Two decades of community forestry in Nepal: What have we learned?

Two decades of community forestry in Nepal: What have we learned?
of forest-based enterprises limited to ones that would be acceptable to Maoists.
Some CFUGs were also asked to change their name to one with Maoist
signifi cance; this immediately made them targets for retribution by the government
forces. Sometimes forest users had to seek permission from both the Government
Department of Forests and the Maoists in order to conduct any forestry operations
– a time consuming and diffi cult demand.
The CSPM approach brought considerable clarity of action to the often uncertain
security situation during the worst years of the confl ict. Nevertheless, project staff
did not always fi nd it easy to implement. With some minor and brief exceptions,
staff remained stationed in the district headquarters - but trying to conduct
activities as far as possible “as normal” required both courage and patience. Sometimes
partners and even other staff members used the confl ict as an excuse for doing
poor work. On occasions there was also the sense of being undermined by higher
level decision-making and the strong need for SDC coordination. One particular
issue was a feeling of solidarity with other project staff, and not wishing to jeopardise
project operations, and thus jobs, by speaking out about problems.
“During the confl ict, the working policy and strategy had to be changed so frequently that
the implementing partners were confused and were not able to cope with the project’s
changing strategy. Although the main aim of SDC was to engage with the government
and rebels to create development space for projects and partners to operate in and on the
confl ict, on various occasions project staff and partners were in a tense situation… Senior
SDC staff went to a secret place “underground” to meet rebellion 16 leaders. This empowered
the rebels who then thought that they were important as they could obstruct development
work and ‘big’ offi cials would go to see them. This in turn disempowered local project
staff, as the rebel leaders would not listen to them and would demand the presence of big
offi cials from SDC. As a result SDC projects (NSCFP and similar other SDC funded projects)
were accused of being too ‘soft’ on the rebels, or local staff and SDC were even accused
of being ‘supporters’ of the rebels”.
Anita Shrestha, NSCFP Ramechhap
Box 7. Operating during the period of conflict
Usha Dahal, District Forest Coordinator of Okhaldhunga recalls her memory of working in
and on confl ict during 2004-2005 in the following way.
“As per SDC’s policy at that time we continued development efforts in community forestry
despite the heightened confl ict. We wanted to focus our interventions on targeting the
poor households in remote areas – mostly those affected by the Maoists. According to the
CSPM approach, when going to the fi eld we had to inform our plan of movement to the
district administration and the police, and had to secure their permission to travel to that
area. On the one hand, this put us on the suspect list of the administration, as how was
it possible for us to work in such places without having connection with Maoists ? On the
other hand, the Maoists were furious to see us there in the village running programmes
without registering our project in their ‘government unit’ and gaining prior approval of the
programme. They used to suspect us of being spies for the administration. Many of us were
on the suspect list of “both the governments”. Nevertheless our commitment to serve the
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