Two decades of community forestry in Nepal: What have we learned?

Two decades of community forestry in Nepal: What have we learned?
“SDC was very active in the development of the BOGs, and this created a good
environment. Do no harm and safe and effective confl ict sensitive management were very
useful for operating in confl ict.”
Bharat Pokharel, Project Director, NSCFP
The practical effects of the confl ict on project activities were numerous. The rule
of government and democratic processes ceased to function properly, meaning
that village administrations could no longer operate smoothly. The Maoists ran
parallel government at various levels, and people had to comply with the rules
of both governments. The political side of the VDCs could not operate, but the
administrative side (VDC secretary) was still to some extent functional, although
under tremendous pressure from Maoists for forced donations and extortion. More
than the VDC staff, the restriction of movement of line agency staff from district
headquarters was signifi cant. Fear of violence and intimidation of the part of both
the government and Maoist forces meant that people started distancing themselves
from any external development initiatives; it was safer not to talk to any strangers
coming into the village, to travel to meetings, or even to express oneself openly
in public. In the case of community forestry, activities were particularly limited by
a ban on gatherings of people, and limited access to some forests – which were
often used (by both sides) for military camps. The Maoists also made government
buildings a specifi c target, with the result that many Forest Department buildings
were destroyed – along with all local forestry records. Being commonly situated in
quite isolated places, they made easy targets.
As the Maoists grew stronger in the project area, they started imposing their own
rule. Their leadership appreciated the CSPM approach of SDC, and thus did not
call for a halt to SDC-supported activities. Furthermore, the aims of community
forestry – especially the livelihoods support for the very poor and disadvantaged
– corresponded with Maoist philosophy, although of course partnering with
the government did not. In discussions with NSCFP staff, one Maoist likened
community forestry to a house that had good foundations, but which had been
badly constructed. In following the BOGs, project staff members were limited in
their movements, being required to give priority to their personal safety and that of
their colleagues. Often the only practical option was to work through local NGOs
and community-based organisations (CBOs) who had good local contacts and
could thus dare to travel where project staff could not. Anyone travelling not only
risked intimidation and violence at the hands of Maoists, but also the government
forces – both parties were suspicious, but generally less so of local people. A
particular diffi culty at local level was that Maoists started to expect CFUGs to
contribute to the rebel movement out of their funds. This encouraged CFUGs to
spend rather than to save, and to be very cautious about any income generating
activities – thus timber harvesting operations were delayed, and the development
16 The term bidrohi in Nepali was used, literally meaning rebel. This was a term coined by the government of Nepal
for the Maoists during the armed confl ict period for going against the rule of law of the State.
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