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Lightness and Brightness and Other Confusions

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er of mental categories perceptions are intuitively structured into objective<br />

experience of objects arranged under concepts. (Kant 2004, p 193–197). Kant<br />

says that “concepts without perceptions are empty; perceptions without concepts<br />

are blind.” (Kant 2004, p 156). We cannot know what objects may be in<br />

themselves apart from "our mode of perceiving them." (Kant 2004, p 125).<br />

Sense qualities – for example colour, sound, etc. – <strong>and</strong> the unknown matter<br />

of the world together form what Kant calls ‘content’ (Inhalt) <strong>and</strong> this content<br />

is given its mental (human) form by our inner categories <strong>and</strong> analytic abilities.<br />

(Liedman 2006, pp 233–236). Experience of colour <strong>and</strong> light are subordinate<br />

to apprehension of space. According to C. D. BROAD 17 human beings<br />

can in Kant be seen as “centres of innate systems of spatial references, of<br />

which they are perpetually <strong>and</strong> immediately aware.” (Broad 1979, p 22).<br />

To Kant colour <strong>and</strong> light are primarily perceptual links between an outer<br />

reality <strong>and</strong> the inner world; colour <strong>and</strong> light have no meaning until they have<br />

found a given position in space <strong>and</strong> time <strong>and</strong> in an inner conceptual structure,<br />

<strong>and</strong> thereby become logically integrated parts of an individually experienced<br />

world as a whole.<br />

EDMUND HUSSERL 18 <strong>and</strong> the phenomenology he presents connect to this perspective.<br />

His project is to bring about a strictly scientific epistemology based<br />

on human consciousness <strong>and</strong> mere phenomena. According to Husserl we<br />

have only direct access to accidental <strong>and</strong> individual experiences (phenomena);<br />

these alone can be taken as a pretext for an epistemology on scientific<br />

ground. (Husserl 1989, p 45). Hence Husserl’s st<strong>and</strong>point is quite the contrary<br />

to the positivist scientific view, which implies that the only veritable is<br />

the outer ‘objective’ world.<br />

Knowledge as part of the world<br />

MARTIN HEIDEGGER 19 claims – in contrast to Husserl – that it is not possible to<br />

underst<strong>and</strong> how the world gets a meaning if we do not find out how human<br />

beings exist in the world, because this is what influences how the world is<br />

perceived. To Heidegger the human world is a complex of meanings. It is not<br />

enough to look at the world: meaning originates in human interaction with<br />

the world around, when using the world. (Heidegger 1986, p 69). From epistemological<br />

reasons Husserl reduces his descriptions to man himself <strong>and</strong> to<br />

his individual consciousness: he sets a limit to the external objective world.<br />

Heidegger moves this limit “out into” the surrounding world.<br />

17<br />

American philosopher, 1887–1971<br />

18<br />

German philosopher, 1859–1938<br />

19<br />

German philosopher, 1889–1976<br />

20

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