Download - Royal Australian Navy

TOUCHDOWN 

ISSUE 3 DECEMBER 2003 

THE AUSTRALIAN NAVY AVIATION SAFETY AND INFORMATION MAGAZINE

TOUCHDOWN ISSUE 3 DECEMBER 2003 

1 

FLEET AVIATION SAFETY CELL 

LCDR Rick Sellers RAN (FASO/Editor) 

Tel: (02) 4424 1236 Email: richard.sellers@defence.gov.au 

CPOATA Frankie Siska (Assistant FASO) 

Tel: (02) 4424 1251 Email: frankie.siska@defence.gov.au 

POPT Annie Schofield (Magazine Contact) 

Tel: (02) 4424 2328 Email: anne-maree.schofield@defence.gov.au navyairsafety@defence.gov.au 

Mr Ian Carroll (Database Manager - DBM) 

Tel: (02) 4424 1205 Email: ian.carroll@defence.gov.au 

Published by 

Impact Graphics Pty Limited 

Tel: (02) 4443 5966 Email: graphics@impactgraphics.com.au 

Photography 

NAS Photographic Section 

FASC 

Navy Photographic Unit 

ABPHOT Kaye Adams HMAS NEWCASTLE 

Disclaimer 

Touchdown is produced in the interests of promoting aviation safety in the RAN, under the direction of 

Commander Australian Navy Aviation Group. The contents do not necessarily reflect Service policy and, unless 

stated otherwise, should not be construed as Orders, Instructions or Directives. All photographs and graphics 

are for illustrative purposes only and do not represent actual incident aircraft, unless specifically stated. 

Deadlines 

Issue 1 2004 contributions by 20 February 2004. Distributed April 2004 

Contributions should be sent to 

POPT Annie Schofield (Magazine Contact) 

Tel: (02) 4424 2328 Fax: (02) 4424 1604 

Comments, contributions,etc are invited from readers in the interest of promoting Aviation Safety as widely as 

possible throughout the RAN. 

Internet 

www.navy.gov.au/publications/navypubs.html 

Intranet 

http://niw.albatross.navy.gov.au 

CONTENTS 

Foreword 2 

Starter Motor Failure 3 

HMAS KANIMBLA’s Flight Decks - (Managing Risk) 4 

Know your limits - they may be lower than you think! 8 

Motion Sickness - it’s in the bag! 10 

“That’s the way it’s always been done.” 12 

How really responsible are you as the Aircraft Captain? 14 

There is no such thing as a “Straight Forward Flight” 16 

A Message from COSAVN COMAUSNAVAIRGRP 18 

Commanding Officer’s Commendations 19 

Bravo Zulu 19 

817 Squadron 20 

816 Squadron 21 

Project Sea 1405 Update 22 

Safety Awareness Day Expo 23 

CMDR Keith Engelsman, RANR - Aviation Milestone 23 

HMAS ALBATROSS the Year in review 24 

Fly Navy 

Fly Safe

2 TOUCHDOWN ISSUE 3 DECEMBER 2003 

BY C A RITCHIE, RAN 

VICE ADMIRAL 

CHIEF OF NAVY 

Foreword 

Safety in operations is an essential and expected part of the way we 

do business in Navy. 

As Chief of Navy, I take great 

pleasure in being asked to write 

this foreword. TOUCHDOWN is a 

great read, and offers a wealth of 

information not only to the 

aviation community but to the 

wider Navy community as well. 

The quality of articles presented 

is a credit to those associated 

with aviation operations. 

Your contributions ensure that we 

remain well informed, and when 

incidents do occur, you are not 

afraid to be open and honest in 

reporting your experiences, to 

ensure that valuable lessons are 

learnt. 

The Royal Australian Navy over 

the past couple of years has 

seen an ever increasing 

operational tempo with military 

action spread over vast distances 

and cultures. The complexity and 

challenge of these operations is 

reflected in Naval Aviation, where 

you continue to introduce new 

initiatives and processes to 

improve the safety and 

effectiveness of your operations. 

I fully endorse and support such 

initiatives as Crew Resource 

Management, Aviation Risk 

Management and Human Factor 

Training for aviation maintenance 

personnel. I see aviation safety 

as a force multiplier, which has 

the potential to preserve valuable 

assets and add to the 

effectiveness of our operations. 

Safety in operations is an 

essential and expected part of 

the way we do business in Navy. 

The open and honest reporting 

system that has been built up 

within Naval Aviation is an 

enviable achievement, but it 

requires support at all levels to 

remain a “just” reporting culture. 

This means that honest errors 

and mistakes are reported and 

dealt with, but not punished. 

Violations of known and practiced 

procedures and regulations 

however, whether operational or 

technical, cannot be tolerated 

under any circumstances. 

An open and honest reporting 

system and a just reporting 

culture are pivotal to the success 

of Naval Aviation Safety and have 

my total support. 

The Navy Aviation Air Safety 

System (AIRSAFE) ensures that 

Navy complies with legislation 

and higher defence policy in 

relation to the aviation 

environment. AIRSAFE aims to 

prevent adverse events through 

proactive management and the 

integration of safety into our core 

business, wherever our operations 

take us. AIRSAFE permeates how 

we operate and can only be 

achieved through commitment, 

resource allocation, good 

management and leadership. 

The aviation safety work 

implemented at 

COMAUSNAVAIRGRP and in 

particular the work of the Fleet 

Aviation Safety Cell (FASC) 

ensure that we continue to learn 

from events and incidents, which 

in turn adds to our operational 

effectiveness. 

I applaud the efforts that have 

lead to the RAN Aviation 

community being recognised 

both within Australia and 

internationally as a capable, 

professional and dedicated 

Maritime Aviation Force. 

Your efforts and dedication in 

providing assets and conducting 

demanding operations safely is 

well recognised within the Fleet 

and in the wider Australian 

community. 

I give my personal endorsement 

and support to your safety 

program. 

C A RITCHIE, RAN 

Vice Admiral 

Chief of Navy 


Fly Safe


3 

BY POATA M CONNELL 

805 SQUADRON 

There in 

front of me 

was a very 

sad looking 

starter 

motor... 

Starter Motor Failure 

After the incident we sat around the bollard of Wisdom and 

discussed the events. 

This occurrence happened whilst 

HMAS Melbourne was on patrol 

in the Persian Gulf in 2002. 

We had had another long day 

(more than a couple of hours in 

the heat is a long day) and we 

recovered Tiger 84 after sunset 

for the last time that day. 

The Ships Flight Team had gone 

through the motions of getting 

the gear out for stowing and 

fuelling, then its hurry up and 

wait forward of the white line 

whilst the aircraft goes into the 

evolution of an engine compwash 

and drying out run. 

Even though it is an evolution we 

become accustomed to and is 

very routine, things can still 

happen, and it is a credit to the 

attention of the team, on this 

particular day. As per usual there 

is always some distraction which 

starts the chain of events…. 

After the pilot had completed the 

water wash phase for the engines 

he then commenced a No 1 and 

No 2 engine start, bringing both 

engines to ground idle for the 

drying out run. The pilot had a 

normal start with all the correct 

indications the only problem 

being was the ECS system (Air 

condition for us lucky blokes) had 

not come back on line after the 

start. The ECS system in an 

S-70B-2 Seahawk shuts off 

automatically during start to allow 

bleed air be used for the start 

cycle then once the engines are 

self -sustaining it kicks back in. 

The pilot signalled for an ATV (Air 

Technical Avionics) sailor to jump 

in and have a play to make sure 

there was no finger problems or 

maybe just a quick fix. Whilst all 

this was going on the rest of us 

standing around noticed what 

appeared to be steam from the 

exhaust rising. This usually 

happens first up but disappears 

soon after. After about a minute, 

one of the Able Seaman was 

starting to get the same feeling 

as myself and expressed his 

concern and wanted to know if it 

was anything to worry about. 

It was about this time I was 

starting to think the same, as the 

steam hadn’t dissipated and then 

that feeling of uncertainty starts 

whizzing around in your head and 

gut. I decided to go and take a 

look. I did a walk around but due 

to it being dark I still could not 

ascertain whether it was steam or 

smoke, where exactly it was 

emanating from, or see any 

secondary signs. I informed the 

pilot I was going up to take a 

look at something for a “warm 

and fuzzy” he gave me the 

thumbs up and away I went. After 

checking the No 2 engine cowl 

area, I leaned across the forward 

sliding fairing and I noticed dirty 

black oil around the left hand 

side of the main gearbox fairing, 

then I noticed oil around the 

engine cowl latch and gaps 

around the cowl also had oil. 

The AB who was also curious had 

now noticed oil was streaming 

down the port side. 

It was at this moment, as I was 

backing away to come down to 

get the pilot to shut down that a 

white flash appeared in the 

intake cooling slots for the engine 

followed by what looked like 

sparklers coming out of the gaps 

of the engine cowl latch and 

where the cowl meets the firewall. 

Needless to say my descent was 

fairly rapid and signalled the pilot 

to shut down immediately. 

Without the traditional flat 

spinning and yelling, the Flight 

Team got out the AFFF hose and 

stood by whilst we waited for the 

engines to wind down. After 

everything was shut down, I 

grabbed the Taccos hand held 

extinguisher climbed up and 

cautiously opened the cowl to 

find oil and smoke everywhere. 

There in front of me was a very sad 

looking starter motor. We carried out 

a check to make sure nothing else 

would occur then decided to get the 

aircraft stowed so we could make a 

better assessment. 

The result: The starter motor had an 

electrical short and the start circuit 

had allowed air to keep the starter 

motoring. The caution/advisory panel 

had indicated a normal start and the 

“starter” caption had extinguished at 

the right time. But due to air still 

going to the starter from the APU 

(priority system) the ECS had not 

come back on line, hence the ECS 

fault. We carried out inspections on 

the engine and adjacent areas for 

heat and secondary damage. 

The starter motor was replaced and 

an engaged ground run carried out 

the next day with everything being 

“peachy", the ECS system worked as 

advertised. After the incident we sat 

around the bollard of Wisdom and 

discussed the events mainly 

reminding everyone that mundane 

evolutions can turn into exciting 

moments very quickly, but felt that 

due to the professional and 

situational awareness of the team 

and the follow up actions, we 

prevented a worse situation. 

The personnel involved in this 

incident should be congratulated for 

the way they dealt with a potential 

catastrophic situation. 

The Situational Awareness and quick 

thinking of the entire team, indicates 

a very positive attitude towards even 

the most routine maintenance and 

flying evolution’s. Well Done! 

Editorial by 

LCDR P Morvell, RAN 

AEQM 

FAEU 

POATA Matty Connell is the lucky 

winner of the $100 prize for the 

best submission to this edition of 

Touchdown. Congratulations. 


Fly Safe


BY LEUT (TAFF) FOSTER, RAN 

SAVO 

HMAS KANIMBLA 

HMAS KANIMBLA’s Flight 

Decks - (Managing Risk) 

HMAS KANIMBLA sailed for the Middle East Area of operations on 

23 January 2003 to conduct Operations BASTILLE, SLIPPER and 

FALCONER. When the conflict commenced in March the ships Aviation 

Department became more heavily involved with multi spot multi aircraft 

(including multi type) operations. 

There was a 

job to be 

done and this 

wasn’t an 

exercise, but 

for real. 

BELOW HMAS KANIMBLA FLIGHT DECK 


Fly Safe 

The purpose of the article is to 

highlight areas during our recent 

operations where there were 

potential flight safety risks and 

how KANIMBLA worked around 

those issues by using well taught 

Risk Management (RM) 

procedures, sound judgement, 

logic and thorough briefing 

techniques. 

The intent is to provide the 

reader with some light relief, 

inform, enlighten, entertain and 

above all, encourage you to 

discuss what was right or wrong 

and maybe what you would have 

done in the same place ‘you be 

the judge’. Finally, everything in 

this article is based on my 

personal views, opinions and 

experiences. 

Experience Counts 

Wouldn’t you love a dollar for 

every time someone said to you 

experience is important and how 

having experience will help you 

when times get tough? Well I can 

now confirm to you all that it is 

true! Experience is like having a 

little something extra in the bank 

for emergencies. Just break the 

glass and problem solved (not quite 

that easy). My personal experience 

was gained by doing the job from 

the other end, as embarked aircrew. 

That flight experience has helped 

me as the Ships Aviation Officer 

(SAVO) to do my job with 

confidence knowing that I have 

been taught well. 

The Statistics 

The statistics for KANIMBLA’s flight 

deck throughout her operations in 

the Gulf but especially during the 

first week leading up to, and the 

three weeks after commencement 

of hostilities, are to my mind pretty 

impressive. Fourteen different 

aircraft types and marks from 

Australia, Great Britain, Kuwait and 

the United States operated to our 

deck by day, night, both aided and 

unaided. Many of the aircraft 

arriving with little or no prior notice 

and whilst the ship was conducting 

concurrent RHIB and Rafting 

operations. 

The aircraft: 

Australia 

Seahawk S-70B-2 

Sea King Mk50 

Great Britain 

Merlin EH101 

Lynx Mk4 and 8 

Sea King Mk4, 6 and 7 

Kuwait 

Super Puma AS332/AS532 

United States 

Seahawks HH60/SH60 

Sea Knight CH46 

Dauphin AS365 

Sea King H4 

Super Stallion MH53E. 

The Beginning 

The Aviation Department was in 

top gear several days before 

hostilities broke out. There were 

numerous meetings and of course 

the quickest way to get everyone 

together was to fly them, especially 

the CTG staffs who were based on 

the carriers and in various 

locations ashore. We later 

embarked the British Sea King Mk 

7’s from 2000 to 0800 and this 

was to last several days. The 

Mk7’s positioned on KANIMBLA so 

that they could conduct continuous 

operations over the Al Faw 

Peninsula and the Knor Abdullah 

waterway prior to the assault 

taking place. Another regular to 

our deck was the US Coast Guard 

Dauphin who was busy patrolling 

the Khawr Abd Allah waterway and 

reporting on everything and 

anything. Then at very short notice 

a Kuwaiti Super Puma turned up 

with the Kuwait Chief of Defence 

Force for one of the meetings and 

this was just the beginning.


5 

The Requirement 

While all this higher level 

planning was in progress, aviation 

had to prepare to meet the still 

largely unknown challenges. The 

task was made a little simpler by 

having to only work the two aft 

spots, Spots 2 and 3. 

The forward flight deck was the 

home for first of all the LCM8’s 

and then up to seven coalition 

RHIB’s that would be used later 

to clear the Khawr Abd Allah 

waterway leading up to the port 

of Umm Qasr. The first thing that 

had to be done was to work out a 

watch routine that would provide 

the following: 

a. two spots at thirty minutes notice 

by day and one spot at thirty 

minutes by night 24/7 (later 

fifteen minutes notice); 

b. hot refuel facility available 

throughout the above times; 

c. deck teams available and 

manned in accordance with (IAW) 

ABR 5419; 

d. rest periods for deck teams (IAW) 

ABR 5150; 

e. able to operate ADF and coalition 

aircraft unaided and coalition 

aircraft on Night Vision Goggles, 

and 

f. last, but by no means least, 

identify procedures to control the 

Risks. 

The Watches 

The Aviation Department is made 

up of just 3 people, two Flight 

Deck Team (FDT) members and 

one Ships Aviation Officer (SAVO). 

The rest of the aviation team 

comprised four maintainers drawn 

from ALBATROSS based 

squadrons, three musicians from 

the RAN Band (augments) and 

supported by the Stores and 

Supply (S/S) department who 

supplied two FDT trained 

personnel. The Flight maintainers 

were split into Two Watches 

ensuring that our Sea King, Shark 

05 was always available for its 

extensive flying operations. The 

maintainers would stop what they 

were doing and support manning 

the spots or acting as the fire suit 

men during the really busy 

periods. Without their help we 

could not have fulfilled the 

manning obligations required to 

run two spots. 

Objectives and identifying the 

Risk 

Objective # 1 ensure we had a 

deck available to refuel coalition 

aircraft when they needed it and 

that FDT’s were rested and alert. 

It is worth noting that in the 

beginning KANIMBLA was the 

only deck within cooee of 

anywhere, therefore because of 

our close proximity to the Al Faw 

and the ability to provide hot 

refuels, coalition aircraft were 

able to blanket patrol and survey 

the peninsula none-stop. 

Secondly as SAVO I had to 

ensure that my flight deck crews 

had the rest they needed. Later 

this proved to be the most 

difficult of all to achieve. Sleep 

was disrupted often; for instance, 

during the mine threat everyone 

accommodated below four deck 

was required to sleep in the 

hangar. Sleeping in the hangar 

was difficult because we were still 

receiving aircraft and launching 

RHIB crews for patrols throughout 

the day and night. It was 

invariably difficult to get six hours 

uninterrupted sleep during any 

twenty-four hour period. 

Objective # 2 was to ensure that 

KANIMBLA had the clearances to 

recover the aircraft in our area of 

operations and that we would 

know how to secure the aircraft to 

the deck and how to refuel it. 

Objective # 3 the aircraft were all 

going to be armed. 

(Risk is the chance of something 

happening that could impact upon 

objectives. It is measured in terms 

of consequence and likelihood 

(AS/NZS 4360:1999). 

My Rules - As SAVO 

Rule # 1 a thorough knowledge of 

ABR 5419 and HOSTACs and what 

these publications contain is 

important. 

Rule # 2 apply to MHQ as early as 

possible for a clearance to operate 

any and all aircraft that might 

conceivably come to our deck. 

Rule # 3 fully and 

comprehensively brief my deck 

teams on position of tie down 

points, refuel positions, and how to 

walk around or stand next to an 

armed aircraft, covering day, night 

and Night Vision Goggle (NVG) 

operations. 

The Unusual and Unexpected 

No matter how much you plan, 

regardless of how much 

preparation you put in, something 

is always going to come out of left 

field. The following is a precise 

account of some of the more 

unusual things that I had to think 

about and what I did to satisfy 

myself that we could do it and do 

it safely. Remembering all the 

while that there was a job to be 

done and this wasn’t an exercise 

but for real and people were 

relying on us to be there and 

provide a service. 

The ship at anchor inside a swept 

channel with a tail wind 

The ship was anchored in entrance 

to the Khawr Abd Allah waterway, 

aircraft transiting out to us would 

usually arrive with not a lot of fuel 

and with few options of a landing 

pad other than KANIMBLA. So here 

we are a relative wind of 180 and ‘X’ 

knots. OK, the aircraft is going to be 

offered an into wind approach for a 

landing to the most aft spot that is 

three spot. What are the safety 

considerations, is it allowed, what 

about clear deck operations, how do 

we get the flight deck teams out to 

the aircraft and what are the risks to 

the team? Aft facing approaches 

are allowed but the landing circles 

are designed for a forward facing 

approach and landing so I had to 

think about the positioning of the 

flight deck team. In this case Clear 

Deck Operations was the way to go, 

but brief the team and the 

helicopter crew on the procedure to 

get the FDT out and the aircraft 

secured on deck. Once the aircraft 

was on deck we had the FDM and 

the FDT plus two extra hands walk 

up the port side of the flight deck to 

a position clear of the rotor disc. 

The FDM then cleared the FDT plus 

the two extras into the aircraft. 

Control # 1. The two extra numbers 

were there to ensure that the two 

FDT members attaching lashings to 

the rear attachment point on the 

Sea King did not walk back towards 

the hangar (the natural direction to 

take) but AFT and out to the front of 

the Sea King. 

BELOW HANGER BUNKING DURING MINE THREAT 


Fly Safe


RIGHT FLIGHT DECK OPERATIONS 

BELOW SLED DRAGGING 

Ships Control Zone 

On the busy days KANIMBLA could 

have both Spots occupied one 

aircraft holding, expecting others to 

arrive at any time and during the 

daylight hours and occasionally at 

night other helicopters not 

operating on our frequency would 

infringe the Ship Control Zone. 

The aircraft infringing our airspace 

were conducting what must be 

considered important tasking, 

CH47 Chinooks, CH 46 Sea 

Knights were conducting resupply 

to troops on the Al Faw and CH53 

Super Stallions were dragging 

sleds in their efforts to locate and 

deal with mines. Again this was not 

an exercise what do you do? Hold 

everything? No, of course not. 

Control # 2 Ensure you know 

where everything is, use the 

lookouts to report all traffic to the 

OOW, who informs the HCO, who 

in turn informs the Operations 

room. Teamwork and the 

knowledge you provide informs 

the pilots clearly of all other 

conflicting traffic, they will then 

sort out their own collision 

avoidance once airborne. 

Armed helicopters 

Just about all of the helicopters 

that landed on KANIMBLA’s flight 

deck were armed. The type of 

armament varied but included 

Hellfire, Sea Skua missiles 50 

cal, GSMG and chaff. The first 

priority for aircraft once on the 

deck was to apply the safety pins 

to the launchers and not put 

chocks in or lashings on. 

Once the missiles were safe, the 

flight deck team could go in and 

apply chocks and lashings. 

Control # 3 luckily I did not have 

to worry about pitch and roll 

because most of the time it was 

zeros on both. But the FDT 

briefings had to be thorough, no 

walking in front of gun barrels, no 

leaning on, crawling under, 

standing in front of, or feet in the 

way of anything that could go 

bang or fall off. All sounds pretty 

obvious right? What about the 

landing direction and lets not 

forget RADHAZ? How about the 

tie down points and the line up 

lines? When I used to do this we 

would land with the missiles 

pointing away from anything that 

could be damaged and that 

BELOW AIRCRAFT REFUELLING ON DECK 

included adjacent ships. In the 

end the option was for a normal 

landing direction, a pause while 

the weapons were made safe and 

a normal tie down. The launch 

sequence is off lashings, out 

chocks, and remove the safety 

pins, then launch. 

Night Vision Goggle (NVG) 

Operations 

I’m personally not sure this is the 

correct title to use, after all I’m 

trying to describe some of the 

safety controls that we put in 

place to enable us to do our job 

efficiently and safely. Perhaps a 

better title would be ‘NVG The 

Lack of Vision’. We knew that we 

had to provide an NVG 

compatible deck and it was 

something that FAVO’s office and 

KANIMBLA strived to provide in 

time for our arrival in the North 

Arabian Gulf. Later we realised 

just how important it was to have 

an NVG compatible deck. 

Without NVG capability the US 

pilots that came to us for ‘hot 

refuel’ would require to de-goggle 

twenty minutes before 

approaching the deck. Just think 

of all that wasted time and fuel, 

time that would be better spent 

in support of operations. 


Fly Safe 

Control # 4 I started thinking 

about the flight deck teams how 

were they supposed to operate 

around a darkened deck. 

Importantly, how was the FDM 

supposed to communicate with 

the FDT and the pilot. Let’s take 

the last problem first, how was 

the FDM to communicate with the 

pilot? The solution was easy; 

Infra Red Cyalume sticks, but that 

didn’t solve the problem of 

communication between FDM 

and FDT.


7 

Control # 5 what if we just 

turned up the NVG compatible 

deck wash lights when the aircraft 

was safely on deck? Control 

number two we turned the deck 

wash lights up after landing (this 

is not a long-term answer). 

Control # 6 the UK Lynx would 

operate on NVG and de-goggle 

for the approach and landing. 

Now we have a problem; the 

wash lights have NVG compatible 

filters fitted, does that mean we 

have to change them every time, 

or do they provide sufficient 

illumination to safely recover an 

unaided aircraft? The embarked 

Sea King Flight Commander 

conducted a night unaided 

assessment of the deck wash 

lights fitted with NVG filters. The 

Flight Commander found that the 

deck wash lights fitted with filters 

and normal centre line and deck 

edge lighting provided very 

effective light coverage, such that 

unaided approaches could be 

easily flown. 

An example of the NVG 

compatible wash lights (Green). 

Normally all mastheads and 

ships upper deck lights are 

extinguished. 

Risk Management and its 

Application 

(Communication and consultation 

are fundamental aspects of the 

entire Risk Management Process) 

Throughout the operation, I 

consciously made decisions and 

offered solutions to envisaged 

problems to Command that 

ensured the flight decks on 

KANIMBLA would be able operate 

at thirty or fifteen minutes notice 

continuously. But what guided me 

and enabled me to make those 

decisions? 

The Risk Management 

Philosophy states that risk 

management supports and 

encourages initiative allowing 

flexibility, adaptability and 

eagerness to act (no problem 

with the last one). The common 

sense solutions KANIMBLA 

adopted were the result of simply 

identifying and controlling the 

hazards. I used the following five 

steps to help in my decision 

making: 

The five steps 

1. Identify the hazard (Risk); 

2. Assess Hazards (Estimate the 

Risk); 

3. Develop Controls and make 

Risk decisions; 

4. Implement controls, and 

5. Supervise and evaluate. 

The Controls As discussed in the 

previous paragraphs. Think of 

them as identified hazards. The 

hazards were then discussed with 

all who had a stake in the 

outcomes (the Hazards were 

assessed). In the case of the aft 

facing Sea King, the positioning 

of the flight deck team and the 

provision of two additional flight 

deck team members, think of that 

as the development of controls 

and the risk decision making 

(reducing the risk). 

The provision of the two extra FDT 

members could be viewed as 

implementing controls and 

reducing the risk (in this case 

reduce the possibility of walking 

into a tail rotor). Finally keep 

updating. The SAVO supervises, 

evaluates, if necessary fine-tunes 

and make changes if and as 

required. 

Conclusion 

I am obviously very proud of the 

service KANIMBLA’s Flight Deck 

Team’s provided to the coalition 

aircrews who operated with us. 

The service, however, could not 

have been provided without the 

full involvement and support of 

Command and KANIMBLA’s Ships 

Company, it really was a whole 

team effort. I have only touched 

on a sample, and written about 

just a few of the many decisions 

made when presented with the 

unfamiliar during this operation. 

Lastly, Risk Analysis Management 

is a fantastic tool to have at hand 

and will do two things, ensure 

your decisions are sound and 

manage the Risk, but you must 

be honest. 

The easiest thing to do is nothing. 

Fly Safely. 

References: 

A. AAP 6734.001 Chapter 7 

B. Aviation Risk management Operator 

Handbook 

LEUT Foster and all of 

KANIMBLA’s team are to be 

congratulated on a job well done 

in a very demanding 

circumstance. This article serves 

to illustrate how sensible 

application of sound Risk 

Management techniques can 

enhance the safety and 

effectiveness of demanding and 

complex operations 

Editorial By LCDR R Sellers, RAN 

FASO 

COMAUSNAVAIRGRP 


Fly Safe


BY LEUT A TENBRUGGENCATE, RAN 

816 SQUADRON 

Know your limits - they may 

be lower than you think! 

Now that the time had come for some crew decision-making, 

our collective fatigue began to seriously affect the mission. 

The 

overwhelmingly 

obvious 

decision would 

be to use the 

rescue hoist 

to lower the 

swimmer into 

the water, but 

fatigue can 

render the 

obvious rather 

obscure. 


Fly Safe 

It was April 2000, and we were in 

the first week of a four month 

deployment with NATO’s Standing 

Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL) on 

HMCS Fredericton, approximately 

700NM North-West of Bermuda. 

For once, the stars had aligned 

properly: I was on the best ship 

in the Navy, on the sharpest crew 

on the Wing, heading towards 

some of the best ports on the 

planet. The fact that our aircraft 

was the oldest Sea King in the 

fleet only seemed to add to the 

mystique. Despite her age of 37 

years, and 12,000+ airframe 

hours, she was in fine shape, 

having just come out of periodic 

maintenance as a Mk 2 model 

with upgraded GE T58-100 

engines. 

So it was with a slight feeling of 

superiority when we took over the 

aircraft after Crew 1 (or as we 

liked to call them, ‘The B-Team’) 

returned from a fruitless three 

hour search for a missing 

trimaran, the ANNA V, being 

sailed single-handed from Florida 

to Portsmouth. Sure, we had 

already done a full day’s flying, 

but the adrenaline kick of a 

night-time Search and Rescue 

(SAR) mission seemed like more 

than enough to compensate for 

our low-grade fatigue. 

As we approached the search 

area, I set-up in the back door 

with Night Vision Goggles (NVGS), 

and began my scan of the 

surface. The gusty 35-40 knot 

winds had driven the seas to 

three metres, with whitecaps, thus 

lowering our probability of 

detection. 

About two hours into the mission, 

as we re-positioned to maintain 

proper track spacing, I looked 

below and saw what at first 

appeared to be a mast, floating 

on the surface. We marked the 

spot with a Mk25 smoke marker, 

and turned for a coupled 

approach to the hover. As the 

smoke lit, it obscured the 

immediate area, and the debris 

could not be spotted. After a few 

minutes in the hover, it was 

decided to commence a sector 

search, using the smoke marker 

as the datum. This tactic proved 

successful, and within five 

minutes, we were in the hover 

beside an overturned hull bearing 

the name ‘ANNA V’. What I had 

thought was a mast, was in 

reality one of the boat’s 

outriggers, which had been torn 

away from the hull. It became 

immediately clear that had we 

not used NVGs, we stood no 

chance of finding the vessel at 

night. A quick examination of the 

debris showed that the time for 

some difficult decisions had 

come. Although the outriggers 

had been torn from the hull, the 

nets and stays could be seen just 

beneath the surface, posing an 

extreme tangling hazard to our 

rescue swimmer. The state of the 

mast and sails could not be 

determined, and the steel hull 

awash. 

Our rescue swimmer, who 

happened to be the baby Marine 

Engineering Officer, Diving Officer 

and a remarkable triathlete, 

surveyed the scene and gave an 

enthusiastic affirmative when 

asked if he thought the task was 

prudent and achievable. 

Up to this point nothing in the 

mission, besides being well past 

our crew day, was out of the 

ordinary. All decisions were SOP, 

and the stress level was quite low. 

Now that the time had come for 

some crew decision-making, our 

collective fatigue began to seriously 

affect the mission. 

The first poor decision came when 

we came to diver deployment. The 

standard envelope was 10 to 30 

feet, from zero to ten knots. Our 

night-time hover limit was 40 feet. 

The overwhelmingly obvious 

decision would be to use the rescue 

hoist to lower the swimmer into the 

water, but fatigue can render the 

obvious rather obscure. Thus we 

pushed down to a 20-foot hover, 

and after giving a thumbs-up, the 

swimmer exited the aircraft. He 

rose to the surface, indicated well, 

and proceeded to the stricken 

vessel. It was only after the mission 

that we learned he had broken his 

mask on the ill-advised water entry. 

From the relative safety of the 

aircraft, we marvelled at the 

swimmer’s courage and athleticism 

as after several attempts, he pulled 

himself onto the hull. He began to 

pound on it with his pry-bar in an 

attempt to elicit a reply from the 

sailor, should he have taken shelter 

in an air pocket under his vessel. 

After what seemed like an eternity, 

the diver moved away from the 

debris, and signalled for pick-up. 

The second bad decision was more 

of a cluster of bad decisions. I’ll be 

the first to admit that I was anxious 

to get in on the action, and 

suggested we recover the diver via 

double-lift (he looked pretty 

fatigued, and hey, why should he get 

all the fun?). Besides, as the 

dutiful SENSO, I was already 

wearing the harness. Now while 

night voice con is something that


9 

LEFT HMCS FREDERICTON HELAIRDET 

CREW 2 IN PORTO SANTO, MADEIRA 

ISLANDS, JUNE 2000 

we had practiced quite frequently, 

it was surely not the wisest 

choice when a hover-trim, 

horsecollar (Nowra strop) 

recovery was available. Even so, 

the recovery would have 

proceeded far more smoothly had 

the swimmer not swam directly to 

the smoke marker our pilots had 

been using as their reference. 

The diver and I were treated to an 

unwelcome combination of body 

surfing and waterskiing as our 

pilots struggled to follow the con 

of our (understandably) jittery 

TACCO with the Doppler hover 

indicator as their only useable 

reference. 

Once our dripping forms were 

hauled into the aircraft, I felt like I 

was back in my comfort zone, 

and gave a little in-situ debrief to 

the TACCO. I thought I heard the 

pilots mention something about 

torque as we departed the dip, 

but though little of it as I 

strapped in for the ride home. 

Little did I know that I had 

missed the most dangerous part 

of the trip. Fittingly, this was also 

the result of some poor decision 

making. 

Canadian Sea Kings are 

notoriously tail-heavy and under 

normal circumstances, every 

effort is made to load cargo and 

passengers as far forward as 

possible. On this particular 

mission, in addition to the normal 

crew and diver, we had brought 

the ship’s Medical Assistant along 

- just in case. We thought little of 

it when we strapped him into the 

forward troop seat, which is 

immediately aft of the port-side 

escape window. 

So as we sat in the dip after the 

diver recovery, we had: one 230lb 

TACCO, one 190lb SENSO, one 

200lb medic, and one 170lb 

diver, plus who knows how much 

water, all in the rear cabin, with 

gusty 20-25kt winds buffeting the 

aircraft. The Co-Pilot (CP) was at 

the controls as the Aircraft Captain 

(AC) took a break after the difficult 

hoist work. When the radalt lowaltitude 

warning (35 feet) 

sounded, the AC looked at the 

instruments, and much to his 

charging saw the attitude indicator 

swinging through 30 degrees of 

nose-up pitch. He immediately 

took control of the aircraft and 

departed the hover. 

From the aft cabin, the only 

indication I had that something 

was amiss was a “Watch your 

torque” call from the Co-Pilot. 

With its combination of upgraded 

engine, and old gearbox, the Mk2 

was susceptible to over-torque. 

We maxed-out at 116% 

twin-engine torque, well over the 

allowable transient limit for the 

CH-124 Mk2 (the aircraft captain 

still swears that if examined 

closely, the collective would show 

a distinct upward-bend) and 

regained a safe regime of flight. 

Our transit back to the ship was a 

short one. But the fun wasn’t 

over. As a final reminder of the 

effects of distraction and fatigue, 

the aircraft was over-fuelled on the 

flight deck resulting in a fuel spill. 

As a new arrival in the RAN 

Aviation Branch, inevitably I 

compare aspects of the system 

I’ve left and the one in which I 

now operate. Each has strengths 

over the other, and I feel this 

mission provides a very good 

basis on which to make 

comparisons regarding both 

mission effectiveness and flight 

safety. 

What first struck me in the RAN is 

the exhaustive briefing process 

undertaken before flights - 

especially the AVRM aspect. 

Although all missions in the 

Canadian Forces are briefed, 

when operating at sea with the 

same crew, day-in, day-out 

complacency can set in. 

Taking the time to identify and 

discuss the most hazardous 

evolution in the mission may have 

forced us to re-think our diver 

drop and recovery method. 

A mitigating factor in the hazards 

posed in the night-time hoist 

recovery of the diver was the wet 

hoisting training that is an annual 

requirement for Canadian Sea 

King crewmen. This involves an 

actual wet hoist from a body of 

water by an aircraft. The 

advantage of experiencing the 

combined effects of a real 

sea-state, rotor-driven spray and 

noise while attempting to recover 

someone from the water cannot 

be overstated. Even though the 

recovery was my first experience 

of being winched from the water 

at night, I felt very comfortable 

and familiar with the 

environment. 

From a mission capability 

standpoint, without night vision 

goggles, this search would have 

been futile. Forward Looking Infra 

Red (FLIR - which was fitted to 

the aircraft) is of little use when 

searching for relatively small, cool 

objects in anything less than a 

calm sea state. It should be 

noted that an aircraft need not 

have NVG-compatible 

instrumentation for crewmen to 

be able to use them to great 

advantage. 

The final point is common to both 

fleets, and indeed to all aviators. 

This is the insidious nature of 

fatigue. As I stated earlier, 

everything seemed to be going 

fine while the mission proceeded 

as briefed. As soon as we 

needed to make some critical 

decisions we found ourselves 

lacking. More alarming was the 

lack of cross checking within the 

crew. Nobody took the time to sit 

back and ask themselves, “Could 

we be doing this in a better and 

safer way?” Adrenaline may have 

masked the symptoms of fatigue, 

but it didn’t make up for its 

effects on decision making. 

The SNFL deployment of 2000 

remains the highlight of my career 

in the Canadian Forces. The 

experiences of that dark spring 

night have made me a better and 

safer, and hopefully more humble 

aviator. If I could sum the 

lessons I learned into one 

statement it would be, “Know your 

limits - they may be lower than 

you think!” 

LEUT A Tenbruggencate’s article 

serves as a powerful reminder of 

how the insidious nature of 

fatigue coupled with the stress 

and adrenalin of a real Search 

and Rescue (SAR) can conspire 

against a crew’s decision making 

process when they need it most! 

Editorial By 

LCDR R Sellers, RAN 

FASO 



Fly Safe


BY CAPT L SINCLAIR 

SO3 AVIATION PSYCHOLOGY 

AVMED 

Motion Sickness - 

it’s in the bag! 

“Astronauts Bean, Garriott and Lousma, the Skylab crew launched on a 59 

day mission in July 1973, were so nauseated and disoriented for the first 

week of their flight that they couldn’t carry out their scheduled experiments”. 

The brain is 

confused by 

the information 

it receives, and 

this causes 

dizziness, 

blurred vision, 

nausea and 

other symptoms 

of motion 

sickness. 


Fly Safe 

So what’s the commotion? 

When a person is exposed to an 

environment of unfamiliar motion 

and conflicting sensory inputs the 

normal human response is 

motion sickness. Motion sickness 

can occur on ships, aircraft, 

submarines, spacecraft, 

simulators, amusement park rides 

and even cars. The spectrum of 

severity of symptoms ranges from 

mild discomfort to severe 

compromise of function. A variety 

of environments within the 

Australian Defence Force (ADF) 

generate motion sickness and the 

subsequent incapacitation of key 

personnel can be devastating. 

Are you confused? 

There is general agreement that 

motion sickness is a result of 

sensory confusion. The problem is 

a sensory mismatch in the brain, 

in which the vestibular system of 

the inner ear sends messages 

about body position and 

movement that contradict 

information relayed by the eyes. 

From this sensory confusion the 

‘Neural Mismatch Theory’ or 

’Sensory Rearrangement Theory’ 

has been developed which 

essentially holds that motion 

sickness arises from conflicting 

motion cues, either between 

different sensory channels or 

between what is expected and 

what is actually experienced. 

For example - inside the cabin of 

a rocking boat, the inner ear 

detects changes in body position 

as it bobs with the movement of 

the boat. But since the cabin 

moves with the passenger, the 

eyes register a relatively stable 

scene. The brain is confused by 

the information it receives, and 

this causes dizziness, blurred 

vision, nausea and other 

symptoms of motion sickness. 

Another commonly reported 

situation occurs in the back of 

aircraft where visual cues of the 

motion are absent. The 

semicircular canals within the 

ears will however detect that 

motion and create a neural 

mismatch. This mismatch triggers 

the motion sickness response 

starting with uneasy feelings in 

the stomach and progressing 

through the range of symptoms. 

‘The blood rushes out of your 

head and you’d rather crawl into 

a corner and be left alone. 

There’s cold sweating, nausea 

and vomiting’ 

Robert Thirsk - Canadian 

astronaut on the 1996 Columbia 

space shuttle mission. 

Motion Sickness - 

Main Symptom Alert 

Stomach awareness 

Loss of appetite 

Increased salivation and 

swallowing 

Cold Sweating 

Skin pallor 

Sensation of fullness of the head 

Difficulty focusing 

Visual flashbacks 

Eye strain 

Blurred vision 

Increased yawning 

Headache 

Dizziness 

Vertigo 

Postural instability 

Fatigue 

Stress 

Vomiting 

So do the eyes have it? - 

not according to the ears…. 

Our eyes provide 80% of our 

orientation information, and are 

the dominant sense. Due to this, 

visual cues will override vestibular 

information in most 

circumstances. 20% of 

orientation is provided by the 

combined use of our vestibular 

system (the balance system of


11 

the inner ear) and the 

proprioceptors (sensors in a 

person’s joints and muscles). So, 

if we are deprived of visual cues 

then the brain will rely on these 

senses for orientation 

information. If this perception 

does not match our true spatial 

orientation then we are suffering 

from spatial disorientation which 

could lead to disaster. 

Each inner ear contains a set of 

three semi-circular canals that 

contain fluid which responds to 

head movements due to inertia 

and momentum, and which send 

information to the brain about 

our orientation. If this information 

is not concordant with 

information received from the 

eyes, we can get motion sick 

and/or disoriented. 

Our perception of spatial 

orientation is based on the 

brain’s interpretation of the 

various inputs it receives from the 

sensory channels. 

How adaptable are you? 

Have you felt nauseated, maybe 

to the point of vomiting, during 

manoeuvres such as wing overs, 

loops and aerobatics? Do you 

suffer from headache, loss of 

appetite, upset stomach and a 

general sick feeling during flight? 

Have you noticed a pattern of 

illness emerging after you have 

taken breaks from flying? These 

are typical questions asked of 

aircrew who report motion 

sickness and the answers vary 

due to individual differences and 

adaptability. However, a common 

link between most motion 

sickness sufferers is the lack of 

exposure to the new environment. 

Even highly experienced 

astronauts experience space 

motion sickness (SMS) during the 

first few days of exposure to the 

weightless (otherwise known as 

micro-gravity) environment of 

space. Continued exposure and 

individual adaptation produces a 

progressive decline in the 

intensity of symptoms (Reason 

and Brand, 1975). SMS is similar 

to motion sickness on Earth and 

not only disrupts the well-being of 

crew members, but it also can 

impair their performance during 

critical stages of spaceflight. 

The frequency of airsickness 

during pilot training also 

demonstrates this adaptive 

response. Aircrew who are 

continuously exposed to the new 

motion of flight develop an 

increased tolerance to the 

environment which leads to a 

decrease in the onset of motion 

sickness. 

How susceptible are you? 

Individual variation is wide 

ranging with motion sickness. 

Despite there being a high 

occurrence of sickness prevalent 

within those starting out in their 

flying careers most individuals 

adapt quickly to the motions 

associated with flying and have 

no further problems. The 

susceptibility is dependent upon 

3 factors: 

Receptivity 

This will depend on how sensitive 

your vestibular system is to the 

particular motion you experience. 

If you are highly receptive, be 

warned, you will become sick with 

only minor stimulation. 

Adaptability 

Once fully trained, pilots rarely 

become motion sick as they fly 

frequently and have adapted to 

the motion of the aircraft. You 

may become sick each time you 

fly if you are poor at adapting to 

a new motion, even if you fly 

frequently. The importance of 

adaptation cannot be 

underestimated. 

Retentivity 

It is important for adaptation to 

be retained once it has been 

achieved. If you can retain the 

sensation of a new motion easily 

then the adaptation will be 

sustained even without being 

frequently exposed to that 

environment. Unfortunately if you 

can’t retain the sensation of that 

motion you will lose your 

adaptation very quickly. 

Overall, if you are very receptive to 

new motion stimuli, adapt slowly 

and fail to retain your adaptation 

easily, there is a high probability 

that motion sickness will be an 

ongoing concern. However, if you 

are less receptive, adapt quickly 

and retain this adaptation you are 

unlikely to suffer the effects of 

motion sickness. 

Susceptibility + A Complicating 

Factor = Motion Sickness 

Given enough stimulation anyone 

can experience motion sickness 

although some are simply more 

prone than others to becoming 

motion sick. To this, add a 

complicating factor such as speed 

or a flight manoeuvre and you can 

quickly begin to feel overwhelmed 

with motion sickness and the 

associated stress. 

Operational Significance 

Motion sickness has an adverse 

effect on performance which 

contributes to a reduced ability to 

devote full attention to taskings. A 

fully incapacitated member is 

unable to undertake assigned 

duties and missions can potentially 

be disrupted or aborted. 

From the operational perspective, 

motion sickness can lead to: 

• Reduced level of performance 

• Decreased effectiveness 

• Aborted missions 

• Flying safety hazard 

• Decreased motivation 

• Increased stress and anxiety 

Simulator Sickness-this is for real 

The high fidelity of flight simulators 

means that we can train pilots, 

presented with high risk scenarios, 

within a safe environment. On-line 

availability and operational costs 

are additional factors for training 

within simulators. Replicated 

cockpits, enhanced visual systems 

and motion cues, generate the 

power to convince your sensory 

systems that you are actually 

flying an aircraft. Unfortunately 

this in turn can lead to a type of 

motion sickness known as 

simulator induced sickness (SIS). 

Simulator sickness is similar to 

motion sickness but has fewer 

symptoms: 

Despite the advantages of using 

simulators there are potential 

negative impacts on health, 

safety and training due to the 

development of motion sickness 

symptoms and other after-effects 

such as balance disturbances, 

visual stress and altered handeye 

coordination. 

It’s in the bag 

Motion sickness can be 

debilitating particularly if you are 

inexperienced within the 

environment that you work. But 

there is something that you can 

do about it. If you speak up and 

seek assistance it could mean 

the difference between reaching 

for that airsick bag or getting on 

with what you love doing - Flying. 


Fly Safe


BY LCDR J A BUTLER, RAN 

816 SQUADRON 

“That’s the way it’s 

always been done.” 

Some thoughts on RAN deck landing operations 

BELOW FLIGHT DECK TEAM PERSONNEL 

“That’s the way it’s always been 

done." How many times have you 

heard this phrase being given as 

the answer to why something is 

done a certain way? One of the 

first times I heard these infamous 

words was about fourteen years 

ago after I had just completed my 

first series of deck landings on 

the way to achieving my initial 

Deck Landing (DL) qualification. 

I had simply asked why the deck 

crew remained on deck prior to 

putting the lashings on and after 

taking them off. I figured that 

takeoff and landing on a moving 

surface was a pretty dangerous 

evolution, so why have lots of 

people standing only a few 

metres away? Imagine my 

surprise when not long afterwards 

I landed on a Royal Navy frigate 

where the goofers, dressed in 

shorts and t-shirts and brew in 

hand, were peering at me through 

a half open hangar door as I 

nervously completed solo DL 

number one. Little did they know! 

Since then I have accumulated 

close to 3000 deck landings on 

45 different ships, and these 

words still ring in my ears on 

many occasions as I hover over 

the spot. In fact I must confess to 

probably using these words on 

occasion. 

One of the keys to flight safety is 

identifying the hazards and 

therefore minimising the risks 

before an incident or accident 

occurs. This is my attempt to do 

just that. The following is a 

hypothetical scenario, but one 

that could have potentially 

occurred only recently. 

A Seahawk with three crew and 

four passengers (aircrew and 

maintainers) departs the Naval 

Air Station (NAS) NOWRA for DL 

Practice serials with an ANZAC 

Class frigate. On taxi, a number 

of bolts on the starboard 

undercarriage shear due to 

fatigue and the washers and 

bolts fall to the ground. No one 

notices. The aircraft requires a 

‘clear deck’ landing initially, ie. 

Non-Recovery, Assist, Securing & 

Traversing (RAST) system, as they 

need to drop off the Landing 

Safety Officer (LSO) and 

maintainers in order to conduct 

RAST operations. Clear deck 

operations require a Flight Deck 

Marshaller (FDM) and Flight Deck 

Team (FDT) of four to be on the 

deck during the landing. 

Environmental conditions are 

challenging with sea and swell 

creating deck movement right on 

the limits. The wind is strong and 

gusty. As the aircraft rolls onto 

final approach, the Helicopter 

Control Officer (HCO) gives the 

aircraft a “green deck for a clear 

deck recovery." On late final, the 

...these words still ring in my 

ears on many occasions as I 

hover over the spot. 

aircraft captain notices a large 

number of people on deck seven 

and queries this with the HCO. 

The HCO explains that a Grade 1 

FDM is being supervised by a 

Grade 2, and a photographer is 

also on the deck to get some 

happy snaps of the aircraft. As 

this is not such an unusual 

request, the Aircraft Captain 

continues for the landing. 

As the aircraft is positioned over 

the spot and moves downward, a 

pitching deck creates the 

situation of a very firm landing, 

although still well within the limits 

of the aircraft. However, due to 

the damaged mainwheel, the 


Fly Safe


13 

undercarriage suffers a 

catastrophic failure on landing 

and the aircraft leans 

dramatically to Starboard. Due to 

the gusty conditions, the inertia 

of the downward moving aircraft, 

and its subsequent undercarriage 

collapse, the reduced clearance 

of the rotor disc results in the 

blades striking the deck on the 

starboard side. The tip of the 

main rotor blades are travelling at 

close to 430 km/h and due to 

the advancing blades being on 

the starboard side, shrapnel 

sprays the forward deck area, 

piercing the thin hangar doors 

like a hot knife through butter. 

The seven people aboard the 

aircraft are uninjured. I’ll leave 

it to your imagination to 

contemplate the fate of the 

people on deck. Thankfully, the 

real life version of this scenario 

ended at the pre takeoff stage 

from NAS, when a very alert 

maintainer noticed the bolts fall 

from the mainwheel on taxi (refer 

Touchdown Issue 3 December 

2002). 

Deck landing operations are 

arguably one of the most 

hazardous evolutions we 

undertake in naval aircraft. 

Over recent years, many of the 

incidents/accidents involving 

naval helicopters have occurred 

while conducting deck operations. 

Take for example recent incidents 

involving Seasprite and Seahawk 

mishaps on deck - minimal 

chance of aircrew injury, but high 

potential for injury to deck teams. 

Surely if we can reduce the 

exposure time of personnel to 

this hazardous environment, then 

we minimise the risk of injury. 

RAST operations have gone a 

long way toward reducing the risk. 

Apart from the RAST cable 

hookup sequence prior to 

landing, all RAST operations have 

eliminated the necessity for 

anyone to be on deck during 

either the take-off or landing 

phase. Orientation markings on 

the deck are sufficient for the 

pilot not to require a FDM. 

Why could this principle not be 

applied to clear deck operations 

as well? That is, the flight deck 

team does not proceed onto the 

deck until the aircraft has 

completed the landing. The time 

delay in securing lashings to the 

aircraft would be only slightly 

longer than at present, but the 

risks of being unsecured for 

slightly longer are far outweighed 

by the added safety to flight deck 

teams. Similarly, after removing 

lashings for takeoff, the team 

could exit the flight deck prior to 

the aircraft lifting. 

With no disrespect intended to 

the professionalism of the many 

FDMs, how many pilots actually 

rely on the FDM’s signals while 

undertaking takeoffs and 

landings? Nevertheless, there 

may be occasions where a FDM 

is required to assist the pilot. 

This option should always be 

available if required by the 

situation, however, better to have 

one person on deck exposed to 

the danger than five. Deck 

markings may also need to be 

revised to accommodate the 

changes in procedure. 

The concept of having no flight 

deck team on deck during takeoff 

and landing as described above 

may work quite well with a 

frigate/Seahawk combination, but 

in different circumstances, may 

not be so applicable, eg. multiple 

spot landing platforms. 

Nevertheless, the basic principles 

could still apply where every 

attempt is made to minimise 

personnel exposure during the 

actual takeoff/landing sequence. 

There are many issues to be 

considered in order to implement 

this concept and it is beyond the 

scope of this article to address 

them all in depth. Suffice it to 

say, hazard reduction is 

something we should be 

contemplating throughout all our 

operations - not being afraid to 

challenge longstanding 

procedures if there is a safer 

and/or more efficient way of 

doing business. I propose that 

deck landing operations fall well 

and truly into this category. That 

is, we may well be conducting our 

deck operations along the lines 

of, “that’s the way it’s always 

been done.” 

LCDR Butler, raises a very strong 

argument, for a review of how we 

conduct our Flight Deck 

Operations. This is an excellent 

example of an experienced 

aviator questioning the 

appropriateness of our deck 

operations from a safety 

perspective - perhaps we can 

increase the safety of our deck 

operations. What do you think? 

Comment should be made to the 

Fleet Aviation Safety Officer or 

the Assistant Fleet Aviation 

Safety Officer 

COMAUSNAVAIRGRP. 

Editorial By 

LCDR R Sellers, RAN 

FASO 



Fly Safe


BY FLTLT G CHETTLE 

723 SQUADRON 

How really responsible are 

you as the Aircraft Captain? 

Ultimately, the Aircraft Captain signs for and is responsible for 

the aircraft and the well-being of his/her crew. 

With the 

apparent time 

constraints 

now removed, 

none of us 

saw the need 

to replot the 

SIGMET as it 

hadn’t 

changed and 

we believed 

it had been 

done correctly 

the first time. 

The sortie was to be a Medium 

Level Navigation Exercise (NAVEX) 

from NAS Nowra to RAAF 

AMBERLEY in order to preposition 

the aircraft up to Cairns for 

embarkation a couple of days 

later. It was planned for two of 

us to share the captain hours on 

the way up to AMBERLEY before 

arriving in Cairns to do our 

embarked phase of PARC. 

The week before the navex, we 

had all the routes planned and 

sorted with the refuellers and 

appropriate agencies where 

contacted. We had planned the 

navex in good time, as we were 

about to go on a couple of days 

of leave during 723 Squadron 

stand down period. 

On the morning of the intended 

departure, I asked the Co-Pilot 

(CP) to complete the weight and 

balance and get the Meteorology 

and Notice to Airman(Notams) for 

the route while I began writing up 

the pre-flight brief on the board. 

When I returned to the classroom 

to check the weather, I was 

informed there was a Significant 

Meteorology warning (SIGMET) 

current for occasional severe 

turbulence. At that time the 

AS350B Squirrel was forbidden 

from flying in forecast severe 

turbulence conditions in 

accordance with the flight 

manual. According to the plotted 

area, we could remain clear of 

the affected region providing we 

stayed coastal until Wollongong. 

We had a perceived time 

constraint of launching early 

enough to arrive before last light 

at AMBERLEY. Another limitation 

on the Squirrel makes it unable 

to fly in Instrument Meteorology 

Conditions (IMC) and due to the 

weather forecast for AMBERLEY, 

we could not be assured of 

remaining clear of cloud if we 

arrived at night. The Co-Pilot (CP) 

elected to ask a non-crew 

member (a pilot of similar 

experience) to plot the SIGMET, 

whilst he checked the weather 

and NOTAMS of the airfields and 

areas enroute. Unbeknown to 

both the CP and myself as 

Aircraft Captain, the SIGMET was 

plotted incorrectly by the 

non-crew member. The CP did 

not check the plot, believing it 

had been done correctly by the 

non-crew member as did neither 

the Authorising Officer (AO) or 

myself (as Aircraft Captain) 

believing also that the area had 

been correctly plotted. 

RIGHT AS350BA SQUIRREL 


Fly Safe


15 

We continued with our planning, 

and briefed the sortie with our AO 

(who had been on leave during 

the original planning of the 

navex). At this time he expressed 

some concerns about whether we 

would be able to arrive at 

AMBERLEY before last light. 

During the brief, I told the AO that 

there was severe turbulence 

forecast but we would remain 

clear of the forecasted and 

plotted area. While packing our 

bags into the aircraft, we were 

called back to the Squadron to 

the CO’s office. On relaying our 

plan to the CO, the AO proposed 

a new plan to fly to AMBERLEY 

over two days to lessen our time 

constraints. With the apparent 

time constraints now removed, 

none of us saw the need to replot 

the SIGMET as it hadn’t changed 

and we believed it had been 

done correctly the first time. 

We subsequently rebriefed the 

flight, however, immediately prior 

to leaving the Squadron for the 

second time, we were informed 

that the ship had become 

unserviceable and was therefore 

no longer able to put to sea. 

The deployment was therefore 

immediately cancelled. 

In order to gain some benefit 

from all of the preparation that 

had been invested into the 

original plan, the CO decided to 

allow us to take the aircraft on a 

navex to RAAF WILLIAMTOWN and 

back as a ‘consolation’. 

After another check of the 

weather, we found there was no 

change in the SIGMET and 

subsequently launched for 

WILLIAMTOWN. When we were 

approximately 30 miles South of 

WILLIAMTOWN, the ATIS was 

reporting severe turbulence. 

We decided to divert to RAAF 

RICHMOND, which had moderate 

turbulence on the ATIS and was 

about 35 miles away. On final 

approach into RICHMOND, the 

tower informed us that we were to 

contact the Squadron on landing. 

On contacting the Squadron, our 

AO asked us to replot the 

SIGMET. We did this and found 

that it had covered our flightpath 

for the duration of the sortie 

flown North of Wollongong. 

Lessons learned 

Although the Squirrel has since 

had the restrictions of flying in 

forecast severe turbulence lifted, 

this incident remains important 

due to the contributing factors 

leading up to it. Firstly, the timing 

of the deployment was such that 

the crew came back from leave 

on the morning they were 

supposed to be departing. 

A better solution would have 

been for the crew to come back 

to work the day before the 

departure, allowing the crew to 

prepare for any last minute 

changes and give the AO a 

chance to look at the plan the 

day before. This would have 

reduced some of the perceived 

time constraints on the morning 

of departure. It would also have 

allowed the AO to concentrate on 

the domestics rather than 

deciding if the plan was feasible 

and trying to highlight any 

possible ‘gotchas’. 

Secondly, the format of the 

SIGMET was somewhat 

non-standard. The boundaries of 

the SIGMET were depicted by a 

combination of airfields, 

latitude/longitudes and the Flight 

Information Region (FIR) 

boundary. The format most 

recognised was of boundaries 

using airfields and Instrument 

Flight Rules (IFR) reporting points 

only. SIGMETS are usually 

plotted using the PCA (Planning 

Chart Australia), which has the 

airfields of Australia plotted, 

however the latitude/longitudes 

are not drawn across the map 

and are only marked around the 

edges of the map. In the haste 

to plot the SIGMET, the non-crew 

member had plotted some of the 

latitude/longitudes incorrectly 

and overlooked the FIR boundary. 

Another factor is the plan, which 

was in its third iteration by the 

time we launched. Certainly 

there may have been some level 

of ‘press-on-itis’ experienced by 

my co-pilot and I. After all the 

planning for the embarkation had 

fallen through, we felt we were 

due some second prize and 

decided to go flying in a 

somewhat frustrated state. 

An amount of complacency is 

evident in hindsight, as the 

eventual sortie was a much 

easier navigation exercise in 

comparison to the original plan. 

There is also the issue of 

balancing the trust placed on 

fellow course mates (or crew) 

and maintaining a decent 

Crew Resource Management 

environment. Obviously the 

lesson learnt here should not be 

‘don’t trust anyone’, quite the 

contrary. Doubtless there will be 

numerous occasions where this 

would be quite impractical. 

The lesson should be something 

along the lines of finding a way 

to ensure that the important 

items (in this case prohibited 

flight into forecast severe 

turbulence) are confirmed by the 

Aircraft Captain. Ultimately, the 

Aircraft Captain signs for and is 

responsible for the aircraft and 

the well-being of his/her crew. 

BELOW AS350BA SQUIRREL 


Fly Safe


BY LEUT L GODWIN, RAN 

805 SQUADRON 

There is no such thing as 

a “Straight Forward Flight” 

Don’t ever be afraid to call time out on something you are not 

happy with. 

The brief 

consisted of 

something 

along the 

lines of “no 

significant 

weather, 

there is a 

SIGMET 

current.... 

The practice of authorising at a 

Training Squadron can have 

significant differences to that of 

an operational Squadron. 

In addition to the normal range of 

issues that confront an 

Authorising Officer (AO), crews’ 

may not be fully qualified and are 

generally very inexperienced, 

coupled with a very restrictive 

platform and in this case, a long 

transit to Cairns generates some 

interesting problems. 

The deployment to Cairns had 

been planned some time 

beforehand and was essentially 

under the supervision of the 

Flight Commander. As the Flight 

Commander was to be on leave 

during the period, a handover of 

duties was carried out to myself. 

Normally it would be practice to 

brief the major points of the 

detachment the day before and 

only follow up with Met and 

Notams on the day of departure. 

Due to the fact that both 

students were on leave the day 

prior, the entire plan was to brief 

and authorise the flight on the 

morning of departure. 

The obvious issue that first raised 

alarm bells was the time of flight 

and the fact that there would be 

a strong possibility of a night 

recovery to Australia - AMBERLEY 

(YAMB) on the first night. 

Coupled with the anticipated 

weather and the fact that the 

recovery would have to be made 

Night Visual Meteorology 

Conditions (VMC), (an aircraft 

restriction placing a 1000 feet 

vertical clearance from cloud) 

there was a strong desire to get 

going and prevent a night arrival. 

The planning data was based on 

nil wind and there was already 

an indication of significant 

headwind. The crew’s intention 

for refuelling was discussed and 

in an effort to reduce time on the 

ground, a discussion as to the 

refuelling points ensued. Ooops, 

some more changes. How about 

looking at the track and see 

where we can save time. 

Essentially the crew was told to 

depart and call from the second 

fuel stop with updated weather, 

timings and intentions for the 

rest of the day. 

The crew walked, but not before 

advising me that I would receive 

another call tomorrow from their 

relief student pilot who was 

taking the aircraft from YAMB to 

Australia - CAIRNS (YBCS) with a 

staff aircrewman the following 

day. They were pre-positioned at 

YAMB for the next day. Without 

thinking of any further dramas I 

immediately began to think of a 

reason as to why there was a 

need to get the aircraft to Cairns 

in two days. I discussed the plan 

with the Squadron CO and told 

the crew not to launch and to 

return to the Squadron as we 

would replan the trip over three 

days to minimise any risk. 

Over the next hour or so, 

significant changes to the entire 

plan were made which included 

civil air, accommodation and fuel 

changes. The plan was rewritten 

and rebriefed to all and sundry. 

The crew duly gathered their bags 

ready to depart for a shortened 

day of flying. As the crew were 

about to leave the Squadron 

building we were informed that 

the detachment was delayed 

Until Further Notice (UFN) due to 

significant mechanical dramas 

with the ship. 

Stop, have a brew, Relax. 

Shortly thereafter, the two student 

pilots requested a short Navex to 

Australia - WILLIAMTOWN (YWLM) 

and return, as they had 

completed a significant amount 

of planning and they felt that 

they wanted to “get airborne”. 

As we now had an aircraft that 

had more fuel than a standard 

load in it and the fact that it 

would save a de-fuel, the trip was 

approved. The brief was exactly 

that and mainly took into 

account the fact that there was 

no change from the morning 

meteorology. The morning 

meteorology brief had been 

relatively brief and consisted of 

something along the lines of “no 

significant weather, there is a 

SIGMET current, but so long as 

we stay east of a line, Wagga - 

Mudgee we are OK”. Due to time 

compression in the morning, the 

job of collating meteorology and 

NOTAMS was given to a fellow 

student not involved in the trip. 

Not necessarily a problem in 

doing that, however, a small yet 

extremely significant mistake was 

not picked up by the crew and 

the holes in the cheese were 

beginning to line up. 

The two students who were 

intending to fly the trip are good 

operators with a good degree of 

common sense. 


Fly Safe


17 

The fact that the trip was an 

apparently straightforward flight, 

I elected not to “micromanage” 

the sortie anticipating that they 

were more than capable of 

obtaining the current meteorology 

and NOTAM information. In doing 

this, I felt that I was showing faith 

in their abilities and duly 

authorised them to depart on 

their trip as briefed. 

A short while later the wind 

appeared to gain in strength in 

order to appraise myself of the 

possibility of the changing 

weather conditions, I obtained a 

full meteorology brief. It was 

then that I discovered that the 

entire area of their operations 

was covered by a SIGMET for 

severe turbulence. I immediately 

initiated procedures to get the 

aircraft to remain at their next 

planned stop until the weather 

had abated. 

Overall, the lessons learnt by me 

where; 

Don’t ever be afraid to call time 

out on something you are not 

happy with. 

Don’t ever treat any flight as an 

apparent “straightforward flight.” 

Appreciate how to judge what 

depth of briefing you need from 

the particular experience level of 

crew/student giving the brief. 

The Co-Pilots decision to ask a 

non-crew member to plot the 

Significant Meteorology warning 

(SIGMET) area is not the problem 

in this case. 

After all the individual given the 

task was a qualified pilot capable 

of performing the relatively 

simple plotting exercise required. 

Given the time constraints 

imposed upon the crew to launch 

on time so as to arrive at the 

destination before last light this 

decision would be considered by 

most to be entirely appropriate 

and a good example of resource 

management. It is well 

understood that task allocation 

must be equally shared as much 

as practically possible so that no 

one individual is placed under 

too much time pressure. By doing 

this the chances of human error 

intervening should be reduced in 

theory. In this case however, 

human error still managed to 

occur in the form of a 

miss-plotted SIGMET area. 

History tells us that miss-plots 

have always occurred (the Air 

New Zealand Mount Erebus 

disaster is one notable example) 

and will continue to occur. In a 

past life as a Flight Commander 

such was my concern about 

launching off the Flight Deck with 

something attached to the 

aircraft that shouldn’t be there I 

employed several of my team 

(TACCO, SENSO, FDM, and LSO), 

including myself to check critical 

items as a risk reducer. 

These item’s are well known 

gotcha’s such as chains, earthing 

leads, telebrief cables, pitot 

covers, engine covers, unsecured 

panels, tail probes in track slots 

etc, etc. So what’s my point, it’s 

simply that aviation should be at 

least worth a double check as a 

minimum. Triple checking is even 

better, particularly on critical 

items. Quadruple checking 

…………..@you#$must%^?bepara 

*(noid). 

In this case it is not the 

Authorising Officer’s responsibility 

to double check the SIGMET 

plotting, however, it certainly 

would have been a good idea for 

the captain to check the area, 

given that at the time the Squirrel 

was prohibited from flying in 

areas of severe turbulence. In his 

defence it would appear that this 

double check may not have been 

possible due to the usual lack of 

time we have all experienced on 

most, if not all navigation 

exercises (navex) embarked 

upon. 

So what’s the answer to this age 

old problem of having to get the 

Meteorology as late as possible 

so that the most up-to-date data 

is used for planning. One method 

familiar to most, is to get the MET 

and NOTAMS, two hours before 

brief time and plan without the 

clock conspiring against you. 

Then immediately prior to brief 

get an update and double check 

against the original data. In my 

experience the chances of there 

being any changes worth 

worrying about are almost next to 

nothing. 

So in a nutshell: 

1. Complete as much of the 

planning as you can possibly do 

the day prior to the trip. 

2. Get the MET and NOTAMS two 

hours before brief time so that 

you can plot, plan, have a brew 

and crunch the numbers at your 

leisure. 

3. Update the MET and NOTAMS 

just prior to briefing and note the 

changes if any. 

4. Double checking important 

items is always a good idea. 

Triple checking critical items 

must be better. 

AVIATION IS WORTH A DOUBLE 

CHECK. 

Editorial By 

LCDR L Curac, RAN 

CPE 


BELOW AS350BA SQUIRREL 


Fly Safe


BY CAPT T BARRETT, RAN 

COS AVN 


A Message from COSAVN 


Another busy year has passed, 

again with Naval Aviation at the 

forefront of ADF activity. We have 

seen some tremendous effort 

from embarked flights operating 

in the North Arabian Gulf, and 

over Iraq. Operations continue in 

the Solomon Islands with 

accolades for the work of 

maintainers and aircrews there. 

OP RELEX doesn’t stop. 

At NAS Nowra, training continues 

unabated as we work to meet the 

Naval Aviation Force’s future 

personnel requirements. Trials 

and acceptance testing to 

support Seasprite and Seahawk 

have been conducted. And the 

base has supported a significant 

number of ADF operations - 

including recent Hawk and 

Hornet detachments. 

We must guard against this - 

and the best way is to look to 

our strengths. 

Acceptance of our “No - Blame” 

safety culture is more wide 

spread - recent incident reports 

are critically frank, providing 

useful insight to lessons learned. 

Crew Resource Management 

(CRM) is allowing better cockpit 

decision making during the 

demands of flying in real world 

events. 

These strengths are contributing 

to the safe management of naval 

Aviation- but they rely on 

individuals - they rely on you, to 

participate in the safety game, to 

take action to prevent incidents 

yourself, and to report when 

these actions have not prevented 

an incident. Safety is about 

protecting yourself. The “safety 

system” provides you with the 

tools, but we must all practice 

what is taught. Be involved and 

see the difference it makes. 

With such a frenetic pace, you 

would expect to see a dramatic 

rise in incident and occurrences 

within the Naval Aviation force 

and support elements. This has 

not occurred and on balance we 

are doing well in light of the 

increased efforts. But there are 

signs that this effort, now 

sustained for over two years is 

causing some complacency. We 

must guard against this - and the 

best way is to look to our 

strengths. The use of Operational 

Risk Management is more 

evident in decision making and is 

becoming second nature to most. 


Fly Safe


19 

Commanding Officer’s 

Commendations 

ABATA J Vella 

ABATA T Colson 

817 Squadron 

ABATA Jimmy Vella and ABATA 

Tam Colson were awarded 

Commanding Officer’s 

commendations from CO 817 

Squadron on 21 August 2003 for 

exemplary performance in 

conducting maintenance on the 

Sea King helicopter. Both 

members received the award after 

they individually identified 

cracking on two different 

airframes. These cracks were 

discovered in the primary 

structure of the airframe and if 

they remained unnoticed, the 

airworthiness of these two aircraft 

may have been compromised. 

The locations of both the cracked 

areas is a difficult area to 

inspect. Cracking of the Main 

Rotor Gear Box (MRGB) mounting 

feet is a known defect area on 

the Sea King fleet both in 

Australia and overseas and 

cracking in these areas occur 

approximately every 5,000 hours 

of operation on any particular 

airframe. 

AB Colson discovered the crack 

in the port forward section of the 

MRGB Mounting Frame in one of 

the flight line aircraft. Further 

inspection of the surrounding 

area using eddy current crack 

detection hardware revealed three 

further significant cracks in the 

cross member and the starboard 

aft MRGB mounting frame. 

Major frame repair work is now 

required to bring the aircraft back 

to a serviceable state. 

AB Vella discovered cracking in 

the port side of the MRGB 

mounting frame in another of the 

flight line aircraft. The aircraft was 

returned to a serviceable state 

after approximately a month of 

major frame repair work. 

This aircraft was returned to a 

serviceable state quicker than the 

other affected aircraft due to the 

lesser extent of the cracking in 

the MRGB mount fitting. 

The diligence and keen 

maintenance displayed by the 

aircraft maintenance technicians 

on 817 Squadron is epitomised 

by the efforts of AB Vella and 

AB Colson in keeping the 

Sea King at the forefront of 

operations. 

BELOW L TO R ABATA J VELLA, CO 817 SQUADRON 

CMDR K MACCAULEY-BLACK, ABATA T COLSON 

Bravo Zulu 

SMNATV Eastwood 

805 Squadron 

During the morning unlock of 805 

Squadron on 11 September 

2003, SMNATV Eastwood 

detected a strong odour of 

aviation fuel after unlocking and 

opening the internal hangar 

access door. 

Upon further investigation of the 

maintenance hangar, SMN 

Eastwood discovered fuel 

dripping from the starboard 

forward fuel cell vent pipe and 

pooling underneath the aircraft 

parked in hangar bay three. 

This pool of fuel was estimated 

to be approximately 15 litres. 

SMN Eastwood immediately 

opened the hangar door directly 

behind the affected aircraft to 

commence ventilating the space. 

The first supervisor at work was 

notified of the incident and 

additional ventilation was 

commenced with the opening of 

additional hangar doors either 

side of hangar bay three, along 

with the GSE and stores R&D 

roller doors for cross ventilation. 

SMN Eastwood then manned a 

portable fire extinguisher until the 

NAS Fire Service arrived to 

commence cleanup of the fuel 

spill. 

SMN Eastwood’s presence of 

mind when confronted with this 

incident and timeliness in 

notifying his supervisors, allowed 

for an expeditious response to a 

potentially hazardous situation 

within 805 Squadron facility. 


Fly Safe


817 Squadron 

817 Squadron began 2003 at the 

same rapid tempo as the past 

few years. Preparations were well 

under way for Flight 1 to embark 

in HMAS KANIMBLA and depart 

for OP SLIPPER. With Flight 1 

farewelled in early February the 

Squadron welcomed home what 

was to be the last detachment to 

Christmas Island for OP RELEX. 

BELOW 817 SQUADRON PERSONNEL 

The Squadron took a quick breath 

and started preparing for the 

remainder of the year with OP 

SLIPPER fast evolving into OP 

FALCONER and Flight 1 became 

the first 817 Squadron Sea King 

to operate in a declared combat 

zone. 

Flight 1 provided an essential 

service in the Gulf - flying the flag 

for Naval Aviation and 817 

Squadron with professionalism 

and gusto which was proved by 

19 support missions into Iraq, 

the transport of in excess of 

300,000 lbs of cargo and 400 

passengers during the operation. 

Training continued back at Nowra, 

including a few short 

detachments in HMAS SUCCESS 

in support of Ex KAKADU and Ex 

CROCODILE. Unfortunately, the 

rate of effort was hampered with 

an engine failure for Flight 1 and 

airframe cracks found on a 

number of aircraft. 

817 Squadron maintenance 

personnel continued to work 

extremely hard. Even with many 

setbacks, they were able to 

provide sufficient aircraft to 

support the high operational 

tempo and sustain the majority of 

the training. 

In August, with the imminent 

return of Flight 1 from OP 

FALCONER the Squadron was 

thinking of relaxing - however that 

idea was quashed very quickly 

with the request for two aircraft to 

embark in HMAS MANOORA for 

OP ANODE in the Solomon 

Islands. Once again the aircrew 

and maintainers of 817 

Squadron rose to the challenge 

and provided the requested 

capability. 

OP ANODE continues with an 

impressive rate of effort from all 

involved. The crew has conducted 

a variety of tasking including 

transporting Harold Keke and a 

NZ Huey. 


Fly Safe


21 

816 Squadron 

Canberra Fires: January 2003. 

Two S-70B-2 aircraft tasked with 

DACC 2-fire support in 

conjunction with various civil 

agencies during the period 14-26 

January 2003. Significant sorties 

dedicated to fire bombing and 

spotting in and around the ACT. 

The Squadron was stood down 

following an ease in the crisis on 

Monday 27 January 2003. 

Pong Su Insertion: April 2003. 

Two aircraft tasked with 

supporting the interception of a 

North Korean freighter by the 

Australian Customs Service off 

the coast of Newcastle. Special 

Operations personnel were fast 

roped onto the vessel for secure 

and search purposes following 

allegations that drugs were being 

smuggled. Following the 

successful boarding, it was 

confirmed that significant 

quantities of illegal drugs were 

found. 

the training of all three varieties of 

aircrew. Initial operating base was 

Hervey Bay, where an intensive USW 

period was undertaken with 

significant training benefit had by 

all, particularly the TACCO OFT 

students. Following Hervey Bay, the 

ABOVE SQUADRON PERSONNEL AT CANBERRA BUSHFIRES 

detachment then utilised the 

facilities of RAAF AMBERLEY where 

the tempo switched to a utility/GFP 

flavour, before again detaching to 

Caloundra to exercise Freedom of 

Entry march through the city, the 

first since 1998. 

Exercise Crocodile: 26 August - 

19 September 2003. 

Three S-70B-2, and approx sixty 

Squadron aircrew and 

maintenance personnel detached 

in support of Exercise Crocodile, 

the aim of which was to progress 

BELOW S-70B-2 AIRCRAFT ON FLIGHT LINE 


Fly Safe


Project Sea 1405 Update 

Project Sea 1405 is an upgrade 

to the existing S-70B-2 Seahawk 

helicopter operated by the RAN. 

It involves installation and 

integration of Electronic Support 

Measures (ESM), Forward Looking 

Infra Red (FLIR), and Counter 

Measures Dispensing System 

(CMDS) by Tenix Defence Pty Ltd 

and aims at enhancing the threat 

detection, surveillance, and 

countermeasures capabilities of 

the Seahawk. 

The new Electronic Support 

Measures (ESM) provide a first 

line of defence in electronic 

warfare and threat detection. It is 

used to obtain early warning of an 

enemy’s presence and to track its 

electromagnetic (RF) emissions 

beyond radar range. ESM provides 

valuable battle space awareness 

by allowing the crew to 

differentiate between friendly and 

enemy aircraft from data gained 

from intercept search receivers. 

The data is then processed by 

radar signal analysers to 

determine the enemy’s position 

and threat capabilities. 

Detection devices integrated into 

the ESM system include the 

Missile Approach Warning System 

(MAWS) and Radar Warning 

System (RWS). 

The FLIR is a passive system 

designed to detect IR radiation 

from potential targets. It displays 

a video image based on radiation 

emitted by heated bodies, for 

example friction between the 

wheels and tracks of tanks and 

heat from engine exhaust of an 

attack helicopter. The major 

advantages of FLIR is its ability to 

increase detection range and 

enhance vision during poor 

visibility. 

These two detection devices 

provide the threat assessment to 

the Countermeasures Defence 

System. The CMDS operates in 

automatic, semi-automatic and 

manual modes to dispense flares 

and chaff to counter RF and 

infra-red guided missiles as 

appropriate. 

This will provide the RAN S-70B-2 

Seahawk with its first fully 

integrated countermeasures 

system, a substantial progression 

from manually dispensed chaff 

previously used. 

All systems are currently installed 

in the prototype aircraft, which 

has recently completed its first 

flight trials with the new PS1405 

systems operating. The aim of 

these initial trials was to 

determine the new system’s 

electro magnetic compatibility 

with the existing aircraft systems. 

Subsequent flight testing has 

involved Developmental Flight 

Tests (DFTs) of the FLIR and 

Missile Approach Warning 

System, which has produced 

promising results to date. 

The prototype is expected to be 

accepted by the RAN in April 

2004, with the remaining fleet of 

15 Seahawks to be modified by 

December 2005. This represents 

a significant capability 

enhancement to the 

RAN S-70B-2 Seahawk fleet. 

BELOW FLIR SYSTEM FITTED TO AIRCRAFT 


Fly Safe


23 

Safety Awareness Day Expo 

An Aviation Maintenance Safety 

Awareness Day Expo was held in 

honour of the late LEUT Craig 

King, RAN on 08 August 2003. 

One of his final wishes was to 

raise the safety awareness of 

Navy aircraft maintainers to the 

hazards encountered in their day 

to day work environment and 

improve their awareness for 

personnel protection. 

The Fleet Aviation Engineering 

Unit (FAEU) sponsored the day 

and encouraged all personnel at 

HMAS ALBATROSS to attend. 

Eleven distributors and 

manufactures displayed a variety 

of equipment for aviation 

personnel to examine that may 

have some applicability in the 

workplace. Additionally, the 

opportunity was provided for PPE 

distributors to promote ‘safety at 

home’ by displaying and offering 

for sale domestic use PPE 

products. 

As this was the first occasion for 

this event, Fleet Aviation 

Engineering Unit (FAEU) is already 

planning next years Expo for 06 

August 2004. They plan on 

increasing the number of 

distributors and manufacturers, 

have the products displayed with 

stock numbers, if an item is 

codified, and invite other ADF units 

to attend. FAEU is dedicated to 

building on the Navy’s already 

sound safety culture. 

Any suggestions or comments to 

improve next years Expo can be 

directed to FAEU for 

consideration, POC LT Karl 

Dreikorn, USN 

Karl.Dreikorn@defence.gov.au 

or phone (02) 4424 1762. 

CMDR Keith Engelsman, RANR - 

Aviation Milestone 

Commander Keith Engelsman, 

RANR has recently achieved an 

aviation milestone, celebrating 

40 years of flying. 

His first flight was on 

05 July 1963, when he flew a 

20 minute familiarisation in a 

de Havilland Chipmunk. 

To celebrate his 40 year 

milestone the Aviation FEG 

surprised CMDR Engelsman with 

a flight in a Hiller 12C, the 

aircraft type in which he did his 

rotary wing training in 1963. 

The Hiller, one of only three in 

operation in Australia, was flown 

from Bankstown to HMAS 

ALBATROSS especially for the 

occasion. 

CMDR Engelsman has had a long 

and illustrious career. In over 40 

years of flying he has amassed a 

total of 7,677.2 flying hours - a 

most respectable average of 

almost 200 hours per year. 

Even more impressive is that he 

has piloted over 189 different 

aircraft types. 

A graduate of the Empire Test 

Pilot School (ETPS) in the UK, 

CMDR Engelsman is a respected 

Test Pilot. His work was recently 

recognised by the Royal 

Aeronautical Society, who have 

awarded CMDR Engelsman the 

prestigious RP Alston medal, for 

his vast experience and courage 

as a test pilot. Previous medal 

recipients include former Soviet 

fighter pilot Grigory Sedov and 

Bob Cole of the UK’s Civil 

Aviation Authority. 

CMDR Engelsman now clocks up 

flying hours in his own aircraft, a 

home built RANS S-7 light 

aircraft, call sign VH-RAN. 

BELOW COMMANDER K ENGELSMAN IN THE PILOTS SEAT OF THE HILLIER 


Fly Safe


HMAS ALBATROSS 

the Year in review 

BELOW WELCOME HOME PARADE GUARD, 

NOWRA NSW 

HMAS ALBATROSS has seen a 

number of significant events during 

the past six months - the first of 

which was the demolition of the old 

Air Traffic Control Tower. 

LCDR Bruce Fallon, RAN had the 

honour of taking the first swing at 

the tower when demolition work 

commenced in late May 2003. 

LCDR Fallon is the last of the 

Navy’s operational Air Traffic 

Controllers (ATC), and had worked 

in this tower for over ten years 

before moving to the new facility in 

February 2000. The tower was the 

second Air Traffic facility at the 

airfield, the first being the site of 

the commissioning of ALBATROSS 

before it was decommissioned in 

the late 1950’s. 

LCDR Fallon said that he was sad 

to see the “old girl” go, and still 

had fond memories of controlling 

from the console that faced the 

wrong way but “you had the best 

view of Beecroft Peninsula”. One 

benefit of being able to see the 

waves crash in Jervis Bay was that 

it gave the “surfies” of the section, 

time to ponder on which beach 

they were going to hit after work. 

On 16 August 2003, a large and 

enthusiastic crowd lined the 

streets of Nowra’s Central 

Business District to witness a 

parade of around 200 local 

Defence personnel. Shoalhaven 

City Council hosted the ‘Welcome 

Home Parade’ for Defence 

personnel in the Shoalhaven area 

who had engaged in or supported 

recent overseas operations, 

namely Operations BASTILLE, 

FALCONER, RELEX and RELEX II. 

The parade was reviewed by 

Commodore Geoff Ledger, RAN, 

Commander Australian Navy 

Aviation Group. HMAS CRESWELL 

provided a guard of Midshipmen 

to lead the parade and the three 

local Australian Cadet Units also 

participated. 

Guest of Honour, The Hon Danna 

Vale MP, Minister Assisting the 

Minister for Defence made a 

speech, thanking the local 

Defence personnel for the vital 

role they undertake in our Navy, 

in the Australian Defence Force 

and in support of Australia’s 

national security. Other official 

guests included Mrs Joanna Gash 

MP, Federal Member for Gilmore, 

Mrs Shelley Hancock, State 

Member for South Coast and 

Councillor Greg Watson, 

Shoalhaven City Mayor. 

Damage included the roof to 

805 Squadron hangarettes, being 

peeled away in many places, with 

much of the roofing material 

coming to rest, wrapped around 

the Squadron’s new utility, leaving 

it badly scratched and dented. 

The service station, which 

provides vehicle workshop 

services for personnel on the 

base was severely damaged, with 

part of the building collapsing. 

Other damage included roofing 

torn away from the Junior Sailors 

Auditorium, guttering from a 

number of buildings ripped away 

and many building’s roller doors 

were twisted and buckled. 

Two large gum trees breached the 

perimeter security fence, crushing 

it as they broke through. 

Although there was no damage 

sustained to Navy helicopters, 

two privately owned Aero Club 

aircraft broke their moorings and 

suffered significant damage. 

In addition two Dakotas from the 

RAN Historic Flight suffered minor 

wing damage. 

In late August a severe windstorm 

wreaked havoc over the New 

South Wales South Coast, with 

the Shoalhaven region being hit 

hard. Winds of 76 knots (140 

km/hour) were recorded at the 

Naval Weather and Oceanography 

Centre on the afternoon of 

Sunday 23 August 2003, and 

ALBATROSS sustained 

considerable damage. 

ABOVE WIND DAMAGE AFTER AUGUST 

2003 STORM 


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