education Law §313 in order to eliminate racial bias towards the admittance of
students into state colleges.
AL-08 Amend §3-0313of the Environmental Conservation law by adding sub-section 8 to
illegalize Hydraulic Fracturing
AL-11 The purpose of this bill is to limit the extent of Port Authority fare increase, and
ultimately to save New Yorkers money.
AL-13 Amend Section 1612, by adding subsection 6 to the New York State tax law to increase
and cap the percentage of money from the New York State lottery dedicated to education.
AL-16 Amend § 3609-E by Adding Subsection 5 to the New York State Education Law to
Maintain Educational Funding at the 2010-11 Level for Each School District in the State.
AL-20 Members of the assembly urge the state Senate in joining them to amend the New York
State Constitution to legalize casino gambling.
AL-26 create a database in which incidents of bullying are mandated to be recorded, and to
establish a plan to terminate the problem of bullying.
AL-27 Amend section 30.10 subsections (b) and (e) of the Criminal Procedure Law to increase
the statute of limitations for rape and sexual conduct in the second and third degrees.
AL-31 Restrict the amount of time an individual or family can live within public housing.
AF-07 Allow registered independents to vote in primary elections.
AF-08 Amend Section 490.60 of the New York State Penal Law to establish the crime of
terrorist recruitment a Class C felony
AF-17 Amend section 3-C of the General Municipal Law to revoke the 2% property tax cap and
replace it with a 2% spending cap for each school district
AF-19 change the wording of the selective service law to mandate that both men and women
have to sign up for the draft at age 18.
AF-23 amend section 182.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law to mandate video arraignment
AF-25 Amend §3202 of the New York State Education Law in order to eliminate the funding for
charter schools
AF-36 Amend section 606 of existing tax law S884-2011 to provide additional assistance to inhome
caregivers by increasing the tax credit from twenty percent to forty percent
AF-39 Require all New York State street vendors to adopt the New York City policy , to obtain a
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positive letter grade from the department of health inspectors in order to maintain their
street vendor license.
AF-40 Amend an unfunded special education mandate in order to make it non mandatory for
high schools of a Class C population and under to be required to have one special
education teacher for each core subject.
AF-41 Ban the possession of all tobacco products from minors
Bills Vetoed by the Executive Branch:
S-03: Allow a school nurse to give over-the-counter medication to students with parental consent.
Vetoed as this is a school district issue.
S-14: Repeal Status of Limitation on Child Abuse
Vetoed as this goes against AL-27 (signed) which is to Amend section 30.10 subsections
(b) and (e) of the Criminal Procedure Law to increase the statute of limitations for rape
and sexual conduct in the second and third degrees.
S-15: Make it possible for first time, nonviolent offenders to serve in the military in lieu of a serving
time in a correctional facility
Vetoed - Criminals should not be able to serve in the military
AL-18: End Affirmative Action in the admissions process to New York state Funded Colleges
(SUNY's).
Vetoed
AL-19: Amend the Section 2 of Article 3 of the New York State Constitution to place a term limit on
New York State Legislators of Four Two-Year Terms.
Vetoed due to a technicality issue
AL-35: Add letter C to TAX Article 22 Part 2 section 616, To exempt veterans within the state with 8
years of service from future New York State income tax.
Vetoed
AL-36: Deduct tax dollars from correctional facilities and utilize it towards Educational purposes.
Vetoed
AF-01: Enforce stricter punishments for cases dealing with bullying, harassment, and intimidation in
public schools as well as school-related activities in grades 7-12 across the state of New York.
Vetoed: Idea, not something that can be implemented through legislation; school district
issue
AF-02: Remove the statue of limitations for reporting a case involving sexual misconduct with a minor.
Vetoed: Goes against AL-27 (signed)
AF-24: Amend Section 60.45 of the criminal procedure law; rules of evidence; admissibility of
statements of defendant
Vetoed: Ineffective; interrogations should not be available to the public
AL-28: Reinstate Capital Punishment in the State of New York
Vetoed: Governor does not agree with Capital Punishment
AF-29: Amend the NYS Education Law S-3204-A To prohibit school districts from disallowing
homeschoolers residing in the state of New York from participating in interscholastic and
intramural athletic programs and non-athletic extracurricular activities.
Vetoed Students who are homeschooled should not have the ability to participate in
extra-curriculars if they choose not attend the school
AF-33: To prevent the abuse of foster care children.
Vetoed: Ineffective; poorly written
AF-35: Repeal New York State’s statue of limitations for child sexual abuse, allowing victims to
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indefinitely press charges against their attackers.
Vetoed: Goes against AL-27 (signed)
AF-37: Add subsection 9 to section 605 of New York State Education Law. To provide better access to
healthcare for the citizens under the poverty line in New York State through the creation of a
scholarship program that allows prospective medical students to apply for a chance to reduce the
cost of their education.
Vetoed: There simply is not enough money within New York's Education budget to
create such a program
AF-38: To forbid smoking in multi-housing units
Vetoed: Cannot be enforced; discretion of the citizen as to whether or not they want to
smoke in their own homes
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Bills Passed and Signed by the Executive
Cabinet during the
76 th Youth and Government State
Conference
March 9-11, 2012
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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER S – 04 A
INTRODUCED BY: Nana Apraku, Tenaja Smith-Butler, Jainaba Darboe and Joy Ugiagbe
AN ACT
TO: Cap funding for correctional services and allocate the money towards educational facilities.
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose
The purpose of our bill is to ensure that education is given proper priority in the NYS budget system. We wish to
allocate more funds to education upon the passage of our bill.
Summary of Provisions
Section 1:
Allocation: To set apart for a special purpose; designate.
NYS (New York State) Budget: A drafting of how and where funding for NYS will be spread.
Educational facilities can be daycares, schools, afterschool programs or a library.
Section 2:
Our bill is going to cap funding for correctional services and put the money that would have been given to correctional
services to educational facilities. At the end of the drafting, where legislators create the budget, cap for correctional
services made and all the extra original funds will be deducted from the planned amount and allocated to the educational
portion of the NYS Budget.
Justification
Education is a major element in the development of children and young adults in society. However recent studies
have shown that there is a growing unbalance in the amount of money spent on education compared to correctional
institutions. California spends almost 3-5 times more money on jails and prisons than on education with a graduation rate
of only 68% and this situation is where New York will be soon if there isn’t a plan to prevent it. New York spends about
$56,000 per inmate compared to the average $16,000 per student enrolled in the school system. There has been an
increasing trend to spend more money on jail systems, in 1986 the U.S. allocated almost 10 billion dollars toward
correctional facilities by 2005 that number quadrupled to almost 43 billion dollars. State prisons have as many as 8,000
excess beds at their 67 facilities, and the ratio of correction officers to inmates far exceeds national averages, state
records show. Millions of dollars are also paid to improve jail beds or front gate presentation. New York State must set
priorities and make sure that when money is tight that we are allocating it properly.
Fiscal Implications
We do not plan to add or reduce the amount of funds provided we wish to spread them more fairly.
Effective Date
The 2013-2014 NYS Budget Drafting process. (Begins in Spring).
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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER S-04 B
INTRODUCED BY: Heather Kilmer, Jaye Kudreyko, Brittany Bassett, and Marisa Passaro
AN ACT
TO: Add subsection 14 to section 220.16 of the New York State Penal Law.
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly do enact as follows:
Purpose
To ban “bath salts”, the manufacture, sale, and distribution of bath salts in New York State.
Summary of Provisions
Section 1: Definitions
“Bath Salts”: A mixture of hallucinogenic substances such as mephedrone, Methylenedioxypyrovalerone, or MDPV,
methylone, and various other substances based on the manufacturer and brand.
D.E.A: Drug Enforcement Administration; a component of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Section 2: Provisions
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree when he knowingly and unlawfully
posses:
1. A narcotic drug with intent to sell it; or
2. A stimulant, hallucinogenic substance, or lysergic acid diethylamide, with intent to sell it and has previously
been convicted of an offence defined in article two hundred twenty or the attempt or conspiracy to commit any
such offense; or
3. A stimulant with intent to sell it and said stimulant weighs one gram or more; or
4. Lysergic acid diethylamide with intent to sell it and said lysergic acid diethylamide weighs one milligram or
more; or
5. A hallucinogen with intent to sell it and said hallucinogen weights twenty-five milligrams or more; or
6. A hallucinogenic substance with intent to sell it and said hallucinogenic substance weighs one gram or more; or
7. One or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances containing methamphetamine, its salts, isomers or
salts of isomers with intent to sell it and said preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances are of an
aggregate weight of one-eighth ounce or more; or
8. A stimulant and said stimulant weighs five grams or more; or
9. Lysergic acid diethylamide and said lysergic acid diethylamide weighs five milligrams or more; or
10. A hallucinogenic substance and said hallucinogen weighs one hundred twenty-five milligrams or more; or
11. A hallucinogenic substance and said hallucinogenic substance weighs five grams or more; or
12. One or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances containing a narcotic drug and said preparations,
compounds mixtures or substances are of an aggregate weight of one-half ounce or more; or
13. Phencyclidine and said phencyclidine weighs one thousand two hundred fifty milligrams or more; or
14. A “bath salt” containing mephedrone, methylenedioxypyrovalerone, and methylone with intent to sell or use it.
Fiscal Implications
There are no necessary funds needed, there is no tax paid on this substance.
Justification
This Bill will ensure the safety of the public in New York State. By banning “bath salts”, New York State can protect
users of this drug and the people around them.
Effective Date
This bill will go into effect one year after its passage.

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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER S-11
INTRODUCED BY: Bree Dexter, Helen Dillingham, Ashley Moss, Gail Van Valkenburg
AN ACT
TO: Amend § 134 of article 4 of New York State Labor Law
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose
The purpose of this bill is to extend the hours of work available for minors sixteen and seventeen years of age
beyond the set maximum in § 134 of article 4 of New York State Labor Law in order to allow them to further
support their families financially.
Summary of Provisions
Section 1
Hours of work for minors sixteen and seventeen years of age. 1. When school is in session, no minor sixteen or
seventeen years of age enrolled in a daytime school, other than a part-time or continuation school, shall be
employed: a. (i) More than four hours on any day preceding a school day, other than on a Sunday or holiday; (ii)
except that students enrolled in a cooperative work experience program approved by the department of education
may be employed for no more than six hours on any day preceding a school day, other than on a Sunday or
holiday, if such hours of employment occur solely pursuant to such program. Any hours worked by students in
such programs shall be included when calculating the number of hours worked for purposes of subparagraph (i)
of this paragraph;
b. More than eight hours on a Friday, Saturday, Sunday or holiday;
c. More than twenty-eight thirty-five hours a week.
d. More than six days a week;
e. After ten o'clock at night on any day preceding a school day, or after midnight on any day preceding a school
day provided the employer receives and maintains both the written consent of the minor's parent or guardian and
a certificate which shall be provided to the employer at the end of each marking period by the minor's school
which shall assert that such minor is in satisfactory academic standing according to the standards in such school
district;
f. After ten o’clock at night on any day preceding a non-school day or, if the employer receives and maintains
the written consent of the minor's parent or guardian, after midnight; or
g. Before six o'clock in the morning.
Section 2
When school is not in session, no minor sixteen or seventeen years of age shall be employed:
a. More than eight nine hours a day, except that for the purpose of making one or more shorter work days or a
holiday in a week, such persons may be employed up to ten hours on any one day of the week, and nine hours on
any of four other days, but not in excess of forty-eight fifty-four hours in any such week;
b. More than forty-eight fifty-four hours a week.
c. More than six days a week; or
d. After twelve midnight or before six o'clock in the morning.
Justification
This bill gives teens more opportunities to earn money during a time of economic turmoil. The amount of
families that rely on teens’ income is increasing, and it is time that these teens are given more of a chance to
assist their families. This bill only benefits families and minors that wish to work more.
Fiscal Implications
There are no fiscal implications.
Effective Date
If passed, this bill shall go into effect as of January 1, 2013.
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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER S - 12
Introduced By: Maria Henry, Ani Marellapudi, Andrew Quigley, Cassius Wilkinson
AN ACT
TO: This bill will address flaws in the current system of criminal probation.
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose
The institution of an intensively supervised probation system, similar to Hawaii’s HOPE (Hawaii's Opportunity
Probation with Enforcement) program, will minimize the amount of repeat offenders (of drug related crimes) within our State’s
criminal justice system. A combination of swift and consistent punishment for the violation of probation, coupled with the full
cooperation of probation officers, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and New York State police forces, we can effectively induce the
behavioral change that will allow probationers to return to their rightful place in society.
Summary of Provisions
Probationers in HOPE Probation receive swift, predictable, and immediate sanctions – typically resulting in several days
in jail – for each detected violation, such as detected drug use or missed appointments with a probation officer. In HOPE
Probation, defendants are clearly warned that if they violate the rules, they go to jail. Defendants are required to call a hotline each
weekday morning to find out if they must take a drug test that day. Random drug testing occurs at least once a week for the first
two months. If probationers test positive, they are arrested immediately. If they fail to appear for the test or violate other terms of
probation, warrants for their arrest are issued immediately. Once they are apprehended, a probation modification hearing is held
two days later, and violators are typically sentenced to a short jail term. The jail time may increase for subsequent violations and
repeat offenders are often ordered into residential treatment.
Amendments will be made to New York State Penal Law Article 65.00 and 65.10 concerning the repeated probation of
drug users. Such criminals would be given a regimen of HOPE probation.
Justification
In New York State, we see the same fundamental problems in probation enforcement that once plagued the Hawaii Justice
System. Offenders, convicted of drug related crimes, are placed in a probation system that is too lenient and too negligent of their
problems. Probation officers frequently allow offenders to have multiple violations of their parole without consequence. Then,
after an arbitrarily chosen number of violations, offenders’ probation is revoked and they serve the rest of their sentences in jail.
Our current system is flawed on a psychological level as it offers offenders no incentive to change their behavior. They are allowed
to violate the terms of their parole until their probation is suddenly and arbitrarily revoked. The policy of fast and consistent
punishment will create the deterrence that offenders currently lack. New York State will see that the threat of punishment, when
upheld by the entire criminal justice system, will be enough alone to deter the violation of probation.
Justification of this reform is warranted by the ineffectiveness of the current New York State probation. In 2010, there
were 113,858 people arrested for drug offenses and among those, 61.8% of the arrestees had prior offenses. Being on the HOPE
program reduces an offender’s chance of facing sanction by one half, and of going to prison by two-thirds. Furthermore, it reduces
the chance of being arrested for a new crime by over fifty percent. Institution of the HOPE program will not only shrink the drug
market, but will save lives, as the vast majority of offenders are deterred from using drugs, and the small percentage that continue
to do will receive rehabilitative treatment on a more personal and effective level.
Fiscal Implications
The establishment of this parole reform would hold strong economic incentives for the state, in its current fiscal
condition. The cost per offender in the system is an additional $1400 per year (inclusive of the mandatory rehabilitation programs
for offenders who continue to fail tests), and saves $7000 per year. An average of $30,00 of public tax money is required to
imprison a convict for one year. This probation system would help reduce the necessities from taxpayer funds, as it would create
an environment in which a lower proportion of those on probation return to prison. With these results, taxes can either be
decreased, or can instead be invested in state institutions with more productive returns (i.e. education).
Effective Date
If passed, this bill’s legislation would go into effect beginning on June 1, 2012.
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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER S - 13
INTRODUCED BY: Emily Vigliotta, Devin Messina, Celina Bassett and Ashley Guillois
AN ACT
TO: Amend the New York State Penal Law by adding section 125.30, to require parental permission for a minor to have
an abortion.
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose
The purpose of this bill is to require any unemancipated minor to receive consent from a parent or guardian in order to
have an abortion. This will ensure that minors make responsible decisions, under the guidance of their guardian,
regarding whether or not to have an abortion.
Summary of Provisions
Section 1: Definitions
Unemancipated: a minor still under parental authority
Section 2: Provisions
125.30 Parental Consent for a minor to have an abortion.
It is required that all unemancipated minors receive parental permission, from one or more parents, to have an
abortion.
Justification
Parents have traditionally been recognized as having rights regarding the medical authority of their children. In New
York State, parents are required by law to provide permission when their minor child has a tooth drilled, bone x-rayed, or
ears pierced, but they do not need to give consent for their pregnant daughter to have the surgical procedure of an
abortion. Parents in New York State have the right to have a say in a serious medical procedure, which could affect their
daughter both physically and emotionally for the rest of her life.
This bill addresses the best interest of minors. In New York, over 83% of abortions occur in outpatient clinics; therefore,
a girl is unlikely to have the benefit of conferring with a trusted family physician about her decision. Mandating parental
consent of a minor’s decision to have an abortion will help to ensure that the minor is speaking to those who know her
best about her medical history, the risks of abortion, and available alternatives.
There are also a myriad of side effects from abortions including but not limited to PTSD, cancer, heart disease, urine
hemorrhage, uterine perforation, or inflammation. This bill will help make sure the girl receives any necessary treatment
or medical attention following the procedure. In order to protect any pregnant girls considering abortion, New York must
join the 22 other states and require parental permission for a minor to have an abortion. Where parental consent for
abortions has been put into effect, the results have been significant and extremely beneficial to the state and citizens.
Fiscal Implications
There are no fiscal implications for this bill.
Effective Date
This bill will go into effect exactly one year after its passage.
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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER S - 20
INTRODUCED BY: Kaliel Williamson, Thomasina Nguyen, Jah'male Dickson, & Kiersten Gordon
AN ACT
TO: Regulate in-store tobacco advertisement
The people of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose
To prevent New York State minors from exposure to tobacco advertisements that may convince them to use said
substance, even though it is only legal for adult use.
Summary of Provisions
Section 1
"Material" means anything tangible which is capable of being used or adapted to arouse interest, whether through the
medium of reading, observation, sound or in any other manner, or the display.
“Class B Misdemeanor” means any misdemeanor that is punishable by imprisonment of up to six months.
“ATUPA” means adolescent tobacco use prevention act - which says that stores cannot sell tobacco products to minors. If
violated, fines and/or licence suspension is implemented depending on the number of offences.
Section 2
Tobacco materials are to be kept out of sight in stores that are open to minors. Tobacco materials may be kept under
counters, in closed cabinets, or other areas out of sight to customers unless the customer demonstrates proof of legal age.
A person or establishment is guilty of illegally advertising tobacco products to minors when the material is located in
plain view inside, outside, and on the property of the store. Punishment for unlawful tobacco advertising corresponds with
the punishment outlined in the Adolescent Tobacco Use Prevention Act (ATUPA) - Public Health Law Article 13-F.
Justification
Youth who shop in stores filled with tobacco advertisements are twice as likely to start smoking. Tobacco advertisements
are more influential on adolescent smoking behavior than peer pressure. In a survey of Albany county minors, most agree
that less teens would smoke without tobacco advertisements. Studies show that minors are influenced by tobacco
advertisements more than adults. Studies show that adults who already use tobacco are barely influenced by the
advertisements. On average, people who begin smoking do so before the age of 18.
Tobacco companies may still communicate with adults and retailers may inform customers that cigarettes are for sale.
Places that have criminalized in-store tobacco advertisement have seen decline in youth tobacco use, and local business
have not experienced any significant impact.
There are highly negative social implications for a large smoking population.
(a) Smoking overall kills 25,500 people every year in New York State.
(b) Secondhand smoke kills 2,500 New Yorkers every year.
(c) There are an estimated 570,000 New Yorkers afflicted with serious disease directly attributable to their smoking.
A state average of 14.8% of teenagers use tobacco products. Cigarettes are the only legal substance that is harmful when
used properly or in any amount. The World Health Organization supports a ban on tobacco product displays. Minors are
not legally permitted to smoke, so they should not be influenced to.
Fiscal Implications
The New York State government budget will not be altered. New York State small business owners will largely be
unaffected as seen in countries that already apply this law (Canada, Thailand, Iceland)
More than $8.1 billion is spent treating illnesses caused by smoking. In 2010, smoking caused $6.5 billion in lost wages
and productivity. This law may eventually offset the negative implications of a large smoking population.
Effective Date
This law will be enacted January 1st, 2013.

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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AL - 01
INTRODUCED BY: Michael Andersen and Marisa Parrotta
AN ACT
TO: amend Education Law §313 in order to eliminate racial bias towards the admittance of students into state colleges.
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose
Section 1
1. State College - Any college in the state of New York baring the label of “SUNY” and any community college in the
state of New York.
Section 2
We plan to amend this law in order to eliminate the current racial/ethnic bias we believe is being enacted on students who
apply to state colleges.
Summary of Provisions
3. (f) The requirements of this section shall not apply to an students applying to a state run college in that race/ethnicity
can no longer be listed or written on an application to a New York State funded college.
Justification
The purpose of this initiative is to eliminate bias in the admission to the State University of New York collegiate system,
giving fair opportunities to equally qualified students, regardless of race, ethnicity, or heritage.
Fiscal Implications
This would have little to no fiscal implications because most applications are online, and those that aren’t can simply be
printed for the new year excluding the race/ethnicity sections.
Effective Date
This bill would go into affect upon its passage.
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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AL - 08
INTRODUCED BY: Kelci Henn, Zoey Gliksman
AN ACT
TO: Amend §3-0313of the Environmental Conservation law by adding sub-section 8 to illegalize Hydraulic Fracturing
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly do enact as follows:
Purpose
The purpose of this bill is to illegalize the process of hydraulic fracturing in the state of New York.
Summary of Provisions
Section 1: Definitions
A. Hydraulic Fracturing – a process in which fractures within rock layers below the earth’s surface are opened
and widened by injecting chemicals and liquids at high pressure: used especially to extract natural gas or oil.
B. E.P.A. –The Environmental Protection Agency, established by the United States government to coordinate
federal programs aimed at combating pollution and protecting the environment.
C. Natural Gas – a combustible mixture of gaseous hydro carbons (HC) beneath the earth’s surface used for
energy.
D. Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC’s) - compounds emitted as gases from certain solids or liquids. They
include a variety of chemicals, some of which may have short and long-term adverse health effects.
Justification
In 2010 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimated that 70 to 140 billion gallons of water are used to fracture
35,000 wells in the United States each year. The extraction of so much water for fracking has raised concerns about the
ecological impacts to aquatic resources, as well as dewatering or drinking water aquifers. In addition to large volumes of
water being wasted, there is a variety of chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing fluids which are proven to be toxic to
humans and wildlife only further polluting the environment. Negative medical effects such as cancer, respiratory
infection, nervous paralysis, and other respiratory or digestive complications are directly linked to the leftover chemicals
from the highly flammable and toxic gas that is amidst within the drinking water and atmosphere of many residents due to
this dangerous drilling process.
Fiscal Implications
There are no fiscal implications for this legislation.
Effective Date
This bill will go into effect immediately after its passage.

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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AL - 11
INTRODUCED BY: Rocco Graziano
AN ACT:
TO: Cap Port Authority fare hikes on bridges and tunnels
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose:
The purpose of this bill is to limit the extent of Port Authority fare increase, and ultimately to save New Yorkers
money.
Justification
New Yorkers work hard for their money. A state employed worker makes around $33,000 a year. If someone
pays cash on Port authority tolls, they are paying roughly $3,120 a year. This is because there are, on average, 260
working days in a year, and the cash tolls is $12.00. If you use an EZ-Pass, you will pay $2,470 a year. To get more
money, the avaricious Port Authority is trying to raise fares 4% of the next 4 years. New Yorkers can't afford to pay
these prices. 10% of an average state employed worker's annual pay goes just to the Port Authority. In the past, people
have not stood idly by while they had to pay large sums of money. Also, the unemployment rate in New York State was,
according to good reports, 7.9% in October 2011. This bill would allow the unemployed save money. The fares hinder the
unemployed from searching for jobs because they don’t have the money to pay the tolls. Also, the money they use on tolls
could go towards basic living necessities such as, food, car payments, or their mortgage. A private audit will ensure that
the income of the Port Authority is put to good and legal uses.
Summary of Provisions
Section 1
Fare- the price of conveyance or passage in a bus, train, airplane, or other vehicle
Cap- to put a maximum limit on
Section 2
Our bill will cap Port Authority fares on bridges and tunnels. It will limit the Port Authority to raising fares only 50 cents
every four years. This bill would impose a yearly private audit of Port Authority expenses and income.
Section 3
The purpose of this bill is to limit the extent of Port Authority fare increases, and ultimately to save New Yorkers money.
Fiscal Implications
This bill will have a positive impact on New York residents. It will save them thousands of dollars in money that
they would have to pay in tolls. The state would be gaining money too. This bill does allow for tolls to increase, just not
too much.
Effective Date -This bill will go into effect immediately upon its passage.

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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AL - 13
INTRODUCED BY: Angela D’Angelo, Kelsey Barnett, Kwasi Enin, Matthew Carroll
AN ACT
TO: Amend Section 1612, by adding subsection 6 to the New York State tax law to increase and cap the percentage of
money from the New York State lottery dedicated to education.
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly do enact as follows:
Purpose
The purpose of this bill is to increase and cap the amount of money given to New York State education out of the New
York State lottery funds. The lottery originally started out as taxes going towards community construction and aid. It was
made governmental by New York State so the majority of lottery funding could go into education.
Summary of Provisions
Section 1: Definitions
Administrative costs: An expense incurred in controlling and directing and directing an organization, but not directly
identifiable with financing, marketing, or production operations. Administrative costs are related to the organization as a
whole as opposed to expenses related to individual departments.
Constitutional: Of or pertaining to the constitution of a state, organization, etc.
Section 2:
f. As consideration for the operation of the video lottery gaming facility at Aqueduct racetrack, the division shall
cause the investment in the racing industry of the following percentages of the vendor fee to be deposited or paid, as
follows:
1. Six and one-half percent of the total wagered after payout of prizes for the first year of operation of video
lottery gaming at Aqueduct racetrack, seven percent of the total wagered after payout of prizes for the second year of
operation, and seven and one-half percent of the total wagered after payout of prizes for the third year of operation
and thereafter, for the purpose of enhancing purses at Aqueduct racetrack, Belmont Park racetrack and Saratoga race
course.
2. One percent of the total wagered after payout of prizes for the first year of operation of video lottery gaming at
Aqueduct racetrack, one and one-quarter percent of the total wagered after payout of prizes for the second year of
operation, and one and one-half percent of the total wagered after payout of prizes for the third year of operation and
thereafter, for an appropriate breeding fund for the manner of racing conducted at Aqueduct racetrack, Belmont Park
racetrack and Saratoga race course.
3. Four percent of the total revenue wagered after payout of prizes to be deposited into an account of the franchised
corporation established pursuant to section two hundred six of the racing, pari-mutuel wagering and breeding law to be
used for capital expenditures in maintaining and upgrading Aqueduct racetrack, Belmont Park racetrack and Saratoga
race course.
4. Three percent of the total revenue wagered after payout for prizes to be deposited into an account of the
franchised corporation established pursuant to section two hundred six of the racing, pari-mutuel wagering and
breeding law to be used for general thoroughbred racing operations at Aqueduct racetrack, Belmont Park
racetrack and Saratoga race course
5. Paragraphs one, two, three and four of this subdivision shall be known collectively as the "racing support
payments".
g. In the event the state elects to construct a video lottery terminal facility at the Aqueduct racetrack, all video lottery
terminal revenues payable to the video lottery gaming operator at the Aqueduct racetrack remaining after payment of
the racing support payments shall first be used to repay the state's advances for (i) confirmation of the chapter eleven
plan of reorganization and cash advances for the franchised corporation's operations following confirmation of the
chapter eleven plan of reorganization and (ii) the amount expended by the state to construct such video lottery
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terminal facility at Aqueduct racetrack pursuant to an agreement with the state. Subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of this
paragraph shall be defined as the state advance amount and the
amounts payable to the division of the lottery.
6. The prize money for all lottery drawings shall be reduced from 51% to 40%, and Administrative costs are to be reduced
from 3% to 2%. Education aid will be increased from 38% to 50% from all drawings. This will capped and mandated.
Justification
The lottery proceedings go by prize money (51%), aid to education (38%), retailer commissions (6%), contractor fees
(2%) and administrative costs (3%). Today, more money is going to the government out of lottery than promised to go
into education and the percentage of the money that was to go to education has decreased over time. As originally
promised when the lottery was made governmental, the education percentage will be the highest coming out of lottery
fund drawings and this bill will put into effect the original intentional and ensure that it remains that way.
Fiscal Implications
All funding comes directly out of the New York State lottery.
Effective Date
This bill will go into effect one year upon its passage.

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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AL - 16
INTRODUCED BY: Adam Henn, Nicholas Telano, Adam Zarcone, Amanda Reiffert
AN ACT
TO: Amend § 3609-E by Adding Subsection 5 to the New York State Education Law to Maintain Educational Funding
at the 2010-11 Level for Each School District in the State.
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly do enact as follows:
Purpose
To ensure future educational prosperity by instituting that programs and funding that a district already holds cannot be
further taken away due to state budget cuts year after year.
Summary of Provisions
Section1: Definitions:
A) Fiscal Year – a period used for calculating annual financial statements for business, corporations, and other
organizations. The New York fiscal year begins on April 1st and ends on March 31 st
B) Fiscal Budget - An itemized summary of estimated or intended spending for a given period along with
proposals for financing them.
C) State Aid - Public money appropriated by a state government for the support or improvement of a public
local institution
Section 2: Provisions:
§ 3609-E. School tax relief aid, when and how payable commencing July1, 1998. Notwithstanding any other
provisions of this article, school tax relief aid shall be paid pursuant to this section.
5. Any payment to a school district through state aid or government funding shall be given back, continuously held and
maintained for the remainder of every school year without any cuts or withholdings of this money from any
governmental institution at any time.
a. The funding and state aid shall comprise of the school districts particular needs addressed for in that school
district’s 2010-2011budget plan and shall never be altered by deductions from cuts.
b. Educational funding shall never decrease from cuts and must be remained untouched by the state government based
on the 2010-11 funding level but can be increased based off of advancements of the curriculums and extracurricular
activities within the district based on the allotted expenditures.
Justification
Before the extremely drastic education budget cuts around the state from the governor’s 2011 initial executive budget plan,
school districts were plentiful with beneficial school activities, curriculums, and faculty. Any cuts towards NYS education will
never be able to take place, and funding can only be added depending on the needs of the school district for that year, only
resulting in educational success and maintained expenditures. Also, finding a job within this economy is extremely difficult,
so faculty jobs and teacher positions will be kept and maintained rather than laid off as we have seen in this past year, which
only added to the unemployment. With this legislation we can ensure that proper learning, expenditures, and jobs are
rightfully given back and maintained at the successful 2010-2011 level to the future students and teachers of the state, thus
providing a well earned education that New York students rightfully deserve.
Fiscal Implications
Any fiscal cuts that take place towards education at any money value shall be based off of what the previous year’s state aid
statistics were for that district. Therefore, this legislation shall be enacted in accordance to every school district’s necessary
funding, proportional to the 2010-2011 funding level data. Also, the funding shall adjust to the inflation rate at whatever time
this legislation is enacted, therefore constantly positively changing according to the status of the state’s economy.
Effective Date
This legislation shall go into effect one year after its passage.
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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AL - 20
INTRODUCED BY: Christopher Cicerelli, Michael Gross and Jack Franzino
AN ACT
To: RESOLUTION: Members of the assembly urge the state Senate in joining them to amend the New York State
Constitution to legalize casino gambling.
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose
To amend Article I, section 9, of the New York State Constitution to legalize casino gambling.
Summary of Provisions
Whereas, Article I, section 9 of the New York State Constitution allows for games of chance to be permitted to only bona
fide religious, charitable or non-profit organizations for veterans, volunteer firefighter and similar non-profit organizations,
Whereas, the Constitution further states that the legislature shall pass laws that ensure such games are rigidly regulated to
prevent commercialized gambling,
Whereas, the need of New York State to fund additional revenue to address its current deficit of over two (2) billion
dollars,
Whereas, the need to create jobs throughout the state is of permanent concern given the current unemployment state in the
state,
Whereas, this resolution will allow for the creation of five (5) casinos in the first year after public referendum, and for a
maximum of ten (10) additional casinos over the next five (5) years, which will be spread throughout the geographical
regions of the state,
Resolved, that the assembly and Senate of the State of New York, jointly, that the Legislature of the State of New York
urges the passage of this resolution amending the Constitution of the State subject to a mandating public referendum,
Resolved, that the Chief Clerk of the Assembly transmits copies of this resolution to the Speaker of the Assembly and the
President Pro-Tempore and to each member of the New York State Legislature.
The New York State Constitution is amended to legalize casino gambling throughout the state. In the first year after the
passage of this amendment five (5) casinos will be licensed. There shall be a maximum of ten (10) casinos licensed over a
five (5) year period.
Effective Date
This bill shall go into effect exactly one year after its passage.

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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AL - 26
INTRODUCED BY: Chelsea Smart, Ashley Enright, Francine Gangone, Spela Sulga
AN ACT
TO: create a database in which incidents of bullying are mandated to be recorded, and to establish a plan to terminate the
problem of bullying.
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose
This piece of legislation will establish a database, in which, school officials will be mandated to record reported incidents
of bullying involving students within their school districts. Each case will be defined based on the levels of frequency and
severity of the behavior provided. Then, bullies involved in the incident will be required to attend sessions with a school
social worker to provide bullies with the help they need to terminate the behavior.
Summary of Provisions
Section 1: Definitions
Level I Bullying: A first time offender who intentionally harasses another by following them, engaging in a course of
conduct, or by committing acts which places a person in reasonable fear of physical or mental harm. This must be
reported incident within the New York State school districts only.
Level II Bullying: A bully who has been found bullying more than one time, by intentionally harassing another by
following them, engaging in a course of conduct, or by committing acts which places a person in reasonable fear of
physical or mental harm. This can be in person bullying reported by a school official into the database, cyber bullying
reported by police into the database, or a combination thereof.
Level III Bullying: A child who has been reported for bullying more than once and more severe, causing the victim
serious mental or physical injury. The bully must intentionally harass another by following them, engaging in a course of
conduct, or by committing acts which places a person in reasonable fear of physical or mental injury. This can be in
person bullying reported by a school official into the database, cyber bullying reported by police into the database, or a
combination thereof.
School Official: For purposes of this bill, a school official is defined as a staff member with disciplinary responsibilities
such as, a principle, assistant principle or dean within New York State school districts.
Cyber Bulling: Intentionally harassing a person by following them, or by committing acts which places a person in
reasonable fear of physical or mental harm through technology.
Section 2: Provisions
(1) All New York State schools are required to form a database in which they are mandated to record reported incidents
of bullying. Incident reports must include names of those involved in the situation, objective facts on what occurred, a
rationally based conclusion on why the incident happened and the situation’s effect on the victim. This information’s
access will be limited to school officials within the district only.
(2) Police are mandated to report incident of cyber bullying into the student’s school district’s database.
(3) The school district can view what police enter about students within their school districts only, but the police do not
have access what the school has entered. A minor’s record shall be terminated upon their graduation from the school
district.
(4) All New York State schools are required to define the level of bullying, based on the provided definitions, and follow
an action plan to provide a permanent solution to the problem. The plans of action are as follows: a bullying defined
under Level I is required to attend three mandatory thirty minute secessions with a school social worker, already
mandated by law, over a thirty day period of time: Level II offenders are required to attend six mandatory thirty minute
secessions with a school social worker over a sixty day period; and Level III bullies are required to attend nine thirty
minute secessions with a school social worker over ninety days.
(5) If a student refuses to go to the social worker sessions to correct the bullying behavior problem, the school has the
discretion to take disciplinary actions to follow. The State mandates the minimal action is an extra social worker session.
Justifications
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Bullying and Cyber Bullying is a rapidly increasing problem in New York State. Though legislation has been passed to
protect children from this violent epidemic, it has largely been unsuccessful because efforts solely attempt to help the
victim. This bill will target bullying at the roots of the problem: the bully. Instead of schools simply punishing the bully
through means such as suspension, this bill ensures that the perpetrator receives the help that they need to terminate their
behavior. Thus, this bill shall end the cycle of bullying and provide a permanent solution to the victim and to the bully.
Fiscal Implications
Considering New York State already mandates social workers are employed in every school district based upon
population, and the State mandates police officers report cyber bullying cases (this bill will only mandate the specific
database it is entered into) it will not burden the state with any further fiscal implications.
Effective Date
This piece of legislation will go into effect six months after its passage.

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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AL - 27
INTRODUCED BY: Kayleigh Martin, Joseph Cervone, Christy Zegel
AN ACT
TO: Amend section 30.10 subsections (b) and (e) of the Criminal Procedure Law to increase the statute of limitations for
rape and sexual conduct in the second and third degrees.
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly do enact as follows:
Purpose:
The purpose of this bill is to increase the statute of limitations for rape from five years to seven years.
Summary of Provisions
Section I: Definitions
Sexual Contact: the unlawful intentional touching of intimate parts for the purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim
or sexually gratifying the actor.
Sexual Conduct: means sexual intercourse, deviate sexual
intercourse, aggravated sexual contact, or sexual contact.
Section II: 30.10 Timeliness of prosecutions; periods of limitation.
1. A criminal action must be commenced within the period of limitation prescribed in the ensuing subdivisions of this
section.
2. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision three:
(a) A prosecution for a class A felony, or rape in the first degree as defined in section 130.35 of the penal law, or a
crime defined or formerly defined in section 130.50 of the penal law, or aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree
as defined in section 130.70 of the penal law, or course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree as defined
in section 130.75 of the penal law may be commenced at any time;
(b) A prosecution for any other felony must be commenced within five seven years after the commission thereof;
(c) A prosecution for a misdemeanor must be commenced within two years after the commission thereof;
(d) A prosecution for a petty offense must be commenced within one year after the commission thereof.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision two, the periods of limitation for the commencement of criminal
actions are extended as follows in the indicated circumstances:
(a) A prosecution for larceny committed by a person in violation of a fiduciary duty may be commenced within one
year after the facts constituting such offense are discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should
have been discovered by the aggrieved party or by a person under a legal duty to represent him who is not himself
implicated in the commission of the offense.
(b) A prosecution for any offense involving misconduct in public office by a public servant may be commenced at
any time during the defendant's service in such office or within five years after the termination of such service;
provided however, that in no event shall the period of limitation be extended by more than five years beyond the period
otherwise applicable under subdivision two.
(c) A prosecution for any crime set forth in title twenty-seven or article seventy-one of the environmental
conservation law may be commenced within four years after the facts constituting such crime are discovered or, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been discovered by a public servant who has the responsibility to enforce
the provisions of said title and article.
(d) A prosecution for any misdemeanor set forth in the tax law or chapter forty-six of the administrative code of the
city of New York must be commenced within three years after the commission thereof.
(e) A prosecution for course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree as defined in section 130.80 of the
penal law may be commenced within five seven years of the commission of the most recent act of sexual conduct.
(f) For purposes of a prosecution involving a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal
law, other than a sexual offense delineated in paragraph (a) of subdivision two of this section, committed against a
child less than eighteen years of age, incest in the first, second or third degree as defined in sections 255.27, 255.26
and 255.25 of the penal law committed against a child less than eighteen years of age, or use of a child in a sexual
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performance as defined in section 263.05 of the penal law, the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the child
has reached the age of eighteen or the offense is reported to a law enforcement agency or statewide central register of
child abuse and maltreatment, whichever occurs earlier.
(g) A prosecution for any felony defined in article four hundred ninety of the penal law must be commenced within
eight years after the commission thereof provided, however, that in a prosecution for a felony defined in article four
hundred ninety of the penal law, if the commission of such felony offense resulted in, or created a foreseeable risk of,
death or serious physical injury to another person, the
prosecution may be commenced at any time; provided, however, that nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to
shorten or otherwise lessen the period, defined in any other applicable law, in which a prosecution for a felony
designated in this paragraph may be commenced
Justification
In 2007, there were 248,300 victims of rape, attempted rape, or sexual assault. This does not include victims under the age
of 12. In 2010, there were 2,771 rapes reported in New York State. Sixty percent of rapes or acts of sexual assault go
unreported. Someone is sexually assaulted every two and a half minutes in the United States. By passing this amendment,
we can extend the amount of time allowed to prosecute a rape or sexual assault, thus putting more pedophiles behind bars
and getting justice for the victims.
Fiscal Implications
There are no fiscal implications in the foreseeable future.
Effective Date
This bill will go into effect one year after its passage.

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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AL - 31
INTRODUCED BY: Donavan Swanson Precious Asiedu
AN ACT:
TO: Restrict the amount of time an individual or family can live within public housing.
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly do enact as follows:
Purpose
The purpose of this bill is to improve New York City’s communities containing public housing. Public housing
has increased social and criminal activity causing the state more money and has supported generations of non-working to
low incoming families forming an unhealthy dependency on the state.
Summary of Provisions
Section 1
Public Housing: affordable housing provided and regulated by the public based on income and needs
(elderly, disabled, etc.)
HUD: Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Section 2
This bill will essentially place a time limit on each current and entering family in the NYSHA system.
This time limit would be created by HUD to help regulate and create an appropriate scale of for the amount within the
family and the amount of time they are able to stay. Any elderly or disabled persons or not included within this new
change. If a person exceeds their time limit they may apply again for public housing but may be required to prove
financial stability and a course for other housing goals.
Justification
Although public housing has provided low income families with an opportunity for shelter and support
it has formed an unhealthy dependency on residents and provided a cesspool for criminal activity and wasted tax dollars.
According to the New York State Housing Bureau Comspstat, from 2009 to 2010 a 2.3% increase was found in crime
within Public Housing along all five boroughs of New York City. These crimes include murder, rape, robbery, felony
assault, burglary, grand larceny and grand larceny auto; the total for 2010 being 4,183. Not only is this number
unacceptable for public housing grounds, but a reflection on the number of criminals entering the system alone from
crimes committed in Public Housing. Criminal Activity in these houses is a response to generations of the same families
living there breeding the same laid back, financially secure attitude. By pressuring families to exceed beyond the
minimum expectation and incorporate themselves into reliable, independent citizens of New York State. In 2008 NYCHA
held over 403,000 residents living in 178,000 apartments, home to 5 percent of New York City’s population with a budget
of $2.8 billion dollars. That $2.8 billion dollars is a sum of states taxes that all residents of NYS contributed to and the
federal government. It is time for a change.
Fiscal Implications
If this bill passes, Revenue sources such as government financial programs will receive money back from the
very same people they once provided shelter for, these people will now be able to pay taxes and make a living for
themselves. Depending on the age group and the number of family members there are, that can determine how much
money the family will save. Saving money is important because they will be able to provide proper food, clothing,
education, etc. for themselves and/or their children (if any). This bill not only helps the lives of New York state residents,
however, it also helping the state’s budget. There is a possibility of more taxes entering the state’s budget, but the system
will still continue, just not everyone will remain in the system to get government assisted help.
Effective Date
This bill would go into effect starting January 2014.
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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AF - 07
INTRODUCED BY: Tyler Nappo, Daniel McDowell, and Jolien VanNieuwenhuizen
AN ACT
TO: Allow registered independents to vote in primary elections.
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose
The purpose of this bill is to allow independents to vote in primary elections, which will create a more balanced election
and will make candidates less partisan.
Summary of Provisions
Section 1: Definitions
State Primary-A preliminary election in which presidential candidates are chosen by their political party.
Independent-A voter with no major political party affiliation.
Open Election-A primary election where independents are allowed to vote.
Section 2: Provisions
Enrolled members of a party, or registered independents entitled to vote in the nomination of a candidate for public office
or the election of such party, and equal in number to at least the number of signers required to designate a candidate for
such office or position may file with the officer or board with whom or which are filed designating petitions for such
office or position a petition requesting an opportunity to write in the name of a candidate or candidates, who need not be
specified, for such office or position. Upon the receipt of such petition, such office or position shall be deemed contested
and the primary ballots of the party shall afford an opportunity to vote thereon. Requests for an opportunity to write in the
names of candidates for two or more offices or positions may be included in the same petition. Such petitions shall be
subject to objections and court determination thereof in the same manner as designating petitions so far as the provisions
therefor are applicable. All required notices shall be served on the members of the committee named in the petition. A
signature to a petition for an opportunity to ballot in primary elections made earlier than sixteen days before the last day
to file designating petitions for the primary election shall not be counted.
Justifications
Forty percent of Americans are registered independents. As of now, in 18 states, including New York, these citizens are
deprived the right to vote in primary elections. Because of this, candidates tend to be more partisan, which doesn’t allow
them to address problems that affect all Americans. While presidential candidates are more partisan during primaries, the
often switch to more moderate views for the national election. This can mislead the voters, and give candidates
inconsistent beliefs, which can be dangerous. In our democratic society, all Americans should exercise their right to vote.
32 states allow open primaries, and New York should follow.
Fiscal Implications
There are no fiscal implications.
Effective Date
This bill will go into effect exactly one year after its passage.

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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AF- 08
INTRODUCED BY: Morgan Knudtsen Amber Pike, and
Christopher Rodriguez
AN ACT
TO: Amend Section 490.60 of the New York State Penal Law to establish the crime of terrorist recruitment a Class C
felony
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose
To establish the crime of terrorist recruitment defined as intentionally soliciting another to engage in acts of terrorism, as
a class C felony.
Summary of Provisions
Section One: Definitions:
Class C Felony- A felony whose penalty is a fine of up to $100,000, or imprisonment of up to 40 years, or both; however,
for a repeat offender, the term of imprisonment may increase up to 2 years with prior misdemeanor convictions, and up to
6 years with a prior felony conviction.
Domestic or International Terrorism: The unlawful use of force or violence, committed by a group(s) of two or more
individuals, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.
Section Two: Provisions
The Penal Law is amended by adding a new section to 490.60 to read as follows:
A person is guilty of terrorism recruitment when, with the intent that another person engages in conduct, constituting any
crime set forth in this article, he or she recruits, solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause
such other person to engage in terrorist conduct. Terrorism recruitment is a Class C felony.
Justification
Terrorist organizations and their membership are in perpetual search to recruit new members. Terrorists seek to entice the
disenfranchised and gain members to carry out their criminal acts. The active recruitment for terrorist acts is a growing
trend which requires an immediate response. As law enforcement actively seeks to unearth these groups and defeat their
heinous schemes, we have a responsibility to hold accountable those who solicit or recruit individuals or groups for
terrorism. This bill seeks to effectively deter terrorist recruitment and punish those who seek to employ others for their
criminal plans.
Fiscal Implications
Any fiscal implications would include the payment of law enforcement employees as well as the trial and jailing of all
accused and convicted parties.
Effective Date
This legislation will go into effect exactly one year after its passage
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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AF - 17
INTRODUCED BY: Robert Vecchio and Devin Imperatore
AN ACT
TO: Amend section 3-C of the General Municipal Law.
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose
The purpose of this bill is to revoke the 2% property tax cap and replace it with a 2% spending cap for each school district
in New York State, in order to help school districts financially and decrease the New York State debt.
Summary of Provisions
Section 1 – Definitions:
Soft cap: a cap with flexibility.
Hard cap: a cap with little to no flexibility.
"Tax levy limit" means the amount of taxes authorized to be levied by or on behalf of a local government pursuant
to this section, provided, however, that the tax levy limit shall not include the following:
Section 2 –
This bill is repealing the 2% property tax cap and replacing it with a hard 2% spending cap. §3-c. Limit upon real
property tax levies by local governments. 1. Unless otherwise provided by law, the amount of real property taxes that may
be levied by or on behalf of any local government, other than the city of New York and the counties contained therein,
shall not exceed the tax levy limit established pursuant to this section.
2. When used in this section:
(a) "Allowable levy growth factor" shall be the lesser of: (i) one and two one-hundredths; or (ii) the sum of one plus
the inflation factor; provided, however, that in no case shall the levy growth factor be less
than one.
(b) "Available carryover" means the amount by which the tax levy for the prior fiscal year was below the tax levy
limit for such fiscal year, if any, but no more than an amount that equals one and one-half percentof the tax levy limit for
such fiscal year.
(c) "Coming fiscal year" means the fiscal year of the local government for which a tax levy limit shall be
determined pursuant to this section.
(d) "Inflation factor" means the quotient of: (i) the average of the national consumer price indexes determined
by the United States department of labor for the twelve-month period ending six months prior
to the start of the coming fiscal year minus the average of the national consumer price indexes determined by the United
States department of labor for the twelve-month period ending six months prior to the start of the prior fiscal year,
divided by: (ii) the average of the national consumer price indexes determined by the United States department of labor
for the twelve-month period ending six months prior to the start of the prior fiscal year, with the result expressed as a
decimal to four places.
(e) "Local government" means a county, city, town, village, fire district, or special district including but not
limited to a district created pursuant to article twelve or twelve-A, or governed by article thirteen of the town law, or
created pursuant to article five-A, five-B or five-D of the county law, chapter five hundred sixteen of the laws of nineteen
hundred twenty-eight, or chapter two hundred seventy-three of the laws of nineteen hundred thirty-nine, and shall
include town improvements provided pursuant to articles three-A and twelve-C of the town law but shall not include
the city of New York or the counties contained therein.
(f) "Prior fiscal year" means the fiscal year of the local government
immediately preceding the coming fiscal year.
(g) "Tax levy limit" means the amount of taxes authorized to be levied by or on behalf of a local government
pursuant to this section, provided, however, that the tax levy limit shall not include the
following:
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(i) a tax levy necessary for expenditures resulting from court orders or judgments against the local government
arising out of tort actions for any amount that exceeds five percent of the total tax levied in the
prior fiscal year;
(ii) in years in which the system average actuarial contribution rate of the New York state and local employees'
retirement system, as defined by paragraph ten of subdivision a of section nineteen-a of the
retirement and social security law, increases by more than two percentage points from the previous year, a tax
levy necessary for expenditures for the coming fiscal year for local government employer ontributions to the New
York state and local employees' retirement system caused by growth in the system average actuarial contribution rate
minus two percentage points;
(iii) in years in which the system average actuarial contribution rate of the New York state and local police and fire
retirement system, as defined by paragraph eleven of subdivision a of section three hundred nineteen-a of the
retirement and social security law, increases by more than two percentage points from the previous year, a tax levy
necessary for expenditures for the coming fiscal year for local government employer contributions to the New York
state and local police and fire retirement system caused by growth in the system average actuarial contribution rate
minus two percentage points;
(iv) in years in which the normal contribution rate of the New York state teachers' retirement system, as defined
by paragraph a of subdivision two of section five hundred seventeen of the education law,
increases by more than two percentage points from the previous year, a tax levy necessary for expenditures for the
coming fiscal year for local government employer contributions to the New York state teachers'
retirement system caused by growth in the normal contribution rate minus two percentage points.
(h) "Tax” or “taxes” shall include (i) a charge imposed upon real property by or on behalf of a county, city, town,
village or school district for municipal or school district purposes, and (ii) special ad valorem levies and special
assessments as defined in subdivisions fourteen and fifteen of section one hundred two of the real property tax law.
Justification
A hard cap on how much more local municipalities and school districts can raise their spending compared to their prior
fiscal year’s budget is 2%. This excludes the city of New York and counties contained within. The 2% property tax cap
needs to be repealed due to the fact that it is discriminatory towards low property wealth districts. When schools with
fewer students will get more money per student than larger populated schools it will offer the student in the smaller
school more opportunities and give them an unfair edge when applying for colleges. The 2% spending cap is needed to
check the local municipalities and schools with spending more than they have, thus, attempting to limit the amount of
debt in New York State. Repealing the 2% property tax cap will even out the opportunities for students. For example,
William Floyd will have to cut 6 million dollars if state aid remains the same. They would be forced to cut remaining
sports clubs and programs. William Floyd students applying for college will be overlooked because their activities sheet
will be almost empty, compared to a sachem student whose activities sheet will be very full. A 2% spending cap will
allow school districts to keep remaining programs; therefore, equalizing the opportunity for New York students to go to
college.
Fiscal Implications
When put into effect, this bill will limit the amount of debt in New York State by preventing the excess spending without
cutting a revenue source in all municipalities.
Effective Date
This bill will go into effect one year after its passage.

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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AF - 19
INTRODUCED BY: Rebecca Bolan, Taylor Goodspeed, Rachel Bush, Mary LaBar, and Emily Marra
AN ACT
RESOLUTION TO: change the wording of the selective service law to mandate that both men and women have to sign
up for the draft at age 18.
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose
To urge congress to include women in selective service registration to further equalize men and women’s rights.
Summary of Provisions
Section 1
Selective Service- the law responsible for supplying U.S. armed forces with people in the event of a
national emergency. It is an independent agency of the federal government's Executive Branch.
Section 2
Both men and women will be mandated to register for the draft within thirty days of their eighteenth
birthday. If either fail or refuse to register, one could be sent to prison for up to 5 years and may be fined up to
$250,000. In addition, one cannot qualify for federal student grants or loans for college, job training benefits and
state and federal jobs.
Justification
Women should have the same rights as men are afforded. If women want equal rights and equal
opportunities as men then they should have to adhere to the same rules and regulations. Women have proved
themselves to be willing and able to serve in the military. Both women and men will have to take both physical
and mental tests to make sure they are fit and able to serve if the draft went into effect.
Fiscal Implications
The fiscal implications will be nominal.
Effective Date
This resolution will go into effect at the start of the upcoming year after its passage.
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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AF - 23
INTRODUCED BY: Chelsea Bona, Scott McPhie, Seth Gliksman, and Kelsey Whelpley
AN ACT
TO: amend section 182.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law to mandate video arraignment
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose:
The purpose of this bill is to mandate that the arraignment process be done through video. When a person is arrested and
accused of a felony, they must be transported to and from court with police escorts. There, judges, attorneys, court
officers, and others must be paid for their presence. This process could be accomplished quickly and more effectively
with a video system, and therefore save the state money.
Summary of Provisions:
1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as provided in section 182.30 of this article, the court, in its
discretion, will dispense with the personal appearance of the defendant being charged with a felony, except an
appearance at a hearing or trial, and conduct an electronic appearance in connection with a criminal action [pending in
Albany, Bronx, Broome, Erie, Kings, New York, Niagara, Oneida, Onondaga, Ontario, Orange Putnam, Queens,
Richmond, St. Lawrence, Tompkins, Chautauqua, Cattaraugus, Clinton, Essex, Montgomery, Rensselaer, Warren,
Westchester, Suffolk, Herkimer or Franklin county provided that the chief administrator of the courts has authorized
the use of electronic appearance and the defendant, after consultation with counsel, consents on the record. Such consent
shall be required at the commencement of each electronic appearance to such electronic appearance].
2. If, for any reason, the court determines on its own motion or [on the motion of any party that the conduct of an
electronic appearance may impair the legal rights of the defendant, it shall not permit the electronic appearance to
proceed. If, for any other articulated reason] either party requests at any time during the electronic appearance that such
appearance be terminated, the court [shall] may grant such a request. Upon the adjourned date the proceeding shall be
recommenced from the point at which the request for termination of the electronic appearance had been granted.
Justification
Transporting alleged criminals is dangerous, time consuming and expensive; in order to help the state and the citizens
within it, we must implement a video arraignment system.
Fiscal Implications
Each year our tax dollars are wasted on an unnecessary expense. By paying an initial start-up fee and for the upkeep of a
video arraignment system, we will save the money that was previously spent on the transport of the arrested.
Effective Date
This will go into effect two years after the passage of this bill.

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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AF - 25
INTRODUCED BY: Alison Collins, Melissa Weiner, Kelsey Mensch
AN ACT
TO: Amend §3202 of the New York State Education Law in order to eliminate the funding for charter schools
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly do enact as follows:
Purpose
The purpose of this bill is to eliminate the funding for Charter Schools. Any student that attends a charter school is paid
for by the tax dollars of the members in the community they are from. It is not fair that tax payers are providing the tuition
for students (whom they don’t even know) to attend a Charter School. With the aid to education getting slashed every
year, it is vital that we save as much money as possible to help preserve our schools and protect students’ futures. By
cutting the funding for Charter Schools, the money saved would be allocated to public schools. In essence, Charter
schools are to be made self-sustaining and be funded only by a tuition enacted by the specific school.
Summary of Provisions
Section 1: Definitions
A) Charter Schools: are primary or secondary schools that operate according to a five-year charter funded only
by a private source.
B) Private School: A school supported by a private organization, private individuals or by the payment of fees rather than
by the government
C) Public School: A school supported by public funds
Section 2:
§3202 of the New York State Education Law
8. Homeless children. A homeless child, as defined in subdivision one of section thirty-two hundred nine of this article,
over the age of five and under twenty-one years of age, who has not received a high school diploma, shall be entitled to
attend a public school without payment of tuition, in accordance with the provisions of section thirty-two hundred nine of
this article.
9. Charter schools: Charter schools, as defined by the definitions, are open and attended by choice. They are separate and
indifferent to the public schooling system. Any student wishing to attend a Charter School is required to pay the tuition in
place. The tuition will be up to the specific Charter School’s discretion. The Charter School will not be subject to receive
public funding under any circumstance. Any Charter school is not to be chartered solely by school districts, teachers,
parents, activists, state-authorized, non-profit groups, universities and/ or government entities. Any entity listed in the
previous statement wishing to donate money towards the charter school, may do so as long as it does not solely fund the
school and its attendees.
Justification
Every year, school districts are giving portions or their already scarce budgets to fund charter schools. This occurs at the
taxpayer’s expense. Lately, their produced results have not even been worth it. Typically, students from charter schools
perform at a lower level than their peers in public schools. This is due to the fact that charter schools have a greater
tendency to hire inexperienced teachers than public schools. Charter schools are not subjected to the same rules as public
schools, yet are funded in the same way: with public money.
Fiscal Implications
By making Charter Schools self-sustaining, New York State will be saving an abundance of money. With 35,000 students
attending Charter Schools in New York State, there is a substantial amount of tax dollars that, given the economic
circumstance, New York cannot lose. This bill does not cost any money to be implemented but will be saving money in
the long run. This legislation will save public schools money each year that they would regularly have to put towards
funding charter schools. They will be able to allocate that money for other programs within their own school, if they so
choose.
Effective Date
This bill will go into effect exactly one year after its passage
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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AF - 36
INTRODUCED BY: Morgan Chamberlain, Marie DeLorenzo, Tori Persons, Mitchell Jordon
AN ACT
TO: Amend section 606 of existing tax law S884-2011 to provide additional assistance to in-home caregivers by
increasing the tax credit from twenty percent to forty percent
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose
The passage of this amendment will create addition revenue for the state along with decreasing the money being spent on
Medicaid every year. By raising the tax credit from twenty percent to forty percent, it will give another incentive for
people to care for their elders and in the long run, create family bonds
Summary of Provisions
Section 1
Caregiver- a person who provides unpaid assistance in daily living, health care, financial matters, guidance,
companionship and social interaction.
Tax Break- a tax deduction that is granted in order to encourage a particular type of commercial activity.
Medicaid- an insurance program for New Yorkers who can't afford to pay for medical care.
Section 2
For the purpose of this amendment, we provide the definitions set above as a background, and we wish to enact
as follows:
Amend section 606 of existing tax law S884-2011 to provide additional assistance to in-home caregivers.
Regulations: In order to receive the tax credit a receipt must be shown at the time the money is being collected.
Justification
This will create revenue for New York State by decreasing the amount of money being spent on Medicaid each year. By
giving an incentive for people to take care of their elders it will produce a sense of family along with providing seniors a
loving and healthy environment
Fiscal Implications
The money given to the people will cost less than the money originally put into Medicaid. In the long run, this will save
money for the state.
Effective Date
This amendment will be put into effect immediately upon passage.

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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AF - 39
INTRODUCED BY: Ravyn Santiago and Kaylin Parisi
AN ACT
TO: Require all New York State street vendors to adopt the New York City policy , to obtain a positive letter grade from
the department of health inspectors in order to maintain their street vendor license.
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose
This bill will require all New York State street vendors to be rated in a similar, if not exactly the same manner as
New York City restaurants, with the letter grade sanitary inspection system. The street vendors will receive a letter grade
determined by their health conditions, and they must publicly display their letter grade for customers to see how clean the
street vendor conditions are.
Summary of Provisions
Section 1
Street Vendor: A seller of goods in small amounts to consumers without having a fixed retail location
Letter Grade System: Sanitary inspection results given to a place that sells, cook , and prepares food, like a restaurant,
from an inspector from the department of health based on the place health conditions.
Prepare: Make (food or a meal) ready for cooking or eating.
Section 2
To remain in business, street vendors must receive and maintain a positive letter grade from sanitary inspectors that
inspect their health conditions. Sanitary inspector will not only be inspecting a street vendor on their health conditions but
also will be scoring them on the street vendor sanitary conditions, giving them a letter such as A,B, or C. This will cause
street vendors to receive a letter grade from the health inspectors just like a restaurants will receive based on the sanitary
conditions. This will also require street vendors to maintain a satisfactory grade “A” to keep their street vendor license.
Justification
There are 4,000 to 6,000 street vendors found in New York State today. New York State has had several reports of
customers that purchase street vendor food that has been ill from eating there food. Customers have caught food
poisoning, other diseases, itching skin, etc. Also, within the last year there has been about 2,575 violations that came
from street vendors alone .If customers had knowledge of the conditions of witch their food was coming from before
purchase, some of these cases, if not all, could have been avoided. New York State should aim towards keeping its
citizens safe and make sure know as much knowledge's as they can about the food they eat and spend their money on, by
having a letter grade system for street vendor inspections. This system that will cost the state nothing and will bring
knowledge to its citizens.
Fiscal Implications
This bill will not have a financial impact on New York State residents. This bill will only require inspectors to
include the letter grade system into their inspections for street vendors and giving them a letter grade.
Effective Date
This bill will go into effect immediately after it is passed
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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AF - 40
INTRODUCED BY: Molly Schoder, Olivia Seamans, Sarah Calzada
AN ACT
TO: Amend an unfunded special education mandate in order to make it non mandatory for high schools of a Class C population
and under to be required to have one special education teacher for each core subject.
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose
Amend a government mandate, which requires a special education teacher for each core subject in high schools. Class C and D
schools would be exempt from the future law.
– Schools of Class C populations and under would be wasting budget money on unneeded teachers if this mandate were
passed excluding this amendment.
– With the passage of our amendment, it will save high schools from spending more budget money than is already spent on
special education and salaries of teachers.
Summary of Provisions
Section 1
Charter School- a primary or secondary school that receives public money but are not subject to some of the rules, regulations,
and statutes that applies to other public schools.
Class C population- 175-300 high school students
Class D population- 1-174 high school students
Race to the Top Fund- a competition between the 50 states and their local school districts that focuses on the improvement of
students’ education and the effectiveness of teachers of the United States.
Section 2
Amend a government mandate, which requires a special education teacher for each core subject in high schools. Class C and D
schools would be exempt from the future law.
– Schools of Class C populations and under would be wasting budget money on unneeded teachers if this mandate were
passed excluding this amendment.
– With the passage of our amendment, it will save high schools from spending more budget money than is already spent on
special education and salaries of teachers.
Justification
The average salary of a special education teacher is about $51,000. With the passage of this bill, many small schools will
be saved from spending unnecessary budget money to pay these new teachers that the school would be required to hire if
this bill is not passed.
Fiscal Implications
With the passage of this bill, no money will be spent in any way. The purpose of this bill is to prevent the
unnecessary spending of money.
Effective Date
Our bill will go into effect as soon as this government mandate is passed by legislation.

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STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AF - 41
INTRODUCED BY: William Lawrie, Garrison Hughes, Ian Lawrie, Josie Worley
AN ACT
TO: Ban the possession of all tobacco products from minors
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose
The purpose of this bill is to ban the possession of all tobacco products from minors in the State of New York.
Summary of Provisions
Section 1:
Minor: Any person under the age of eighteen.
Tobacco Products: All products and articles made of, or containing tobacco such as cigarettes, cigars, smokeless tobacco,
snuff, snus, kreteks, pipe tobacco, dissolvable tobacco (strips or sticks), and all foreign types of tobacco products.
Tobacco Education Program: a class/course taught by teachers or staff members of an organization qualified in helping
prevent teens from using tor ceasing the use of tobacco products
Section 2:
To enforce this law, all police officers and all other persons able to write a citation can do so if a minor is caught with any
sort of tobacco product in their possession. Consequences for the minor are as follows:
First offense: $25 fine
Second offense: $50 fine + 10 hours of community service
Third offense: $75 fine + 15 hours of community service + mandatory attendance to a tobacco
education program
Any additional offenses will be up to the judge’s discretion. Failure to uphold any of the consequences regardless of the
offense will result in further punishment brought about by a court hearing.
Justification
Within New York State, about ninety percent of all tobacco users start before the age of eighteen. Currently, individuals
under eighteen are not allowed to purchase tobacco products, however, they are able to possess them. A number of studies
indicate that adolescents are especially vulnerable to the effects of tobacco, and may be more likely to develop a more
serious addiction in comparison to adults. By enacting this piece of legislation, New York State would not only prevent
these tobacco users from harming themselves, but also those around them, including the environment. Our state, as a
whole, must take small steps toward decreasing the number of underage tobacco users to in turn save lives.
Fiscal Implications
Upon the passage of this bill, it will generate revenue to villages, towns, and cities across New York State.
Effective Date
Once passed, this bill will go into effect January 1, 2013.

Legislative Branch Activity
Senate Results
Lieutenant Governor:
President pro Tempore:
Hans Lueders
Maria Henry
Passed
Failed
S-13 S - 16
S - 11 S - 06
S - 08 S - 01
S - 12 S - 18
S – 04 A S - 09
S - 05 S - 10
S - 04 B S - 07
S - 15 S - 02
S - 20 S - 19
S - 03 S - 17
S - 14 AF - 04
AF - 35 AF - 11
AF - 38 AF - 13
AF - 20
AF - 50
AF - 22
Topics of Passed Senate Bills
S – 03 Allow a school nurse to give over-the-counter medication to students with parental consent.
S - 04 A Cap funding for correctional services and allocate the money towards educational facilities.
S – 04 B Add subsection 14 to section 220.16 of the New York State Penal Law to ban “bath salts”, the
manufacture, sale, and distribution of bath salts in New
S – 05 Give the right to donate a person’s body to science after death, even if they have been imprisoned
or on death row given that their body qualifies.
S – 08 Amend Section 661 of the New York State Education Law to allow for illegal immigrants the right
to apply for financial aid for college
S – 11 extend the hours of work available for minors sixteen and seventeen years of age beyond the set
maximum in § 134 of article 4 of New York State Labor Law in order to allow them to further
support their families financially.
S – 12 This bill will address flaws in the current system of criminal probation.
S – 13 Amend the New York State Penal Law by adding section 125.30, to require parental permission
for a minor to have an abortion.
S – 14 S-14: Repeal Status of Limitation on Child Abuse
S – 15 Make it possible for first time, nonviolent offenders to serve in the military in lieu of a serving
time in a correctional facility.
S - 20 Regulate in-store tobacco advertisement
AF – 35 Repeal New York State’s statue of limitations for child sexual abuse, allowing victims to
indefinitely press charges against their attackers.
AF – 38 To forbid smoking in multi-housing units
Topics of Failed Senate Bills
S – 01 Add a wealth tax for people who make above two million dollars per year after debts.
S – 02 To repeal the current tax cap in New York State.
S – 06 Remove Open Enrollment in Public High School Honors and AP Classes
25

S - 07 facilitate the ability of students to pay for college by mandating that all banks offer a loan in which
the long-term interest rate does not exceed 5%
S – 09 Eliminate Teacher Tenure from Public Schools grades K-12 in New York State.
S – 10 Increase the retirement age of New York State tier I, II, III, IV, and V teachers to sixty-five from
the age range of fifty-five to sixty-two depending upon which tier one falls in. This will decrease
the state’s taxpayer’s burden to support the pension fund for teachers.
S – 16 Amend Section 924 of the New York State Real Property Tax Law to relieve all businesses and
residential properties impacted by the floods as a result of Hurricane Irene
S – 17 develop nuclear power plants throughout the state of New York.
S - 18 Make it a crime to ingest alcohol to the point of inebriation while pregnant
S – 19 Lower Minimum Wage for Businesses with less than 500 employees
AF – 04 Permit the usage of tablets or laptop computers in school for educational purpose for public high
school students.
AF – 11 Equalize the punishments for labor trafficking and sexual trafficking to a minimum of 25 years in
prison.
AF – 13 : Allow the sale of any alcoholic beverages in places of food sales to be determined by the
county in which the store is located
AF – 20 Amend N.Y. [PUB. HEALTH] LAW § 1399-hh (1997) to restrict use of any tobacco products to
children under the age of 18.
AF – 22 Reduce the amount of illegal searches performed by New York State Police Officers
Assembly Liberty Results
Speaker:
Deputy Speaker:
Adam Henn
Chelsea Smart
Passed
Failed
AL – 01 AL – 07
AL – 11 AL – 28
AL – 26 AL – 40
AL – 27 AL – 10
AL – 08 AL – 25
AL – 02 AL – 21
AL – 29 AL – 06
AL – 24 AL – 39
AL – 32 AL – 37
AL – 16 AL – 23
AL – 31 AL – 05
AL – 20 AL – 12
AL – 19 AL – 09
AL – 13 AL – 17
AL – 18 AL – 38
AL – 35 AL - 41
AL – 36 AL – 04
AL – 03 AL – 34
AL – 22
AL – 30
AL – 14
AL – 15
AL – 33
AL - 42
26

Topics of Passed Assembly Bills
AL-01 Amend Education Law §313 in order to eliminate racial bias towards the admittance of
students into state colleges.
AL-08 Amend §3-0313of the Environmental Conservation law by adding sub-section 8 to
illegalize Hydraulic Fracturing
AL-11 The purpose of this bill is to limit the extent of Port Authority fare increase, and
ultimately to save New Yorkers money.
AL-13 Amend Section 1612, by adding subsection 6 to the New York State tax law to increase
and cap the percentage of money from the New York State lottery dedicated to education.
AL-16 Amend § 3609-E by Adding Subsection 5 to the New York State Education Law to
Maintain Educational Funding at the 2010-11 Level for Each School District in the State.
AL-18: End Affirmative Action in the admissions process to New York state Funded Colleges
(SUNY's).
AL-19: Amend the Section 2 of Article 3 of the New York State Constitution to place a term limit on
New York State Legislators of Four Two-Year Terms.
AL-20 Members of the assembly urge the state Senate in joining them to amend the New York
State Constitution to legalize casino gambling.
AL-24 Mandate all public school students from grades seven to twelve take a self-defense course
in their physical education class.
AL-26 create a database in which incidents of bullying are mandated to be recorded, and to
establish a plan to terminate the problem of bullying.
AL-27 Amend section 30.10 subsections (b) and (e) of the Criminal Procedure Law to increase
the statute of limitations for rape and sexual conduct in the second and third degrees.
AL-31 Restrict the amount of time an individual or family can live within public housing.
AL-35: Add letter C to TAX Article 22 Part 2 section 616, To exempt veterans within the state with 8
years of service from future New York State income tax.
AL-36: Deduct tax dollars from correctional facilities and utilize it towards Educational purposes.
Topics of Failed Assembly Bills
AL-04 Improve the nutritional content of school foods
AL-05 Amend section 1399-q of the Public Health Law to prohibit smoking in all hotel/motel rooms in
New York State
AL- 06 Require all welfare applicants submit to a drug test prior to receiving any state run government
provided benefits
AL-07 Better regulate the fur trade.
AL- 09 Enforce New York State drivers to retake the Department of Motor Vehicles driver’s license
exam every time the license needs a renewal.
AL-10 Amend the Green Jobs – Green New York Act of 2009. to limit the environmental impact of
government buildings in New York State by providing loans to county governments who are
eager and able to perform these transformations.
AL-12 Provide an alternative to euthanizing sheltered animals.
AL-14 Updating Education with Today’s Modernizations by replacing school books with portable
electronic devices.
AL-15 Repeal the newly installed 2% property tax cap of chapter 97 of the 2011 New York State law.
AL-17 Require public schools to provide autistic students with a touch screen learning device.
AL-21 Mandate that all universities and institutions of higher learning must disclose any criminal history
of a student to potential roommates.
AL-22 Amend Legislative Law Article 4A, to add section 72A to create a public committee to review and
revise, remove, and/or re-categorize legislation.
AL-23 Strengthen the requirements necessary for employment as a New York State politician, by
requiring all politicians to hold part-time employment outside the domain of the acquired
government position.
AL-25 Reduce gang related crime throughout New York State by providing every community in NYS
27

with access to the funds necessary to reduce gang-related crime.
AL-28 Reinstate Capital Punishment in the State of New York.
AL-30 Raise awareness about police brutality
AL-33 Amend the insider trading law to make it clear that government officials are subject to the same
rules as the general public.
AL-34 Amend Article 20A, Section 725 to eliminate collective bargaining rights of New York State labor
unions.
AL-37 Amend section 605-a under the Education Code to provide monetary grants for overall academic
excellence in New York State’s secondary education institutions.
AL-38 Amend Vehicle and Traffic Law Article 19 § 502 and mandate a road test be taken by licensed
drivers once every ten years.
AL-39 Amend section 131 of New York State social service law by changing subsection18 to mandate
the earning of a high school diploma, or a GED in order to apply for welfare.
AL-40 To amend §131 of the New York State Social Services law to hold legal guardians responsible for
their biological or legally adopted children if they do not attend school on a regular basis.
AL-41 establish a streamlined secondary education system in the state of New York.
28

Chief Justice
Halle-Anne Orr
2012 JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP TEAM
Associate Justices
Erin Englemann
Mitchell Beatie
Becca Dewitt
Lauren Dole
Ashley Domagola
Evan Malone
Dina Al-Akmi
Kevin Parakkatu
Brittany Sutton
3 rd year Justice Principal Justice for D7
2 nd year Justice
2 nd year Justice Principal Justice for D6
2 nd year Justice
2 nd year Justice Principal Justice for D1
2 nd year Justice Principal Justice for D3
Principal Justice for D5
Principal Justice for D4
Principal Justice for D4
Barbara Blaszczyk
Carl Cicerelli
Manserat Dhami
Erica Finan
Jessica Furia
Sierra Galusha
Logan King
Tom Jacobs
Vincent Kappel
Michael Mazzeo
Thomas Muthig
Brittany Sutton
Marina Vanini
Christopher Walker
Attorney General
Tara Galusha
Deputy Attorney General
Joanna Bugenis
Public Defender
Eric Quitter
Deputy Public Defender
Stephen Bruno
29

BEST 2012 ATTORNEY BRIEF
IN THE
SUPREME COURT APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST
DEPARTMENT
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the Matter of Raphael Ortega, Appellant
v.
The People of the State of New York, Respondents
____________________________________________________
On Appeal from the Trial Court
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT (TEAM 24)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Colton Bishop District 3
Daniel Schwartz District 3
Rebecca Sung District 3
30

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities.........................................................................................................................2
QuestionsPresented......................................................................................................................... 2
Statement of Facts............................................................................................................................2
Summary of Argument....................................................................................................................5
Argument.........................................................................................................................................5
Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................9
31

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
People v. Adair, 84 A.D.3d 1752 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2011) 6
People v. Foy, 32 N.Y.2d 473 (N.Y. 1973) 5
People v. Spears, 64 N.Y.2d 698 (N.Y. 1984) 5
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Did the trial court abuse it’s discretion in denying Appellant Ortega a third adjournment in
order to locate his alibi witness, thus violating Appellant Ortega’s Sixth Amendment right?
(1) Was Atiron a material witness?
(2) Was due diligence exercised by the Appellant?
(3) Will Atrionbe available at a future trial?
II. Did the trial court violate Appellant Ortega’s right to effectively confer with counsel?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Ortega and his best friend Atrion Raimundi attended a wedding in Saratoga
Springs, New York in which they were the only two minorities at the almost completely white
wedding. Both men made song requests of the DJ, but the DJ did not want to play Appellant
Ortega’s song request and stated that he had just given a song request. Being the only two
minorities at the event, Appellant Ortega angrily replied that it was the other black man. Later
that night, the DJ reported his $5,000 digital mixer stolen and the DJ identified Appellant Ortega
Page
in the lineup as the man whole stole the mixer. This identification was backed up by two other
witnesses. Appellant Ortega’s attorney failed to notify the prosecution until two days prior to
trial that they would be calling Atrion Raimundi as an alibi witness.
During the prosecution’s case, Flynn Jebb, Appellant’s former girlfriend and Atrion’s
date for the evening, testified Atrion was with her almost the entire night and often in the dessert
line, but not on or near the dance floor. She further testified that she saw the Appellant on the
dance floor. No witnesses testified that they saw the Appellant and Atrion together in the dessert
line, contradicting Atrion’s statement upon which Appellant’s attorney was basing their
32

argument. Flynn Jebb also testified that Appellant became very angry when others at the
wedding could not stop laughing when the Appellant told the “other black guy” story.
After the prosecution rested, the Appellant was directed to call his first witness. Atrion
was to be that first witness, but he had left the courtroom on the first day of trial and was told to
return when the defense started its case. No new subpoena was issued to Raimundi. The trial
judge used her discretion and adjourned the matter to the next day. A second adjournment was
graciously given to 2:00 p.m. after the Appellant’s attorney stated to the Court that he did not
have an answer as to where the witness was, as he was told by telephone that Atrion would be
there when the trial began in the morning. The witness was still not there at 2:00 p.m. and the
request for a material witness subpoena was denied.
The Appellant was directed to proceed with his case by the trial judge and was given first
a ten minute conference and then a 15 minute break to confer with his attorney on how to
proceed. When a third break was denied, Appellant testified contrary to the other witnesses by
testifying that he and Atrion were together for long periods of time in the dessert line. Appellant
could find no other witnesses at the large event to support his claim. The prosecution cross
examined him regarding how long it took for Atrion to surface as an alibi witness. Appellant
was convicted and sentenced to one year in prison. He appeals lower court’s ruling on the
grounds that the denial of the third continuance to produce his alibi witness and the second
request for an adjournment to confer with counsel violated his sixth amendment rights.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In any case, “when the protection of fundamental rights has been involved..., that
discretionary power has been more narrowly construed” for judges. People v. Spears, 64 N.Y.2d
698, (N.Y. 1984). The trial court did not abuse its discretion when denying Appellant Ortega’s
final request for an adjournment to produce his alibi witness. This continuance was not
warranted because the request was based on the lack of appearance from a witness who was not
33

material, and there was no certainty that he would attend a later trial date. Also, the defense did
not exercise due diligence in order to guarantee his appearance. Finally, the denial of a second
recess was appropriate and did not violate the Appellant’s Constitutional Rights because the
appellant had already been given plenty of time to confer with counsel.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT
ORTEGA A THIRD ADJOURNMENT TO LOCATE HIS ALIBI WITNESS, NOR DID IT
VIOLATE APPELLANT ORTEGA’S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT.
When reviewing the appropriateness of a denial of an adjournment request, the appellate
court defers “to the discretion of the court, which is consistent with the general rule that the
granting or denial of any adjournment by a Trial Judge is a matter of discretion.” People v. Foy,
32 N.Y.2d 473, 476 (N.Y. 1973); citing People v. Jackson (111 N. Y. 362); also citing People v.
Oskroba, 305 N. Y. 113, 117.) A trial judge must consider three factors in making the decision to
allow a continuance: “‘(1) that the witness is really material and appears to the court to be so; (2)
that the party who applies has been guilty of no neglect; (3) that the witness can be had at the
time to which the trial is deferred.’” People v. Foy, supra at 477; citing King v. D’Eon (1 W.
Black. 510). A review of the above cited three prong test in consideration of this case clearly
shows that the lower court judge did not abuse her discretion.
(1) Atrion Raimundi is not a material witness. It is obvious that the judge did not believe
the witness was material, as she denied a material witness warrant request. It is a judge’s duty to
consider all possibilities when making decisions on the materiality of witness and whether a
subpoena should be issued to ensure their appearance at the court. “The decision whether to grant
an adjournment lies in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of that discretion
‘in denying a request for an adjournment will not be overturned absent of showing prejudice’.”
People v. Adair, 84 A.D.3d 1752, 1754 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2011); citing People v.
Arroyo, 161 AD2d 1127, 1127. The judge in this case made her decision regarding Atrion’s lack
34

of materiality after listening to all the other witnesses and weighing their demeanor and
credibility. The judge makes the overall decision whether or not the witness is credible, and there
is no evidence that she was biased, so her decision that Atrion is not a material witness should be
upheld.
(2) Further evidence that the trial judge was correct to deny the third continuance request
is because Appellant is guilty of neglect. Although Atrion Raimundi was initially subpoenaed
and sent away and told to come back at a later date, no subpoena was issued thereafter.
Although calls were made to the witness and his family to guarantee his appearance, it was
clearly not enough. It could be argued that the failure of the Appellant’s attorney to take steps to
ensure Atrion’s presence in court by a new subpoena or other means was a factor in the Trial
Judge’s decision to deny a material witness warrant. In People v. Foy (supra at 478), they
concluded that “a request for a short adjournment... should not be denied merely because of
possible inconvenience to the court or others.” In fact, the court was not inconvenienced and
rather granted adjournments several times prior to deciding that the trial would proceed, because
it was necessary and the trial court wanted to make sure that the Appellant had was not unfairly
prejudiced. But since the defense did not exercise due diligence, when choosing not to take
preliminary steps like issuing another subpoena or other actions, the trial court did not abuse it’s
discretion in declining another adjournment.
(3) The court was within it’s rights to decline the third adjournment because the
Appellant cannot show that Atrion would be available at a trial set at a later date. In People v.
Foy, an alibi witness, Martin Lopez, had taken a day off from truck driving to appear in court. He
did not get the chance to testify that day, and could not afford to take another day off from work.
Although subpoenaed to testify at the following court date, he did not show up. The witness in
our case, Atrion, similarly would not show up to another court date, but for different reasons.
While the witness in People v. Foy would not be able to attend for financial reasons, Atrion will
35

not because his actions show that he has changed his mind and doesn’t wish to testify. The fact
that Atrion only revealed his knowledge two days before trial, he did not seek alternative
transportation on other scheduled trial days, and other witnesses testified to never seeing the
Appellant and him together during the wedding, shows he most likely changed his mind on
testifying as he does not want to perjure himself. The close timing of adding Atrion to the
witness list shows that it may be a last resort for the defense as the Appellant should have raised
Atrion as an alibi long before this time if he is in fact an alibi. Since the Appellant cannot
satisfy any of the three prongs set forth in People v Foy, the trial court was correct and within its
right to deny a third continuance.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE APPELLANT ORTEGA’S SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVELY CONFER WITH COUNSEL.
Throughout the trial, two contiuances were granted for a total of twenty-five minutes, for
Ortega to confer with his counsel. In People v. Spears (supra at 700), the trial judge allowed the
defense “a few minutes” to converse, but interrupted their discussion in no less than five seconds
after the unexpected end of the prosecution’s case. That case was overturned at the appellate
division. In comparison, the defense was given ample amount of time to meet because in
addition to the twenty-five minutes given by the trial judge after the Appellant was told he must
proceed with his case, he actually had since 3:00 p.m. on the previous day when the prosecution
rested and the first adjournment was granted to discuss the possibility that the witness may not
appear, and to discuss the pros and cons of Appellant testfying on his own behalf. The judges
came to the conclusion that “denying even ‘a few minutes’ delay was arbitrary and an abuse of
discretion as a matter of law.” People v. Spears (supra at 700). Our case can easily be
distinguished from People v. Spears. The defendant’s constitutional right to confer with counsel
was in no means violated.
36

CONCLUSION
The Appellant’s request to have a new trial is unnecessary and unwarranted. The trial
judge did not abuse her discretion when denying any of the Appellant’s requests. Their request
for another continuance was unsubstantiated because they did not follow the necessary steps
before they requested it. Also, in People v. Foy (supra at 478), they came to the conclusion that
“when the witness is identified to the court, and is found to be within the jurisdiction, a request
for a short adjournment after a showing of some diligence and good faith should not be denied
merely because of possible inconvenience to the court or others.” The quote states that a short
adjournment should be granted when some effort is placed into locating a witness. We agree,
with the trial Judge, as two adjournments had been granted, making another unnecessary. In
addition, the request for another recess to further discuss the case was also needless because the
Appellant and his attorney had numerous opportunities from the beginning of the trial to consult.
Therefore, the Respondent asks the Court to uphold the trial judge’s decision in its entirety.
Respectfully Submitted,
___________________
Colton Bishop District 3
___________________
Daniel Schwartz District 3
___________________
Rebecca Sung District 3
37

Attorney General Judicial Review Case
Presented Friday March 9, 2012
This 2011 Bill was Passed by Assembly Freedom
STATE OF NEW YORK
YMCA YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT
BILL NUMBER AL – 37
INTRODUCED BY:
Raven Santiago, Brianna Bautista, Tia Drummond
AN ACT
TO: Prohibit the act of smoking around minors.
The People of the State of New York, represented in the
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Purpose
The purpose of our bill is to stop smoking around minors. We need this bill in New York State because a
plethora of minors die or get effected by second hand smoke.
Summary of Provisions
Second hand smoking and third-hand smoking are very dangerous. This bill will band second hand smoking with a
minor. We strongly believe that banning second hand smoking with a minor will save a lot of lives. .Second hand
smoking can be very toxic are over 4000 chemical compounds in secondhand smoke, consisting there have been of
60 have been identified as causes to cancer. The consequences that we think will be settling and fair due to the child
and parents is that the first time caught well smoking with a child is that the parent must pay $500 fine and attend
classes that understand the dangers of second hand smoking. Also if the adult charged with smoking with a minor
does not attend classes given by the Department of health and proven to a court then there license is suspended. If
caught a second time smoking with a minor present then the adult will get there license suspended, also have to pay
a $1000 fine, and is charged with child endangerment.. This bill is helping saving young life's that haven't even lived
and they shouldn't have to pay for being there when not able to have any control off what someone else is doing..
Justification
45 million people smoke in the U.S and 126 million Americans are exposed to secondhand smoke and 22
million of that are children aged 3-11 that are exposed to second-hand smoke. Between 70% and 90% of nonsmokers
in the American population, children and adults, are regularly exposed to secondhand smoke. It is estimated
that only 15% of cigarette smoke gets inhaled by the smoker. The remaining 85% lingers in the air for everyone to
breath. If a person spends more than two hours in a room where someone is smoking, the nonsmoker inhales the
equivalent of four cigarettes. Second hand smoking can cause many diseases and can affect anyone a great deal (let
alone a minor) in a health hazards way, and decreases the child's life with each breath that they take. The second
hand smoke, underage passengers are subjected to when the driver is actively smoking while operating the vehicle in
places the child at a much high risk of developing a host of repertory illnesses like pneumonia, emphysema, lung
cancer etc.
Fiscal Implications
In our bill there will be a small influx in the operational budget of the Administration for Children Services
operating budget. Due to the increase of new ACS investigations and subsequent removal. But the budgetary
increase will fail in comparison to what the state currently pays for children suffering from second hand smoke
related illnesses.
Effective Date
This bill will go into effective immediately after its passage.
38

Attorney General Judicial Review Con Law Case 1 2012
Atrion Raimundi, Appellant
v.
Child Protective Services and Mike Couzens, individually, Respondent
Supreme Court Appellate Division, Third Department
New York
______________________________________________________________________________
Facts of the Case:
In 2011, the New York State Assembly Freedom passed a bill criminalizing smoking cigarettes and driving
while a minor (defined as under the age of 18) is in the vehicle. The penalties for breaking the law include fines,
mandatory counseling, and referral to Child Protective Services (CPS) for investigation. If the case is referred to
Child Protective Services, the case worker may remove a child from the home of a smoker if they find it is in the
best interest of the child.
On February 26, 2011, Atrion Raimundi and his son, Joe (age 2), were on their way to Saratoga Springs,
NY for a wedding. They were running late so Atrion was speeding. Just after passing through Albany, Atrion was
seen by State Police Officer, Molly Warren, who pulled Atrion over.
Molly went up to the drivers-side window and asked Atrion to roll it down. Immediately, a cloud of
cigarette smoke wafted out Atrion’s window. It was hard to see into the car because of all the smoke, but Molly
thinks she saw cigarette butts in the ash try of the car. It wasn’t until she heard Joe cry that she realized there was a
child in the backseat of the car. Molly immediately became concerned for Joe’s safety due to all the second-hand
smoke he was inhaling.
Molly asked Atrion if he was smoking. He denied it saying “I’ve been driving too fast for the last two
hours and the smoke is from my car overheating. We were just putting up with the smoke in order to get to Saratoga
National on time for my friend’s wedding.” Molly did not believe Atrion. She wrote him two tickets one for
speeding and one for smoking within 10 feet of a minor.
Due to Molly’s concern for Joe, Molly called local CPS right after she finished writing the tickets for
Atrion. She reported her concerns about the second-hand smoke to which Joe was being exposed and mentioned
they were on their way to a wedding at Saratoga National. That same day, CPS selected Case Worker Mike
Couzens to investigate.
Mike was trained on how to spot signed of physical abuse, including aggressiveness and indifference
towards children. The CPS Policy and Training Manual allowed case workers to make immediate decisions to
remove a child from a potentially abusive situation. It was policy to remove a child temporarily if the parent is
caught smoking in the car with a minor (in violation of state law) in addition to one other indicator of potential
abuse. However, it warned that smoking in the presence of minors was not enough by itself to remove a child from
the parents on an emergency basis.
Mike decided not to waste any time and headed over to Saratoga National. Molly met him there to help
“just in case.” When Mike arrived, he saw a male, matching Atrion’s description, standing outside the building
smoking a cigarette. A toddler sat next to him in the snow by a bush—crying and screaming at his father. Atrion
appeared indifferent to Joe’s tears. When Atrion finished smoking, he grabbed Joe’s hand forcefully led him into
the building. Joe cried louder and resisted going into the building with his father, Atrion. Molly then went over to
Mike and told him the story of the traffic stop. She ended by commenting, “It’s because of parents like Atrion that
innocent children get cancer and asthma.”
After watching Atrion and speaking to Molly, Mike decided to temporarily remove Joe from Atrion’s care
to check for physical abuse and for side-effects to his second-hand smoke inhalation. At 5pm, Molly found Atrion
and asked him to accompany him outside, while Mike went inside to find Joe. Mike and Molly brought Joe to
Saratoga Hospital.
Atrion was told where Joe was taken, but not allowed to see his son at any point while Joe was at Saratoga
Hospital. It took several hours of waiting in the Emergency Department for Joe to be seen by a doctor. They ran a
barrage of tests. No bruises or any other signs of physical abuse were found. However, there were some abnormal
results in Joe’s breathing tests and the doctors were concerned Joe may be asthmatic. They admitted him for the
night in order to run more tests throughout the night.
After many tests, the doctors determined Joe had Allergic Asthma caused by a unique type of pollen from
the bushes outside Saratoga National. The doctors gave Joe an antihistamine and he immediately started to get
better. Based on the doctor’s findings, he determined Joe was not in risk and returned him to his father at
approximately 5am the following morning.
39

Atrion and Joe brought §1983 claims against CPS and Mike Couzens, individually, for their alleged
constitutional violations. Atrion argued that (1) CPS, through its agent Mike, violated the Fourth Amendment by
unreasonably seizing Joe without probable cause that Joe was in danger; and (2) CPS, through its agent Mike,
violated the Fourteenth Amendment, substantive due process, because Atrion and Joe’s separation was shocking,
arbitrary, and capricious. CPS and Mike countered by arguing that (1) CPS and Mike were protected by qualified
immunity; (2) Mike did not violate Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights because there was probable cause Joe was
in immediate danger if he remained with Atrion; and (2) Mike did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because
Atrion and Joe were not separated so long a period of time as to violation Plaintiffs substantive due process rights.
At trial, both parties moved for summary judgment. The court dismissed Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment
claims finding that no reasonable juror would conclude that Atrion and Joe’s separation was so long as to be
shocking, arbitrary, and capricious. It also dismissed Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims finding that CPS and
Mike were entitled to qualified immunity. The Appellate Division agreed. Atrion now appeals.
AG Tara Galusha represents: Child Protective Services and Mike Couzens, individually, Respondent
PD Eric Quitter represents: Artion Raimundi Appellant
40

Chief Justice Decision
Atrion Raimundi, Appellant, v. Child
Protective Services and Mike Couzens,
individually, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third
Department, New York
March 9, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Eric Quitter and Stephen Bruno,
for Appellant.
Tara Galusha and Joanna Bugenis, for
Respondent.
JUDGES: Last, Last, Last, and Last.
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York rule part in favor of the respondent, Child
Protective Services and Mike Couzens, and part
in favor of the Appellant, Atrion Raimundi.
The Constitution of the United States protects
the most sacred rights of our citizens, and the
two amendments at issue in this case are the 4th
amendment, which protects against unreasonable
seizures, and the 14th amendment, which
protects our right to familial association. First,
this court does not find that there was a violation
of the 4th amendment. The Attorney General
was able to successfully convince the court that
Couzens acted appropriately under the
circumstances. Under the 4th amendment, CPS
can only seize a child if one other sign of abuse
is coupled with the violation of smoking with a
minor in a motor vehicle. The Attorney General
adequately showed that this abuse existed, thus
constituting a 4th amendment violation. In our
case, however, several factors made it clear that
possible abuse in an emergency situation
existed. Couzens used both his knowledge from
Molly Warren, who is a trained police officer,
his abilities as a trained CPS worked to
determine when abuse is taking place, and the
scene he witnessed, which included Joe crying
and screaming in the snow as Atrion acted
indifferent and eventually forcefully grabbed the
child. Considering the totality of the events, we
believe that an emergency situation did exist and
that it was in the best interest of the child for Joe
to be taken into the custody of CPS. Because of
this, the 4th amendment was not violated.
In regards to the 14th amendment, we find that
CPS violated Atrion’s fundamental right to
familial association. This violation existed due
to the fact that the separation was shocking,
arbitrary, and capricious. Just as there was a
threshold of time when the children should have
been returned in the case of Perez v. Sugarman,
the Public Defender sufficiently demonstrated
that such a threshold exists in our case. Prior to
when physical abuse was officially ruled out, we
find that the holding of Joe was not shocking,
arbitrary, and capricious. Since the possible
threat of physical abuse still existed, the 14th
amendment was not violated. However, we find
that this threshold was surpassed once Atrion
was denied visitation to his son after the
physical abuse had been disproven. According to
Anthony v. New York, a main reason a 14th
amendment violation was not found was because
contact was given to the family. In our case,
however, no such contact was granted, thus
justifying the 14th amendment violation. Since
there was no further threat of abuse we find that
withholding Joe from Atrion’s custody was
shocking, arbitrary, and capricious, thus
constituting a 14th amendment violation. The
14th amendment protects the rights of familial
association. Being as this is a part of the
constitution and thus a fundamental right, we the
court feel that protecting this right is of upmost
importance.
Even though we find no violation of the 4th
amendment, the violation of the 14th
amendment provides justification that a new trial
should be granted.
41

Case A 2012
Supreme Court Appellate Division, 4th Department
New York
Mark Rutkowsky, Petitioner
v.
The YMCA, Respondent
Facts of the Case:
(Note for this case you must consider the YMCA to be a government run agency. Non-profits are notoriously close
to government anyway so it is not a stretch of the imagination)
Mark Rutkowsky had worked for the YMCA for 40 years before being terminated for conduct detrimental
to a government agency. As part of his punishment he also lost his pension. Mark had been the conference
organizer for New York Youth and Government (Y&G) for 20 years. Under his leadership he grew the program
from approximately 400 students to 600 students. Mark also represented the New York Y&G program at
Conference of National Affairs (CONA) for 25 years. Mark mentored students who had gone on to be selected as
committee chairs and presiding officers at both the state and national level. In a forty year career Mark had only
been reprimanded once for the Bowerman “Speedo” incident of 2003. Mark had quickly corrected that problem by
ending the use of the pool at Y & G. Otherwise he was a model employee who was regularly promoted and had
received bonuses during financially sound years.
The YMCA had a direct budget from the YMCA for Y&G, which was supplemented by dues paid by the
students. Mark’s problems began when the economy declined in 2007. Not only was his budget decreased, but he
realized that not enough funds were being devoted to Y & G to provide scholarships for students who could not
afford to pay on their own. Mark tried traditional fundraisers and applied for grants but by 2009 over 50 students
were unable to attend the conference.
In 2010, Mark began directing funds from other YMCA programs to provide money for scholarships. In
2010, Mark “redirected” $20,000 which allowed an extra hundred students to attend. Mark never took a dollar for
himself. In order to do this, Mark falsified financial records, created false status reports, and lied to his direct
superiors on at least ten occasions. During this same time Mark had several, but not excessive, unauthorized
absences because he needed to construct the fake documents at home to avoid being caught at work. He could not
provide doctors notices and seldom could notify his supervisor in advance. Ironically, Mark took funds from a
YMCA mutual fund which was decimated by the debt ceiling crisis and the money would have been lost in the stock
market anyway.
When the YMCA learned of Mark’s actions, Mark was terminated. Mark appealed the termination and revocation
of his pension in a Section 75 Hearing. After all of the evidence above was entered and Mark testified that he only
committed the conduct because it was in the best interests of the students. He also testified he was too old to get
another job and he still had the responsibility to support himself and his wife during their retirement years. Hearing
Officer Allison Bugenis stated she considered all of the evidence and then found there was substantial evidence to
support the charge of conduct detrimental to a government agency and found the penalty was appropriate.
Mark is now appealing the Hearing Officers Bugenis decision as being arbitrary and capricious stating
specifically that the punishment was so disproportionate to the offense in light of the all the circumstances as to be
shocking to one’s sense of fairness.
The following cases are the only cases you may use in your brief. If other cases are cited in the supplied cases you
may cite them but only for the paragraphs from the original cases. The Iarocci case contains several summaries for
other cases not given to you. Use the summaries in your brief and arguments as you will.
Iarocci v. West Haverstraw, 2011 WL 1678418
Muraik v. Landi, 798 N.Y.S.2d 497, (2 nd Dept. 2005)
Goudy v. Schaffer, 808 N.Y.S.2d 712 (2 nd Dept. 2005)
Alston v. Morgan, 664 N.Y.S.2d 819 (2 nd Dept. 1997)
42

Team 1 v 11
MARK RUTKOWSKI, Appellant, v. THE
YMCA, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Thomas Hendrix, Cody Shaner, and
Zech Yaw, for Appellant.
Matthew Scanlon and Brendan
Conneely, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Mallone, Al-Ajmi, Dhami, Vanini, King,
Finan
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of he State of New York rule
in favor of the respondent, the YMCA. The
respondent provided sufficient evidence to prove that
the decision of the lower court to uphold termination
was justified. The respondent also provides such
evidence as to justify the revocation of Mark’s
pension.
The first issue debated within this case was whether
or not Mark Rutkowsky’s actions were a result of
moral turpitude or were detrimental to a government
agency, thus justifying the termination of his
employment. The respondent does this by using
Muraik v. Landi in which it was found there was
insufficient evidence to support either of these
claims. However, the respondent then compares the
facts of the cases to show that, through Mark’s
submission of fraudulent records, he is indeed
committing an act of moral turpitude. The court
finds that this is dissimilar to the acts of fraud within
Muraik due to the fact that Mark’s actions also had
an adverse affect on a government agency, whereas
the acts in Muraik did not. The respondent then
moved to explore the differences between our case
and that of Alston v. Morgan. Alston is used by the
respondent to expose the ruling that “the failure to
report to work and to provide documentation for
absences as an employee is directed to do, is a
rational basis for finding misconduct.” These
findings of misconduct are then augmented by the
respondents showing that the actions committed by
Mark were much more severe than in the Alston case.
The respondent provided sufficient evidence to prove
that Mark’s transgressions were of moral turpitude as
well as detrimental to a government agency, thus we
find termination to be an appropriate punishment.
The second issue in this case similarly addresses the
acts of moral turpitude and those detrimental to a
government agency when compared to the reputable
career of Mark Rutkowsky in order to determine the
appropriateness of the revocation of pension. The
respondent highlights the variations between our case
and that of Iarocci v. West Haverstraw in order to
emphasize the severity of the circumstances of
Mark’s actions. The respondent successfully argued
that, unlike Iarocci, Mark’s absences were
unauthorized and no documentation was provided,
thus the rulings of Iarocci should not apply. This
argument sufficed in negating the mitigating factors
that would ordinarily apply due to Mark’s extensive
career with the YMCA. Mark’s immoral crime of
fraud and stealing from another YMCA program for
his own interests strongly overrode any career
accolade he received throughout his lifetime.
Following that point, the respondent proceeded to
contrast our case to that of Goudy v. Schaffer, in
which “the evidence did not establish, nor does the
respondent suggest, that the petitioner’s misconduct
was one of moral turpitude or motivated by malice or
selfishness.” While the appellants attempted to argue
that Mark’s actions were on behalf of the students,
we agree with the respondents that Mark was, in fact,
acting out of selfishness. We agree with the
respondent in this regard due to Mark’s connection to
the success of the program and the fact that the
greater the amount of students who attended this
program, the greater the benefits to Mark’s
reputation. Due to these findings, we conclude that
the revocation of Mark’s pension is the appropriate
punishment given the circumstances of the case.
We concur with the respondents and move to uphold
the decision of the trial court.
43

Team 2 v 8
MARK RUTKOWSKI, Appellant, v. THE
YMCA, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
COUNSEL:
for Appellant.
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
Evan Prentice and Dan Liesner,
Steven Viele and Nichole
Rubertone, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Englemann, Walker, Dole, Galusha,
Muthig
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Court of Appeals of the State of New
York find in favor of the respondent as for the
termination of his position, and in favor of the
Appellant as for keeping his pension after a
deduction of $20,000. The respondent proved
that Rutkowski’s actions were no longer worthy
of him being employed with the YMCA. The
appellant showed that Rutkowski’s actions were
not harmful enough to toward the YMCA for
him to lose his pension, but were harmful
enough for him to get $20,000 deducted from his
pension.
Crucial to this case was the fact of whether or
not “termination imposed on [Mark Rutkowski]
by [the YMCA] was ‘disproportionate as to
shock one’s sense of fairness.” In Iarocci v.
West Haverstraw. We review the search of the
“standard for determining the appropriate
penalty when a finding of guilt has been found
in an administrative proceeding and punishment
imposed.” The petitioners were unable to cover
any part of this cross case that makes it unable to
cite any arguments and benefits in the case. The
respondent was able to cover how Rutkowski
didn’t have excused absences, and provide the
proper documents in order to show how it is
irrelevant. In the case, like in Muraik v Landi we
held that submitting falsified documents to ones
superiors does not constitute as a reasonable
justification for losing one’s pension. However
in our case because Rutkowski embezzled
$20,000 we deduct that from his pension and
because of the embezzlement we terminate his
position at the YMCA as the respondent argued.
The petitioner’s used Muraik v Landi to show
Rutkowski’s long history as a distinguished
employee. They also showed the devastation that
would come if we took away his pension and the
affect on his family and his future. In addition
they were able to prove that Rutkowski wasn’t
motivated by malice and selfishness in his
actions. The respondents used the case in how
Rutkowski willingly and knowingly submitted
falsified records and documents. Unlike in
Goudy v. Schaffer where the court suggested
that where “a petitioner’s misconduct was one
of moral turpitude or motivated by malice or
selfishness” would result in loss of a pension it
doesn’t compare to the appellant because
Rutkowski wasn’t guilty of moral turpitude.
Also the petitioners had ‘to change the ruling of
termination because of the affect it would
impose on the family” for this reason Rutkowski
was able to keep his pension. Although
embezzlement usually constitutes a crime of
moral turpitude the case at bar is the rare
exception. The petitioners failed to use this case
in a way to prove Rutkowskis innocence’s. The
respondents were able to show guilt on
Rutkowski because of the one stain on his
record. The petitioners were able though to show
how he quickly took care of the Bowerman
Speedo incident, and how nothing has happened
like it again. In the end both sides contradicted
what they said by agreeing on the loss of job but
keeping of the pension and the deduction off of
the pension.
We hereby find in favor of both the appellant
and respondent by rewarding the appellant his
pension and the respondent with the termination
of Rutkowski and a deduction of $20,000
44

Team 4 v 14
MARK RUTKOWSKI, Appellant, v. THE
YMCA, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
COUNSEL:
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
Joey Catalano, for Appellant.
Jordin O'Reilly and Lynsey
Springman, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Orr, Mazzeo, Jacobs, Cicerelli,
Kappel, Sutton
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the respondent, The
YMCA. The respondent properly sufficed to
show that Officer Bugenis’ decision should be
upheld. The respondent adequately proved that
Mark Rutkowski’s punishment was not arbitrary
and capricious, did not “shock one’s sense of
fairness” and was proportionate to his crime.
Crucial to this case was the determination of
whether the punishment of the lower court was
“proportionate” to the crime. According to
Iarocci v. West Haverstraw, 31 Misc. 3d 1222A
(N.Y. 2011) “the test is whether such
punishment is ‘…..so disproportionate to the
offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be
shocking to one’s sense of fairness.’” In Iarocci,
the court annulled the termination where
Iarocci’s termination was based on excessive
absences due to hospitalizations for medical
reasons. Unlike in Iarocci, however,
Rutkowski’s absenses in this case were tainted
by moral turpitude because he was using the
time to falsify records and misappropriate funds.
While the petitioner showed that Rutkowski’s
40-year career was notable, Rutkowski’s
negative actions out-weighed the positive years
he spent with the Y. Therefore, the respondent
proved that Rutkowski’s punishment of losing
his job and pension was proportional to the
crime of committing fraud and falsifying
records.
The respondent adequately proved that
Rutkowski’s actions were ones constituting
“moral turpitude.” As stated in Goudy v.
Shaffer, 24 A.D.3d 764 (N.Y. 2005) “…the
petitioner’s misconduct was one of moral
turpitude or motivated by malice or selfishness.”
In the case of Goudy, there were 42
specifications of incompetence, but none were as
severe as the offenses Rutkowski committed.
Rutkowski’s use of the YMCA’s money in order
to further his own interest in the Youth and
Government program proved to be motivated by
selfishness and his failure to ask permission
constituted malice.
In addition, the court needs to make a
determination of whether the punishment of the
lower court is “shocking to one’s sense of
fairness.” In Muraik v. Landi, 19 A.D.3d 697
(N.Y. 2005), Muraik’s termination was reversed
even where there were “several instances of
misconduct by the petitioner in knowingly
submitting false time records for his
subordinates,” because of the “minimal
prospects of alternative employment thus
imposing a devastating impact on his ability to
support his family.” In the case at bar,
Rutkowski acted in such a way that reflected
moral turpitude, unlike the case involving
Muraik. The respondent proved that Rutkowski
knowingly submitted false records while
“redirecting” YMCA funds. Therefore, the
matter of removing Rutkowski’s pension, could
not constitute a “shock to one’s sense of
fairness.”
In conclusion, even though the petitioner
brought about points that were notable, the court
has decided that the hearing officer’s decision
will be upheld, and that the punishment with
proportionate to the crime committed.
45

Team 7 v 9
MARK RUTKOWSKI, Appellant, v.
THE YMCA, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Vimbai Ushe and Erin
Loftus, for Appellant.
Katie Roxstrom and Kathryn Rowan, for
Respondent.
JUDGES: Dewitt, Domagola, Parakkatu,
Blaszczyk, Furia
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the respondent, the
YMCA. The respondent properly established
that Mark acted against the interests of the
YMCA when redirecting the company’s
$20,000. The respondent also proved that it is
not shocking to one’s sense of fairness to take
Mr. Rutkowski’s pension as his actions
constituted moral turpitude.
Fundamental to this case is, understanding the
definition of moral turpitude which is being
“motivated by malice or selfishness” as cited in
Robert Muraik v. Anthony M. Landi. The
respondent proved that Mark’s actions were of
moral turpitude as he stole a substantial sum of
money from the YMCA to improve his own
image. The YMCA’s Youth & Govt. program
was Mark’s brain child and this court finds that
this was one of Mr. Rutkowski’s ‘pet projects’ in
that in making the Youth and Govt. program
look better was in his best interest. Therefore we
hold that in this sense he was acting not with
malice, but with selfishness alone in his
reallocating the YMCA’s resources. Although
the transported money did benefit an extra
hundred students, Mark only did this to maintain
the longevity of the program and his own job.
When regarding mitigating factors, counsel
proved that past factors have no control upon
present situations. Specifically, Mark’s generally
flawless career of 40 years except for the
Bowerman Speedo Incident of 2003 should not
be considered by the court as committing fraud
outweighs such deeds.
Next, the respondent clearly expressed that it is
not shocking to one’s sense of fairness to take
away Mr. Rutkowski’s pension. In the case of
Goudy v. Schaffer, William Goudy was able to
keep his job and pension though he had 42
specifications of incompetence and misconduct.
Counsel effectively proved that Mark has no
resemblance to Mr. Goudy as incompetence and
misconduct is in no way similar to lying to one’s
employers while committing fraud. Council
proved that by allowing Mark to keep his
pension, the YMCA would be setting a
precedent to condone moral turpitude as long as
the outcome works in the company’s favor.
Respondent stressed that to respect YMCA
values such as honesty the organization must not
give any benefits to Mark.
With such evidence provided, we agree in the
lower court’s decision to terminate Mark’s
career and pension
46

Team 2 v 20
MARK RUTKOWSKI, Appellant, v.
THE YMCA, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Dan Liesner and Evan
Prentice, for Appellant.
Ashley Hampson and Brian
Shiminski, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Dewitt, Domagola, Parakkatu,
Blaszczyk, Furia
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
find in favor of the appellant, Rutkowski.
The appellant successfully proved that
Rutkowski's termination and loss of pension
were too severe. The appellant adequately
proved that Rutkowski’s actions did not
constitute as moral turpitude.
The crucial issue of this case was that
Rutkowski's punishment of termination from
his job was disproportionate to the offense.
The appellant compared the case at bar to
Muraik v. Landi, in which the appellant had
a 29 year career with only one incident prior
to the act of fraud. Similarly, Rutkowski
was a model employee with many years of
good service and only one prior offense.
Though both employees committed fraud,
the appellant argued that Rutkowski acted
without "malice or selfishness." Rutkowski's
actions were most certainly motivated by a
desire to serve the students of the Youth and
Government program, who were not able to
pay for the conference.
The appellant in our case also successfully
compared the records of these men, arguing
that Rutkowski's service overrode his fraud.
In the case of Romano v. Town Board of
Town of Colonie, the petitioner had received
several warnings about his excessive
absenteeism. Appellant demonstrated that
Rutkowski had received no warning prior to
his termination and that this termination was
erroneous and thusly, merited a new trial.
The appellant also used Alston v. Morgan to
counter that Rutkowski's absences were not
excessive and took place over a shorter
time-span.
The second most crucial issue was that of
the petitioner's pension. The petitioner
defined a pension as an award for good
service. In the case of Goudy v. Schaffer,
the petitioner was terminated after 42 counts
of incompetence and misconduct, yet his
pension was restored after they determined it
was too severe a punishment. Similar to
Rutkowski's case, Goudy had to provide for
his family. The appellant in our case did not
excuse Rutkowski's act of fraud, and
recognized that Rutkowski inappropriately
redirection $20,0000. The petitioners
argued that Rutkowski's prior service earned
him the right to keep his pension, and
encouraged that his only punishment be
repaying the money that he had taken for the
Youth and Government program. He
compared Rutkowski's right to maintain his
pension to Muraik v. Landi, where it was
determined that due to his years of good
service, and that because Mark had a family
support, he deserved his pension.
We believe that the decision of the lower
court should be overturned and that
Rutkowski receives both his job and pension
with the $20,000 he embezzled, deducted
from his pension.
47

Team 7 v 13
MARK RUTKOWSKI, Appellant, v. THE
YMCA, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
COUNSEL:
for Appellant.
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
Erin Loftus and Vimbai Ushe,
Liam McGurl, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Orr, Mazzeo, Jacobs, Cicerelli,
Kappel, Sutton
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York partially affirm and partially overturn the
decision of the lower court. The appellant
properly justified the security of Mark
Rutkowski’s pension while the respondent
properly justified the termination of Mark
Rutkowski. The appellant successfully proved
that the 40-year career of Mark Rutkowski
provided a sufficient reason to keep his pension.
The respondent on the other hand proved that
Rutkowski’s absences, along with the
redirecting of $20,000, was sufficient grounds
for termination.
Crucial to this case is the determination of when
a removal of a pension is improper. In the case
of Muraik v. Landi, termination of a pension
was improper where Muraik’ had a 29-year
career and the evidence showed that it would
impact the ability to support his family. The
petitioners successfully analogized the 40-year
career of Mark Rutkowski and the impact a
pension has on his ability to support his family
to the Muraik case. The petitioner also
successfully argued that a pension is a reward
for past years of good service and Mark
Rutkowski had 40 great years as a YMCA
employee, as seen through his positive impact
on the Youth and Government program.
The respondent failed to cite case law that would
justify the removal of Mark Rutkowsky’s
pension. Although the respondent brought about
the Alex Bowerman “speedo” incident in 2003,
he could not refute the argument presented by
the petitioner. The respondent attempted to
tarnish Mark Rutkowski’s almost clean slate
with this prior incident, but the Court finds that
this single incident does not cast a shadow on
Mark’s otherwise exemplary 40-year career.
Along with bringing about the Alex Bowerman
“speedo” incident, the respondent tried to refute
the case of Muraik v. Landi but could not
differentiate that case from the current case. In
conclusion, the Court finds that the removal of
Mark Rutkowski’s pension is shocking to one’s
sense of fairness and must be reversed.
Secondly, a crucial factor of this case is when
termination of employment is considered just. In
the case of Alston v. Morgan it states, “the
determination that the petitioner be dismissed
was not so disproportionate to the offenses
committed as to be shocking to one’s sense of
fairness.” Here, the respondent successfully
used the case of Alston v. Morgan to justify
termination on the grounds of Mark Rutkowski’s
numerous absences. The respondent linked
Alston’s unauthorized absences to Mark
Rutkowski’s unauthorized absences. Also, the
respondent emphasized that the absences in this
case were for used to commit fraud,
strengthening the justification for termination.
Furthermore, the Court agrees with the
Respondent that the YMCA needs to set a
precedent for those who commit crimes of moral
turpitude and Mark must be used to set this
precedent. The petitioners failed to convince the
Court that Mark’s absences should not being
grounds for termination of his employment.
While the petitioners attempted to distinguish
Mark’s personality from his misconduct, we find
that the termination of Mark Rutkowski’s job
was an appropriate punishment for his offense
and is not shocking to one’s sense of fairness.
With respect to the pension, we overturn the
lower court’s decision. With respect to the
termination of employment, the lower court’s
decision is affirmed.
48

Case B 2012
Raphael Ortega, Appellant
v.
The People of the State of New York, Respondents
Supreme Court Appellate Division, First Department
New York
Facts of the Case:
In February 2001, best friends Raphael Ortega and Atrion Raimundi attended the whitest wedding known
to man in Saratoga New York. In fact they were the only two minorities at the event which even included the people
working. Atrion is a 6'3", light skinned, clean shaven African American with a shaved head weighing in at 220
pounds on a good day. Raphael is of mixed race of Puerto Rican/Dominican descent with dark skin, a full head of
hair, goatee, approximately 5'9" and 160 pounds wet at least until he gained ten pounds studying for the bar. Also
attending the wedding was Flynn Jebb who was Raphael’s ex (after a very bitter breakup) and Atrion’s current date.
During the wedding Atrion approached “Slick Sam” the D.J. and requested the Electric Slide. Five minutes later
Raphael approached Sam and asked for the Cha Cha Slide and Sam replied, you just requested electric slide.
Raphael, who was angry, replied, no that was the other black guy. Later that evening many wedding guests saw a
person they described as a minority in and around “Slick Sam”’s DJ equipment. At the end of the night “Slick
Sam” reported that his $5000 digital mixer was missing and told the police that the “other black guy” must of stolen
it. He later identified Raphael in a line up. Two other people identified Raphael as the minority near the dance
floor and one other witness was unsure. The police also interviewed Flynn who stated Atrion was with her most of
the evening but was also constantly on the dessert line (which was not near the dance floor) and that she saw
Raphael on the dance floor. Atrion stated he was mostly on the desert line and had the waistline to prove it. He
also stated Raphael loved to dance and no matter what wedding they were at he would be found on the dance floor
or on the dessert line with him. Two days before trial Raphael’s attorney contacted the prosecutor and told him that
they would be calling Atrion as an alibi witness.
The matter proceed to trial. Raphael’s attorney’s opening argument centered around Atrion providing an
alibi for Raphael that involved a lot of high calorie desserts. Raphael’s attorney also subpoenaed Atrion as a defense
witness. Atrion either misread the subpoena or the subpoena was wrong and showed up to trial on the first day and
was told to come back when it was the defense case. Slick Sam testified he had not really gotten Atrion and
Raphael mixed up, it was only he did not like the Cha Cha slide so he was trying to anger Raphael. Flynn Jebb
testified consistent with the above and included that Raphael had come back to their table at the wedding and retold
the “other black guy” story to the other guests who made him even angrier because they could not stop laughing.
No one testified to seeing Atrion and Raphael together on the dessert line but several people remember Atrion eating
an entire cake. The People rested at 3p.m. and Judge Colleen Murtagh asked Raphael’s attorney to call his first
witness. Atrion was not in the courtroom and the attorney asked for an adjournment to the next day. The next day
the attorney made the representation that he had spoken to Atrion on the phone and he had agreed to be there first
thing in the morning. Judge Murtagh then asked where was Atrion and the lawyer did not have an answer. The
lawyer asked for a second adjournment until two p.m. which was granted. At 2 p.m. the attorney made the
representation that he had talked to Atrion’s family who had stated he had missed the bus because he could not run
fast enough and they were not sure how far he would have to walk to court. Raphael’s attorney asked for a material
witness warrant which was denied. Judge Murtagh also denied the next request for a continuance and made Raphael
proceed. Raphael conferred with his counsel for about ten minutes after which Judge Murtagh became impatient
and asked if the defendant was going to testify. The attorney asked for a 15 minute break, which was granted and
then for another 30 minute break which was denied. Judge Murtaugh muttered something like this trial needs to
end in the next six months. Then Raphael testified that Atrion was with him on the dessert line for significant times
during the wedding and the prosecution cross him on the fact that Atrion only came to light two days before the trial.
Raphael was convicted and sentence to one year in jail.
Raphael now appeals the judge’s decision to deny his third request for a continuance on the grounds that
Judge Murtaugh’s denial of the two motions for adjournment violated his rights to call witnesses on his behalf and to
effectively confer with his counsel.
The following cases are the only cases you may use in your brief.
People v Adair, 84 A.D.3d 1752 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2011)
People v. Foy, 32 N.Y.2d 473 (N.Y. 1973)
People v. Singleton, 41 N.Y.2d 402 (N.Y. 1977)
People v. Spears, 64 N.Y.2d 698 (N.Y. 1984)
49

Team 15 v 60
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Third Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Aaron DeLoria and Alex
Ruzbacki, for Appellant.
Ethan DeAbreau and Jeff
Gao, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Dewitt, Domagola, Parakkatu,
Blaszczyk, Furia
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate court of the state of New
York find in favor of the respondent, the
People of the State of New York. The issue
in this case was whether or not the judge
abused his discretion in denying a third
adjournment. The respondents adequately
disproved the test in People v. Foy that
states, “to put off trial it must appear that:
(1) that the witness really is material and
appears to the court to be so; (2) that the
party who applies has been guilty of no
neglect; (3) that the witness can be had at
the time to which the trial is deferred. “ The
state proved that the Foy test was not
applicable in this case.
First, they successfully proved that
Raimundi was not a material witness due to
the fact that he would not provide a proper
alibi for Raphael Ortega. The state properly
explained that it was simply not possible for
the two minorities to be together the entire
night. Another case law concerning a
material witness is People v. Adair. They
successfully compared the nonmaterial
officer in question in Adair to Atrion
Raimundi. We therefore find Raimundi was
not material.
With regards to the second prong, the
respondents successfully proved that the
appellants had shown neglect throughout the
trial. They properly expressed the different
possibilities the appellants could have taken
to provide their “material witness.” They
provided examples such as providing a car,
or providing another subpoena for Atrion
Raimundi.
And lastly, the respondents disproved the
third prong by mentioning the errors within
the subpoena. They mentioned the
importance of due diligence and gave proper
examples of how to improve the actions of
the appellants.
The respondents also properly disclosed the
second issue of whether or not the judge had
shown bias by not granting a third
adjournment. They adequately explained the
issue of time. The appellants had over 23
hours, which was found by the respondents
to be plenty of time to revise their argument.
They also properly compared this situation
to People v. Singleton, where they only had
17 hours to prepare a new argument. The
respondents properly expressed the logical
reasoning for of Judge Murtaugh’s denial of
a third adjournment by proving how
unprepared the appellants were by not
providing a backup for their argument. We
agree with the original ruling of the court
and certify that Raphael’ Ortega’s
conviction came at the conclusion of a
properly conducted and fairly run trial.
50

Team 17 v 24
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Kiersten Chambers and Kassie
Chopa, for Appellant.
Daniel Shwartz, Colton Bishop,
and Rebecca Sung, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Orr, Mazzeo, Jacobs, Cicerelli,
Kappel, Sutton
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the respondent, The State
of New York. The respondent properly showed
that the judge’s decision to deny Raphael
Ortega’s third request for a continuance was not
violating his right to call a witness and the right
to effectively confer with his council.
The respondent’s properly showed that Ortega’s
rights to call a witness were not violated by
using the test outlined in The People of the State
of New York v. Foy. The test consists of three
prongs, 1. That the witness is really material and
appears to the court to be so; 2. That the party
who applies has been guilty of no neglect and 3.
That the witness can be had at the time to which
the trial is deferred. The appellants attempted to
prove that the defense did all they could to reach
Raimundi and to ensure his presence in court.
The respondent properly refuted this by arguing
that a phone call to the family and a delayed
material witness warrant were not enough to
grant a new trial and thus failed the second
element of the Foy test. It is required that the
appellant prove that Ortega practiced due
diligence in providing his alibi witness. But, the
respondent’s continued emphasis on the lack of
communication between Raimundi and Ortega,
as well as the failure to provide transportation,
only confirmed that Ortega lacked due diligence
in providing a witness.
Next, the respondent successfully argued that the
appellant had also failed the third element of the
Foy test by inadequately arguing that Raimundi
would in fact arrive if the trial had been
adjourned. The respondent correctly showed
how the two adjournments and the 15 minute
break were adequate amounts of time for the
defense to locate their witness. The appellants
failed to prove how Raimundi would have been
any more likely to appear in court, especially
that he could not even be reached after the
subpoena. The request for a third adjournment
was correctly denied since the witness was
proven to be unreliable and elusive.
The respondent lastly proved that Ortega’s right
to effectively confer with his council was not
violated. By correctly citing the case of The
People of the State of New York v. Spears, the
respondents proved the previously granted
adjournments were ample time for the defense to
prepare their case and that Ortega’s right to
confer with council was not violated. The
respondent showed that when the judge granted
the extra adjournment, the defense should have
discussed alternative ways to prove their case for
the sake of efficiency of time for the court.
Ortega was granted more than a few minutes to
discuss with his lawyers over the course of the
trial. In the case of Spears, the judge only
granted a few minutes, while Ortega was given
sufficient time to discuss the possibility of the
witness not appearing.
We disagree that Raphael Ortega’s third request
for a continuance was violating his right to call a
witness and the right to effectively confer with
his council. We find that the lower court’s
original ruling should not be overturned.
51

Team 21 v 26
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Third Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Seth Jaff and Joe Alari, for
Appellant.
Dio Nunez and Koraly
Adams, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Englemann, Walker, Dole,
Galusha, Muthig
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the respondent, the
People of the State of New York. The
respondent properly showed that Judge
Colleen Murtagh did not abuse her
discretion by refusing the additional 30-
minute delay. The respondent also proved
that sufficient time was given to confer with
the counsel.
The issue presented in this case is whether
or not the court abused its discretion by
refusing the third adjournment. The rule for
whether or not the court abused its
discretion is the Foy test addressed in
People v. Foy. The Foy test states that “to
put off a trial it must appear (1) that the
witness is really material and appears to the
court to be so; (2) that the party who applies
has been guilty of no neglect; (3) that the
witness can be had at the time to which the
trial has deferred.” In People v. Adair the
witness was not material because the officer
was not present during the crime. Similarly,
in our case Atrion was not a material witness
because there are two other witnesses that
stated Atrion and Raphael were not together
the whole night. As to the second Foy test
factor, Raphael was neglectful. He could
have done much more to get Atrion to the
courtroom; there are many means of
transportation in New York City. They
could have sent him a bus schedule, ordered
a taxi, or taken a subway. Addressing the
third factor of the Foy test, there is no way
to be sure Atrion could be present at the
time to which the trial would be deferred.
Atrion failed to attend the two
adjournments. Thus, he has decided to
change his mind and not testify. In sum, all
three factors have not been met.
The second issue presented is whether or not
sufficient time was given to confer with
counsel. In People v. Spears the judge gave
the defendant 5 seconds to confer with
counsel. In Spears the court found that 5
seconds was not enough time. In our case,
15 minutes were given for counsel to confer
with Raphael. That amount of time is
sufficient to satisfy the right to counsel.
Unlike Spears, Raphael was given two
previous adjournments when another
argument should have been prepared in case
Atrion did not show up, which was likely
given the fact he did not appear to testify
after two adjournments were granted.
Defense counsel should have prepared
previously. The court properly denied the
second request for an additional 30-minute
delay.
We agree with the original ruling of the
court and that Raphael’s conviction came at
the conclusion of a properly conducted,
fairly run trial.
52

Team 58 v 28
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Danamarie Gangon, for Appellant.
Maxwell Beebe and Ceejay Lofland, for
Respondent.
JUDGES: Mallone, Al-Ajmi, Dhami, Vanini,
King, Finan
OPINION
We the Appellant Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the respondent, The People
of the State of New York. The respondent
properly illustrated that Judge Murtaugh’s
actions did not deny Raphael Ortega his
constitutional right to call a witness on his
behalf nor his right to effectively confer with
council. The respondent was able to prove that
Judge Murtaugh’s action to deny a third
adjournment was not a violation of these rights.
The Sixth amendment grants every citizen the
right to call a witness in his or her defense. In
this case the respondent was able to prove that
Judge Murtaugh did not abuse her discretion
when she denied Raphael Ortega a third
adjournment. In People v. Foy the court cites
People v. Brabson when they say “…the
defendant does not have the right to delay his
trial unreasonably regardless of reality.” The
respondent accentuated that since Raimundi
failed to arrive after the first two adjournments
the court could not further delay the trail
because of his inability to come at the proper
time. Additionally the respondents explained
that a case cannot be delayed indefinitely when
they explained why Ortega did not deserve a
third adjournment as referenced in People v.
Singleton. In People v. Singleton, three
adjournments were issued prior to denying the
final adjournment. The respondents correctly
correlated Singleton to our case, where Judge
Murtaugh issued two adjournments, proving
there was no abuse of discretion.
The third prong of the Foy test states, “to put off
a trial it must appear that the witness can be had
at the time to which the trial is deferred”,
respondents proved that Raimundi would most
likely not show up if a third adjournment were
granted. As the respondents successfully argued,
Raimundi’s failures to be present after the first
and second adjournments were enough to
suggest that he would not appear if a third
adjournment had been granted.
Both the respondents and appellants addressed
the second prong of the Foy test which
recognizes that to delay a trial “…the party who
applies has been guilty of no neglect”. The
appellants argued against this, claiming that the
defendants used due diligence including
contacting Raimundi’s family to try and ensure
his arrival. However, the respondents provided a
stronger argument explaining that Ortega’s
counsel could have taken further measures such
as providing Raimundi a bus schedule to ensure
his arrival to the courthouse on the proper day.
The first prong of the Foy test states “…to put
off a trial it must appear that the witness is really
material and appears to the court to be so.”
Judge Murtaugh’s decision to deny the
defendants a material witness warrant proves
Raimundi was not a material witness. While the
appellants argued that Atrion was a material
witness being the only other minority at the
wedding and a friend of defendant, the
respondents successfully argued that Raimundi
could not confirm the whereabouts of Ortega
every minute of the night.
The sixth amendment of the constitution also
ensures that one is allowed to refer to their
counsel throughout the duration of a trial. As the
respondents stated, in the case of People v.
Adair adjournments lie in sound discretion of the
court. The respondents correctly connected this
to our case to show that Judge Murtaugh did not
abuse her discretion when she denied Raphael a
thirty minute break to confer with his counsel.
Additionally, referencing the case of People v.
Spears, the respondents explained that the judge
in the Spears case openly issued a prejudice
statement where as in this case Judge Murtaugh
simply muttered something under her breath. We
believe the jury used their best discretion upon
hearing Judge Murtaugh’s comment.
We therefore uphold the ruling of the lower
court on all issues
53

Team 16 v 23
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Beth Crimi and Brianna
Connolly, for Appellant.
Mary Stephenson and Krista
Barbeau, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Englemann, Walker, Dole, Galusha,
Muthig
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the respondent, the people
of the State of New York. The respondent was
able to clearly establish that the amount of time
given to the defendant by Judge Murtagh
infringed upon neither the defendant’s right to
call a witness on his behalf nor his right to
affectively confer with his co-council. The
respondent was also able to sufficiently attack
the veracity of the materiality of Atrion
Raimundi to justify the denial the third
adjournment on the grounds that he was not
sufficiently important to the case as applied to
People v. Foy.
Crucial to this case was the 3 prong Foy test, in
which it is clearly outlined that the criteria for a
new trial to be granted in regard to a lack
witness testimony require: (1) That the witness
is really material and appears to the court to be
so; (2) that the party who applies has been guilty
of no neglect (3) that the witness can be had at
the time to which the trial is deferred.
As to the first prong of the test, the respondent
was able to cast a reasonable doubt on the
materiality of Atrion Raimundi as a witness with
numerous statements by attendees of the
wedding that contended that Atrion and Raphael
had minimal interaction during the wedding, and
Atrion was therefore not material enough to
warrant a third adjournment even if he could
have been marginally important to the trial in
question.
As to the second prong of the test, the
respondent was able to prove that the defendant
was guilty of neglect, by arguing that the
defendant should have been able to get to the
court room in the time allotted due to the
flexibility of the New York City transit system.
In regard to the third prong of the test, though
the defendant’s contention that Atrion’s
attendance on the wrong day demonstrated his
capacity to be in the courtroom on time was well
received. The respondent was successfully able
to demonstrate that this contention alone was not
enough to justify a new trial. The defendant also
attempted to contend that the Judge Murtagh’s
mutterings during the case were a showing of
prejudice, similar to People v. Spears. However,
the respondent was able to demonstrate that this
matter, in which the Judge was only alleged to
have whispered a predatory statement, is very
different from Spears, in which the defendant
was berated and abused by the judge.
Finally the defendant argued that the denying of
the adjournment by judge Murtagh infringed
upon the right of the defendant to affectively
confer with his co-council. However the court
agrees that all defendants should have had plan
“A, B, C, D, and E” in case of a problem and the
right was not infringed upon.
While the defendant’s contention that the
discretion of Judge Murtagh was “not unlimited”
as stated in People v. Singleton was well
received, the arguments of the respondent
clearly showed that the lower court judge did not
abuse her discretion. Therefore we find that the
decision of the lower court should be upheld and
no new trial to be granted.
Order affirmed, Justices Muthig, Engelmann,
Galusha, and Dole concur.
54

Team 18 v 60
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Third Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Auden Lewis and Randi
Ciminello, for Appellant.
Ethan DeAbreau and Jeff
Gao, for Respondent.
JUDGES: . Mallone, Al-Ajmi, Dhami,
Vanini, King, Finan
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We, the Appellant Court of the State of New
York, find in favor of the respondent, the
People of the State of New York. The
respondent successfully argued that Judge
Murtaugh did not infringe on Ortega’s
constitutional rights to confer with his
counsel and call witnesses for his defense.
A vital factor in this case is determining
whether or not Ortega’s constitutional right
to call a witness was violated. The case of
People of the State of New York v. Ronald
Foy says that, “to put off a it must appear (1)
that the witness is really material and
appears to the court to be so; (2) that the
party who applies has been guilty of no
neglect; (3) that the witness can be had at
the time to which the trial is deferred.” The
Respondent clearly stated that the Foy Test
failed on all counts, and therefore, the trial
cannot be put off simply due to the absence
of Atrion Raimundi. The respondents said
that the witness is not material because the
testimony of Raimundi could not affect the
outcome of the case because there were no
other witnesses that saw them together at the
party. They said that Ortega’s trial attorneys
were guilty of neglect because of their lack
of due diligence. This was proven through
the fact that they could not do something
like provide other transportation methods to
Raimundi. The third prong of the trial also
failed because Raimundi did not come for
the first two times he was summoned to
trial, so we do not know if he would be there
another time. The respondent also correctly
compared our case to People v. Adair by
emphasizing that, under the “totality of the
circumstances,” Ortega had adequate time to
prepare for the trial. They said that, if the
attorney in the case of Adair was able to
prepare for the case in 17 days, Ortega could
clearly be ready to present within a time
frame of two months. We agree with the
respondent’s assessment.
Another essential issue in this case
surrounds the situation of whether or not
Ortega was allowed the right to confer with
his co-council. The respondents used the
case of People v. Spears; they stated that
unlike Spears, the judge gave Ortega more
than just a “few minutes” to consult with his
lawyer. The respondents stated that the
fifteen minutes break Judge Murtaugh
granted Ortega could have been used as
valuable time to confer with his co-council.
In fact, Ortega could have conferred with his
co-council the
We find no abuse of discretion. Therefore,
we rule in favor of the respondents because
they effectively debated that Judge
Murtaugh did not violate Ortega’s
constitutional rights to confer with his
counsel and call witnesses for his defense.
55

Team 20 v 26
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Third Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Shanta Stevens, Raad Alam,
and Armajit Singh, for Appellant.
Dio Nunez and Koraly
Adams, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Orr, Mazzeo, Jacobs, Cicerelli,
Kappel, Sutton
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the Respondent, the
People of the State of New York. The
Respondents sufficiently showed that the
appellant’s right to both call a witness on his
behalf and to effectively confer with his
counsel were not violated.
According to the case of People v. Foy , in
order to “put off a trial it must appear that
the witness is really material and appears to
the court to be so; that the party who applies
has been guilty of no neglect; that the
witness can be had at the time to which the
trial is deferred.” The respondent’s
adequately showed that Atrion was material
to the case by citing evidence that he was
not present with Raphael at the wedding. In
addition, they demonstrated that the
appellant was guilty of some neglect, for if
they really wanted Atrion to appear in court
they could have ensured he had an adequate
source of transportation. In regards to
ensuring Atrion’s right to call witnesses on
his behalf.
The respondents also used the case of
People v. Singleton to show that the amount
of adjournments given to the appellant was
sufficient to protect Raphael’s constitutional
right to confer with council. In our case, 2
adjournments as well as a short break were
granted, which the respondents successfully
argued should have been enough time for
the appellant to consult with council.
Because the amount of adjournments was
appropriate, the appellants’ right to confer
with council was not violated.
The respondents also stated that the court’s
discretion “in denying a request for an
adjournment will not be overturned absent a
showing of prejudice,” as stated in People v.
Adair. They adequately argued that no such
prejudice existed by showing how the
comments made by Judge Murtaugh did not
affect the actions of the jury. The
respondents made this clear by comparing
the judge made excessively loud and
prejudicial comments which could easily be
heard by the jury, thus justifying the
granting of a new trial. However, in our
case, Judge Murtaugh’s mumbles do not
clearly compare and do not justify the
granting of a new trial.
In conclusion, we decide to rule in favor of
the respondent. We find that no new trial
will be granted, and Raphael’s conviction
will remain.
56

Team 59 v 28
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Third Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Ashley Rogers, Claire
Delayne, and Christina Fallone , for
Appellant.
Maxwell Beebe and Ceejay
Lofland, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Dewitt, Domagola, Parakkatu,
Blaszczyk, Furia
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the respondent, the
People of the State of New York. The
respondent sufficiently demonstrated that
Judge Murtagh did not in any way abuse her
discretion. The respondents disproved all of
the factors in the test outlined in People v.
Foy to determine abuse of discretion when a
court denies an adjournment. The
respondent proved that Judge Murtagh did
not abuse her discretion in denying further
consent with counsel.
The issue in this case is whether or not the
lower court abused their discretion in
denying the third adjournment through
application of the Foy test. The Respondents
adequately disproved the three criteria of the
Foy test which are as follows: (1) that the
witness is really material and appears to the
court to be so, (2) that the party who applies
has been guilty of no neglect (3) and that the
witness can be had at the time to which the
trial is deferred. The Respondents proved
the first criteria of the Foy test was unmet by
accurately arguing that Atrion is not a
material witness because there was sworn
testimony presented in the trial by both
Flynn Jebb and DJ Slick Sam which stated
that Raphael was on the dance floor all night
and not with Atrion. This case was related to
that of People v. Adair in that the judge did
not abuse her discretion due to denying an
adjournment. It was also argued that Atrion
would not be considered material to the case
because he was not called as a witness until
two days before the trial.
The second criterion of the Foy test was
additionally not met, as shown by the
respondents. The defense was clearly guilty
of neglect and they did not take necessary
steps to make sure Atrion would make it to
court at the time of the trial. The defense
should have issued an additional subpoena
and could have made more effort to inform
the witness of bus scheduling or they could
have paid for a car to pick him up. The third
criterion was unmet as the respondents
addressed the fact that the witness was given
two opportunities to appear in court and
failed both times and therefore could not be
had at the time to which the trial was
deferred.
The second issue in this case is whether or
not Judge Murtagh abused her discretion in
not allowing the defendant to properly
confer with their counsel. The respondent
stated that “the defense asked for 15 minutes
and they were granted 15 minutes.” This
was put in contrast to People v. Spears
where the judge only gave the defendant a
mere 5 seconds to consult his lawyer. Given
this wide disparity in time pointed out by the
respondents we have determined that it
would be inappropriate to grant the
defendant a new trial as the court did in the
case of People v. Spears.
Therefore, we agree with the lower court
and uphold their decision to deny the
defendant, Raphael Ortega, a new trial.
57

Team 57 v 25
RAPHAEL ORTEGA Appellant, v. THE
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Katie Seeger and Maggie
Miller, for Appellant.
Jasmine Somers, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Mallone, Al-Ajmi, Dhami, Vanini,
King, Finan
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the appellant, Raphael
Ortega. The appellant properly proved that
Judge Murtaugh’s decision in not granting the
third adjournment was considered as violating
Ortega’s right to call a witness to court.
However, the appellant failed to prove that the
lower court violated the defendant’s right to
confer with his counsel.
An important aspect of this case was proving
whether the defendants’ right to call a witness to
stand was violated or not. The appellant proved
that the witness, Atrion Raimundi, was a
material witness because he was an alibi witness
and the whole defense essentially centered his
presence in court. The appellant proceeded to
properly apply the first prong of the Foy test,
found in People v. Foy, to support her claim that
Raimundi was essential to the case and that
Judge Murtagh abused her discretion when
denying the third adjournment. The appellant
continued to effectively apply the second and
third prong of the Foy test in the argument. They
went about proving the second prong of the Foy
test, that the party who applies has been guilty of
no neglect, successfully by stating that it is the
court is at fault by not issuing the material
witness warrant that was requested in the
original trial. By stating that the court failed to
show importance towards the material witness in
this case proves that a new trial is in order due to
the violation of the defendant’s constitutional
right to call a witness to the stand. Finally, the
appellant established that the third prong of the
Foy test, that the witness can be had at the time
to which the trial is deferred, was met in this
case. The appellant went on to prove this by
stating that the witness was on his way to court
when he was last contacted and that the thirty
minutes could have, in fact, been enough time
for the witness to get to there. This argument
clarifies the question of whether the defendants’
right to call a witness to the stand had been
violated or not and affirms that the lower court
did, indeed, abuse its’ discretion by not granting
the third adjournment.
Another crucial aspect of this case was the
proving that Judge Murtagh abused her
discretion when not allowing the defendant
enough time to confer with their counsel. While
the appellant was successful in properly proving
the first aspect of the case they failed to address
the second one. The appellant was incorrect in
comparing the case to that of People v. Spears,
where a judge vocally expressed impatience and
only allowed the counsel five seconds to confer
with his defendant. This case is incomparable to
that of People v. Spears because in our case the
defendant was given a total of 23 hours to
effectively confer with their counsel and failed
to properly use that time. The court cannot be
held accountable for the irresponsibility of the
defense. Therefore, the appellant failed to show
the court that Judge Murtagh abused her
discretion by not allowing more time for the
defendant to confer with his counsel.
We disagree with the original ruling of the court
and certify that Raphael Ortega be granted a new
trial.
58

Case C 2012
The People of the State of New York, Appellants
v.
Deidre Rubenstrunk, Respondent
Supreme Court Appellate Division, - Fourth Department New York
Facts of the Case:
In March of 2009, Deidre Greeley and Brian Rubenstrunk moved into a three bedroom fixer-upper in
Mastic Long Island in preparation for their marriage in July 2011. Brian was a handy guy who could fix most
anything so the two began gutting the house to the joists and rafters in an effort to create their “dream home”.
Things began to deteriorate when they began working on the kitchen just days before the wedding. Next door
neighbors Aaron Taggert and Jane Henderson could hear verbal arguments and both clearly remember Deidre
threatening Brian that if the Kitchen was not finished before their honeymoon, he was a dead man.
Brian and Deidre returned from Bora Bora with the kitchen still in disrepair. They hosted a dinner party for
their good friends Jane, Aaron, Kelsey Willford and Logan Bowman. The party was a disaster because a kitchen
cabinet fell on Murphy’s head splitting his skull and then hit Deidre in the back of the head as she tried to help
Logan. Deidre was further incensed that all of the women guests include her were wearing the exact same outfits
(Michael Kors steel grey dress) which is common in Long Island. All of the guests remember Deidre giving Brian
her patented “death look” and quietly saying, “Your finished”. The next morning, Deidre dialed 9-1-1 report Brian
had been shot in the kitchen. The murder weapon was found on the floor next to Brian. No sign of forced entry or
fingerprints were found except for those of the dinner guests. The police also found a nanny cam (Deidre denied
knowing one existed) that clearly showed a woman of Deidre’s height, wearing a steel grey dress shooting Brian in
the kitchen and dropping the gun on the floor. The video was black and white and shot from behind so you did not
see the shooters face and only lasted about 4 seconds. Deidre told police she had been hit in the back of the head by
someone around midnight and then work up the next morning. The police found the gun still in place on the floor
but the lab messed up all of the potential forensic tests to including a finger print and DNA test of the weapon as
well as a gunshot residue test of Deidre’s dress.
Based on the testimony of the witnesses from the party, and the nanny cam, Deidre was charged and tried
for second degree murder. The main witness for the People was Logan Murphy who give riveting testimony that
Deidre was in a mood to kill that night after her pasta was ruined by the accident. Logan was subjected to extensive
cross examination concerning the extent of his injuries from cabinet falling on his head. The second most important
witness was Jane Henderson who corroborated Logan and added about the early fights she could hear next door.
Both Jane and Kelsey were cross examined thoroughly on the fact that they could have been the woman in the video
and that they had potential motives to kill Brian. Kelsey was cross examined about a possible affair she was having
with Brian and the defense produced a picture of Brian with his arm around her at a barbeque. Jane was also cross
examined about a potential affair she was having with Brian, but the Judge did not give the defense much leeway
because there was no corresponding picture.. Kelsey and Aaron were less helpful to the prosecution and only
testified things were tense but they could not tell if Deidre was joking when she said he was finished. Aaron could
not remember the earlier arguments. Deidre was convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison.
Deidre filed a CPL Section 440.10 motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence
approximately 2 months after the trial based on several factors. She included a sworn affidavits that Logan Murphy
had been being treated for memory loss from the time of the accident and was actually committed to Stonybrook
University labs for dementia approximately two days after testifying. She also included a sworn affidavit from
Kelsey Willaford that stated a week after the murder Jane Henderson told her that she had killed Brian because he
was obnoxious even though she loved him. Additionally Deidre provided a sworn affidavit from Aaron that stated
about a month after the trial he had been at a bar same bar as Jane and after she had had too much to drink she had
said aloud she was sorry that she killed him, but he was obnoxious after all. Defense counsel attempted to obtain a
sworn affidavit from Henderson but she refused.
The trial judge considered all of the Salemi factors and found that Deidre did not meet the six factor test
from the Salemi test but failed to state why. Then he granted the motion for a new trial anyway stating where there
is that much smoke something is probably burning.
The People of the State of New York now appeal this decision stating it was not in the judge’s discretion to
grant the motion if the Salemi test is not met. Deidre Rubenstrunk also appeals the ruling because she believes she
did meet the six factor test based on the evidence she has submitted.
The following cases are the only cases you may use in your brief. If other cases are cited in the supplied
cases you may cite them but only for the paragraphs from the original cases.
People v. Salemi, 309 N.Y. 208 (1955) People v. Balan, 484 N.Y.S.2d 648 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1985)
People v. Macon, 924 N.Y.S.2d 311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) People v. Powell, 424 N.Y.S.2d 626 (N.Y. County Ct.
1980)
59

Team 29 v 33
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK, Appellant, v. DEIDRE
RUBENSTRUNK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Justin Viele, Lukas Marra,
and Jon Orday, for Appellant.
Raymond Garcia and Alex
Lester, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Orr, Mazzeo, Jacobs, Cicerelli,
Kappel, Sutton
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellant Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the Appellant, The
People of the State of New York. The
Appellant successfully showed that the
information related to Logan Murphy and
Jane Henderson is not “Newly Discovered
Evidence”, and The Respondent failed to
prove the existence of new evidence based
on the test in People V. Salemi. They further
failed to show that this court can allow a
new trial without all six factors of the
Salemi test having been met, in the interests
of justice as suggested in People V. Balan.
The Appellant proved to the court that the
test detailed in People v. Salemi must be
entirely satisfied in order for evidence to be
considered “Newly discovered”. The
respondent argued that under Balan, the
court has the inherent discretion to grant a
new trial which is not compliant with the
statute in People v. Salemi in the interests of
justice. If the court were to ever allow a
new trial in the interests of justice, a party
must prove that the newly discovered
evidence is trustworthy. The Appellant
proved that in this matter it is not in the
interests of justice to grant a new trial
because the alleged new evidence was not
trustworthy. The Appellant showed that the
affidavit which cites Jane Henderson as
having said she killed Brian was not
trustworthy because the comments Jane
made were while she was inebriated and
regardless of the fact that affidavit is sworn,
its content is not trustworthy.
While the Respondent proved most of the
prongs of the Salemi test, they failed to
prove two of them, which is not acceptable
for the information they wish to provide to
be counted as “Newly discovered evidence”
warranting a new trial. The Salemi test
states: Newly discovered evidence in order
to be sufficient must fulfill all the following
requirements: 1. It must be such as will
probably change the result if a new trial is
granted; 2. It must have been discovered
since the trial; 3 it must be such as could not
have been discovered before the trial by the
exercise of due diligence; 4. It must be
material to the issue; 5. It must not be
cumulative to the former issue; and, 6. It
must not be merely impeaching or
contradicting the former evidence.” The
Appellant proved that the Logan Murphy’s
mental status and dementia could have been
discovered prior to the trial, had the
Respondent’s lawyers done their due
diligence of ensuring the mental state of the
witness. Furthermore, the Appellant showed
the “new evidence” would have merely
impeached and contradicted what was
presented in the original trial, if Logan were
to be asked to speak again to his former
mental status, he would only contradict
what was originally said. These two facts
nullify the other prongs of Salemi test and as
such this information cannot be considered
“newly discovered evidence”
We over turn the lower court’s Judge’s
decision to grant a new trial based on the
interest of justice.
60

Team 30 v 36
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, Appellant, v. DEIDRE
RUBENSTRUNK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Erin Clark and Hannah Crosby, for
Appellant.
Lauren Navarro and Jenna Maxwell for
Respondent.
JUDGES: Englemann, Walker, Dole, Galusha,
Muthig
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the respondent, Deidre
Rubenstrunk. Although, the respondent failed to
persuade the court that all factors of the Salemi
test were met, they proved that the judges
original ruling was supported by precedent case
law. The respondents also made clear to the
Court that this ruling was made in the interest of
justice and was supported by trustworthy
evidence.
The test for this case was outlined in the matter
of People v. Salemi. “( 1) such as will probably
change the result if a new case is granted; (2)
discovered since trial; (3) not discoverable
before trial by due dilligence; (4) material to the
issue; (5) not cumulative to the former issue; (6)
not merely impeaching or contradicting former
evidence.” The appellants adequately pointed
out that several factors of that Salemi case were
not met. First, the evidence of Logan Murphy's
dementia was clearly cumulative because
Murphy was extensively cross examined on his
injuries in the original trial so this new evidence
would be merely building on that. Additionally,
the evidence as presented to the court is merely
impeaching former testimony because Murphy's
medical status serves only to discredit his
original testimony.
The prevailing argument in this case became
whether or not the Salemi Test is necessary in
determining if new evidence is sufficient
grounds for a new trial. On this issue, the
respondents cited the case of People v. Balan
which allows a new trial even if the Salemi test
is not met as long as it is in “the interest of
justice” and complies with the statute for new
evidence, CPL 440.10(g). The first part of the
statue requires that the evidence be “such that
would probably change the outcome of the
case.” The respondents made apparent to the
Court that Jane's admission of guilt coupled with
Murphy's dementia was likely to change the
outcome of the case. The second prong
stipulates that it must be such that could not
have been discovered before the trial. Once
again, the respondent's proved that the evidence
supported this because dementia is a condition
that progresses over time and would therefore
could not have been diagnosed before hand. The
sworn statements were given only after Jane
Henderson had admitted to the murder and the
trial was over. Inasmuch, there was absolutely
no way for the court to reasonably expect the
respondents to uncover this beforehand even
with due diligence. In People v. Powell the court
noted that the Salemi case ”sets forth the criteria
which must be satisfied to meet the newl
discovered evidence standard of the statute.”
Despite that legal precedent, we are compelled
to agree with the respondent's argument that the
matter of People v. Balan is the controlling
precedent because it is the most recent case.
The appellants compared our case to that of
People v. Macon. However, we must recognize
the clear distinctions between the two cases. In
Macon, one of the major reasons a new trial was
not granted was because they lacked sworn
statements. Conversely, in the case at hand, as
stated by the respondents, there were two sworn
statements. The additional evidence of Murphy's
dementia was obviously trustworthy because it
was determined by a medical professional. In
this matter, we find that there was not a lack of
“trustworthy evidence” sufficient to necessitate a
new trial
We agree that “where there's smoke, there must
be fire” as stated by the original trial judge and
so in the interest of justice order a new trial be
granted to Deidre Rubenstrunk.
61

Team 31 v 38
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK”, Appellant, v. DEIDRE
RUBENSTRUNK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Sarah Holl and Valerie
Manghir, for Appellant.
Ravneet Dhillion and Doug Palacios, for
Respondent.
JUDGES: Mallone, Al-Ajmi, Dhami,
Vanini, King, Finan
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the respondent, Deidre
Rubenstrunk. The respondent proved that a
new trial may be granted without meeting all
six factors of the Salemi test, which is used
to find new evidence sufficient in court, if
the evidence is in the interest of justice.
In the case of People v. Salemi, it states that
a new trial cannot be granted unless six
criteria are satisfied. The appellant argued,
through the use of People v. Powell, that all
six elements of the test must be proven by
the respondent in order for the decision of
the lower court to be upheld. The respondent
successfully countered this argument and
cited the case of People v. Balan, a more
recent precedent, in which the court
“specifically found a new trial may be
granted in the interest of justice. Through
the Balan case, the respondents argued that a
new trial can be granted without satisfying
all elements of the test if the new evidence is
trustworthy and in the interest of justice.
We believe that the respondent successfully
argued that although the new evidence
obtained did not fully satisfy the Salemi test,
it was both trustworthy and in the interest of
justice.
The respondents argued that Logan
Murphy’s testimony was in the interest of
justice. They stated from the first factor of
the Salemi test that the discovery of Logan
Murphy’s dementia would probably change
the outcome of a new trial. The respondents
then emphasized the third factor of the
Salemi test in that the defense practiced due
diligence because there would be no way to
know about Logan Murphy’s dementia
because it is a progressive disease. Finally,
the respondents emphasized the sixth factor
of the Salemi test that states “it must not be
merely impeaching or contradicting the
former evidence”. The respondents applied
this by saying this knowledge of Logan’s
dementia would not contradict his former
testimony. The new evidence obtained
would emphasize how memory loss could
have affected Murphy’s testimony,
something that was not discussed or
examined in the previous trial.
Also, the respondents successfully proved to
us that the new evidence concerning Jane
Henderson is also trustworthy and necessary
for the pursuit of justice. They stated that
the sworn affidavits from Kelsey Willford
and Aaron Taggart, in which Jane
Henderson admitted to being the killer, can
be used in a new trial because it is probable
that it will change the result of this new trial.
It goes further to satisfy another element of
the Salemi test because it was not discussed
in the previous trial and therefore is not
cumulative.
We believe that the ruling of the original
court should be upheld and that a new trial
should be granted to Deidre Rubenstrunk
despite her not satisfying the six factor
Salemi test for her new evidence.
62

Team 34 v 39
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK”, Appellant, v. DEIDRE
RUBENSTRUNK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Fatomauta Majadjifor, for
Appellant.
Kenny Reynolds and Philip
Yeh, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Dewitt, Domagola, Parakkatu,
Blaszczyk, Furia
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the appellant, the State
of New York. The appellant sufficiently
proved that Deidre Rubenstrunk did not
meet the test outlined in People v. Salemi,
and therefore did not earn a new trial.
The main issue of the case is whether
Rubenstrunk met all six factors of the test in
People v. Salemi. The six factors of the
Salemi test determine the conditions under
which a new trial can be ordered. The
factors are: it must be such as will probably
change the result if a new trial is granted, it
must have been discovered since the trial, it
must be such as could have not been
discovered before the trial by exercise of die
diligence, it must be material to the issue,
and it must not be merely impeaching or
contradicting the former evidence. The
appellant emphasized that in order for the
standard to be met, it is essential for all six
elements to be proven.
The respondent argued that all elements of
the Salemi test do not need to be met if the
evidence presented is overwhelmingly
trustworthy and in the interest of justice by
citing the case of People v. Balan. The
appellant proved that Balan is trumped by
the case of People v. Powell, which states
that the six element standard is a necessary
precedent. Furthermore, the appellant
demonstrated that the failure of one element
of the Salemi test must result in no retrial
being granted.
The appellant successfully argued that in
order for new evidence to be found worthy,
the defendant must have practiced due
diligence in finding this evidence previously
and that it could not have been found until
after the trial had occurred. The appellant
demonstrated that the respondent has failed
to prove these elements on both counts.
Logan Murphy's injury and corresponding
mental competency were well know before
the original trial and the discovery of a
mental condition only proves that
Rubenstrunk did not practice due diligence
when examining witnesses previously.
Furthermore, a sworn affidavit from Kelsey
Willaford claiming Jane's guilt could have
been obtained before the trial because the
statement was made prior to the original
proceedings. In failing the second and third
elements of the Selami test, Rubenstrunk is
not entitled to a new trial.
We believe that the decision of the lower
courts should be upheld, and that Deidre
Rubenstrunk should not receive a new trial.
63

Team 31 v 62
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, Appellant, v. DEIDRE
RUBENSTRUNK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Sarah Holl and Valerie Manghir
for Appellant.
Seth Steele and Kalia Hoope for Respondent.
JUDGES: Englemann, Walker, Dole, Galusha,
Muthig
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the Appellant, the People
of the State of New York. The appellant showed
that the decision should be overturned because
the prongs in the Salemi case were not met. The
appellant succeeded in this by proving that there
was no new evidence presented and Deidre’s
defense did not express due diligence in the
original trial.
The appellant showed that Deidre provided no
newly discovered evidence through the sixprong
Salemi test. The first prong states “New
evidence will probably change the result at
trial”. The appellant demonstrated that both the
testimonies of Logan Murphy and Aaron and
Kelsey would not be new evidence. Logan was
extensively cross examined for memory loss
prior to the trial and because there was no sworn
affidavit for Jane’s testimony, respectively. The
second prong states that the “evidence must have
been discovered since the trial.” This prong was
also not met because the information about both
Jane and Logan was discovered prior to the trial.
Also, the appellant proved that the respond did
not meet the third prong of the test. The third
prong is that “evidence could not have been
discovered before trial, even with due
diligence”. The appellant showed that Deidre’s
defense failed to exercise due diligence in the
case of both Logan and Jane. In the case of
Salemi, the new information about the witness
going to a mental hospital did not pass this third
factor because they knew of the mental illness
before the trial. Similar to our case, the defense
should have known about Logan’s dementia and
they also cross examined him about the memory
loss. Moreover, they should also have known
about Jane’s guilt prior to try because she
admitted to killing Brian to Kelsey prior to trial.
The appellant was also successful in proving that
Deidre failed to fulfill the fifth prong that states
that “evidence is not cumulative to the former
issue.” Moving to the final issue, the evidence
was cumulative to that in the original trial
because it was already considered. As
mentioned above, the fact that Logan had
dementia already came to light in the original
trial when he was extensively cross examined
and Jane was cross-examined about her possible
motive to kill Brian. In sum, regarding the
Salemi factors, the appellant successfully
demonstrated through the facts of the case that
Deidre failed to meet the factors.
Next, the appellants successfully argued that the
“interest of justice” argument found in People v.
Balan was not a proper basis for granting a new
trial unless the Salemi test was satisfied. People
v. Balan states as follows: “Assuming that the
court has the inherent discretion to grant a
motion which is not in compliance with the
statute the interest of justice does not require
that such relief be granted here, given the wholly
untrustworthy nature of defendant’s papers….”
Here, there was no trustworthy evidence, so the
interest of justice argument does not apply to the
case at hand. While the respondent attempted to
argue that all six factors of the Salemi test did
not have to be met in order for a new trial to be
granted, the case of People v. Powell states
“[t]he power to grant an order for a new trial,
based upon newly discovered evidence, is purely
statutory and such a power may be exercised by
the court only when the requirements of the
statute have been satisfied, the determination of
which rests in the sound discretion of the court”.
Because the respondents failed to meet all six of
these prongs, it is clear that no new trial can be
granted.
We overrule the decision of the lower court and
hold that no new trial be granted.
64

Team 34 v 37
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK, Appellant, v. DEIDRE
RUBENSTRUNK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Fatomauta Majadji, for
Appellant.
Sarah Busso and Olivia Corder, for
Respondent.
JUDGES: Mallone, Al-Ajmi, Dhami,
Vanini, King, Finan
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We, the Appellate Court of the State of New
York, rule in favor of the appellant. We
believe that the trial judge erred in granting
Diedre a new trial because she did not meet
all six factors of the Salemi Test.
The test for the admission of newly
discovered evidence, as stated in the case of
New York v. Salemi contains six points that
explain that “Newly-discovered evidence in
order to be sufficient must fulfill all the
following requirements: 1. It must be such
as will probably change the result if a new
trial is granted; 2. It must have been
discovered since the trial; 3. It must be such
as could have not been discovered before the
trial by the exercise of due diligence; 4. It
must be material to the issue; 5. It must not
be cumulative to the former issue; and, 6. It
must not be merely impeaching or
contradicting the former evidence.”
The appellant successfully proved Logan
Murphy’s failure to comply with the Salemi
Test based upon the fifth factor of the test.
The appellant’s argument, consisting of the
effects of dementia, was sufficient to show
that any alleged evidence regarding the
discovery of Murphy’s condition was
cumulative to the evidence put forth at the
initial trial. Thus, not complying with the
fifth factor of the Salemi Test has
discredited the respondents claim to Murphy
constituting as newly discovered evidence.
The appellant also successfully proved Jane
Henderson’s failure to comply with the
Salemi test based upon the first factor of the
test. Due to her inebriated state,
Henderson’s credibility in her statements to
Aaron is compromised and is thus
untrustworthy. This lack of credibility
would prevent a different outcome in a new
trial based upon CPL Section 440.30 as
shown underlined in the case of New York
v. Macon.
In addition, the appellant’s argument
regarding the interpretation of the Salemi
Test sufficed to show that all six factors
must be met in order for a new trial to be
granted as stated by the case of New York v.
Powell. Although the respondent posed the
argument that the court should consider the
testimony trustworthy and in the interest of
justice, thus complying with the
interpretation as set by People v. Balan, they
failed to show that the evidence in our case
was either trustworthy or in the pursuit of
justice.
Based upon the reasons above, we rule in
favor of the appellant and move to overturn
the lower court’s decision.
65

Team 30 v 40
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, Appellant, v. DEIDRE
RUBENSTRUNK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Erin Clark and Hannah Crosby for
Appellant.
Massitan Fafana and Karman Saini, for
Respondent.
JUDGES: Dewitt, Domagola, Parakkatu,
Blaszczyk, Furia
OPINION
We the Appellant Court of the State of New York
finds in favor of the respondent, Diedre Rubenstrunk.
The court finds that Deidre deserves a new trial based
on the premise that she met all six factors of the test
outlined in Salemi v. State of New York.
The respondent proved that Deidre deserved a new
trial due to the fact that new evidence exists. As
cited in the case of People v. Salemi, newly
discovered evidence needs to pass a six prong test in
order to be sufficient in court. The case outlines that
the respondent must satisfy the following: 1. It must
be such as will probably change the result if a new
trial is granted, 2. It must been discovered since the
trial, 3. It must be such as could have not been
discovered before the trial by the exercise of due
diligence, 4. It must be material to the issue, 5. It
must not be cumulative to the former issue, and 6. It
must not be merely impeaching or contradicting the
former evidence. The respondent proved that the
outcome of the case would most likely change if
evidence was presented that the trial’s primary
witness, Logan Murphy, is suffering from dementia
and memory loss. Furthermore, the respondent
confirmed that Logan’s condition could only have
been discovered after the trial, proving that element
two of the Salemi test is satisfied. The respondent
successfully argued that all six elements were met
and that testimony concerning Logan’s mental
competency is material to the case and it would not
serve to merely impeach the witness or to be
cumulative.
New evidence was also found in the testimonies of
Kelsey Williford and Aaron Taggert concerning Jane
Henderson. The respondent adequately proved that
the two legal documents stating that Jane Henderson
had admitted murdering Brian Rubenstrunk, strongly
satisfied the six elements of the Salemi test. As the
case of People v. Macon states, and the respondent
confirms, a sworn statement carries more merit than
an unsworn statement. The testimony of Williford
and Taggart requires a new trial because the new
evidence was not cumulative or contradicting
because these testimonies were not brought forth in
the first trial. The respondent clearly stated that this
case is unlike People v. Powell, were the evidence
was in fact cumulative.
We agree with the lower court’s decision to grant
Deidre Rubenstrunk a new trial on the premise that
she meets all six factors as set forth in the case of The
People v. Salemi.
Additionally, there were two different sworn
affidavits from Kelsey Williford and Aaron Taggert.
The sworn statements also came about a month after
the trial. The third criterion of the test says that the
evidence has to have not been able to be discovered
before the trial with the exercise of due diligence.
The respondent adequately proved that Deidre could
not have known this information before the trial
because Kelsey was not going to say that Jane
committed the murder, when she was a suspect
herself. The respondent argued that She felt safe
coming out with the statement after she had been
cleared on the accounts of murder, and therefore no
longer had a reason not to tell the truth under oath.
The fourth prong states that the evidence must be
material to the issue and Logan’s newly discovered
dementia was completely material due to the fact that
his testimony may be unreliable. The evidence of
possibility that Jane committed the murder is also
material because Deidre may be kept in jail for a
crime she did not commit. The respondent also
proved that the evidence was not cumulative unlike
the case of People v. Powell. The evidence was not
cumulative because Jane’s possible affair was never
brought up in the trial because the Judge did not give
any leeway due to the fact that no picture was
present. The final factor of the Salemi test was
proven when the respondent proved that none of the
evidence contradicted the evidence presented in the
trial. Deidre now had sworn affidavits accusing Jane
of the murder, which had not been done in the
original trial. As the case of People v. Macon states, a
sworn statement carries more merit than a unsworn
statement. Logan’s dementia was not contradicting
because he was only tested on his mental state rather
than memory loss which occurs when someone is
diagnosed with dementia.
We agree with the lower court’s decision to grant
Deidre Rubenstrunk a new trial on the premise that
she meets all six factors of the Salemi test.
66

Team 35 v 41
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK, Appellant, v. DEIDRE
RUBENSTRUNK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Nina Feldman and Michelle
Richman, for Appellant.
Kathryn Lippa and Michael
Eyerman for Respondent.
JUDGES: Orr, Mazzeo, Jacobs, Cicerelli,
Kappel, Sutton
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the Respondent,
Deidre Rubenstrunk. The Respondent
successfully argued that the standard
outlined in People v. Salemi does not need
to be satisfied and a new trial can be
awarded in the interest of justice.
The Appellant did not successfully argue
that the Respondents failed enough prongs
of the Salemi test to reverse the lower
court’s grant of a new trial. The Appellant
attempted to use the precedent case of The
People of the State of New York v.
Bernadette Powell to prove that all six
prongs of the Salemi test must be met to
grant a new trial, but were ultimately not
persuasive on this point. The Respondent
successfully countered this argument
through the use of People v. Balan which
asserts that all six elements do not need to
be met in the interest of justice.
The Respondent demonstrated to the court,
again using Balan, that when evidence is
trustworthy and material to the case, a new
trial must be granted. The two new
affidavits, presented to the court by Kelsey
Williford and Aaron Taggart, were deemed
trustworthy and successfully satisfied a
number of the elements in the Salemi test.
The Appellant adequately argued the two
separate confessions from Jane Henderson
would absolutely change the outcome of the
original trial and that this information would
not be brought in merely to impeach or
contradict Henderson’s original testimony.
Ultimately it was demonstrated by the
appellant that this information was
trustworthy and therefore a new trial is
necessary.
When considering the evidence surrounding
the severity of Logan Murphy’s mental
condition, and the discovery of dementia,
the appellant definitively proved that it
would be in the interest of justice for this
information to be brought into a newly
granted trial. The Appellant argued that this
information could have been discovered
before the trial but the Respondent
disproved this by stating that the disease is a
progressive disorder and that there was no
way for Rubenstrunk to know before or even
during the trial that Murphy was suffering
from dementia, especially at his young age.
Furthermore, this piece of evidence would
have a significant impact on the outcome of
the case because Murphy acted as the
primary witness in Rubenstrunk’s
conviction.
We agree with the decision of the lower
court and confirm that Deidre Rubenstrunk
should be granted a new trial.
67

Case D 2012
Supreme Court Appellate Division, 4th Department
New York
Chuck Maze on behalf of 15 Minors
Petitioners
v.
City of Albany, New York, Respondents
Facts of the Case:
During the 2010 N.Y.S. Y. & G. conference held at the Capital in Albany, 15 minors became trapped on a
City elevator for approximately two hours. During that time their advisors could communicate with them and they
had plenty of sugar snacks and coffee since none of them had slept the night before. The City quickly dispatched
two state police officers who acknowledged the growing concern of several Youth Advisors while they waited for an
elevator repair technician to arrive and open the door. As a result all 15 student-attorneys were late for their runthroughs
which could of been detrimental to their law firms. Waiting at the door when it opened was Chief Legal
Advisor Joe DePadilla who advised the students to quit whining and get to your courtrooms because you are late.
Every student was in time to complete their tasks.
Katie Boardman, who volunteered at the conference had just opened her own firm after clerking for two
years and she smelled her first class action suit with a big contingent fee payout. She contacted the parents of the
15 students and interviewed all of them concerning their pain and suffering of being trapped in the elevator with
only the caffeine laded drinks and snacks they had at the time. None of the students seemed that traumatized and
Katie was disappointed. Katie went home and discussed what happened with her husband Jeremy. Jeremy had just
started working as her paralegal after the Democrats shut down Standard and Poors for giving the United States a
bad credit rating. Jeremy told Katie she was asking the wrong questions, she should have asked the students if they
were traumatized because they were late for a requirement enforced by Joe DePadilla who Jeremy found
intimidating in the past. Jeremy suggested they interview every student who had ever worked in the Legal program
in Y & G since 1996. Since Katie had no other clients, the two of them spent all their time doing that. They found
the 15 students did suffer a lot of anxiety in dealing with Joe especially after the elevator. They also interviewed
2000 former students including Molly Warren and Jane Henderson, who stated they had lived in fear of Joe for
years and they easily imagine the psychological damage the students would have suffered being late. The vast
majority of students though Joe was no big deal and one student Michael Cousins actually liked him.
Katie and Jeremy filed suit against the City of Albany after two years of research. Pre-trial deposition,
motions and other matters took another year. The case went to trial for two fiercely litigated weeks with 20
witnesses and the Boardman’s won on all counts. This was the first plaintiffs victory every under a theory that a
third party could cause pain and suffering from an industrial accident. The jury awarded each of the students a year
supply of red bull and snickers bars. The Boardmans then submitted their costs and fees. They provided two
spreadsheets documenting every interview, all of the legal research, motion practice, and trial time which added up
to 2.5 million dollars. Judge Robin Kheleher who presided over the litigation also reviewed the fee request. She
decided to apply the Lodestar method. She set the hourly rate for Katie at $300 (which was the American Bar
Associations reasonable rate for class actions by experienced attorneys in Albany), and for Jeremy at $150 (as a
paralegal) for hours out of trial and double that for in trial. She then calculated the hours for the interviews as 1000,
motion practice 200 hours, interrogatories 1000 hours, and trial time 80 hours. Jeremy only billed for ½ the
interviews and Katie for the rest which yielded a sum of $633,000. (The judge’s calculation of the hours was
derived by the spreadsheets submitted by the Boardmans, the judge reduced the reported hours by 30% in all
categories besides trial from the original hours) Judge Kheleher then reduced the amount by $50,000 because it was
Katie’s first case, increased the amount by $100,000 because it was Katie’s only case, increased it $50,000 because
it was novel, decreased it $25,000 because of the amount recovered on behalf of each student (approximately
$46.22) for a final total of $708,000.
The Boardmans and the City of Albany now appeal the Judges determination of fees. The City Claims the
amount should be less because the judge did not fully research the reported hours, over counted the interview hours
because so few witnesses were for the plaintiffs (Everyone knows Joe is universally loved by Judicial participants),
over calculated the hourly rate, and did not reduce the fee enough because the students basically recovered a six
pack of coke and two snickers bars. The Boardman’s claim the amounts should be more because the judge
arbitrarily reduced the number of hours they spent, did not take into account the novelty of the suit (making Joe into
a bad guy is very hard to do because he is universally loved by Judicial participants) and did not take into account
they won on all claims.
The following cases are the only cases you may use in your brief. If other cases are cited in the supplied
cases you may cite them but only for the paragraphs from the original cases.
Matakov v. Kel Tech, 924 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1 st Dept. 2011) Fleming v. Barnwell, 865 N.Y.S.2d 706, (3 rd Dept. 2008)
Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131 (2 nd Cir. 1994) Rahmey v. Blum, 466 N.Y.S.2d 350 (2 nd Dept. 350)
68

Team 43 v 54
CHUCK MAZE ON BEHALF OF 15
MINOR, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF
ALBANY, NEW YORK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
COUNSEL:
for Appellant.
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
Emily Davis and Devon Drake,
Nikita Mehta and Grace Kockubinski, for
Respondent.
JUDGES: Mallone, Al-Ajmi, Dhami, Vanini,
King, Finan
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York uphold the lower court’s decision and
maintain the fee that Judge Kheleher awarded to
Katie Boardman. A major determining factor of
this case was whether or not Judge Kheleher
abused her discretion in determining the proper
award for Katie Boardman. Both the petitioner
and the respondent spent a major amount of time
detailing with how much the fee should be
augmented or diminished but both sides failed to
prove to us that Judge Kheleher abused her
discretion in administering the Lodestar Method.
The appellant mentioned how in Matakov v.
Kel-Tech Construction Inc. “It is well
established that a trial court’s fee award in a
class action is entitled to broad deference, “and
will not be overturned absent an abuse of
discretion, such as a mistake of law or a clearly
erroneous factual finding.” This was in regards
to the 30% fee reduction of Katie Boardman’s
award by Judge Kheleher without a reason.
However, we have found that this reduction was
completely within Judge Kheleher’s discretion.
This decision is upheld by Lunday v. City of
Albany with the precedent that “We do not
require that the court sets forth item-by-item
findings concerning what may be countless
objections to individual billing items.”
The first adjustment of the Lodestar method
detailed in Rahmey v. Blum is “the novelty and
difficulty of the questions presented.” The
respondent stated that they agree with the fee
award for novelty, while the petitioner
acknowledged the fee award but stated it wasn’t
enough. We have found that Judge Kheleher’s
decision of a $50,000 augmentation due to the
new theory that a “third party could cause pain
and suffering from an industrial accident” is the
correct amount for the novelty of this case. This
decision that it is a novel case is supported by
the fact that there is no case law that would give
precedents to abide by in ruling one way or
another. This lack of case law also increases the
difficulty of the original trial. We can turn to the
case of Fleming v. Barnwell to find that a
similar situation of lack of case law would cause
an increase of the fee award “in part by the
novelty of the case” and “the difficulty involved
in proving” the claim. The increase that Judge
Kheleher made is the correct adjustment.
The second adjustment of the Lodestar method
is “the skill requisite to perform the legal
services.” The petitioners stated that the amount
of requisite skill is high because of the novelty
of the case and disagreed with the $50,000
decrease because it was her first case. The
respondents failed to show that because this was
her first case she deserved the reduction
prescribed by Judge Kheleher. We have found
that the Judge Kheleher’s reduction of $50,000
due to the fact that this was her first case and
there was not much skill requisite is a sufficient
amount. In Fleming v. Barnwell an experienced
lawyer got the requested “award of $425,000”
and his award was granted because of his
experience. Therefore, Katie Boardman’s award
should be reduced because she is inexperienced.
The third adjustment of the Lodestar Method is
“the preclusion of other employment by the
attorney due to acceptance of the case.” The
respondents failed to mention the issue of
preclusion and thus, do not have any complaints
with the fee award of $100,000 issued by Judge
Kheleher. We also agreed with Judge Kheleher’s
decision because none of the precedent cases
have any preclusion involved. We can refer to
the dissent in Matakov v. Kel-Tech which states,
“The trial court ‘is intimately familiar with the
nuances of [a] case, [and] is in a far better
69

position to [rule on a fee application] than is an
appellate court, which must work from a cold
record.” With this being said we reserve the
discretion to Judge Kheleher.
The seventh adjustment of the Lodestar Method
states “the amount involved and the results
obtained.” The petitioners supported an
augmentation to the fee award for the results
obtained because they won on all accounts.
However, the respondents requested an increase
in the penalty of $25,000 because they stated
that the $46.22 won for each student is not
comparable to the $708,000 won for the
Boardman’s. We agree with the Judge’s decision
to decrease the fee award by $25,000. This
decision is supported by the comparison
between this and Barnwell v. Fleming because
in this precedent case there was $30,000 won for
each client, which would constitute a major
decrease in our case. However, the fact that none
of the students complained about the award and
the fact that the Boardmans got exactly what
was requested and won on all accounts, justifies
the decrease of $25,000.
The eighth adjustment of the Lodestar Method
states “the undesirability of the case.” The
petitioners requested an increase in award
because of the fact that they had to deal with 45
clients – the 15 students and their 30 parents.
The respondents requested for a reduction to the
award because she jumped at the opportunity
and created this case. However, we found that
neither of these arguments was compelling
enough to constitute an adjustment. To support
this decision we refer to Matakov v. Kel-Tech
again, “The trial court ‘is intimately familiar
with the nuances of [a] case, [and] is in a far
better position to [rule on a fee application] than
is an appellate court, which must work from a
cold record.”
We agree with the decision of Judge Kheleher
and will uphold the adjustments to the award.
70

Team 45 v 53
CHUCK MAZE ON BEHALF OF 15
MINOR, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF
ALBANY, NEW YORK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Joe Penna and Emily
LaSpisa, for Appellant.
Allen Perry, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Englemann, Walker, Dole,
Galusha, Muthig
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the Respondent. As
cited in the case of Matakov v. Kel-Tech,
the “trial court’s fee award in a class action
is entitled to broad deference, and will not
be overturned absent an abuse of discretion,
such as mistake of law or a clearly erroneous
factual finding.” Here, certain Lodestar
adjustments made by Judge Kheleher
constituted an abuse of discretion.
The test for deciding the payment of the
attorneys in this case is the Lodestar method.
As described in Rahmey v. Blum, the
Lodestar method “is to multiply the number
of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation by the reasonable hourly rate” and
then to make adjustments as necessary. In
the case of Flemming v. Barnwell it is stated
that with regards to fee calculations and
adjustments, the “determination as to the
proper amount of an award of counsel fees
lies largely within the discretion of the court,
the discretion is not unlimited.” The
respondent successfully argued that the
lower court abused its discretion in reducing
Boardman’s fees by 30% without providing
an explanation. The Court finds that the
percentage deduction should have been
greater in light of negligible public policy
impact of Boardman’s victory in the lower
court. The appellant successfully argued
that the attorneys should receive a smaller
award of attorney’s fees, and therefore the
Court remands this case to the lower court
with instructions to decrease the total
number of hours compensated by an amount
greater than the 30% and to provide detailed
findings supporting the revised deduction
amount.
Additionally, as stated in the case of
Raymey v Blum, “it is appropriate to
distinguish between legal work and
investigation, clerical work, and other work
that can often be accomplished by nonlawyers.”
The respondents successfully
showed that the countless interviews
performed by Katie could be considered
clerical work, and because of this, we
further instruct the lower court to
compensate any of Boardman’s hours billed
for interviews at the reduced paralegal rate
of $150 per hour instead of $300 per hour.
In conclusion, we remand with instructions
for the lower court to reduce Boardman’s
attorneys fees by a greater percentage and to
reduce Boardman’s hourly wage for time
spent on interviews to the hourly rate for a
paralegal.
71

Team 48 v 51
CHUCK MAZE ON BEHALF OF 15
MINOR, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF
ALBANY, NEW YORK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Mikhail Lindsay and Alvin
Moreira, for Appellant.
Jon Nelson and Ferdousi
Jahan for Respondent.
JUDGES: Orr, Mazzeo, Jacobs, Cicerelli,
Kappel, Sutton
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find that the judge abused her
discretion during the determination of fees.
As cited in Matakov v. Kel-Tech, the “trial
court’s fee award in a class action is entitled
to broad deference, and will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion,
such as mistake of law or a clearly erroneous
factual finding.” This original fee is
determined by the Lodestar test, which
multiplies the number of hours by the
reasonable hourly rate, and several
adjustments can be made to this. Both the
appellant and respondent showed that the
trial judge incorrectly applied the Lodestar
test and accordingly an abuse of discretion
existed thus allowing us to reexamine the
determination of fees.
First, the appellant cited Flemming v.
Barnell Nursing Home to prove that the
“determination as to the proper amount of an
award of counsel fees lies largely within the
discretion of the court, the discretion is not
unlimited.” Because the appellant showed
that the courts original ruling can be
changed, we then move to the prongs which
can be used to adjust the fee amount. As
cited in the case of Rahmey v. Blum,
novelty is one such prong to be considered
when adjusting the Lodestar fee amount.
Judge Kheleher originally increased the fee
amount by $50,000 because of its novelty.
However, we believe that this estimate was
not sufficient. The appellant successfully
proved that this case was novel because it is
a unique issue that had not previously been
brought to court. We rule to change this
increase to $125,000.
The respondent also made compelling
arguments to have the Lodestar fee adjusted.
First, they claimed that the $300 per hour
rate given to Katie was not accurate because
that rate is the American Bar Association’s
rate for an experienced attorney. The
respondents adequately showed that because
Katie is just out of law school, has never had
a case before, and much work for this case
consisted of merely interviews, giving her
this rate is not accurate. Because of this, we
choose to lower Katie’s rate to $225 per
hour. The respondents also successfully
argued that the amount recovered was
significantly disproportional to the fees
received. The Boardman’s received
$708,000, which is significantly
disproportional to the $46.22 each student
received. Because of this, we choose to
increase the $25,000 reduction to $100,000.
After these adjustments, we have determined
that final total the Boardman’s will receive
will be $550,500.
72

Team 63 v 50
CHUCK MAZE ON BEHALF OF 15
MINOR, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF
ALBANY, NEW YORK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: RJ Morrow and Mason
Callahan, for Appellant.
Emily Collins and Adrianna
Wurster, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Dewitt, Domagola, Parakkatu,
Blaszczyk, Furia
OPINION BY: Last
OPINION
We the Appellant Court of the State of New
York find in favor of the appellant, Chuck Maze
on behalf of the 15 minors. The appellant
properly proved that the Boardman’s deserved to
receive more money for their services rendered
to their clients.
The respondent made good claims that the hours
expended on the case were excessive and the
Boardman’s could have conducted the
interviews in a more efficient way. Therefore,
we uphold the decision of Judge Kheleher to
reduce the reported hours by thirty percent. The
court felt that the defendant proved that the work
done for the interviews was clearly clerical
work. Therefore we find that the fee of $708,000
needs to be reduced by $25,000 based on the
fact that “it is appropriate to distinguish between
legal work, in the strict sense, and investigation,
clerical work…and other work that can be
accomplished by nonlawyers…” as sited in the
case of Rahmey v. Blum.
However, the respondents were more convincing
in that the Judge abused his discretion by not
granting enough money to the Boardman’s. The
appellant properly used the nine adjustments of
the Lodestar test outlined in the case of Rahmey
v. Blum to explain why the Boardman’s
deserved more money. The appellant proved that
the Boardman’s took on a very novel case. This
case was novel due to the fact that Katie made a
third party pay for the pain and suffering of the
minors in the elevator. The appellant properly
cited that in the case in Flemming v. Barnwell, a
precedent was set for our case in that the lawyers
received more money then was asked for
because of the novelty of the case. We the court
award the appellant $100,000 for the novelty of
the case. A legitimate claim was presented that
no other employment could be taken on at the
time due to the fact that they had to complete
two thousand interviews in order to find two
valuable unbiased witnesses to testify that Joe
was a “bad” guy. Therefore we raise the amount
by $10,000 for the preclusion of other
employment. We the court felt that prong four
and five did not apply to this matter, and neither
side proved of what nature and length was the
relationship with their clients. The appellant
adequately proved that the Boardman’s received
more than $46.22 for their clients by proving
that the Boardman’s are protecting New York
citizens by adding an incentive for more
frequent elevator maintenance. The appellant
cited this to the case of Lunday v. The City of
Albany which states that “the plaintiffs success
is the ‘most critical’ factor in determining the
reasonableness of the fee awarded.” Therefore,
we the court grant an increase of $25,000 for
results obtain. The appellant also adequately
proved to the court that this was an undesirable
case due to the fact that it is very hard to prove
Joe to be a bad person because he is beloved by
many. Also the case was undesirable because
they had to complete two thousand tedious
interviews about the same topic. The court
grants the Boardman’s $30,000 due to the fact
that the case was undesirable.
For these reasons we rule to overturn Judge
Khelher’s decision to give more money to the
Boardman’s for their services rendered to their
clients. We therefore we find in favor of the
appellant and awards for attorney fees of
$848,000.
73

Team 63 v 52
CHUCK MAZE ON BEHALF OF 15 MINOR,
Appellant, v. THE CITY OF ALBANY, NEW
YORK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: RJ Morrow and Mason Callahan,
for Appellant.
Emily Collins and Adrianna
Wurster, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Dewitt, Domagola, Parakkatu, Blaszczyk,
Furia
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New York
find in favor of appellant in part and respondent in
part. Both proved that there was an abuse of
discretion on behalf of the lower courts. The
respondents provided sufficient evidence that the
hourly rate for the 2000 hours of interviews should be
decreased. The appellants effectively persuaded the
court that the adjustments for novelty, and nature of
the relationship should be increased.
The first issue we must consider is if we should defer
our authority to the lower courts discretion in
determining attorney fees. As the respondents pointed
out, in the case of Flemming v. Barnwell, “While the
determination as to the proper amount of fees lies
largely within the discretion of the court, the
discretion is not unlimited.” The appellant furthered
this precedent when citing the case of Lunday v. City
of Albany which states that in a case of “abuse of
discretion” the lower courts decision in determining
fees will be overturned. In this case the 30%
reduction of all fees was proved an abuse of Judge
Kheleher's discretion because according to People v.
Lunday “whenever the court augments or reduces the
lodestar fee, it must state its reasons for doing so as
specifically as possible.” Clearly here Judge
Kheleher's failure to state the reason for this arbitrary
adjustment was an abuse of discretion.
Since an abuse of discretion was established, we next
determined there were several incorrect calculations
in the original fees. In the case of Rahmney v Blum
the Lodestar fee, defined as “to multiply the number
of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by the
reasonable hourly rate”, is used to calculate attorney
fees and then several adjustments, “(1) the novelty
and difficulty of the questions presented; (2) the skill
requisite to perform the legal services properly; (3)
the preclusion of other employment by the attorney
due to acceptance of the case; (4) whether the fee is
fixed or contingent; (5) time limitations imposed by
the claim or circumstances; (6) the nature and length
of the profesional relationship; (7) the amount
obtained and the results obtained; (8) the
undesirability of the case; and (9) awards in similar
cases.” As stated by the respondents, the 2,000 hours
of interviews were excessive and should be
considered clerical work. According to the case of
Rahmney v. Blum, “it is important to distinguish
between legal work, clerical, and investigative tasks.”
Here, it is apparent that the lower court should have
considered all 2,000 hours clerical work and so all
fees in conducting the interviews should be consistent
with the paralegal hourly rate. Additionally,
throughout all of these interviews, only 2 witnesses
were found. Surely we must consider 2,000
interviews to find two witnesses excessive especially
when, as the respondents suggested, many of the
information obtained could have been recovered
through a written survey. In the original trial, Judge
Kheleher increased the the fee by $50,000 because it
was novel. We agree with the appellants that this
increase was insufficient to express the true novelty
and difficulty of the case. As emphasized by the
appellants, this was the first case where a third party
caused stress from an industrial accident making it
more difficult because there was no precedent case
law to guide the them. Furthermore, the appellants
went on to prove that the fee should be increased
because of the extensive 2 year relationship with
what would essentially be 45 clients (15 teens and 30
parents). These new adjustments will be applied to
the Boardmans attorney fees in this case.
The remainder of Judge Kelehers Lodestar
adjustments will remain the same. Although the
appellant did argue concerning the Boardmans'
preclusion of other employment for this case, we
must agree with the respondents that because this was
Katy Boardman's first case, it cannot be reasonably
assumed that she would have the opportunity to find
other means of employment had she not been
working on this case. We further agree with the trial
courts decision to reduce the fee by $25,000
concerning the success of the trial. As the
respondents argued, according to the matter of
Lunday v. City of Albany “the degree of success is
the most critical factor in determining attorneys fees”
and the Boardmans' won only $46.22 in candy and
soda for each of their clients. However, we reject the
notion that this fee should be further decreased
because the appellants were correct in their
contention that this case successfully set a new safety
precedent in New York State.
We disagree with the lower court's original findings
and remand for changes on the following factors (1)
adjustment in regards to the novelty be increased (2)
adjustments in regards to the nature and length of the
professional relationship be increased and (3) the
hourly rate and hours accounted for the 2,000 hours
be decreased.
74

Team 46 v 64
CHUCK MAZE ON BEHALF OF 15
MINOR, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF
ALBANY, NEW YORK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Ashley Baudier and Mallery
Nargi, for Appellant.
Alex Mauro and Sarah Griffen, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Orr, Mazzeo, Jacobs, Cicerelli,
Kappel, Sutton
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New
York find in overall favor of the Respondent, the
City of Albany, New York. The Respondent
proved that the lower court abused its discretion
in determining Boardman’s fees under the
Loadstar method as outlined in the case of
Rahmey v. Blum. The Respondent proved that
Katie Boardman’s rate and the total fees paid
were not decreased adequately to account for
Katie Boardman’s lack of experience. The
Petitioners successfully proved, however, that
the fee should have been increased by an even
greater amount in light of the novelty of the
case. The Petitioner also proved per Flemming
v. Barnwell, the court does not have unlimited
discretion in manipulating fees and as such, a
30% decrease in attorney fees for interviewing
hours without explanation was not within the
jurisdiction of the court and is not permissible.
This case is centered on the Loadstar method for
attorney compensation in class action suits.
Under the Loadstar method in Rahmey v. Blum,
attorney compensation is calculated by
multiplying an attorney’s reasonable rate by a
reasonable number of hours, with adjustments as
necessary. Under the Loadstar method,
adjustments can be made for: (1) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions presented; (2) the skill
requisite to perform the legal services properly;
(3) the preclusion of the other employment by
the attorney due to the acceptance of the case;
(4) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (5)
time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client; (7) the
amount involved and the results obtained; (8) the
undesirability of the case; and (9) awards in
similar cases. The Petitioners successfully
proved that the novelty of this case was not
properly compensated for. The idea of a third
party being guilty for damages had never before
been heard in court and there is no other case
which it can be compared to, nor is there any
similar information on the topic. For that reason
the amount paid to Boardman of $50,000 on
account of novelty should be tripled to
$150,000. The Respondent, however, proved
that Katie Boardman should not have been paid
the hourly rate of the American Bar Association
of $300 for experienced lawyers because she
was a recent law school graduate without any
court experience aside from clerking. The Court
finds that the hourly rate requested by the
Respondent of $150 per hour is too low, but that
an hourly rate of $225 adequately acknowledges
that some level of skill is required in order to
win a class action suit as a first case. In
addition, the Court makes an additional
adjustment to the lower court’s Loadstar
analysis and increases the deduction for
Boardman’s first case from $50,000 to
$100,000.
The matter of Flemming v. Barnwell states that a
judge does have discretion in determining fee
and rate reductions for class action suits but that
discretion is not unlimited. Rahmey v. Blum
states a Judge must explain the reductions or
additions as specifically as possible. The
Petitioner demonstrated the Judge abused his
discretion by reducing the overall number of
hours by 30% without listing any specific
reasons. Therefore that 30% reduction in hours
should be removed from the calculations.
In total, Boardman’s final fees are calculated as
follows: $225 per hour for her 1780 hours, 500
hours at the rate of $150 for paralegal work, a
$150,000 increase for novelty and a $100,000
decrease for this having been Katie Boardman’s
first case. The 30% reduction is removed and all
other lower court adjustments are preserved.
Therefore this court orders the final
compensation for Katie Boardman in the amount
of $600,500.
75

Team 48 v 55
CHUCK MAZE ON BEHALF OF 15
MINOR, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF
ALBANY, NEW YORK, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York
March 10, 2012, Argued
March 10, 2012, Decided
COUNSEL: Mikhail Lindsay and Alvin
Moreira, for Appellant.
Alana Narine, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Englemann, Walker, Dole, Galusha,
Muthig
OPINION
We the Appellate Court of the State of New York
find in favor of the respondents in part and the
appellants in part. We remand the case to the trial
court to re-evaluate the award in accordance with this
opinion.
The attorney’s fees are calculated through the
lodestar method, as explained in Rahmey v. Blum.
The lodestar fee is computed by multiplying the
number of hours reasonably expanded on the
litigation by the reasonable hourly rate. According to
Flemming v. Barnwell Nursing Home we review the
trial court’s decision under the abuse of discretion
standard. According to Flemming, the
“determination as to the proper amount of an award
of [counsel] fees lies largely within the discretion of
the court, the discretion is not unlimited.” The 30%
reduction fee properly reduced the reward because of
the additional hours Katie had to spend in order to
learn how to prosecute a case. As for the hourly rate
we find that the 1,000 hours of interviews should be
charged at a $150 an hour rate. As stated in Rahmey
v. Blum “[it] is appropriate to distinguish between
legal work, in the strict sense, and investigation,
clerical work, complication of facts and statistics and
other work which can often be accomplished by nonlawyers
but which a lawyer may do because he has
no other help available. Such non-legal work may
command a lesser rate. Its dollar value is not
enhanced just because a lawyer does it.” Here Katie
did the work of a paralegal during the interviews, so
she should be paid as a paralegal.
the legal services properly; (3) the preclusion of other
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the
case; (4) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (5)
time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client; (7) the
amount involved and the results obtained; (8) the
undesirability of the case; and (9) awards in similar
cases.” We find that the first lodestar adjustment, the
novelty of the case, should be increased even more
than $50,000 -- the amount that the Boardman’s
received. The novelty of this case is very high
because there has been no other case like this. The
second factor of the lodestar method addresses the
skill of the attorney. Judge Kheleher decreased the
amount awarded to Katie because of this fact, but it
should be decreased even more. The skill of Katie
was very low because this was her first case and she
just opened her own law firm. The third prong of the
lodestar fee is the preclusion of other employment.
Katie may have not taken another case because of the
difficulty of this one, or she could not find another
case because she is simply an inexperienced lawyer.
Thus, the trial court properly did not adjust the award
because of that factor. The fourth factor of the
lodestar method is whether the fee is fixed or
contingent. No money should be taken away from the
Boardman’s because of the fee being contingent.
Most cases like that are taken on a contingency fee;
therefore she was not entitled to extra money for that.
The sixth prong to the lodestar method is addressing
the relationship with the clients. In this case Katie
spent two years in contact with these 15 students and
30 parents. Contradicting this, Katie spent more time
with the 2,000 interviewed students. There will be no
adjustments to the fee for the relationship to the
clients. Number seven of the Lodestar method applies
to the results of the case. In Lunday v. City of Albany
it states that the seventh prong of the Lodestar
method is the most important. Here Judge Kheleher
decreased it $25,000 because the Plaintiff’s were
only awarded $46.22. This was not an abuse of
discretion. The final consideration is the desirability
of the case. This case is very desirable to Katie,
because she could be awarded a high amount of
attorney fees. Therefore we direct the lower court to
decrease the award because of the ninth factor.
In conclusion we the court after these adjustments we
have determined the final total the Boardman’s will
received will be reduced by the lower court on
remand.
Also, adjustments must be made to the fee. The nine
prongs are “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions presented; (2) the skill requisite to perform
76