Two decades of community forestry in Nepal: What have we learned?
Two decades of community forestry in Nepal: What have we learned?
Two decades of community forestry in Nepal: What have we learned?
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<strong>Two</strong> <strong>decades</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>community</strong> <strong>forestry</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Nepal</strong>: <strong>What</strong> <strong>have</strong> <strong>we</strong> <strong>learned</strong>?<br />
<strong>of</strong> forest-based enterprises limited to ones that would be acceptable to Maoists.<br />
Some CFUGs <strong>we</strong>re also asked to change their name to one with Maoist<br />
signifi cance; this immediately made them targets for retribution by the government<br />
forces. Sometimes forest users had to seek permission from both the Government<br />
Department <strong>of</strong> Forests and the Maoists <strong>in</strong> order to conduct any <strong>forestry</strong> operations<br />
– a time consum<strong>in</strong>g and diffi cult demand.<br />
The CSPM approach brought considerable clarity <strong>of</strong> action to the <strong>of</strong>ten uncerta<strong>in</strong><br />
security situation dur<strong>in</strong>g the worst years <strong>of</strong> the confl ict. Nevertheless, project staff<br />
did not always fi nd it easy to implement. With some m<strong>in</strong>or and brief exceptions,<br />
staff rema<strong>in</strong>ed stationed <strong>in</strong> the district headquarters - but try<strong>in</strong>g to conduct<br />
activities as far as possible “as normal” required both courage and patience. Sometimes<br />
partners and even other staff members used the confl ict as an excuse for do<strong>in</strong>g<br />
poor work. On occasions there was also the sense <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g underm<strong>in</strong>ed by higher<br />
level decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g and the strong need for SDC coord<strong>in</strong>ation. One particular<br />
issue was a feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> solidarity with other project staff, and not wish<strong>in</strong>g to jeopardise<br />
project operations, and thus jobs, by speak<strong>in</strong>g out about problems.<br />
“Dur<strong>in</strong>g the confl ict, the work<strong>in</strong>g policy and strategy had to be changed so frequently that<br />
the implement<strong>in</strong>g partners <strong>we</strong>re confused and <strong>we</strong>re not able to cope with the project’s<br />
chang<strong>in</strong>g strategy. Although the ma<strong>in</strong> aim <strong>of</strong> SDC was to engage with the government<br />
and rebels to create development space for projects and partners to operate <strong>in</strong> and on the<br />
confl ict, on various occasions project staff and partners <strong>we</strong>re <strong>in</strong> a tense situation… Senior<br />
SDC staff <strong>we</strong>nt to a secret place “underground” to meet rebellion 16 leaders. This empo<strong>we</strong>red<br />
the rebels who then thought that they <strong>we</strong>re important as they could obstruct development<br />
work and ‘big’ <strong>of</strong>fi cials would go to see them. This <strong>in</strong> turn disempo<strong>we</strong>red local project<br />
staff, as the rebel leaders would not listen to them and would demand the presence <strong>of</strong> big<br />
<strong>of</strong>fi cials from SDC. As a result SDC projects (NSCFP and similar other SDC funded projects)<br />
<strong>we</strong>re accused <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g too ‘s<strong>of</strong>t’ on the rebels, or local staff and SDC <strong>we</strong>re even accused<br />
<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g ‘supporters’ <strong>of</strong> the rebels”.<br />
Anita Shrestha, NSCFP Ramechhap<br />
Box 7. Operat<strong>in</strong>g dur<strong>in</strong>g the period <strong>of</strong> conflict<br />
Usha Dahal, District Forest Coord<strong>in</strong>ator <strong>of</strong> Okhaldhunga recalls her memory <strong>of</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
and on confl ict dur<strong>in</strong>g 2004-2005 <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g way.<br />
“As per SDC’s policy at that time <strong>we</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ued development efforts <strong>in</strong> <strong>community</strong> <strong>forestry</strong><br />
despite the heightened confl ict. We wanted to focus our <strong>in</strong>terventions on target<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
poor households <strong>in</strong> remote areas – mostly those affected by the Maoists. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
CSPM approach, when go<strong>in</strong>g to the fi eld <strong>we</strong> had to <strong>in</strong>form our plan <strong>of</strong> movement to the<br />
district adm<strong>in</strong>istration and the police, and had to secure their permission to travel to that<br />
area. On the one hand, this put us on the suspect list <strong>of</strong> the adm<strong>in</strong>istration, as how was<br />
it possible for us to work <strong>in</strong> such places without hav<strong>in</strong>g connection with Maoists ? On the<br />
other hand, the Maoists <strong>we</strong>re furious to see us there <strong>in</strong> the village runn<strong>in</strong>g programmes<br />
without register<strong>in</strong>g our project <strong>in</strong> their ‘government unit’ and ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g prior approval <strong>of</strong> the<br />
programme. They used to suspect us <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g spies for the adm<strong>in</strong>istration. Many <strong>of</strong> us <strong>we</strong>re<br />
on the suspect list <strong>of</strong> “both the governments”. Nevertheless our commitment to serve the<br />
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