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Trade Policy Note Final-rev08 - Development

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Box 14: Export Policies and WTO and other Tra de Agreements<br />

The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Article 27.2(a)) exempts LDCs<br />

from the prohibition on export subsidies. The same exemption is also provided to a list of<br />

countries (in Annex VII) as long as their per capita GDP remains below $1000. <strong>Note</strong> that<br />

some acceding countries have forsaken this right in their terms of accession to the WTO. The<br />

Agreement on Agriculture permits countries to subsidize exports up to the level of their<br />

negotiated commitments. Very few developing countries have negotiated such commitments,<br />

and thus cannot subsidize.<br />

The TRIMs Agreement prohibits trade balancing requirements, i.e. that investing firms must<br />

export to the extent they import. However, it does permit export performance and transfer of<br />

technology requirements. The GATS Agreement permits performance requirements for<br />

developing countries in order to help strengthen services in developing countries and it has no<br />

effective disciplines on export subsidies.<br />

However, many countries have given up the right to these and other performance<br />

requirements in their terms of accession or in bilateral agreements (BITs and FTAs).<br />

Access to Export Markets<br />

Export-led development strategies obviously require the most free and secure access<br />

to world markets possible. For several decades developing countries have enjoyed<br />

preferential access to developed countries’ markets under the Generalized System of<br />

Preferences negotiated in UNCTAD. These had the advantage of being nonreciprocal,<br />

but the serious disadvantages of not being bound and thus insecure, and of<br />

containing many exceptions, precisely in sectors, (e.g. textiles and clothing and<br />

agriculture) where developing countries possess a comparative advantage. Some<br />

poorer developing countries, notably those in the ACP group, benefited from<br />

contractual preferences in the EU. Most developed countries (excluding the USA)<br />

have complied with their commitment to extend duty free treatment to LDCs. Other<br />

developing countries are granted autonomous preferences to assist them in dealing<br />

with specific problems, such as dependence on exports of illicit drugs.<br />

Many developing countries are seeking to negotiate FTAs with major developed<br />

countries as a means of ensuring conditions of access equal to those of their<br />

competitors. Negotiations have already begun to convert ACP preferences into<br />

reciprocal FTAs (“Economic Partnership Agreements”).<br />

However, barriers and distortions to world trade, particularly subsidized agricultural<br />

production and exports in the industrialized countries, ha ve heavily penalized many<br />

developing countries. Contingent measures such as anti-dumping duties have served<br />

to “nip in the bud” export expansion in developing countries, while stricter sanitary<br />

and technical regulations have also had a disproportionate impact on poor people,<br />

excluding them from export income. Stringent rules of origin have resulted in many<br />

exports not benefiting from available tariff preferences. Poorer people are much more<br />

adversely affected by insecure access to markets, as sudden disruptions to their<br />

exports can provoke immediate unemployment in export industries and bankrupt<br />

small independent producers.<br />

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