Lightness and Brightness and Other Confusions
Lightness and Brightness and Other Confusions
Lightness and Brightness and Other Confusions
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
humans to discount the illuminant. (See footnote 94 below). Let us return<br />
once more to the problem of determining the ‘real’ colour of the green apple.<br />
It was said that the faithful translation, from a given point in space, of the<br />
apple’s colours onto a flat surface would leave us with several contenders for<br />
the ‘real’, colour of the apple. Indeed, a digital photograph <strong>and</strong> its millions of<br />
pixels would leave us with myriads of possibilities, but on closer inspection<br />
this analogy is false. Firstly, we do not fixate objects or scenes at any one time<br />
from one viewpoint, but two. We have stereovision; our two eyes provide us<br />
with two slightly different sets of proximal stimuli that are compared <strong>and</strong><br />
synthesized in the brain. Secondly, we do not (voluntarily <strong>and</strong> naturally) view<br />
the world even from these two viewpoints statically. Either the object moves,<br />
or we move our eyes or bodies in relation to it. 92 This action is central to the<br />
process of extracting relevant information about the world – also its colour.<br />
We perceive through our stereovision <strong>and</strong> our movement in relation to the<br />
green apple that the apple is round; that the shadows <strong>and</strong> highlights are transient<br />
qualities <strong>and</strong> that there is a ‘permanent’ colour to the apple that exists<br />
independent of the variations of highlights, reflections or shadows involved in<br />
the totality. The transient qualities of shadow, half-shadow, highlight, etc.,<br />
are the object’s primary visual spatial attributes that exist in relation to light<br />
<strong>and</strong> motion. If these are subtracted from the spatial equation, what is left is<br />
what could be called the constancy colour. But there is no way we can perform<br />
the subtraction without destroying the real experience of the object’s<br />
colour. This constancy colour is apprehended in the totality by our experience<br />
of space <strong>and</strong> movement, but can never be perceived directly. Constancy<br />
colour cannot be measured <strong>and</strong> has precision only within the limits of ecological<br />
necessity, that is: for the efficient <strong>and</strong> reliable identification of objects,<br />
scenes <strong>and</strong> spaces in relation to the subject’s ecology. 93<br />
Colours are to us what they are in their context. They belong to objects, surfaces,<br />
spaces <strong>and</strong> situations, in which contexts they gain their functional <strong>and</strong><br />
emotional significances. We need constants in order to make sense of the<br />
world. To achieve this our mind-body has adapted to the stream of contingencies,<br />
the ever-changing illuminations <strong>and</strong> angles of view, by developing a<br />
preference for the features that are typical, recurrent <strong>and</strong> identity-giving. One<br />
of these is the colour of objects irrespective of changes in illuminant or changes<br />
in viewing angle <strong>and</strong> distance. There are numerous theories of how this is<br />
achieved, but all of them admit a certain level of flexibility (sometimes referred<br />
to as inaccuracy) in colour constancy. 94 Looked at in another way, this<br />
<br />
For a more elaborate discussion of the significance of motion in perception see Gibson<br />
1986 <strong>and</strong> Noë 2004. See also my article Seeing <strong>and</strong> Perceiving, p 34 in this volume.<br />
See also Natural Experience <strong>and</strong> Physical Abstractions, pp 24 <strong>and</strong> 25 figure 2 in this<br />
volume.<br />
<br />
Helmholtz proposed that constancy of colours involved ‘discounting the illuminant’<br />
by a process of ‘unconscious inference’. This has been contested even in his own life-<br />
99