Expanding the Public Sphere through Computer ... - ResearchGate
Expanding the Public Sphere through Computer ... - ResearchGate Expanding the Public Sphere through Computer ... - ResearchGate
CHAPTER 3. TECHNOLOGY & THE PUBLIC SPHERE 44 Similar support for democratic communication is found through the first six decades of the 20th century. With respect to telephony, the United States government valued universal service to all citizens more than it valued competitive service. AT&Ts emergence as a national monopoly was predicated at least in part in the belief in the democratic potential of the telephone network (U. S. Congress, House of Representatives 1939). In broadcasting, the presence of local voices in the spectrum was valued more highly than the number of voices; trade-offs were made in spectrum allocation that resulted in each home being able to receive fewer local channels rather than a greater number of national channels (Noll, Peck & McGowan 1973, McChesney 1993). Additionally, in policy decisions concerning cable television, the commitment to democratic communication was exhibited in requirements for local access and locally-originated programming (Pool 1983). This is especially noteworthy in the debate on proper levels of “media access”, in which some argue that economic and political structure are responsible for the democratic character of the public sphere (Barron 1967, Caristi 1988). More recently the utopian ideal of democratic communication has been present in the debates considering the “national information infrastructure” (United States, Office of the President 1993) and computer networks (Fisher, Margolis & Resnick 1994, Surman 1994b, Surman 1994a). Twenty-five years of discussion concerning the structure of computer networks, starting with Sackman & Nie (1970), has been infused with the ideal that, if properly constructed, a democratic public sphere will emerge; this is the common thread linking Kapor’s (Kapor 1994) “Jeffersonian” information policy and Dyson, et al’s (Dyson, Gilder, Keyworth & Toffler 1994) Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age. Much of the policy debate adopts the model of “soft-technological determinism” advocated by Pool (1983), who suggests we pay attention to both the generic qualities of technologies, which influence the way they are used, as well as the institutional environment into which technologies are introduced. Echoing these sentiments, Neuman (1991, 18) writes: The evolution and uses of some new technologies (and the failures of others) are not exclusively due to the nature of the technology or the nature of the economic or cultural system into which it is introduced, but rather reflect the interactions of these factors The “new media” literature based on this model focuses on the features which differentiate the emerging participatory forms of communication from the traditional
CHAPTER 3. TECHNOLOGY & THE PUBLIC SPHERE 45 mass media (see Ganley (1992), Neuman (1991), Rice (1984) and Abramson, Arterton & Orren (1988)), and implies that the structural characteristics of media are related to the democratic character of communication within them. Abramson, Arterton & Orren (1988) list six properties in their chapter, “What’s New About the New Media?” while Neuman (1991) identifies nine “Generic Properties of the New Media.” Some of the characteristics suggest a maintenance of the existing structure of relationships among participants in communicative exchanges, albeit at a decreasing cost, increasing volume, increasing content diversity and increasing speed. Vast shifts in the volume of information, the rapidity with which it moves, or the financial resources which it requires are not the engine of change driving the most significant new uses of media technology. If the revolution in media use was to be described with one word, that word would have to be “control.” Beniger (1986) has it right when he locates the change mechanism during the past 150 years in the “control revolution.” Without major shifts in control over media and information, all of the developments discussed above would have resulted in mere extensions of the old media. Neuman (1991) and Abramson, Arterton & Orren (1988) examine separately developments in “user” control and “producer” control. The most important development in the revolution of control in media is what Smith (1980, 21) has labeled as a shift in sovereignty: “In computer-controlled information systems the sovereignty over the text moves from the supplier of information to the controller of the technology.” With this sovereignty comes unprecedented control over receiving, collecting, storing, formatting, processing and distributing information (Schneider 1990). It is in describing the use of media technology that the separate powers of consumer and producer control become obvious. When the technology being discussed is a distribution medium, the producer has access to vastly increased control mechanisms. The ability to target a specific audience is a form of producer control greatly expanded in the new media environment (Abramson, Arterton & Orren 1988, Neuman 1991). By transmitting a message to a preselected audience on the basis of facts or perceptions of specific individuals – in essence, creating an audience or a public for a specific message – the producer presumably is exercising a greater degree of control over the information than by transmitting the same message to an undifferentiated, heterogeneous mass audience. The audience begins to look less and less like the traditional audience for mass com-
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CHAPTER 3. TECHNOLOGY & THE PUBLIC SPHERE 44<br />
Similar support for democratic communication is found <strong>through</strong> <strong>the</strong> first six decades<br />
of <strong>the</strong> 20th century. With respect to telephony, <strong>the</strong> United States government<br />
valued universal service to all citizens more than it valued competitive service.<br />
AT&Ts emergence as a national monopoly was predicated at least in part in<br />
<strong>the</strong> belief in <strong>the</strong> democratic potential of <strong>the</strong> telephone network (U. S. Congress,<br />
House of Representatives 1939). In broadcasting, <strong>the</strong> presence of local voices<br />
in <strong>the</strong> spectrum was valued more highly than <strong>the</strong> number of voices; trade-offs<br />
were made in spectrum allocation that resulted in each home being able to receive<br />
fewer local channels ra<strong>the</strong>r than a greater number of national channels (Noll, Peck<br />
& McGowan 1973, McChesney 1993). Additionally, in policy decisions concerning<br />
cable television, <strong>the</strong> commitment to democratic communication was exhibited<br />
in requirements for local access and locally-originated programming (Pool 1983).<br />
This is especially noteworthy in <strong>the</strong> debate on proper levels of “media access”,<br />
in which some argue that economic and political structure are responsible for <strong>the</strong><br />
democratic character of <strong>the</strong> public sphere (Barron 1967, Caristi 1988).<br />
More recently <strong>the</strong> utopian ideal of democratic communication has been present in<br />
<strong>the</strong> debates considering <strong>the</strong> “national information infrastructure” (United States,<br />
Office of <strong>the</strong> President 1993) and computer networks (Fisher, Margolis & Resnick<br />
1994, Surman 1994b, Surman 1994a). Twenty-five years of discussion concerning<br />
<strong>the</strong> structure of computer networks, starting with Sackman & Nie (1970), has been<br />
infused with <strong>the</strong> ideal that, if properly constructed, a democratic public sphere will<br />
emerge; this is <strong>the</strong> common thread linking Kapor’s (Kapor 1994) “Jeffersonian”<br />
information policy and Dyson, et al’s (Dyson, Gilder, Keyworth & Toffler 1994)<br />
Magna Carta for <strong>the</strong> Knowledge Age.<br />
Much of <strong>the</strong> policy debate adopts <strong>the</strong> model of “soft-technological determinism”<br />
advocated by Pool (1983), who suggests we pay attention to both <strong>the</strong> generic<br />
qualities of technologies, which influence <strong>the</strong> way <strong>the</strong>y are used, as well as <strong>the</strong><br />
institutional environment into which technologies are introduced. Echoing <strong>the</strong>se<br />
sentiments, Neuman (1991, 18) writes:<br />
The evolution and uses of some new technologies (and <strong>the</strong> failures of o<strong>the</strong>rs)<br />
are not exclusively due to <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> technology or <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong><br />
economic or cultural system into which it is introduced, but ra<strong>the</strong>r reflect <strong>the</strong><br />
interactions of <strong>the</strong>se factors<br />
The “new media” literature based on this model focuses on <strong>the</strong> features which differentiate<br />
<strong>the</strong> emerging participatory forms of communication from <strong>the</strong> traditional