Disaster Management Plan - Barmer
Disaster Management Plan - Barmer
Disaster Management Plan - Barmer
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<strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>Plan</strong><br />
OIL & GAS CAIRN’S RAJASTHAN UPSTREAM<br />
FACILITY<br />
9 th September 2010<br />
Prepared for<br />
Cairn India Limited<br />
Prepared by:<br />
Environmental and Geospatial Solutions<br />
3/14, 1st Cross Street, 1st Main Road, Kalaimagal Nagar, Ekkatuthangal, Chennai – 32<br />
044- 4271 9815, 6515 2789, mails@egssindia.com<br />
www.egssindia.com
CONTENTS<br />
Executive Summary 1<br />
Part 1: General 4<br />
1 Introduction 5<br />
1.1 <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> 7<br />
1.2 Description of CIL Site 11<br />
1.3 District Profile – Social, Economic & Demographic 15<br />
1.3.1 General Profile 15<br />
1.3.2 Demography 17<br />
1.3.3 Socio- Economic Profile 17<br />
1.4 <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Philosophy 18<br />
1.5 Theme 19<br />
1.6 Objectives 19<br />
1.7 Scope of Work 20<br />
1.8 Methodology 20<br />
2 Vulnerability Assessment and Risk Analysis 23<br />
2.1 Man-Made Hazards Assessment 24<br />
2.1.1 Fires 24<br />
2.1.2 Accidents 25<br />
2.1.3 Other Hazards 25<br />
2.2 Vulnerability Analysis of Cairn Operations 25<br />
2.2.1 Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment at MPT 26<br />
2.2.2 Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment at RGT 41<br />
2.3 Hazard Mapping 47<br />
2.3.1 Mapping of hazard zones for MPT and RGT 48<br />
2.3.2 Mapping of Hazard Zones for well fields 49<br />
2.3.3 Mapping of Hazard Zones for Pipelines 50<br />
2.4 Natural Hazards Assessment 50<br />
2.4.1 Floods 51<br />
2.4.2 Earthquake 51<br />
2.4.3 Drought 52<br />
2.4.4 Sandstorm 52<br />
2.4.4 Epidemics 52<br />
3 Preventive Measures 54<br />
[i]
3.1 Overview of Recent <strong>Disaster</strong>s 54<br />
3.1.1 Jaipur Fire Incident 54<br />
3.1.2 Mexican Oil Spill 55<br />
3.2 Human/ Industry Induced <strong>Disaster</strong>s 56<br />
3.2.1 Potential causes of fire: 56<br />
3.2.2 Preventive Measures Adopted by Cairn 56<br />
3.2.3 Prevention of other Man-made Risks 58<br />
3.3 Natural <strong>Disaster</strong>s 60<br />
3.3.1 Preventive and Mitigation Measures for Floods 60<br />
3.3.2 Earthquake Preparedness and Mitigation 62<br />
3.3.3 Other Preparedness Measures 65<br />
3.4 Training Needs Analysis 66<br />
4 Mainstreaming DM Concerns into Developmental <strong>Plan</strong>s/Programmes 67<br />
4.1 <strong>Disaster</strong> Development Continuum 67<br />
4.1.1 <strong>Disaster</strong>s affect development 67<br />
4.1.2 Development affects disasters 68<br />
4.2 Negative Realm 69<br />
4.3 Positive Realm 70<br />
4.4 National Development Schemes Addressing DRR 70<br />
4.5 Role of CIL 71<br />
4.5.1 CIL Development Initiatives 71<br />
4.5.2 Civil Society Partnership 72<br />
5 Preparedness Measures 73<br />
5.1 Resources Availability 73<br />
5.2 Community Involvement in <strong>Disaster</strong> preparedness 73<br />
5.2.1 Need for Community Participation 74<br />
5.2.2 Salient Features of CBDM 74<br />
5.2.3 Components for CBDM 75<br />
5.2.4 Culture of Prevention 75<br />
5.3 Critical Elements of Community Based <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> 76<br />
5.4 Conditions for CBDM 77<br />
5.5 Risk Knowledge 78<br />
5.6 <strong>Disaster</strong> Risk Reduction Strategies 79<br />
5.6.1 Financial and Livelihood Strategies 79<br />
5.6.2 Microfinance 79<br />
[ii]
5.6.3 Insurance 79<br />
5.6.4 Social Funds 80<br />
5.7 Support by External Actors 80<br />
5.7.1 Nehru Yuva Kendra: 81<br />
5.7.2 NSS, NCC, Rangers/Rovers and Scouts/ Guides: 81<br />
5.7.3 Civil Defence: 81<br />
5.7.4 Home Guards: 82<br />
5.7.5 <strong>Barmer</strong> Municipal Administration 82<br />
5.7.6 District Zilla Parishad 83<br />
5.7.7 Jesai Army Command, Rajasthan 83<br />
5.8 Operational Emergency Preparedness 83<br />
5.8.1 <strong>Management</strong> and Control of Emergencies 84<br />
5.8.2 Preparation and <strong>Plan</strong>ning 86<br />
5.8.3 Sufficient Competent Personnel 86<br />
5.8.4 Detection of Incidents 87<br />
5.8.5 Emergency Communications 87<br />
5.8.6 Medical Facilities and Support 88<br />
5.8.7 Security Incidents 88<br />
5.8.8 External Support 88<br />
6 Response 89<br />
6.1 Incident Classification 89<br />
6.2 Incident Response Structure 90<br />
6.2.1 Incident Response Teams (IRT) 91<br />
6.2.2 Emergency Response Team (ERT) 92<br />
6.2.3 Emergency <strong>Management</strong> Team (EMT) 92<br />
6.2.4 Crisis <strong>Management</strong> Team (CMT) – Strategic Response 93<br />
6.2.5 Oil Spill Support agencies 93<br />
6.2.6 Health, Safety and Security 94<br />
6.2.7 Oil Spill Response <strong>Management</strong> 95<br />
6.2.8 Logistics 99<br />
6.2.9 Communications 99<br />
6.2.10 Oil Spill Scenarios 100<br />
6.2.11 Causes and Sources of Spill 100<br />
6.3 Escape & Evacuation Assessment (EEA) 101<br />
6.3.1 Escape and Evacuation Procedures 102<br />
[iii]
6.3.2 Impairment of escape and evacuation means 102<br />
6.3.3 Safe Muster Areas 103<br />
6.3.4 Communication System 104<br />
6.3.5 Estimated Escape Time to Safe Area 105<br />
6.3.6 Mapping of Evacuation Routes for Settlements 108<br />
6.3.7 Early Warning and Evacuation (EWS) for Community 108<br />
6.3.8 Medical Evacuation 110<br />
6.4 Reporting and Notification Reporting 110<br />
6.4.1 Incident Reporting 110<br />
6.4.2 Notification 111<br />
6.5 Media Communication 111<br />
6.6 Emergency Response Procedures (ERP) 111<br />
6.7 Sphere Standards 111<br />
7 Partnership with Other Stakeholders 113<br />
7.1 Stake holder Analysis 113<br />
7.2 District Authorities in <strong>Barmer</strong> 114<br />
7.3 Community Based <strong>Disaster</strong> Organizations 114<br />
7.3.1 Select NGOS 114<br />
7.4 Role of Media 115<br />
7.4.1 Before a <strong>Disaster</strong> 115<br />
7.4.2 During a disaster 115<br />
7.4.3 After a disaster 116<br />
7.4.4 NGOs Role in Media 116<br />
8 Financial Arrangements 117<br />
8.1 Funds 117<br />
8.2 Annual Budgets 118<br />
8.3 Fund Allocation for Hazard Preparedness 118<br />
Part 2: <strong>Disaster</strong> Specific Action <strong>Plan</strong> 119<br />
9 Preface For SOPs 120<br />
A. On-Site Fire Related Emergencies 120<br />
B. Fire Scenarios & Emergency Response 120<br />
C. Oil Spill Related Emergencies 121<br />
9.1 SOP: Crude oil pipeline leak 122<br />
9.2 SOP: Oil Well blowout 127<br />
9.3 SOP: Gas Well Blowout 132<br />
[iv]
9.4 SOP: Earthquake 137<br />
9.5 SOP: Floods 142<br />
9.6 SOP: Biological Hazards 146<br />
Part 3: Cross-Cutting Issues 149<br />
10 Review and Updation of <strong>Plan</strong>s 150<br />
11 Coordination and Implementation 151<br />
11.1 Need for Mock Drill 151<br />
11.1.1 For Effective Mock Drill 151<br />
11.1.2 Types of Drills and Exercises 152<br />
11.1.3 Composition of Participants 153<br />
11.1.4 Observers/Evaluators 154<br />
11.1.5 Community Participation 154<br />
11.2 Preparatory Procedure 154<br />
11.2.1 Tips for Conducting Safe Mock Drill 155<br />
11.3 Guidelines for Mock Drill Design 155<br />
11.3.1 Scope 156<br />
11.3.2 Statement of Purpose 156<br />
11.3.3 Objectives 156<br />
11.3.4 Scenario narrative 157<br />
11.3.5 Drill Activity 157<br />
11.3.6 Expected actions/roles and responsibilities 157<br />
11.3.7 Expected response/evaluation criteria 157<br />
11.4 Guidelines for Conducting Mock Drill 158<br />
11.4.1 Pre-drill Briefing 158<br />
11.4.2 Drill Initiation 158<br />
11.4.3 Drill Activity 158<br />
11.5 Guidelines for Drill Evaluation 159<br />
11.5.1 Evaluation Team 159<br />
11.5.2 Elements for Evaluation 159<br />
11.6 Feedback & Improvements 160<br />
11.6.1 Mock Drill Evaluation Report 161<br />
12 recommendations 162<br />
Appendix A – Emergency Contact Numbers 164<br />
1 Hotline Numbers 164<br />
2 Wireless Call Signs 164<br />
[v]
3 Contact numbers of District <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Cell 165<br />
4 Telephone numbers of the important officials in the district 166<br />
5 Police officials 168<br />
6 Municipality 169<br />
7 Health Department 170<br />
8 Healthcare centres in <strong>Barmer</strong> 171<br />
9 Hospitals 177<br />
10 Veterinary hospitals/pharmacies in the district 178<br />
11 Public Health Engineering Department 179<br />
12 Public Works Department 185<br />
13 Other officials 188<br />
14 Voluntary Organisations and NGOs in the Region 189<br />
15 List of Divers/Swimmers in the district 192<br />
16 List of officials trained in fire Fighting and control 198<br />
Appendix B – Maps 200<br />
Appendix C – Incident Action <strong>Plan</strong>s (IAPS) 211<br />
IAPs for Fire Response On-Site 211<br />
Action In the Event of a Fire 211<br />
1. Propane Pool fire from Propane Storage, Refrigeration Package (RGT Facility) 212<br />
2 Fire in the well head in well pad 213<br />
3. Crude Oil fire at Production separator (MPT) 213<br />
4. Fire at the flare area & knock out drum 214<br />
5. Fire in the Diesel Storage, Export Oil, Condensate, Off spec and Settling tanks 215<br />
6. Electrical sub stations 216<br />
7. Buildings (Central Control Building & Fire Station) 217<br />
8. Fire in Chemical Laboratory Building 218<br />
9. Oil & Gas Leakage in Pig Launcher Area (at MPT/ RGT) followed by fire 218<br />
10. Fire/ Gas Leak in Cross country pipe line. 219<br />
11. Fire in Mangala Train 1 facilities 220<br />
12. Fire in Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) 221<br />
13. Fire situations in <strong>Barmer</strong> Hill Project (EWT) 222<br />
16. Fire situation “Major Construction Activities within MPT / RGT/ MT-1 / Well pads” 222<br />
17. Fire in “OB Camps & Office Building” 223<br />
Appendix D – Fire Protection Arrangements 225<br />
1 Mangala Processing Terminal 225<br />
[vi]
2 Mangala Train - 1 (Start up production package) 228<br />
Appendix E – Emergency Resources 231<br />
Cairn Resources 231<br />
District/Government Resources 233<br />
Other Corporate Resources 235<br />
Appendix F – <strong>Barmer</strong> District Profile 237<br />
Glossary of Terms 251<br />
[vii]
List of Figures<br />
Figure 1: <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Cycle .................................................................................................................................................... 10<br />
Figure 2: CIL's Rajasthan Field – Mangala ........................................................................................................................................... 12<br />
Figure 3: MPT Processing Systems Overview ...................................................................................................................................... 13<br />
Figure 4: CIL Facilities Diagram ............................................................................................................................................................... 15<br />
Figure 5: Risk contours from Process Events at MPT ....................................................................................................................... 29<br />
Figure 6: Risk Contours due to Incoming Raageshwari pipelines at MPT ............................................................................... 30<br />
Figure 7: Individual and Combined F-N curves for Crude and Gas Release Events .............................................................. 31<br />
Figure 8: Process Gas and Liquid Leak Frequencies per Hole-Size Category .......................................................................... 36<br />
Figure 9: Process Gas Leak Frequency per Event and per Hole-Size Category ...................................................................... 37<br />
Figure 10: Process Liquid Leak Frequency per Event and Hole-Size Category ...................................................................... 38<br />
Figure 11: Iso-Risk Contours ...................................................................................................................................................................... 44<br />
Figure 12: F-N Curve Day-Night ............................................................................................................................................................... 45<br />
Figure 13: Iso-Risk Contour of Typical Well Pad ............................................................................................................................... 45<br />
Figure 14: Group Risk F-N Curve, Typical Well Pad .......................................................................................................................... 46<br />
Figure 15: Worst Case Radii ....................................................................................................................................................................... 47<br />
Figure 16: Relationship between <strong>Disaster</strong>s and Development ..................................................................................................... 69<br />
Figure 17: Organisation Links for Emergency <strong>Management</strong> in CIL ........................................................................................... 85<br />
Figure 18: Tier Classification in CIL ........................................................................................................................................................ 90<br />
Figure 19: Tiers and Response Teams .................................................................................................................................................... 91<br />
Figure 20: Oil Spill Response Decision Tree ......................................................................................................................................... 96<br />
Figure 21: Risk Contours at MPT shown along with Muster points ........................................................................................ 103<br />
List of Tables<br />
Table 1: Largest Risk Contributors to the Societal Risk from Process Events in MPT ......................................................... 32<br />
Table 2: Individual Risks at Specific Buildings/Locations at MPT .............................................................................................. 33<br />
Table 3: Jet Fire Hazard Results IN MPT ............................................................................................................................................... 35<br />
Table 4: Failure Frequencies for Gas Events in MPT ........................................................................................................................ 37<br />
Table 5: Failure Frequency Applied for Liquid Events on MPT .................................................................................................... 38<br />
Table 6: Base Leak Frequency from EGIG ............................................................................................................................................. 40<br />
Table 7: Used Pipeline Failure Frequency for DN100 and DN300 .............................................................................................. 40<br />
Table 8: Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) at Different Reference Points in RGT .................................................... 44<br />
Table 9: Consequence Analysis Results for LFL and Jet Fire Heat Radiation at RGT ........................................................... 46<br />
Table 10: List of Villages within the Hazard Zones at MPT ........................................................................................................... 48<br />
Table 11: Villages within Maximum Hazard Zones for Well Fields ............................................................................................ 49<br />
Table 12: Risk Prone Villages along Pipelines ..................................................................................................................................... 50<br />
Table 13: Summary of Terrestrial Containment and Control Techniques ............................................................................... 97<br />
Table 14: Probabilities of Potential Sources of Oil Spills ............................................................................................................. 100<br />
Table 15: Total Time for Escape and Evacuation in MPT ........................................................................................................... 107<br />
List of Photographs<br />
Photograph 1: Mangala Processing Terminal .................................................................................................................................... 12<br />
Photograph 2: MPT Oil Storage Tanks ................................................................................................................................................... 12<br />
Photograph 3: Raageshwari Terminal .................................................................................................................................................. 14<br />
Photograph 4: MPT Cross-Country Pipeline Valve Pit ..................................................................................................................... 14<br />
Photograph 5: Sandstorm Near Cairn Facility during Daytime .................................................................................................. 52<br />
Photograph 7: Consultation with Village Head and Members ..................................................................................................... 74<br />
Photograph 6: Community Consultation at Jogasar Kuan ............................................................................................................. 74<br />
Photograph 8: During the DMP Presentation Meeting at <strong>Barmer</strong> Collectorate .................................................................... 82<br />
Photograph 9: DMP Presentation being made by EGSS at <strong>Barmer</strong> Collectorate .................................................................. 82<br />
[viii]
ABBREVIATIONS<br />
AGI Above Ground Installation<br />
BA Breathing Apparatus<br />
BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour<br />
Explosion<br />
BOPD Barrels of Oil Per Day<br />
BS&W Basic Sediment & Water<br />
CBDM Community Based <strong>Disaster</strong><br />
<strong>Management</strong><br />
CBEWS Community Based Early Warning<br />
Systems<br />
CBO Community Based Organisations<br />
CIL Cairn India Limited<br />
CMHO Chief Medical Health Officer<br />
CMP Crisis <strong>Management</strong> <strong>Plan</strong><br />
CMT Crisis <strong>Management</strong> Team<br />
CO 2 Carbon di-oxide<br />
CRA Commissioner for Revenue<br />
Administration<br />
CG Core Group<br />
CSO Civil Society Organisation<br />
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility<br />
CWC Central Water Commission<br />
DCP Dry Chemical Powder<br />
DM <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong><br />
DMC District <strong>Management</strong> Committee<br />
DMP <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>Plan</strong><br />
DRM <strong>Disaster</strong> Risk <strong>Management</strong><br />
DRR <strong>Disaster</strong> Risk Reduction<br />
EEA Emergency Evacuation Assessment<br />
EGF Early Gas Facility<br />
EGIG European Gas pipeline Incident data<br />
Group<br />
EMP Emergency <strong>Management</strong> <strong>Plan</strong><br />
EMT Emergency <strong>Management</strong> Team<br />
EOR Enhanced Oil Recovery<br />
EPPR Emergency Prevention, Preparedness<br />
and Response<br />
ERC Emergency Response Centre<br />
ERP Emergency Response Procedures<br />
ERT Emergency Response Team<br />
ESD Emergency Shut Down<br />
EWS Early warning system<br />
FCP Forward Control Point<br />
FRT Forward Response Team<br />
FERA Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment<br />
GIS Geographical Information Systems<br />
GPS Global Positioning System<br />
HSE Health Safety and Environment<br />
IAP Incident Action <strong>Plan</strong><br />
IMT Incident <strong>Management</strong> Team<br />
ICG Intergovernmental Coordination Group<br />
ICC Incident Control Centre<br />
ICS Incident Command System<br />
IDRN India <strong>Disaster</strong> Resource Network<br />
IDSP Integrated Disease Surveillance Program<br />
[ix]
IM Installation Manager<br />
IMD Indian Meteorological Department<br />
IMG Incident <strong>Management</strong> Guide<br />
INGOs International Non-Governmental<br />
Organisations<br />
IOC Indian Oil Corporation<br />
IRP Incident Response <strong>Plan</strong><br />
IRT Incident Response Team<br />
LHV Lower heating value<br />
MSIHC Manufacture, Storage & Import of<br />
Hazardous Chemicals<br />
MMSCFD Million Standard Cubic Feet per<br />
Day<br />
NCC National Cadet Corps<br />
NDMA National <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong><br />
Authority<br />
NFPA National Fire Protection Association<br />
NGO Non-governmental organisations<br />
NIDM National Institute for <strong>Disaster</strong><br />
<strong>Management</strong><br />
NSS National Social Service<br />
NYK Nehru Yuva Kendra<br />
PLI Public Liability Insurance (1991)<br />
PPE Personal Protective Equipment<br />
PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal<br />
PRI Panchayat Raj Institutions<br />
QRA Qualitative Risk assessment<br />
RGT Raageshwari Gas Terminal<br />
RNAO Rajasthan Northern Area Operations<br />
RTA Road Traffic Accident<br />
SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus<br />
SDMA State <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Authority<br />
SHG Self Help Groups<br />
SOP Standard Operating Procedure<br />
UNDP United Nations Development<br />
Programme<br />
UNISDR United Nations International Strategy<br />
for <strong>Disaster</strong> Reduction<br />
VHF Very High Frequency Wireless system<br />
VLMC Village Level Monitoring Committee<br />
VOC Volatile Organic Chemical<br />
WATSAN Water and sanitation<br />
OISD Oil Industry Safety Directorate<br />
OSCP Oil Spill Contingency <strong>Plan</strong><br />
PAGA Public Address and General Alarm<br />
[x]
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS<br />
• Secretary, State <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> and Relief, Government of Rajasthan<br />
• Deputy Secretary, State <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> and Relief, Government of Rajasthan<br />
• Deputy Secretary, Department of Petroleum<br />
• District Collector, <strong>Barmer</strong> district<br />
• Office of the District Collector, <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> and Mitigation, Govt. of<br />
Rajasthan, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
• Office of Superintendent of Police, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
• Cairn Staff at Gurgaon and Jaipur<br />
• Cairn Staff at MPT, RGT and <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
• Nehru Yuva Kendra, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
• Office of Home Guards, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
• Office of Civil Defence, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
• Office of District Medical and Health Department, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
• Office of District Education Department, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
• Help Age India, <strong>Barmer</strong> (NGO partners of Cairn)<br />
• SURE, <strong>Barmer</strong> (NGO partners of Cairn)<br />
• Dhara Sansthan, <strong>Barmer</strong> (NGO partners of Cairn)<br />
• Office of Army Unit, Jesai<br />
• NSS Unit of MBC Govt College, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
• Office of SSA, Education Department, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
• Community leaders/members of Jogasar Kuan Village<br />
<strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>Plan</strong> Preparation Team<br />
Ramasami Sundaresan FIFireE - Health & Safety, Emergency Preparedness, Incident<br />
Investigation specialist, 36 years oil & petrochemical industry experience<br />
Dr. K. M. Parivelan Ph.D – is DM Specialist who has worked with UN agencies like UNHCR,<br />
UNDP covering Humanitarian Affairs and <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong><br />
A. Sivakumar MSc - IIT Mumbai – Hydrogeology and Environmental Professional with 18<br />
years international experience in oil & gas industry<br />
Indira Reddy MSc - Environmental <strong>Management</strong> Australia – Project Coordination and GIS<br />
expert<br />
[xi]
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY<br />
Cairn India Limited is a BSE listed company with interests in oil and gas exploration,<br />
production and pipeline transportation. It has operating blocks in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat<br />
and Rajasthan. Cairn India has just completed development of major oil and gas fields in<br />
the <strong>Barmer</strong> district of Rajasthan and commissioned world class processing facilities and a<br />
650 km crude oil pipeline to supply the oil to refineries in Gujarat. Keeping in view the<br />
vulnerability of the communities living surrounding Cairn India’s facilities and along the<br />
pipelines, the Government of Rajasthan directed Cairn India to submit a <strong>Disaster</strong><br />
<strong>Management</strong> <strong>Plan</strong> that would address all major hazards and the appropriate response.<br />
Cairn India Limited (CIL) commissioned Environmental and Geo Spatial Solutions (EGSS),<br />
Chennai to prepare a robust <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>Plan</strong> document covering its upstream<br />
assets based in <strong>Barmer</strong> district i.e. Mangala Processing Terminal, Raageshwari Gas<br />
Processing Terminal, connected well pads and cross-country pipeline between MPT and<br />
RGT.<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> district is one of the developing districts in Rajasthan. With harsh desert<br />
environment and erratic climatic conditions, coupled with poverty, illiteracy and lack of<br />
adequate infrastructure, it suffers very often from severe drought conditions and<br />
occasionally from devastating floods with a devastating impact on human life, economy and<br />
environment. Now with the rapid development of oil and gas fields by companies such as<br />
Cairn India and setting up of cement and power plants in the district, there is a significant<br />
socio-economic changes in the lives of the people of <strong>Barmer</strong> for good and at the same time<br />
introduced a new risk of potential major industrial accidents or disasters. It is possible to<br />
minimize the potential risks by:<br />
1. Identifying potential hazards and its impact in on-site and off-site areas<br />
2. Prepare and implement developmental plans to provide resilience to such disasters<br />
3. Developing early warning strategies<br />
4. Mobilize resources including communication and medicinal services, and<br />
5. To help in rehabilitation and post-disaster reconstruction.<br />
Thus the DMP document reviews all credible disaster scenarios and presents a systematic<br />
plan with suitable strategies for disaster preparedness and response. It also provides an<br />
operational framework and procedures for effective roll out and execution with effective<br />
engagement of the communities and the local district administration. Further the plan took<br />
into consideration the Jaipur Oil Depot fire (October 2009) incident, and related findings<br />
and recommendations of OISD. In addition the plan focuses on disaster prevention<br />
measures and proactive safety management. The DMP document is prepared in two<br />
separate formats:<br />
[1]
1. A full DMP Main report as per the suggested outline of the Government of Rajasthan<br />
which includes elaborate information on <strong>Barmer</strong> District Profile, Cairn Oil Field<br />
Facilities (Mangala Processing Terminal, Raageshwari Processing Terminal,<br />
Bhagyam and Aishwarya fields, Resources availability in the District to cope with<br />
disaster etc).<br />
2. A concise Manual with Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for credible disaster<br />
scenarios.<br />
The <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>Plan</strong> (DMP) for Cairn's Rajasthan Upstream operations is<br />
developed with the objectives of protecting the communities in the region, their habitat<br />
and livelihood from calamities, both natural and human induced. The <strong>Plan</strong> is structured<br />
along the format recommended by the Government of Rajasthan and conforms to the<br />
relevant regulations such as the National <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Act, 2005.The DMP takes<br />
into cognizance the <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Authority structure at national, state, district,<br />
block and Panchayat levels.<br />
It is apt to mention here that the DMP is developed in line with national disaster<br />
management vision of "shifting the approach from reactive post-disaster response to one of<br />
proactive, pre-disaster preparedness and mitigation measures". The <strong>Plan</strong> spells out the roles<br />
and responsibilities applicable to all phases of the disaster management cycle:<br />
I. Pre-disaster-preparedness,<br />
II. Mitigation and prevention,<br />
III. <strong>Disaster</strong>-response action, and<br />
IV. Post-disaster- relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction.<br />
The DMP is structured as follows:<br />
Chapter I covers a brief introduction on <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong>, description of Cairn Project<br />
in Rajasthan Upstream facility, note on social, economic, demographic and geographical<br />
profiles of <strong>Barmer</strong> district;<br />
Chapter II addresses vulnerability assessment and risk analysis, covering human/ industry<br />
induced and natural hazards. It also includes detailed vulnerability analysis for operational<br />
areas in upstream facility with its off-site impact on nearby communities and environment;<br />
Chapter III deals with preventive and mitigation measures and strategies for various type<br />
of hazards covering; earthquake, floods, on-site operational hazards like crude oil/ gas<br />
pipeline leakage, oil well/ pad fire, tank fire, etc.;<br />
Chapter IV covers approaches to mainstream disaster management concerns into all facets<br />
of development;<br />
[2]
Chapter V deals with Preparedness measures involving various stakeholders including<br />
community participation. Here detailed community based disaster management approach<br />
is analysed for enhancement. It also includes an overview of the recent oil industry related<br />
disasters, the causes, consequences and lessons for prevention of such incidents;<br />
Chapter VI covers the Response strategies within CIL emergency management and its<br />
coordination with district administration. It includes emergency command structure, early<br />
warnings and evacuation mechanisms. It also considered the universally accepted ‘Sphere<br />
Standards’ for post disaster response context community needs;<br />
Chapter VII deals with scope for partnership with other stakeholders including academic<br />
institutions, and media.<br />
Chapter VIII deals with financial arrangements<br />
Chapters IX-XIV cover disaster specific action plan with Standard Operating Procedures for<br />
potential scenario, special hazards, precautions to be adhered.<br />
Chapter XV covers a brief note on the importance of reviews and updation of DMP on a<br />
regular basis.<br />
Chapter XVI deals with coordination and implementation aspects covering a detailed note<br />
on conducting mock drill and Business continuity plan.<br />
This DMP further takes into consideration aspects for community participation in all<br />
phases of disaster management. It includes disaster preparedness and mitigation vis-à-vis<br />
required improvements on ground with practical implementations like mock drills,<br />
operational procedures, preventive mechanisms, community awareness, early warning<br />
systems and coordination between private and governmental agencies in the event of a<br />
disaster. Thus the DMP document reviews and presents all credible disaster scenarios and<br />
has formulated a systematic plan in evolving a suitable strategy for disaster preparedness,<br />
mitigation and response.<br />
[3]
PART 1: GENERAL<br />
[4]
CHAPTER<br />
1<br />
1 INTRODUCTION<br />
This comprehensive disaster management plan for Rajasthan Upstream facility was drafted<br />
in accordance with the guidelines of the Government of Rajasthan. The disaster<br />
management plan covers natural and man-made disasters, emergency preparedness plans<br />
for on-site and off-site purposes and disaster relief and mitigation. Its prime objective is to<br />
mitigate the possible risks emanating from Cairn India Limited’s (CIL’s) oil field related<br />
operations onsite and offsite in <strong>Barmer</strong> District of Rajasthan.<br />
The Indian economy is rapidly industrialising and expanding. Energy is a major demand for<br />
an expanding economy and major oil explorations and oil production are happening now.<br />
Rajasthan is emerging as a key player in this sector and new oil fields are still being<br />
discovered. This rapid expansion has however increased the hazard, risk and vulnerability<br />
to the industry and the environment.<br />
The potential to have hydrocarbon related/ Industrial disasters are low in frequency but<br />
are very significant in terms of loss of lives, injuries, environmental impact and property<br />
damage. Frequency and severity of hydrocarbon related disasters has increased in last few<br />
years due to rapid increase in explorations, storage, processing, transportation of<br />
petrochemical products, specifically in densely populated areas. Hydrocarbon related<br />
accidents can occur due to lack of safety measure, technical breakdown, or due to a human<br />
error.<br />
A single incident can initiate a series of uncontrolled phenomenon such as large spills, fires<br />
and explosions. These eventually target humans, environment and infrastructure/property<br />
in the area and can be in the form of immediate and residual or long term consequences.<br />
Thus, it is imperative to develop preventive measures like adoption of safer engineering<br />
practices, improved performance of safety devices and reduction of human errors by<br />
regular checks.<br />
The government has also issued guidelines and laws for disaster management and<br />
mitigation. The Umbrella Act EPA, 1986 enacted after the incidence of Bhopal Gas Tragedy<br />
in 1984, and the rules MSIHC Rules 1989, EPPR Rules 1996, PLI Act 1991, besides Factories<br />
Act 1948 (amended thereafter) provided a systematic approach to disaster management<br />
[5]
framework at national, state, district and local levels, in the context of hydrocarbon related<br />
accident management and emergency response.<br />
DMPs thus become essential on two fronts: to have on-site and off-site preparedness; and<br />
secondly to comply with disaster management institutional mechanisms such as the<br />
National <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Act of 2005, National <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Authority’s<br />
guidelines. Needless to add other sector specific safety norms and guidelines have to be<br />
taken into account such as OISD norms, environmental guidelines, etc.<br />
National <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Authority (NDMA) and OISD have also respectively issued<br />
some guidelines for petroleum related disasters. The Guidelines have laid emphasis on<br />
capacity building, risk assessment, information management and coordination of<br />
actions for enhancing the preparedness at various levels. Based on these Guidelines, this<br />
DMP was developed.<br />
With the renewed emphasis of the Government on disaster management and the paradigm<br />
shift in focus from rescue, relief & rehabilitation to prevention/mitigation and<br />
preparedness, a need to revisit the management of hydrocarbon related <strong>Disaster</strong>s has been<br />
felt to establish an institutionalized mechanism so that the hydrocarbon related disasters<br />
can be prevented and if they do occur, for their effective management.<br />
There has been a paradigm shift in the government’s focus from its rescue, relief, and<br />
restoration centric approach to a planning, prevention/mitigation and preparedness<br />
approach. The national vision on disaster management is ‘to build a safe and disasterresilient<br />
India by developing a holistic, proactive, multi-disaster and technology-driven<br />
strategy. This is to be achieved through a culture of prevention, mitigation and<br />
preparedness to generate a prompt and efficient response to tackle disasters. This Policy<br />
framework is also in conformity with the International Strategy for <strong>Disaster</strong> Reduction, the<br />
Rio Declaration, the Millennium Development Goals and the Hyogo Framework 2005-<br />
2015. 1<br />
It has been realised that effective Oil industry <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> (CDM) is possible by<br />
the adoption of preventive and mitigation strategies as most petro-chemical disasters are<br />
preventable in comparison to natural disasters that are difficult to predict and prevent.<br />
The prime objective here is to ensure that the occurrence of hydrocarbon related accidents<br />
are minimised and the risks posed to life, environment and property are reduced. The DMP<br />
calls for a proactive, participatory, well-structured, fail-safe, multi-disciplinary and multisectoral<br />
approach involving all stakeholder groups and is aimed at refining and<br />
strengthening the various mechanisms from stages of planning to field operations.<br />
1 National <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Authority’s Policy outline, 2005<br />
[6]
1.1 DISASTER MANAGEMENT<br />
<strong>Disaster</strong> can be defined as “a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a<br />
society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed<br />
the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources.” (Source:<br />
Reducing <strong>Disaster</strong> Risk, UNDP 2004). Some recent regional disasters include the Indian<br />
Ocean Tsunami in 2004 that affected parts of Asia and Africa and the South Asian<br />
Earthquake in 2005 which affected Pakistan and India. Some recent disasters in India were<br />
the flash floods in Rajasthan in 2006, Mumbai (Maharashtra) and Vadodara (Gujarat) in<br />
2005, the earthquake in Gujarat in 2001, the super cyclone in Orissa in 1999, the Uphaar<br />
Cinema Fire in Delhi in 1997, the recurrent droughts in parts of Rajasthan (1980s<br />
onwards), and the Bhopal Gas <strong>Disaster</strong> in 1984. <strong>Disaster</strong>s result from the combination of<br />
hazards, conditions of vulnerability and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce the<br />
potential negative consequences of risk. (Source: Living with Risk, UN ISDR 2002)<br />
Hazard is a potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may<br />
cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or<br />
environmental degradation. (Source: Living with Risk, UN ISDR 2002) For example:<br />
Earthquakes, flood and, industrial gas leakages are some examples of hazards. Hazards can<br />
be single, sequential or combined in their origin and effects. Hazardous events can vary in<br />
magnitude or intensity, frequency, duration, area of extent, speed of on set, spatial<br />
dispersion and temporal spacing. Based on their causes, hazards are categorized into two<br />
broad types – Natural hazards and Human/ industry – induced hazards.<br />
Vulnerability is the condition determined by physical, social, economic and environmental<br />
factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of<br />
hazards. (Source: Living with Risk, UN ISDR 2002) The scale of damage to a community from<br />
the impact of a given hazard does not only depend upon the community’s physical<br />
exposure to that hazard, but also on its vulnerability. Here, physical exposure refers to the<br />
elements at risk. These elements may include people, artefacts, infrastructure etc. (Source:<br />
Reducing <strong>Disaster</strong> Risk, UNDP 2004). Vulnerability, on the other hand, is determined by<br />
aspects in the physical environment, such as nature of housing, available open space etc, as<br />
well as aspects in the socio-economic domain such as level of income, nutritional status,<br />
marginalization, etc.<br />
Capacity is the combination of all the strengths and resources available within a<br />
community, society or organization that can reduce the level of risk, or the effects of a<br />
disaster. Capacity may include physical, institutional, social or economic means as well as<br />
skilled personal or collective attributes such as ‘leadership’ and ‘management.’ Capacity<br />
may also be described as capability. (Source: Living with Risk, UN ISDR 2002) Example: After<br />
the floods in Vadodara district (Gujarat) in 2005, it was seen that villages with existing<br />
[7]
<strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Teams (DMTs) and <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Committees (DMCs)<br />
responded to the floods well in time, by rescuing people to pre-identified safe areas.<br />
Two concepts within the framework of ‘capacity’ that are often used in <strong>Disaster</strong><br />
<strong>Management</strong> are:<br />
Coping capacity: The manner in which people and organizations use existing resources to<br />
achieve various benefits during unusual, abnormal and adverse conditions of a disaster<br />
phenomenon or process. (Source: Reducing <strong>Disaster</strong> Risk, UNDP 2004).<br />
An example of coping capacity is the community kitchen set up by local village groups in<br />
community areas like temples and schools of Orissa after the 1999 cyclone.<br />
Resilience: The capacity of a system, community or society to resist or to change in order<br />
that it may obtain an acceptable level in functioning and structure. This is determined by<br />
the degree to which the social system is capable of organizing itself, and the ability to<br />
increase its capacity for learning and adaptation, including the capacity to recover from a<br />
disaster. (Source: Reducing <strong>Disaster</strong> Risk, UNDP 2004) For example; after the 2001 Gujarat<br />
earthquake, local communities began clearing the debris, retrieving materials and<br />
reconstructing their houses/work place, even before external help came from the government<br />
or other organizations. This was an example of resilience of the community.<br />
Risk is the probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (deaths, injuries,<br />
property, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from<br />
interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions.<br />
Risk is conventionally expressed by the equation: Risk = Hazard x Vulnerability<br />
Now we use the notation: Risk = Hazards x Vulnerability minus (-) Capacity. (Source:<br />
Reducing <strong>Disaster</strong> Risk, UNDP 2004)<br />
‘<strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong>’ covers a broad range of interventions undertaken before, during<br />
and/or after a disaster to<br />
• prevent or minimize loss of life and property,<br />
• minimize human suffering and<br />
• Accelerate recovery.<br />
The management of a disaster can be viewed as a series of phases including Prevention,<br />
Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, Relief, and Recovery (Rehabilitation and<br />
Reconstruction).<br />
[8]
i) Prevention: Activities to provide outright avoidance of the adverse impact of hazards<br />
and means to minimize related environmental, technological and biological disasters.<br />
Depending on social and technical feasibility and cost/benefit considerations, investing in<br />
preventive measures is justified in areas frequently affected by disasters.<br />
For example, public awareness and education related to fire safety in public buildings could<br />
lead to prevention of fire-related disasters. <strong>Disaster</strong> risk reduction professionals express that<br />
changing attitudes and behaviour contribute to promoting a "culture of prevention".<br />
ii) Mitigation: Any action taken to minimize the extent of a disaster or potential disaster.<br />
Mitigation can take place before, during or after a disaster, but the term is most often used<br />
to refer to actions against potential disasters. Mitigation measures are both physical and<br />
structural, such as flood defences or strengthening buildings as well as non-structural, such<br />
as training in disaster management, regulating land-use and public education, among<br />
others.<br />
iii) Preparedness: Activities and measures taken before a hazard event to ensure effective<br />
response to the impact of hazards. It involves measures that enable governments,<br />
community and individuals to respond rapidly to disaster situations and cope with them<br />
effectively.<br />
Preparedness includes<br />
• making of viable emergency plans<br />
• development of warning systems<br />
• maintenance of inventories<br />
• training of personnel<br />
• search and rescue measures<br />
• Evacuation plans for areas that may be ‘at risk’ for a recurring disaster.<br />
iv) Response/ Relief: The provision of assistance or intervention during or immediately<br />
after a disaster to meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected. It can be of an<br />
immediate, short-term, or protracted duration. For example, search and rescue of affected<br />
people and provision of food, temporary shelter and medical care to the persons affected by<br />
the disaster are some common areas of intervention after a disaster.<br />
v) Rehabilitation: The operations and decisions taken after a disaster with a view to<br />
restore an affected community to its former living conditions, while encouraging and<br />
facilitating the necessary adjustments to the changes caused by the disaster.<br />
An example is counselling by professionals or community leaders to help reduce the<br />
psychological trauma of affected groups of children, women and others after a disaster.<br />
[9]
vi) Reconstruction: The action taken to re-establish a community following rehabilitation<br />
after a disaster. These actions would include construction of permanent housing, complete<br />
restoration of all services and physical infrastructure to the pre-disaster state etc.<br />
vii) Recovery: The term refers to decisions and actions related to rehabilitation and<br />
reconstruction taken after a disaster with a view to restoring or improving the pre-disaster<br />
living conditions of the affected community, while encouraging and facilitating necessary<br />
adjustments to reduce disaster risk. It is important to note that recovery (includes both<br />
rehabilitation and reconstruction) affords an opportunity to develop and apply<br />
disaster risk reduction measures.<br />
1.<br />
FIGURE 1: DISASTER MANAGEMENT CYCLE<br />
Generally India has been traditionally vulnerable to natural disasters on account of its<br />
unique geo-climatic conditions. Floods, droughts, cyclones, earthquakes and landslides<br />
have been recurrent phenomena. About 60% of the landmass is prone to earthquakes of<br />
various intensities; over 40 million hectares is prone to floods; about 8% of the total area is<br />
prone to cyclones and 68% of the area is susceptible to drought. In the decade 1990-2000,<br />
an average of about 4344 people lost their lives and about 30 million people were affected<br />
by disasters every year. The loss in terms of private, community and public assets has been<br />
astronomical.<br />
At the global level, there has been considerable concern over natural disasters. Even as<br />
substantial scientific and material progress is made, the loss of lives and property due to<br />
disasters has not decreased. In fact, the human toll and economic losses have mounted. It<br />
was in this background that the United Nations General Assembly, in 1989, declared the<br />
decade 1990-2000 as the International Decade for Natural <strong>Disaster</strong> Reduction with the<br />
[10]
objective to reduce loss of lives and property and restrict socio-economic damage through<br />
concerted international action, especially in developing countries.<br />
The super cyclone in Orissa in October, 1999 and the Bhuj earthquake in Gujarat in January,<br />
2001 underscored the need to adopt a multi dimensional endeavour involving diverse<br />
scientific, engineering, financial and social processes; the need to adopt multi disciplinary<br />
and multi sectoral approach and incorporation of risk reduction in the developmental plans<br />
and strategies.<br />
Over the past the past few years, the Government of India have brought about a paradigm<br />
shift in the approach to disaster management. The new approach proceeds from the<br />
conviction that development cannot be sustainable unless disaster mitigation is built into<br />
the development process. Another corner stone of the approach is that mitigation has to be<br />
multi-disciplinary spanning across all sectors of development. The new policy also<br />
emanates from the belief that investments in mitigation are much more cost effective than<br />
expenditure on relief and rehabilitation. <strong>Disaster</strong> management occupies an important place<br />
in this country’s policy framework as it is the poor and the under-privileged who are worst<br />
affected on account of calamities/disasters.<br />
The steps being taken by the Government emanate from the approach outlined above. The<br />
approach has been translated into a National <strong>Disaster</strong> Framework [a roadmap] covering<br />
institutional mechanisms, disaster prevention strategy, early warning system, disaster<br />
mitigation, preparedness and response and human resource development. The expected<br />
inputs, areas of intervention and agencies to be involved at the National, State and district<br />
levels have been identified and listed in the roadmap. This roadmap has been shared with<br />
all the State Governments and Union Territory Administrations. Ministries and<br />
Departments of Government of India, and the State Governments/UT Administrations have<br />
been advised to develop their respective roadmaps taking the national roadmap as a broad<br />
guideline. There is, therefore, now a common strategy underpinning the action being taken<br />
by all the participating organisations/stakeholders.<br />
1.2 DESCRIPTION OF CIL SITE<br />
Cairn India Ltd. (CIL) is developing the Rajasthan Block RJ-ON-90/1 in the state of<br />
Rajasthan, India. The RJ-ON-90/1 retained block area spreads over an area of about 3200-<br />
km2 and lies between 24°47'08'' to 26°26'01'' N latitude and 71°15'41'' to 72°04'3'' E<br />
longitudes. The RJ-ON-90/1 block is situated in <strong>Barmer</strong> and Jalore districts of southwestern<br />
Rajasthan i.e. within the Indian Thar desert area. It covers parts of <strong>Barmer</strong>, Shiv,<br />
Baytu and Gudamalani tehsils in <strong>Barmer</strong> district and Sanchore and Bagoda tehsils in Jalore<br />
district of Rajasthan.<br />
[11]
FIGURE 2: CIL'S RAJASTHAN FIELD – MANGALA<br />
Oil is mined from the well pads in the Mangala oil field. Bhagyam and Aishwariya oil fields<br />
are under development in the Northern Zone of the block and Saraswati and Raageshwari<br />
oil fields in the southern zone. All the above fields are located in <strong>Barmer</strong> district, Rajasthan.<br />
The northern fields in the block are envisaged to produce more than 160,000 barrels of oil<br />
per day (25, 437 tons of crude oil). The project comprises of the following key facilities:<br />
Mangala Process Terminal<br />
The production fluids from Mangala field is being processed at Mangala Process Terminal.<br />
The system also includes the 8 pig receivers at the MPT.<br />
Future production from up to 15 well pads at the Bhagyam field and up to 9 well pads at<br />
the Aishwariya fields will also be tied into the MPT via 3 dedicated pipelines.<br />
PHOTOGRAPH 2: MANGALA PROCESSING TERMINAL<br />
PHOTOGRAPH 1: MPT OIL STORAGE TANKS<br />
[12]
The production fluids are received in the inlet manifold and routed to the Inlet Slug<br />
Catchers. Design is premised on allowing dedicated well pad “clusters” and “tiebacks” to be<br />
routed to each train. The function of the slug catcher is to separate out any solids (e.g. sand,<br />
wax) from the production fluid and protect the downstream equipment from fouling, as<br />
well as dampening any slugging that will occur from the pipelines. The vessel will also act<br />
as the primary degasser. As a secondary purpose it is also designed to separate gas and free<br />
water (bulk water separation).<br />
The separated gas passes to the Associated Gas Compressors and the separated water is<br />
routed to the Produced Water Treatment System. The oil /water and emulsion stream is<br />
routed to the Production Heaters, where the temperature is increased to above the<br />
emulsion “break point”. The heater operating temperature is expected to be up to 90 deg C.<br />
The production stream then passes to the Production Separator, where further oil and<br />
water separation occurs and free gas, formed due to pressure let down and generation by<br />
heat addition is also separated. The gas is routed to the suction of the 3rd stage of the<br />
Vapour Recovery Unit. Separated water is routed to the Produced Water Treatment<br />
System. The oil and water stream passes to the Settling Tanks.<br />
The settling tanks provide the primary oil dehydration step; water from the tanks is<br />
removed in under level control and transferred to the Produced Water Treatment System.<br />
Oil from the Settling Tank is pumped to the Dehydrator for final dehydration to BS&W<br />
specification and onward transfer to oil storage. The degassed oil flows through<br />
electrostatic grid(s) for water droplet coalescence and separation.<br />
FIGURE 3: MPT PROCESSING SYSTEMS OVERVIEW<br />
[13]
From the export oil storange tanks, the crude oil is pumped in 24” export pipeline to Gujrat<br />
for sales to Govt. nominated customer.<br />
Raageshwari Field<br />
The Raageshwari Deep Gas field, situated within the RJ-ON-90/1 Contract Area, was<br />
discovered in 2003 by well RJ-E-1 (later renamed Raageshwari-1). Raageshwari Deep Gas<br />
is a tight, lean gas condensate reservoir, with excellent gas quality of approximately 80%<br />
methane, low CO2 and no H2S.<br />
There are 4 well pads located in the gas field. Wells have tested at gas production rates in<br />
the range 2-4mmscfd and producing condensate gas ratios in 40-50 bbl/mmscf range<br />
(based on flashing from well stream conditions to standard conditions). Condensate<br />
density on test has varied but approaches 60 API.<br />
Raageshwari Gas Terminal:<br />
The gas from well pads is feed into the finger type slug catcher to remove all the solids to<br />
prevent fouling of downstream equipments. The gas is then fed into 1st Stage Gas<br />
Separator to separate gas from water. Water produced is transferred to produce-water<br />
flash drums. Condensate from 1 st Stage Separator is feed into Feed/Bottom Exchanger<br />
resulting in a vapour free condensate stream which is routed to condensate storage tank<br />
and a vapour stream which is fed into Stripper Reboiler to eliminate the remaining liquid.<br />
PHOTOGRAPH 3: RAAGESHWARI TERMINAL<br />
PHOTOGRAPH 4: MPT CROSS-COUNTRY<br />
PIPELINE VALVE PIT<br />
The resultant gas is then fed into Gas-Gas Heat exchanger; the cooled gas is then fed to<br />
refrigeration package to separate out the propane. The production gas is then fed into the<br />
2 nd Stage Gas Separator. The separated water is routed to produce water flash drum. The<br />
resulting gas is fed to fuel gas header. Condensate from Stage Separators is fed to produced<br />
water flash drum to further separate water and gas, the resulting gas being routed to gas<br />
flare header.<br />
[14]
Thumbli Water Field:<br />
The crude oil from reservoirs at Mangala and other associated fields would be drilled using<br />
well pads concept. The reservoir will be water flooded in order to maintain reservoir<br />
pressure, provide voidage replacement and to maximize oil recovery. This water will be<br />
sourced from the “Thumbli aquifer” some 20km to the south-east of Mangala. There will be<br />
up to 5 well pads located in Thumbli Water Field. The formation volume factor of the<br />
Mangala crude is approximately 1.1. Therefore approximately 1.1 barrels of make-up water<br />
must be produced and injected for every barrel of oil that is extracted. The overall facilities<br />
diagram for Rajasthan Assets is provided in figure below.<br />
FIGURE 4: CIL FACILITIES DIAGRAM<br />
Since the CIL facilities are situated predominantly in the <strong>Barmer</strong> District, it is imperative to<br />
have a clear understanding of the geographical profile, natural hazards, risks and<br />
vulnerabilities in the region. In view of this, a short profile of the district has been collated<br />
and is given in the next section.<br />
1.3 DISTRICT PROFILE – SOCIAL, ECONOMIC & DEMOGRAPHIC<br />
1.3.1 GENERAL PROFILE<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> district lies between 24°58′ - 26°32′ N and 70°5′ – 72°52′. On its north is<br />
Jaisalmer, to the south is Jalore, and Pali and Jodhpur are to the east. The total area of<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> district is 28,114 km². <strong>Barmer</strong> district is 3,727 ft (1,136 m) above sea level and 22<br />
km in length. The longest river in the district is the Luni. It is 480 km in length and drains<br />
[15]
into the Gulf of Kutch passing through Jalore. <strong>Barmer</strong> district consists of <strong>Barmer</strong>, Baytu,<br />
Shiv, Chauhatan, Gudamalani and Balotra Tehsils.<br />
The district has a geographical area of 2.82 million hectares. In 2004-05, about 1.12<br />
percent of the area had forest cover, 7.2 percent constituted pasture land, 25.13 percent<br />
was fallow land and 51.63 percent was cultivated crop land. The remainder was either not<br />
available for cultivation or cultivable wasteland. Gross cropped area in 2004-05 was 1.55<br />
million hectares (1.79 million hectares in 2006-07) and area sown more than once stood at<br />
90,762 hectares. In 2006-07, some changes took place with net sown area being 60 percent<br />
of total area. It is the condition of the district that allows it to have only 6.24 percent area<br />
under double cropping. The forest cover marginally increased to 1.13 percent and<br />
permanent pastures and other grazing lands constituting 15.38 percent and barren and<br />
cultivable land another 18 percent.<br />
The characteristic features of the climate of the district are its dryness, extremes of<br />
temperature and the fitful and erratic nature of rainfall. The year may be divided into four<br />
seasons, winter from November to March, summer season from April to June, monsoon<br />
from July to mid-September and post-monsoon season up to the end of October.<br />
In summers the temperature soars to 48°C and in winters, it drops to 5°C. Primarily<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> district is a desert where average rainfall in a year is 277 mm. However, extreme<br />
rainfall of 549 mm rain between August 16 and August 25, 2006 left many dead and caused<br />
huge losses. As many as 20 new lakes were formed and 6 of which covered an area of over<br />
10 km².<br />
Throughout summer, the heat is intense and scorching winds prevail. Even during<br />
monsoon, the air is dry in between the fitful spells of rain. The district is prone to droughts.<br />
The rainfall pattern among the regions is very much uncertain. Therefore, kharif cropping<br />
is too much uncertain in all the regions.<br />
The soils of the district are broadly desertic type. Qualitatively the soils are very poor and<br />
devoid of humus content. These soils are very deep and sandy, associated with dunes; inter<br />
dunes and sandy plain covering about 31 percent of the area. Dunes are the spectacular<br />
feature of the district and these occur scattered all over the area.<br />
Potable water in the district comes mainly from rain water harvested in large tanks. Wells,<br />
tube wells and hand pumps are also in use. The seasonal rivers, Luni and Jojree and the<br />
Narmada canal also flow through this district. However the water from the rivers is not<br />
potable.<br />
[16]
1.3.2 DEMOGRAPHY<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> had population of 19,64,835 in 2001 of which males were 10,38,247 (52.84%) and<br />
females were 9,26,588 (47.16%). The district has 3.48 percent of state’s population and<br />
8.29 percent area. The population growth during 1991-2001 was 36.83 percent compared<br />
to 28.27 percent during 1981-1991. The rural population stood at 18,19,431 (92.6%),<br />
while the urban population was 1,45,404 (7.4%). The 5-14 years population was 5,45,120,<br />
15-59 years old were 9,78,039 and 60 plus population was 1,39,461. 15 percent of the<br />
population is under 6 years of age. The district has a population density of 69 per sq km in<br />
2001.<br />
The district has 3,09,739 households of which 91.95 percent are rural areas and only 8.1<br />
percent in urban areas. Of the rural population, 52.78 percent are males while this<br />
proportion is 53.92 percent in urban areas. Given the number of households in the district<br />
at 3,09,739, the average household size comes to 6.34. The average household size in rural<br />
areas is 6.39 compared to urban household size of 5.83. The family size in urban <strong>Barmer</strong> is<br />
thus lower than the rural family size. 28.3 percent houses are permanent type followed by<br />
14 percent that are semi-permanent and 57.8 percent are temporary type. The total<br />
literacy rate in the district is 59.00 with male literacy at 72.80 and female literacy at 43.04.<br />
1.3.3 SOCIO- ECONOMIC PROFILE<br />
Development is reflected in structure of the economy. Normally in the development<br />
process, it is said that, the contribution of agriculture would decline and the contribution of<br />
manufacturing would increase in the first stage. In the latter stage, the service sector would<br />
become important. In the recent times, <strong>Barmer</strong> has observed a structural change as<br />
depicted by district income estimates at current prices. According to Human Development<br />
Report, <strong>Barmer</strong> District, the total income generated in 1999-2000 was Rs.165071 lakh<br />
which increased to Rs. 259338 in 2004-05; a 1.57 time increase or 9.52 percent increase. In<br />
the recent times, the contribution of agriculture and allied sectors declined from 38.4<br />
percent to 32.3 percent from 1999-00 to 2004-05. There is an increase in contribution of<br />
mining and manufacturing sector from 20.5 percent to 24.0 percent during this period. The<br />
contribution of service sector/ tertiary sector improved from 41.2 percent to 43.8 percent.<br />
Despite this structural transformation, one finds that contribution of agriculture sector has<br />
declined by 7.7 percentage points, while contribution of livestock sector has increased by<br />
1.47 percentage points. Within mining and manufacturing sector, mining and registered<br />
manufacturing have gained in contribution while unregistered manufacturing has declined<br />
though still remaining an important contributor (6.53% share). Construction sector has<br />
improved contribution and in 2004-05 contributed 10.1 percent district’s income. The<br />
major activity in service sector is trade, hotel and restaurants (14.4%) and is followed by<br />
[17]
other services (7.175) and real estate activities (7.92%). However, the latter two activities<br />
have lost ground during this period. Transport, banking, railways, other transport,<br />
communication and public administration have gained in their shares in district income.<br />
Employment structure of the district economy is defined in terms of sectoral distribution of<br />
worker and work participation rates. There were 919729 workers in 2001, of which<br />
680208 were main workers and 239521 were marginal workers and 1045106 were nonworkers<br />
which mean the dependency ratio of 53.19 percent. In <strong>Barmer</strong> main workers<br />
constituted around 74 percent of all workers, while 26 percent were marginal workers.<br />
Among the main workers, 72.4 percent were cultivators and 2.8 percent agricultural<br />
workers, thereby implying that work force dependent on agriculture stood at 75.2 percent.<br />
Household industry just had 2.7 percent main workers. The other workers, those in service<br />
sectors and construction etc. constituted 22.2 percent of all workers.<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> district in 2003 had 27048 holdings of which majority were 4 hectares and above<br />
(70.24%). Across tehsils, such holdings were 72.75 percent in <strong>Barmer</strong>, 73.48 percent in<br />
Baytu, 57.61 percent in Gudamalani, 59.51 percent in Pachpatra, 80.90 percent in Shiv as<br />
against the district average of 70.24 percent. Large holding does not mean much in rain fed<br />
areas. However, this pattern of holdings would reflect on agricultural practices. Large land<br />
holdings are a reflection of the harsh environmental conditions, and hence low population<br />
density (69 people per sq km).<br />
1.4 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY<br />
Cairn India’s <strong>Disaster</strong> management philosophy is to provide "reasonable assurance that<br />
adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency or<br />
disaster." This document sets forth emergency planning standards and defines the<br />
responsibilities of the organisations involved in emergency response. In addition, it is<br />
suggested that Cairn could also include the pro-active preparedness and mitigation centric<br />
strategies during implementation of this DM plan.<br />
Effective Multi Response Strategy and synergy of efforts is essential both at State and<br />
district level with institutional arrangements, inter-department linkages, role of NGOs,<br />
voluntary agencies and local communities in disaster management.<br />
Briefly stated, the disaster management philosophy is as under:-<br />
• Requires high quality in the design, construction and operation of the facilities to<br />
reduce the likelihood of malfunctions;<br />
• Recognises that equipment can fail and operators can make errors, therefore<br />
requires adequate layers of safety systems to reduce the chances of such<br />
malfunctions which could lead to accidents;<br />
[18]
• Recognises that, in spite of these precautions, accidents may happen, therefore<br />
requiring containment structures and other safety features to prevent escalation<br />
• Has in place organisations capable of responding to incident’s and emergency<br />
situations that may occur involving any of the Cairn India facilities or supporting<br />
operations, to preserve life, prevent injuries and damage to the environment and or<br />
assets.<br />
• Meets all statutory requirements for emergency response and disaster management.<br />
Cairn India Limited’s (CIL) responsibility is to properly manage any emergency or crisis<br />
situation so as to minimise the impact it may have on all personnel associated with its<br />
activities, the environment, the community, the Company’s financial position and<br />
reputation. To respond effectively to emergencies and incidents an agreed and approved<br />
<strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>Plan</strong> (DMP) is in place supported by a pre-established organisation,<br />
on-call and capable of mobilising and responding effectively to different levels of incidents<br />
that may occur. This organisation is staffed with competent individuals, organised into<br />
teams, with allocated and clearly defined roles and responsibilities and practised in their<br />
roles.<br />
This is in line with NDMA’s objective and vision which is ‘to build a safe and disasterresilient<br />
India by developing a holistic, proactive, multi-disaster and technology-driven<br />
strategy for disaster management. This will be achieved through a culture of prevention,<br />
mitigation and preparedness to generate a prompt and efficient response at the time of<br />
disaster’.<br />
1.5 THEME<br />
The DMP will focus on the following theme:<br />
In line with the National <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Authority’s vision, this DMP will focus on<br />
the paradigm shift from reactive post-disaster response to proactive pre-disaster<br />
prevention, mitigation and preparedness measures.<br />
1.6 OBJECTIVES<br />
The DMP has the following objectives:<br />
• To contextualise the learning from the IOC Jaipur oil depot fire<br />
• To synergise with the national stipulations on disaster management<br />
• To comprehensively address onsite and offsite emergency preparedness<br />
[19]
• To develop the DMP with community participatory approach<br />
• To have holistic and integrated approach to address all phases of disaster<br />
management; pre-disaster, during disaster and post-disaster<br />
• To improve the incident management system with clear missions and lines of<br />
authority<br />
• Develop a state of readiness for a prompt and orderly response to an emergency and<br />
to establish a high order of preparedness (equipment, personnel) commensurate<br />
with the risk<br />
• To ensure an orderly and timely decision-making and response process<br />
(notification, standard operating procedures)<br />
• Ensure effective coordination between Cairn India, local government, community<br />
and other agencies working to prevent and mitigate disasters.<br />
1.7 SCOPE OF WORK<br />
The DMP scope is to cover the following<br />
• Meeting requirements of Department of Petroleum, Government of Rajasthan<br />
• Guidelines of NDMA and SDMA Rajasthan<br />
• Incident Command System (ICS) based<br />
• Community & stakeholder participation<br />
• Pipeline vulnerability & risk assessment with District Administration<br />
• OISD recommendations vis-a-vis IOC Jaipur Terminal fire incident<br />
• GIS based Hazard Mapping<br />
1.8 METHODOLOGY<br />
EGSS has adopted a multi-disciplinary approach consisting of fire safety, incident<br />
management, risk and vulnerability analysis, disaster management policy review, GIS<br />
mapping and environmental impacts. The DMP is developed on the basis of collation of<br />
secondary data of CIL’s previous studies.<br />
EGSS has fielded a multi-disciplinary team consisting of:<br />
Ramasami Sundaresan FIFireE - Health & Safety, Emergency Preparedness, Incident<br />
Investigation specialist, 36 years oil & petrochemical industry experience<br />
[20]
Dr. K. M. Parivelan Ph.D – is DM Specialist who has worked with UN agencies like UNHCR,<br />
UNDP covering Humanitarian Affairs and <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong><br />
A. Sivakumar MSc - IIT Mumbai – Hydrogeology and Environmental Professional with 18<br />
years international experience in oil & gas industry<br />
Indira Reddy MSc - Environmental <strong>Management</strong> Australia – Project Coordination and GIS<br />
expert<br />
The project commenced formally on 14 th April 2010 with a kick-off meeting between CIL<br />
officials and EGSS team. The following secondary and tertiary data /information are<br />
collected from CIL:<br />
• QRA_FERA_EEA Report R1 Chapters – 3,6,13 & 18 (MPT)<br />
• EIA report – complete<br />
• QRA of Early Gas Supply System-Report Rev 1 August 09<br />
• QRA of Raageshwari Gas Terminal - Post Slug Catcher Rev 0 May 09<br />
• QRA of Raageshwari Well Pads-Final<br />
• RGT Bow-Tie Report Rev-2-14Jan2010<br />
• FERA-Early Gas Supply System Report Rev 1 Aug 09<br />
• FERA post Slug Catcher of RGT-Final-DECO-RX-R-REP-0018<br />
• QRA, FERA (RGT)<br />
• MPT process Rev 0 – SOPs<br />
o MPT28 HP-LP Flare Rev A2<br />
o MPT 18 - Sand Wash – Final<br />
o MPT 26 - Fuel Gas System rev<br />
o MPT 50-51-52 - ESD-PCS<br />
o MPT 57 Closed Drains rev<br />
o MPT 58 Hazardous Open Drains<br />
o MPT System 21 - Vapour Recovery Unit rev<br />
• RJON-MPT-OP-PRO-010 - Prod Headers & Pig Rx rev A1<br />
• RJON-MPT-OP-PRO-063 - Hazardous Waste Rev A1<br />
• SOP - Train-2 & 3 start up<br />
• 16 .DECO-MPT-FG-DWG-4601-01-B1 (Fire and safety Emergency lay out)-black –<br />
drawing<br />
• 16 .DECO-MPT-L-DWG-2400-01-B9-ColourPlot plan – drawing<br />
• MPT development overview<br />
• 2, 24 RJON-MRX-HSS-PLN-0001_rev00 Incident Response <strong>Plan</strong> ( IRP ) for RNAO<br />
• RJON-MRX-HSS-PLN-0002 _rev00 Oil Spill Response <strong>Plan</strong> for RNAO<br />
• 13, 14, 15, 16 & 24 RJON-MRX-HSS-PLN-0003_rev00 Fire Contingency <strong>Plan</strong> for<br />
RNAO<br />
[21]
• <strong>Barmer</strong> Census Synopsis<br />
• Census Rajasthan State<br />
• Human development report-<strong>Barmer</strong>- Rajasthan Government<br />
• Cairn-White paper on health final<br />
• Reference note 1_ Rajasthan Government State <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>Plan</strong> outline<br />
• Note on Chemical <strong>Disaster</strong> Guidelines by NDMA<br />
• Map of area showing well pad locations, oil field locations, major pipeline and<br />
villages<br />
Following review of secondary data a field visit to CIL site at MPT and RGT was conducted<br />
for collection of primary data. Primary data was collected through visit and interaction<br />
with HSE staff members of Cairn at the Rajasthan Upstream Project, <strong>Barmer</strong> district<br />
administration, District line departments, civil society organisations, community members<br />
living close to Cairn facilities. Primary and secondary data /information relating to project<br />
location, staff size, operations, logistics involved, hazards, risk, vulnerability, capacity<br />
assessments, etc. was gathered.<br />
A second field visit for community consultation was carried out by EGSS team between 12 th<br />
and 15 th May 2010. EGSS team interacted with the project neighbourhood community for<br />
offsite preparedness planning and gathered inputs for DMP. Through informal interview<br />
and focused group discussion their level of preparedness, hazard awareness, and response<br />
capacities were reviewed. Their inputs were also gathered in terms of their need for early<br />
warning systems, quick transport (evacuation) facilities, etc. The team also interacted with<br />
the <strong>Barmer</strong> District Administration and line departments on the level of disaster<br />
preparedness and coordination. The primary and secondary data were then reviewed and<br />
analysed. The following relevant national laws/Acts were also referred:<br />
• National <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Act, 2005<br />
• NDMA Guidelines on Chemical <strong>Disaster</strong>s, April 2007<br />
• NDMA Guidelines on Mine <strong>Disaster</strong>s<br />
• NDMA Guidelines on Environmental <strong>Disaster</strong>s<br />
• The Environment Protection Act, 1994<br />
• The Forest Conservation Act, 1986<br />
• Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974<br />
• Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974<br />
• The Hazardous Wastes ( <strong>Management</strong> and Handling) Rules, 1989<br />
• Environmental Impact Assessment Notification<br />
• Vulnerability Atlas of India<br />
• NDMA Medical Preparedness and Mass Casualty <strong>Management</strong><br />
[22]
2 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT AND RISK<br />
ANALYSIS<br />
CIL’s oil exploration, storage and transportation related activities take place predominantly<br />
in and around <strong>Barmer</strong> taluk in <strong>Barmer</strong> District, Rajasthan. The vulnerability assessment<br />
covers past history, geographical feature and the impact and intensity of various hazards<br />
and also the damage assessment of the past disasters. Based on this, a list of most<br />
vulnerable villages around CIL were prepared.<br />
Vulnerability is the condition determined by physical, social, economic and environmental<br />
factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of<br />
hazards.<br />
The scale of damage to a community from the impact of a given hazard does not only<br />
depend upon the community’s physical exposure to that hazard, but also on its<br />
vulnerability. Here, physical exposure refers to the elements at risk. These elements may<br />
include people, artefacts, infrastructure etc. Vulnerability, on the other hand, is determined<br />
by aspects in the physical environment, such as nature of housing, available open space etc,<br />
as well as aspects of community awareness about hazards and related preparedness and<br />
also in the socio-economic domain such as level of income, nutritional status,<br />
marginalization, etc.<br />
During the Gujarat earthquake (2001), for example, people living in the old city of Bhuj<br />
with narrow roads, newly-constructed unsafe high-rise buildings and a high density of<br />
population faced more injuries and loss of life during the earthquake, than those living in<br />
the suburbs. The people in suburbs had broader roads and single/double storied buildings<br />
and a lower density of population, which helped quick exit from falling buildings during the<br />
earthquake. In terms of vulnerability, groups of school children and the elderly who could<br />
not evacuate rapidly faced higher cases of injury and loss of lives than other communities<br />
in the same area. Similarly, as in the case of the Jaipur Oil depot fire, the expansion of<br />
habitations close to the oil depot has increased their vulnerability causing high casualties.<br />
Some indicators of vulnerability are:<br />
CHAPTER<br />
2<br />
[23]
• poverty<br />
• population explosion<br />
• demographic imbalances<br />
• unemployment<br />
• growth of large informal economies in unplanned cities<br />
• increasing migrant flows,<br />
• socio-political tensions and uncertainty<br />
• illiteracy<br />
• women and child development concerns<br />
• absence of sound institutional and legislative/ regulatory practices, and<br />
• Unsustainable environmental practices.<br />
Likely disasters in the project area are:-<br />
Natural <strong>Disaster</strong>s<br />
• Flood<br />
• Earth Quake<br />
• Drought<br />
• Sand Storm<br />
• Epidemics<br />
Man-made <strong>Disaster</strong>s<br />
• Fire/ explosion<br />
• Probable on-site emergencies (e.g. Gas leak)<br />
due to Cairn Operations<br />
• Sabotage and pilferage<br />
• Terrorist activities, war or civil disturbance<br />
2.1 MAN-MADE HAZARDS ASSESSMENT<br />
Fires are the major source of hazard in the region due to the dry climatic conditions. The<br />
other hazards include road accidents and potential disasters from Cairn Operations.<br />
2.1.1 FIRES<br />
The high incidence of fires is due partly to the high temperatures during summer and<br />
partly to the presence of large numbers of kutcha (thatched) houses in the villages. The<br />
percentage of temporary housing made from dried thatch is 57.8% thereby exposing a<br />
large percentage of the population to fire-related hazards. There is also a lack of proper fire<br />
safety awareness among the community members. Annually there are at least 10 – 15<br />
villages badly affected by fire accidents in every taluk of <strong>Barmer</strong> District.<br />
[24]
2.1.2 ACCIDENTS<br />
There are four major roads in the district; NH-15, NH112, SH-16 and SH-28. There are<br />
tarred roads inside the towns. Most villages are approachable only through kutcha roads<br />
and few have internal roadways. The overall number of accidents in 1997 (among the<br />
general public as per the District <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>Plan</strong>) was around 319 which<br />
increased to 435 in 2009. The number of fatalities was 72 in 1997 and 219 in 2009.<br />
2.1.3 OTHER HAZARDS<br />
Hazards and risks can potentially emanate from riots, civil strife, pilferage and sabotage<br />
and may be taken into consideration for disaster preparedness and management.<br />
The project area is about 100 -150 km away from the Indo–Pak border and hence the<br />
chances of collateral damage during a war are high. The proximity of the border also<br />
increases the probability of terrorist attacks.<br />
2.2 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF CAIRN OPERATIONS<br />
It is noted from the incident investigation report by Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD)<br />
that the IOC Jaipur Terminal incident is attributable to one or more of the following<br />
probable causes:<br />
• Loss of containment and subsequent pool of large quantities of highly volatile<br />
flammable liquid giving rise to a massive vapour cloud explosion,<br />
• Encroachment close to the Terminal premises by land use developments<br />
• <strong>Plan</strong>t/process engineering practices and design susceptible to human errors<br />
• Layout congestion due to successive plant expansion with the finite land area<br />
• Proliferation of vegetative growth within the facility premises<br />
• Non-adherence to standard operating procedures (SOP)<br />
• Unascertainable level of fire fighting readiness capability and training.<br />
Given Cairn's high emphasis on health, safety and environmental (HSE) excellence and<br />
enforcement measures evinced by the following report, occurrence of a similar nature<br />
within Cairn's operations is highly improbable.<br />
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) for<br />
Cairn operations have been conducted by independent consultants and these analyses are<br />
summarised below.<br />
[25]
2.2.1 FIRE AND EXPLOSION RISK ASSESSMENT AT MPT<br />
Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) study was commissioned to cover CIL’s<br />
Mangala Process Terminal (MPT), Mangala Oil Well Pads, and in-field pipelines and to<br />
assess the level of risk due to credible release scenarios related to oil and gas processes<br />
within these areas. The production fluid from Mangala Oil Well Pads is assumed to be<br />
combustible due to a mole fraction of around 70% water cut after six to nine months of<br />
commissioning the well-pads.<br />
• It has been identified that Slug catcher, Settling Tank, Dehydrator, the pipelines<br />
connecting Dehydrator to Export oil storage tanks and Oil pig launcher, Raageshwari<br />
gas processing facilities and associated pipelines are contributing significant risks to<br />
MPT.<br />
• The total risk can be expressed either in terms of Individual Risk (IR) or Societal Risk<br />
(SR). The Individual Risk (IR) is the risk experienced by a single individual in a given<br />
time period. It reflects the severity of the hazards and the amount of time the<br />
individual is in proximity to them. It is usually taken to be the risk of death, and<br />
usually expressed as a risk per year.<br />
• Societal Risk (SR) - the risk experienced by a group of people (including workers and<br />
the public) exposed to the hazard. SR can be represented with a graph, F-N curve,<br />
showing explicitly the relationship between the cumulative frequency (F) and number<br />
of fatalities (N). The Potential Loss of Life (PLL) is a measure of Societal Risk and<br />
represents the number of fatalities that can be expected to occur each year, averaged<br />
over a long period.<br />
• IR level at key buildings and other locations at the MPT due to process and pipeline<br />
events were estimated. Steam generation area has the highest IR level than other substation<br />
buildings, with an estimated 7.97 x 10 -6 fatalities/ average year. Substation 2<br />
and 4A are the second and third most exposed areas. The IR at Administration<br />
Building due to Raageshwari gas and condensate pipeline release events is estimated<br />
to be about 1.25 x 10 -5 per year.<br />
• Potential Loss of Life (PLL) has been calculated to be 9.55 x 10 -4 fatality average per<br />
year within MPT. The top contributing events to this predicted risk level are Settling<br />
tanks (D-214/224) fire and Export oil storage tanks (D- 250A/B/C/D) fires which<br />
contribute about 75% of total on-site societal risk.<br />
2.2.1.1 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS<br />
The frequency analysis determines the annual release of hazardous materials from process<br />
equipment at the site as well as from the inter-field oil and gas pipelines. The UK Health &<br />
Safety Executive’s (HSE) Hydrocarbon Release Database HCRD, revision HCRD_06, has been<br />
[26]
applied for the process leak failure frequencies using DNV’s leak frequency calculation tool,<br />
LEAK 3.21. A modification factor has been applied by DNV to the base HCRD frequencies for<br />
the risk assessment in Rajasthan Northern Area Development.<br />
The total hydrocarbon process leak frequency for the Mangala Process Terminal (MPT)<br />
was estimated at approximately 0.15 leaks per year, which means there will in average be 1<br />
leak (of any size) every 6.7 years. The overall leak frequency used for the Raageshwari<br />
Condensate line (DN100) is 2.9x10 -7 leaks per meter per year. The overall leak frequency<br />
for the Raageshwari Gas line (DN300) is 1.7x10 -7 leaks per meter per year. The leak<br />
frequencies for MPT on site storage tanks are 3.0x10 -4 leak per year per tank for a full<br />
surface tank fire and 6.0x10 -5 leak per year per tank for a full bund pool fire.<br />
2.2.1.2 CONSEQUENCE MODELLING<br />
Details on the Methodology and assumptions used in the consequence analysis for the<br />
FERA can be found in the FERA Terms of Reference and Rule set documents (DECO-RX-R-<br />
PRO-0112, DECO-RX-R-PRO-0113 and DECO-RX-R-PRO-0104, respectively). This section<br />
will provide some additional details in order to facilitate the interpretation of the<br />
Consequence Results.<br />
Effect of Horizontal Releases<br />
There is some conservatism in the modelling of both liquid and gas process releases as all<br />
are modelled as horizontal releases at 1m above the ground. For ground level impacts, this<br />
method yields worst case scenarios as far as consequences zones are concerned. This is a<br />
common approach when performing consequence modelling for risk assessments. If gas<br />
releases had been modelled vertically, the downwind hazard zones would have been much<br />
smaller.<br />
Liquid events have also been modelled as horizontal releases, such that the pool fires are<br />
assumed to form at the point where the release rains out i.e. touches ground. So even if the<br />
pool formed due to a cloud raining out is relatively small, it may be at a distance from the<br />
leak point and hence the hazard zones may appear to be quite large in relation to the<br />
release point.<br />
Effect of using a Constant Release Rate<br />
A constant release rate has also been used in modelling both liquid and gas releases (the<br />
model releases the entire inventory at the initial release rate). This is also conservative.<br />
Although a time-varying release would have a longer duration, a constant release rate<br />
[27]
maintains the largest hazard zones (initial impacts) for longer than a time-varying release<br />
would. Using a constant release rate is accurate for estimating risk to personnel, especially<br />
for onshore facilities for several reasons. It accurately reflects the fact that personnel will<br />
either be immediately impacted by an event or they will escape the hazard zone before an<br />
eventual escalation of the event. Whether the release rate drops over time becomes<br />
irrelevant for calculating immediate fatalities for release events.<br />
For impacts to equipment and structures it is essential to be aware of both the size of the<br />
hazard zone as well as the duration of that hazard zone. While a time-varying release<br />
would have a longer duration than a constant rate release, the latter would maintain the<br />
largest hazard zones (initial impacts) for longer than a time-varying release.<br />
Therefore, while fatalities can be accurately estimated based on the initial hazard zones of<br />
a release (i.e. someone standing at a certain spot is assumed to either die or to successfully<br />
escape), impact to equipment and structures deserves (and received) a more detailed look<br />
at the duration of the event.<br />
Modelling Crude pool fires<br />
All crude releases from process equipment as well as full bund pool fires and full surface<br />
tank fires were modelled using N-Heptacosane, a material which closely approximates the<br />
low flash point and low emissive power expected of the Crude Oil at MPT. As described in<br />
the FERA Rule Set, production fluid from the Mangala Oil Well Pads through pig receivers<br />
and slug catchers is not considered flammable, i.e., no crude pool fire events are modelled<br />
from Oil well pads to the Settling Tanks.<br />
2.2.1.3 RISK RESULTS<br />
Individual Risk results at MPT<br />
The overall individual Risk Contour Plot in Figure 1 shows the risk distribution on the<br />
Mangala Process Terminal. The figure presents the combined risk from all process events<br />
modelled at MPT. The Risk is expressed as risk of death on average per year.<br />
The contours are marked and shown as risk intervals. The largest contour represents a risk<br />
level of 10 -8 /average year while the smallest contour (shown in light blue) represents an<br />
individual risk of 10 -4 /average year. The large portion of oil and gas process area, export oil<br />
storage tanks as well as diesel storage area are contributing to 10 -4 /average year, which is<br />
coming under CIL’s risk acceptance criteria.<br />
[28]
According to CIL’s risk acceptance criteria; a summed individual risk becomes intolerable<br />
once it exceeds 10 -3 fatalities / average year and is negligible above 10 -6 fatalities/ average<br />
year. In between those two values, the risk falls in the ALARP region.<br />
From Figure 3, a considerable portion of the Terminal, i.e. Export oil storage tanks, Export<br />
oil booster pumps, Oil process area around dehydrators and Gas process area around<br />
scrubbers seem to be in the risk level of 10 -4 , which is under the risk acceptance criteria.<br />
This can be attributed to high congestion of equipments and also large inventory available<br />
in these areas.<br />
The risk due to the release from Export oil pipeline connecting Export Oil Pumps (P-<br />
252A/B/C/D) to Pig Launcher (L-007) was also estimated considering adequate bund area<br />
under the Pipe Rack No.34. However it has been found that the estimated risk is limited to<br />
10 -5 fatalities /avg. year.<br />
FIGURE 5: RISK CONTOURS FROM PROCESS EVENTS AT MPT<br />
The following areas are not exposed to any risk due to process related fire and explosion<br />
events,<br />
• Areas nearby Water storage tanks (D-411A/B)<br />
• Filtered water storage tank (D-452)<br />
• Treated water storage tank (D-454)<br />
• Central Control Building<br />
• Admin Building<br />
• Main Entrance<br />
[29]
• Fire station, Fire water storage tanks<br />
• Main & A/C Warehouses<br />
• Maintenance Shop<br />
• Chemical Lab building<br />
• Recharge Pit located at Northeast direction<br />
At the north-west and nearby gas processing area of the Terminal, it appears that the risk<br />
beyond plant boundary reaches 10 -5 which is again within CIL’s risk acceptance criteria.<br />
Individual Risk results for Raageshwari Pipelines<br />
Figure 6 shows overall individual Risk Contour Plots for combined risks from the<br />
Raageshwari gas and condensate pipelines within MPT area. Most of MPT is exposed to an<br />
individual risk above 10 -8 / average year and lower than 10 -5 / average year due to these<br />
pipeline events. Clearly the risk contours from pipeline events are wider around the MPT<br />
area due to the fact that the pipelines are under higher pressure and there are many more<br />
ignition sources are within the process area.<br />
FIGURE 6: RISK CONTOURS DUE TO INCOMING RAAGESHWARI PIPELINES AT MPT<br />
To find the total individual risk, the contributions from both process and pipeline events<br />
have to be combined. The worst contribution from the gas and condensate pipelines is in<br />
the order of 10 -5 , and the worst from process events is in the order of 10 -4 .<br />
If presence factor for personnel is to be taken into account it is clear that there would likely<br />
not be a summed individual risk greater than 10 -4 fatalities / average year at any location<br />
on MPT.<br />
[30]
Societal Risk<br />
The individual and overall F-N curves are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively and<br />
give the societal risk for all on-site personnel from the fire and explosion scenarios. No<br />
offsite populations have been included in the calculations. It must be noted that the criteria<br />
lines on the F-N curve are shown as acceptable. ALARP lines as shown in red and green<br />
colour are only intended as guidelines and are not CIL Acceptance criteria as F-N curve<br />
criteria has not been defined for this project.<br />
Considering all process related release scenarios, crude related scenarios at daytime are<br />
contributing to high risk which is close to Intolerable line in the ALARP region. It may be<br />
due to the congestion of processing equipments at oil processing area in between settling<br />
tanks and dehydrator, Export Oil Storage Tank, Diesel Storage Tank and Gas processing<br />
area. In detail, this high risk is caused by tank fire and full-bore rupture from Settling tanks<br />
(D-214/224) and Export oil storage tanks (D-250A/B/C/D) at daytime when most people<br />
are present at the terminal.<br />
Individual<br />
Combined<br />
FIGURE 7: INDIVIDUAL AND COMBINED F-N CURVES FOR CRUDE AND GAS RELEASE EVENTS<br />
Figure 4 shows the combined F-N curve considering all oil and gas release events with in<br />
MPT area. The combined F-N curve shows that all process related risks are within ALARP<br />
region. Economic evaluations should be used for the purpose of comparing different design<br />
options or risk reducing measures for the further reduction of risks into risk negligible<br />
region in future.<br />
[31]
Potential Loss of Life (PLL) The expected Potential Loss of Life (PLL) has been calculated<br />
to be 9.5x10 -4 on average per year within MPT. This can also be explained as 1 fatality per<br />
1,047 years.<br />
Main Risk Contributors to Societal Risk<br />
Table 1 indicates the top 10 process events that contribute most to the societal risk for onsite<br />
personnel.<br />
• Risk Integral (per average year) refers to the total number of fatalities per average<br />
year contributed by a given event. This can also be noted the PLL contribution from<br />
each vent.<br />
• Risk Integral (percent) refers to the proportion of the PLL contributed by that event<br />
in percentage terms. The percentage refers to percentage from process events only.<br />
TABLE 1: LARGEST RISK CONTRIBUTORS TO THE SOCIETAL RISK FROM PROCESS EVENTS IN MPT<br />
S. No Event ID Event description<br />
Risk Integral<br />
(per avg year)<br />
Risk<br />
Integral<br />
(%)<br />
1 D-214Tank fire Tank fire 2.07 E -4 21.7<br />
2 D-224Tank fire Tank fire 1.75 E -4 18.4<br />
3 D-224_FBR<br />
4 D-214_FBR<br />
Full bore rupture from Settling<br />
Tank D-224<br />
Full bore rupture from Settling<br />
Tank D-214<br />
5.18 E -5 5.4<br />
5.14 E -5 5.4<br />
5 D-250D Tank Fire Tank fire 4.92 E -5 5.2<br />
6 D-250C Tank fire Tank fire 4.92 E -5 5.2<br />
7 D-250A Tank fire Tank fire 4.92 E -5 5.2<br />
8 D-250B Tank fire Tank fire 4.92 E -5 5.2<br />
9 V-329_FBR<br />
Full bore rupture from Gas<br />
Scrubber V-329<br />
3.78 E -5 4.0<br />
10 D-250C Tank_FBR Full bore rupture from D-250C 3.54 E -5 3.7<br />
The hazard zone obtained from V-329 due to flash fire will have a damage distance of about<br />
450m. This value corresponds to the Lower Flammable Limit attained after the gas release<br />
[32]
from V-329. This event contributes to about 4.0% to the onsite societal risk. The flash fire<br />
LFL contour is very large (damage distance is 450m). However the likelihood of such an<br />
event occurring is very low.<br />
Individual Risk at Buildings and Key Locations<br />
Table 2 lists the Individual Risk (IR) levels at key buildings and other locations at the site<br />
due to process and pipeline events. Steam generation area has the highest IR of the other<br />
sub-station buildings, with an estimated 7.97 x 10 -6 fatalities/ average year. Substation 2<br />
and 4A are the second and third most exposed areas.<br />
The IR at Administration Building due to Raageshwari gas and condensate pipeline release<br />
events is estimated to be about 1.25 x 10-5 per year. Although these risk levels have been<br />
calculated using impact criteria and vulnerabilities aimed at calculating personnel risk,<br />
they can be interpreted to yield some valuable conclusions on impacts to buildings and<br />
equipment.<br />
Steam Generation Area<br />
The main risk contributor to steam generation area is a leak from gas pipeline connecting<br />
Gas Processing Facility and Steam Boilers. Consequence results shows that the largest<br />
hazard zones of the events will reach the steam generation area. However, the individual<br />
risk at this point is 7.97x10 -7 which is within the risk acceptance criteria.<br />
TABLE 2: INDIVIDUAL RISKS AT SPECIFIC BUILDINGS/LOCATIONS AT MPT<br />
Building<br />
Total Individual Risk<br />
Sub-station 1A 4.82 E -08<br />
Sub-station 1B 1.6 E -10<br />
Sub-station 2 4.46 E -07<br />
Sub-station 3 8.12 E -12<br />
Sub-station 4A 4.99 E -08<br />
Sub-station 4B 5.47 E -09<br />
Steam Generation Area 7.97 E -07<br />
[33]
Individual Risk Discussion – Escape and Evacuation<br />
Some of the biggest contributors to On-site Risk are from crude releases resulting in the<br />
formation of large pools. Risk calculations for immediately ignited pool fires are based on<br />
effect zones from a fully developed steady-state pool (where the burn rate equals the<br />
release rate into the pool). This fully formed pool can take some minutes to be developed.<br />
For the medium leaks from the booster oil pipeline pumps (P-251A/B/C/D), it takes about<br />
2 minutes for a pool of 20m diameter to develop.<br />
Gas leaks on the other hand, do not have the same delayed development. A gas jet will<br />
appear immediately and even a gas cloud can reach its steady state in a short time<br />
(seconds). The Oil Export Storage Tank fire events contribute significantly to the on-site<br />
risk at MPT. Crude Tank fires can lead to boil-over events (as described in the FERA Rule<br />
Set document DECO-RX-R-PRO-0102).<br />
Boil-overs have been known to cause large numbers of fatalities, even though they may not<br />
occur in the initial stages of a fire. It is essential that all nonessential personnel be located<br />
far from the area should the export tanks catch fire. Only trained emergency response<br />
personnel and fire-fighters should be on-site, they should be aware of the potential for boilovers<br />
and thus remain at a safe distance from the tank fire itself. With this in mind remote<br />
operation of any fixed fire fighting systems deploying water, water/foam, should be<br />
considered around hydrocarbon storage tanks.<br />
Escalation Potential<br />
In general all unprotected equipment or structures within a radiation level of 37.5 kW/m 2<br />
for 30 minutes or within the fire itself for a shorter period of time are likely to fail. All fires<br />
from small liquid and gas leaks will have durations that are long enough to cause damage if<br />
impinged directly by the flame, very few of these however actually have hazard zones large<br />
enough to impact neighbouring equipment. As documented in the FERA Rule Set document<br />
DECO-RX-R-PRO-0102, event duration is based on a 5 minute detection and isolation time<br />
followed by the time needed to release the entire inventory within an isolatable section.<br />
Although the steam generation and power generation areas are critical to the operation of<br />
the facility, the area around the oil process equipment is the most exposed to events having<br />
the potential to cause escalation. The main risk of impact to equipment and structures is<br />
from large and full bore rupture events.<br />
Escalation Potential in the Oil and Gas Processing Areas<br />
The pool fire risks in the oil processing area are mainly from Settling Storage Tank (D-<br />
214/224), Dehydrator (V-217/227), Diesel Storage Tank (D-857) and Export Oil Storage<br />
[34]
Tanks (D-250A/B/C/D). The consequence results from these pool fire events clearly show<br />
that the potential for impact to the process equipment is possible especially in case of pool<br />
fire from D-214/224. Because of this tank is located more closely with main pipe racks<br />
(No.21 & 19) which carries most of the process pipelines.<br />
Since the oil processing area is the most congested area in the facility, hazards from pool<br />
fire events are major hazard contributors due to oil leaks. As gas pipelines are also present<br />
in the same area, a possibility of VCE cannot be ruled out. However, other than providing<br />
more open space in the area, the best mitigation for VCE risks is to ensure timely and<br />
reliable gas/fire detection leading to effective isolation and blow down of gas inventories.<br />
Jet fires from slug catcher also present a hazard to equipment and steel structures in the oil<br />
processing area. Limiting the duration of these jet fire events is the key to reducing the<br />
possibility of escalating a release event. Full bore ruptures do not have long durations as<br />
the majority of the inventory will be released in short period of time. Flame lengths and<br />
durations of key jet fire events from V-210/220 are given in Table 3:<br />
TABLE 3: JET FIRE HAZARD RESULTS IN MPT<br />
Event Jet fire length (m) Duration of Release (min)<br />
V-210_L/V-220_L 30 ~7<br />
V-210_FBR/V-220_FBR 68 ~3<br />
It is predicted that pool fire from Settling Storage Tank (D-214/224), Dehydrator (V-<br />
217/227), Diesel Storage Tank (D-857) and Export Oil Storage Tanks (D-250A/B/C/D) and<br />
jet fire from the Slug Catchers (V-210/220) could be the worst process hazard. The<br />
inventories in the storage tanks and slug catchers are quite large, and the duration of<br />
release events can be reduced by reducing the inventory of the isolatable segment.<br />
Isolation points (additional ESVs) should therefore be considered at more locations,<br />
especially if they can isolate the vapour inventories of the different Slug Catchers and<br />
Separators.<br />
Risk Acceptance Criteria<br />
From the Acceptance criteria described in FERA Terms of References, DECO-RX-R-PRO-<br />
0113, the ALARP region holds a summed individual risk of 1 in 1000 on-site and 1 in<br />
10,000 offsite, and above 1 in 1,000,000 per year. A summed individual risk of fatality<br />
below 1 in 1,000,000 per year is negligible and deemed acceptable – requiring no<br />
additional measures except for application of best practices and maintaining normal<br />
precautions.<br />
[35]
If presence factor for personnel is to be taken into account, it is clear that there would likely<br />
not be a summed individual risk greater than 10 -4 fatalities /average year at any location<br />
on MPT. In order to estimate the risk to the most exposed person on-site, the presence<br />
factor of this person within the exposed areas has to be defined.<br />
A conservative estimate of the summed individual risk to a highly exposed individual can<br />
be based on the following assumptions:<br />
• The individual has a shift schedule of 2 weeks on and 2 weeks off throughout the<br />
year<br />
• The individual works one 12 hour shift per day<br />
• This individual is outdoors in the process area (and thus more vulnerable than<br />
indoor personnel)<br />
Based on the above assumptions, this hypothetical individual would be between the 1 x 10 -<br />
4 and 1 x 10 -5 contours for 40% of the year and would therefore be exposed to an individual<br />
risk in the range of 2.5 x 10 -4 to 2.5x10 -6 on average per year. According to CIL’s risk<br />
acceptance criteria this would place the risk levels for the most exposed on-site individual<br />
within the ALARP region.<br />
2.2.1.4 OVERALL RESULTS<br />
Process Leak Frequency<br />
The total hydrocarbon process leak frequency for the Mangala Process Terminal (MPT) has<br />
been estimated to about 0.15 leaks per year, which means there will, on average, be 1 leak<br />
(of any size) in every 6.7 years. The total gas leak frequency is about 0.089 leaks per year<br />
and the total liquid leak frequency is about 0.06 leaks per year. Figure 7 shows the overall<br />
distribution of small, medium, large and rupture hole sizes for gas and liquid releases.<br />
FIGURE 8: PROCESS GAS AND LIQUID LEAK FREQUENCIES PER HOLE-SIZE CATEGORY<br />
[36]
Raageshwari Gas and Condensate Pipeline Leak Frequency<br />
The overall leak frequency used for the Raageshwari Condensate line (DN100) is 2.91x10 -7<br />
leaks per meter per year. The overall leak frequency used for the Raageshwari Gas line<br />
(DN300) is 1.71 x10 -7 leaks per meter per year.<br />
Considering there are nearly 800m of pipelines for both DN100 and DN300, the overall leak<br />
frequency for the entire length of each pipeline is about 2.328x10 -4 leaks per year for<br />
DN100 and 1.368x10 -4 leaks per year for DN300. This is the yearly likelihood of having a<br />
leak of any size at any point along the pipeline.<br />
Tank Fire Leak Frequency<br />
Frequencies applied for a full surface tank fire are 3.0x10 -4 leaks per year per tank and for a<br />
full bund pool fire 6.0x10 -5 leak per year per tank<br />
2.2.1.5 DETAILED FREQUENCY RESULTS<br />
Process Leaks<br />
The leak frequencies applied for each of the identified process failure cases, per hole-size<br />
category are illustrated in Figure 8. Table 26 and Table 27 contain all applied leak<br />
frequencies for gas and liquid process failure cases, respectively.<br />
FIGURE 9: PROCESS GAS LEAK FREQUENCY PER EVENT AND PER HOLE-SIZE CATEGORY<br />
TABLE 4: FAILURE FREQUENCIES FOR GAS EVENTS IN MPT<br />
Full Leak Frequency / Year<br />
Failure Case Id Equipment Small Medium Large Rupture<br />
G1 Pipe Line 6.498E -08 4.959E -08 2.736E -08 3.42E -08<br />
G2 L-360 6.830E -03 6.945E -04 4.921E -05 4.543E -05<br />
G3 V-361 3.045E -03 2.392E -04 4.401E -05 4.742E -05<br />
[37]
G4 Fuel Gas Header 1.978E -02 2.635E -03 4.486E -04 4.274E -04<br />
G5 V-840 6.498E -08 4.959E -08 2.736E -08 3.42E -08<br />
G7 v-843 2.914E -02 2.449E -03 3.718E -04 1.629E -04<br />
G8 Pipe Line 2.025E -02 1.743E -03 2.357E -04 1.230E -04<br />
G9 Pipe Line 6.498E -08 4.959E -08 2.736E -08 3.42E -08<br />
Total for Gas Events 7.9E -02 7.76E -03 1.15E -03 8.07E -04<br />
The failure case G1, which is a leak from the Raageshwari gas pipeline within PT, is the only<br />
gas failure case where a small leak has been excluded. This is due to the reason that the<br />
pipeline is buried and is 1.5m deep. Small and medium leaks resulting from this pipeline<br />
can be neglected as the consequence is very small. The main contributor to the leak<br />
frequency for these cases is the large amount of process piping in this segment (an<br />
estimated total of 5,500m of process piping).<br />
FIGURE 10: PROCESS LIQUID LEAK FREQUENCY PER EVENT AND HOLE-SIZE CATEGORY<br />
TABLE 5: FAILURE FREQUENCY APPLIED FOR LIQUID EVENTS ON MPT<br />
Full Leak Frequency / Year<br />
Failure Case<br />
Id<br />
Equipment Small Medium Large Rupture<br />
L4 D-214 - - 3.00E -04 6.00E -05<br />
L6 V-217 2.63E -03 2.24E -04 3.88E -04 2.26E -05<br />
L8 D-224 - - 3.00E -04 6.00E -05<br />
[38]
L10 V-227 2.63E -03 2.24E -04 3.88E -04 2.26E -05<br />
D-250 A<br />
3.00E -04 6.00E -05<br />
L11<br />
D-250 B 3.00E -04 6.00E -05<br />
- -<br />
D-250 C 3.00E -04 6.00E -05<br />
D-250 D 3.00E -04 6.00E -05<br />
L12 Pipeline 4.23E -03 3.29E -04 5.03E -05 2.25E -05<br />
L13 P-251A/B/C/D 5.51E -04 9.95E -05 2.87E -05 2.88E -05<br />
L17<br />
Raageshwari<br />
condensate<br />
pipeline<br />
1.28E -07 1.08E -07 4.07E -08 3.58E -06<br />
L18<br />
Diesel Storage<br />
Tanks -<br />
- 3.00E -04 6.00E -05<br />
L19<br />
Export Oil<br />
Pipeline<br />
3.65E -02 4.62E -03 9.24E -04 4.16E -03<br />
Total for liquid event 1.04E -02 5.13E -02 5.30E -02 5.12E -03<br />
The largest contributors to the liquid leak frequency are the L19 case, which represent the<br />
isolatable sections containing the MPT export pipelines and L12containing Pipeline from V-<br />
217/227 to export oil storage tanks. The high frequency in this area is because of a large<br />
length of piping.<br />
Pipeline Leaks<br />
The gas and condensate pipeline failure frequencies are based on the failure rates<br />
presented in the 6 th European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG) report which<br />
presents data from 1970 to 2004. The required criteria for an incident to be recorded in the<br />
EGIG database are as follows:<br />
• The incident must lead to an unintentional release<br />
• The pipeline must be made of steel<br />
• The pipeline must be onshore<br />
• The pipeline must have a design pressure higher than 15 bar<br />
• The pipeline must be located outside the fences of the installation<br />
[39]
The failure frequency over the past five years (2000-2004) is equal to less than half of the<br />
primary failure frequency over the entire period (1970-2004), showing the improved<br />
performance over recent years. For new pipelines it is recommended to use the base<br />
frequencies for the 2000 to 2004 period as shown below in Table 3.<br />
TABLE 6: BASE LEAK FREQUENCY FROM EGIG<br />
Period Frequency (Per Km/Yr Frequency<br />
1970 – 2004 4.10E – 04 4.10E – 07<br />
2000 - 2004 1.70E – 04 1.70E - 078<br />
However, the report also shows that large diameter pipelines are less vulnerable to third<br />
party damage due to their thicker walls, and their greater hazard potential may make them<br />
more likely to have procedural controls to prevent external interference. Small diameter<br />
pipelines may be more vulnerable to all types of failure, particularly corrosion and natural<br />
hazards, due to their smaller wall thickness.<br />
Once distributed across the different hole-sizes, the resulting pipeline leak frequencies per<br />
hole-size for DN100 and DN300 are defined as follows in Table 29:<br />
TABLE 7: USED PIPELINE FAILURE FREQUENCY FOR DN100 AND DN300<br />
Frequency (Per/Yr)<br />
Pipe Size Small Medium Large Full Bore Total<br />
100 1.41E -07 1.08E -07 4.25E -08 n/a 2.91E -07<br />
300 6.54E -08 5.01E -08 1.97E -08 3.58E -08 1.71E -07<br />
The condensate line is 100mm in diameter and full bore rupture cases are defined as holes<br />
exceeding 150mm.<br />
The EGIG report also details a number of factors that can be considered in refining these<br />
frequencies for application to a specific pipeline. Effects of pipeline content, pipeline<br />
diameter, pipeline temperature, depth of cover for underground pipeline, material of<br />
construction, corrosion protection and other factors are normally considered in a pipeline<br />
frequency analysis. However, since some details of the pipelines’ corrosion protection<br />
programmes and scheduled pigging activities are not currently available, no modification<br />
factors have as of yet been applied to the base EGIG frequencies. Should this information<br />
[40]
ecome available, a sensitivity study can be performed to assess the impact of the modified<br />
pipeline failure frequencies on the risk results.<br />
Storage Tank Fires<br />
Events that has been included for the tank areas are tank fires in the settling tanks, D-<br />
214/D-224, in the export oil storage tanks, D-250A/B/C/D, and in the diesel tank, D-857.<br />
Full bund pool fires are included for settling tanks, export oil storage tanks and diesel tank.<br />
Frequencies applied for a tank fire is 3.00E -04 leaks per year per tank and for a full bund<br />
pool fire 6.00E -05 leaks per year per tank.<br />
2.2.2 FIRE AND EXPLOSION RISK ASSESSMENT AT RGT<br />
2.2.2.1 FIRES<br />
Slug Catcher<br />
In case of liquid leak, an immediate ignition will result into a Pool fire. The Pool Fire<br />
diameter for moderate leak size (25 mm) is approximately 30 meters while heat radiations<br />
contours of 9.46 KW/m 2 and 4.73 KW/m 2 are approximately 25 meters and 35 meters<br />
respectively. In pool fires flame tilts towards wind direction. It implies that escape routes<br />
downwind up to 25 meters and fire monitors up to 35 meters would not be accessible due<br />
to high heat radiations.<br />
There is no contour of 37.5 KW/m 2 heat radiations for this pool fire; hence no fire<br />
escalation is expected due to failure of any nearby equipment in the vicinity.<br />
In case of slug catcher finger leakage resulting into a high pressure jet fire the flame length<br />
is calculated as 16 meters for leakage size of 25 mm. The duration of leakage would be<br />
approximately 25 minutes taking into account the large gas inventory of slug catcher. This<br />
has a potential of fire escalation if jet flame impinges on any equipment.<br />
1st Stage & 2nd Stage Separator<br />
These equipments have the potential to result into a pool fire in case of liquid release and<br />
jet fire if it is a high pressure release. However the heat radiations from such pool fire / jet<br />
fire are going to be limited to process area north side of pipe rack. Flame of a pool fire will<br />
tilt downwind and jet flame could be in any direction.<br />
1st Stage & 2nd Stage Condensate Transfer Pumps<br />
The leakage could be due to seal failure of external leakage from any valve / flange / piping.<br />
The maximum leakage rate in this case is governed by the max discharge rate of the pump.<br />
The maximum discharge rate of 1st stage & 2nd stage condensate pump is 1.75 kg/s & 0.35<br />
kg/s respectively this can result into a pool fire diameter of 6.7 meters & 3.1 meters. As can<br />
[41]
e seen from detail results the heat radiations from these pool fires are not a significant<br />
issue.<br />
Stripper Column<br />
The release from stripper column is going to be high temperature liquid condensate<br />
expected to be fully ‘stabilized’ which implies insignificant vapours to be generated from<br />
such a release. The main hazard is personal injury due to very high temperature of liquid<br />
condensate. If it does ignite, it will result into a pool with approximate diameter of 12 to 15<br />
meters. Heat radiation hazards would mainly be confined to process area – south side of<br />
pipe rack.<br />
Propane Storage<br />
Leakage of liquid propane will form a pool which may result into a pool fire. Subject to<br />
designing containment for propane leak, the pool fire diameter is calculated around 7<br />
meters. The heat radiations such a pool fire are 40 meters, 31 meters and 13.4 meters for<br />
4.73 kW/m2, 9.46 kW/m2 and 37.5kW/m2 respectively. The distance to condensate<br />
storage tank is about 27 meters.<br />
Another scenario is BLEVE of propane vessel. The consequences of such BLEVE would be<br />
disastrous as it will result into a fireball of approximately 100 meters diameter resulting<br />
into fatalities within 50 meters radius from propane vessel and secondary fires. The best<br />
approach would be to minimize the chance of such occurrence.<br />
Refrigeration Package<br />
The main equipment in refrigeration package is propane compressor operating around 21<br />
bars. Pool fire diameter from a release is calculated around 6 meters. Heat radiations are<br />
confined to refrigeration package boundary limits.<br />
Condensate Storage & Loading<br />
Condensate is stored in cone roof tank. The leakage of condensate could be a small to<br />
moderate leak (25 mm to 50 mm hole size) or a full surface tank fire (in case roof is blown<br />
off) or it could be a full-fledged dyke fire (in case overfill / catastrophic failure).<br />
The pool fire heat radiations are calculated approximately 25 & 30 meters for heat<br />
radiations of 4.73 kW/m 2 and 9.46 kW/m 2 respectively for a full dyke fire case.<br />
If it is a full surface tank fire the pool diameter would be same as tank diameter (~8<br />
meters). The heat radiation would be lower but the duration of fire would be higher. For<br />
full surface tank fire the burning rate calculated is 0.85 kg/s which gives a fire duration of<br />
about 48 hours.<br />
Leakage in tanker loading area will form a condensate pool which can result into<br />
condensate pool fire. Heat radiations for such a fire are calculated as 16, 12.5 & 5 meters<br />
[42]
for heat radiations 4.73 kW/m 2 , 9.46 kW/m 2 and 37.5kW/m 2 respectively. This is on the<br />
assumption that there would be containment around condensate loading.<br />
2.2.2.2 EXPLOSIONS<br />
The main hazard of explosion in RGT is from condensate / propane release which will lead<br />
to heavier than air vapour cloud formation. This cloud will drift downwind and if there is a<br />
delayed ignition it may result into an explosion.<br />
The liquid release from slug catcher, 1st & 2nd stage separator, propane vessel &<br />
refrigeration package have the potential to cause explosion.<br />
The most significant unit with reference to impact of explosion is utility building (housing<br />
control room). As can be seen from the detail results liquid release from slug catcher, 1st<br />
separator, propane vessel & refrigeration package have the potential to cause explosion<br />
overpressure (1 psi to 2 psi) covering the utility building depending upon leakage size.<br />
2.2.2.3 QRA FOR RGT<br />
A QRA study was conducted covering all the proposed facilities under Raageshwari Gas<br />
Terminal. The objective of this study was to establish risk levels and compare them with<br />
appropriate risk acceptability criteria to determine the suitability of the development and<br />
suggest risk remedial measures if required. The risk to life is calculated as “individual risk”<br />
and “Group risk”.<br />
• Individual Risk: It is represented by iso-risk contours, which show the geographical<br />
distribution of risk to an individual.<br />
• Group risk: It is represented by FN curves, which show the cumulative frequency<br />
distribution of accidents causing different numbers of fatalities.<br />
The following results are pertaining to the operation mode when condensate is being sent<br />
to Mangala through 4 inch condensate pipeline at pressure 84 bar. Condensate stripper<br />
column, storage tank and loading are not in operation in this mode of operation.<br />
Risk Results (Individual Risk)<br />
Figure below shows the iso–risk contours representing location specific individual risk<br />
(LSIR). The highest risk contour is of 10 -3 per year which covers ‘Process Area’. However,<br />
the actual risk to a worker will be less after accounting for fraction of time the individual<br />
spends over there.<br />
The other areas where people are expected to be continuously present during plant<br />
operation e.g. Control room/Admin Building; MCC and Canteen etc. are outside 10 -3 per<br />
[43]
year risk contour. The proposed location of LQ is on iso-risk contour of 10 -6 per year. The<br />
individual risk at LQ would therefore be considered broadly acceptable.<br />
FIGURE 11: ISO-RISK CONTOURS<br />
The following table indicates location specific risk at each critical point in the plant. All of<br />
these risks fall within ALARP band.<br />
TABLE 8: LOCATION SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL RISK (LSIR) AT DIFFERENT REFERENCE POINTS IN<br />
RGT<br />
Area<br />
LSIR<br />
1 st Stage Condensate Pump Area 3.50 E -03<br />
1 st Stage Separator Area 2.95 E -03<br />
Slug Catcher Area 1.90 E -03<br />
Generator Area 2.10 E -04<br />
Control Room 3.20 E -05<br />
Admin Building, Workshop,<br />
Warehouse<br />
2.60 E -05<br />
LQ 5.10 E -6<br />
Security Cabin 2.20 E -05<br />
[44]
Risk Results (Group Risk)<br />
The Group risk is shown in Figure below in the form of an FN curve. The results of FN<br />
curves show that the risk is not above unacceptable but it falls under ALARP band. It<br />
implies that the terminal do have the potential of events which may occur in multiple<br />
fatalities.<br />
FIGURE 12: F-N CURVE DAY-NIGHT<br />
Top Risk Contributors (Group Risk)<br />
The main risk contributors in total group risk are Slug Catcher (about 29.35%), 1st stage<br />
condensate pump (about 20.75 %) and 2nd stage condensate pump (about 16.25 %)<br />
followed by refrigeration package and propane storage tank 1st stage separator.<br />
2.2.2.4 QRA FOR RAAGESHWARI WELL PADS<br />
Risk Results (Individual Risk)<br />
Figure below shows the iso–risk contours representing location specific individual risk<br />
(LSIR).<br />
FIGURE 13: ISO-RISK CONTOUR OF TYPICAL WELL PAD<br />
[45]
For a typical well pad (in this case well pad No.1), the highest risk contour is of 10-4 per<br />
year which covers ‘manifold Area’. However, the actual risk to a worker will be less after<br />
accounting for fraction of time the individual spends over there. The other areas where<br />
people are expected to be continuously present during plant operation e.g. guard room are<br />
outside 10-5 per year risk contour. It implies individual risk is quite low.<br />
Group Risk<br />
The Group risk is shown in Figure 10 in the form of an FN curve. The criteria used here is<br />
the CIL Group Risk Criteria for FN curves. The results of FN curves show that the group risk<br />
is “broadly acceptable”. The reason for such low group risk is that there in not much<br />
population in and around the plant.<br />
FIGURE 14: GROUP RISK F-N CURVE, TYPICAL WELL PAD<br />
Top Risk Contributors<br />
The main risk contributors in total group risk are dispatch header (89%) and well blowout (10%)<br />
.2.2.5 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS<br />
TABLE 9: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR LFL AND JET FIRE HEAT RADIATION AT RGT<br />
Leakages<br />
Downwind distances LFL<br />
Concenration (m)<br />
Downwind distances Jet Fire Heat<br />
Radiation (m)<br />
UFL LFL 50% LFL 4 kW/m 2 12.5 kW/m 2 37.5 kW/m 2<br />
Minor – 5 mm 0.8 3.2 5.1 5.4 - -<br />
Medium – 25 mm 4 17 45 35 29 24<br />
[46]
The overall risk levels (both Individual risk and Group risk) are quite low. The individual<br />
risk is low because there are not much process equipments on well pads while group risk is<br />
low because no significant population in and around well pads. The heat radiations of 4<br />
Kw/m 2 in case of medium leak goes up to 35 meters.<br />
Fo<br />
Explosion overpressure worst case radii at<br />
weather condition: 5 m/s<br />
D Flash Fire at weather condition: 5 m/s; D<br />
FIGURE 15: WORST CASE RADII<br />
2.3 HAZARD MAPPING<br />
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) for<br />
Cairn operations have been conducted by independent consultants and these results were<br />
used to map the vulnerability of the civilian population to potential hazards using GIS<br />
techniques. The hazard maps are attached in Appendix B.<br />
[47]
2.3.1 MAPPING OF HAZARD ZONES FOR MPT AND RGT<br />
EGSS has proposed a maximum (high risk) hazard zone of 1000 m (i.e. from 2 to 4 times the<br />
maximum hazard as per FERA) as a conservative estimate. Although the risk from fire does<br />
not exceed 0.5 km, there is a possibility of smoke and initial vapour from crude oil to move<br />
to larger distances due to the action of wind. Thus the moderate and minimal (low risk)<br />
hazard zones are also drawn. The moderate hazard zone is taken to be 3 km and the<br />
minimal hazard zone is taken to be 5 km. The list of villages within the hazard zones are<br />
TABLE 10: LIST OF VILLAGES WITHIN THE HAZARD ZONES AT MPT<br />
S.<br />
No<br />
Location<br />
Villages within minimal<br />
hazard zone (5 km<br />
radius)<br />
Villages within moderate<br />
hazard zone (3 km radius)<br />
Villages within maximum<br />
hazard zone (1 km radius)<br />
1 MPT Legon ki Dhani Legon ki Dhani Legon ki Dhani<br />
2 MPT Khatiyon ka Tala Nagana<br />
3 MPT Memaon ki Dhani Khatiyon Meghwalon ki Dhani<br />
4 MPT Nagneshya Mandir,<br />
Nagana<br />
5 MPT Genero Lego ki Dhani,<br />
Mundo<br />
Khisaraniyon ki Dhani<br />
Sangner ka Dhora<br />
6 MPT Bhilon ki Dhani Bhilon ki Dhani<br />
7 MPT Miyon ki Dhani Gulbaniyon ki Basti, Nagana<br />
8 MPT Jogasariya<br />
9 MPT Sangner ka Dhora<br />
10 MPT Nagana<br />
11 MPT Nagana Tala<br />
12 MPT Lumbhoni Janiyon ki<br />
Dhani<br />
13 MPT Bhaton ka Der<br />
14 MPT Bahton ki Dhani<br />
15 MPT Gulbaniyon ki Basti,<br />
Nagana<br />
16 MPT Khatiyon Meghwalon ki<br />
Dhani<br />
17 MPT Badla Talar<br />
[48]
18 MPT Khisaraniyon ki Dhani<br />
19 MPT Sar ka Par<br />
20 MPT Musalmanon ki Dhani<br />
21 MPT Jasnathpura<br />
22 MPT Jogasarkuan<br />
23 RGT Juni Undri Maliyon ki Dhani<br />
24 RGT Dhinglon ki Dhani Dhandiawas<br />
25 RGT Jalila Dhora<br />
26 RGT Bagta ki Dhani<br />
27 RGT Nagar ka Dhora<br />
28 RGT Junanagar<br />
29 RGT Mandawas<br />
30 RGT Nai Undri<br />
31 RGT Maliyon ki Dhani<br />
32 RGT Dhandiawas<br />
The hazard zone map for MPT is given in the Appendix B<br />
2.3.2 MAPPING OF HAZARD ZONES FOR WELL FIELDS<br />
The maximum hazard zones were drawn for Mangala, Aishwariya, Bhagyam and<br />
Raageshwari fields (including well pads and all operations sites) at a distance of 1 km. The<br />
villages within the Hazard zone are.<br />
TABLE 11: VILLAGES WITHIN MAXIMUM HAZARD ZONES FOR WELL FIELDS<br />
S. No Location Village Name S. No Location Village Name<br />
1 Mangala well field Khisaraniyon ki Dhani 1 Aishwariya Bhellon ki Basti<br />
well field<br />
2 Sangner ka Dhora 2 Madpura<br />
3 Nagana 3 Rauji ki Dhani, Kawas<br />
4 Legon ki Dhani 4 Harupaniyo ki Dhani<br />
5 Jogasarkuan 5 Gajali Jhakdo ki Dhani<br />
[49]
6 Chatarwalon ki Dhani 6 Gajani Jhakron ki Dhani<br />
7 Khanji ka Tala 7 Chittar ka Par<br />
8 Khatiyon Meghwalon ki Dhani 8 Kangalpura<br />
1 Bhagyam well field Bothiya 9 Kau-Khera<br />
2 Bothiya Jagir 10 Sagar Ji Charno ki Dhani<br />
1 RGT and nearby Maliyon ki Dhani<br />
well pads<br />
2 Dhandiawas<br />
2.3.3 MAPPING OF HAZARD ZONES FOR PIPELINES<br />
There will be two major cross-country pipelines, from Bhagyam well pad to Mangala<br />
Processing Terminal (MPT) and Aishwariya well-pad to MPT. Since the pipelines are buried<br />
underground, there is minimal risk of fire. However, as a conservative estimate, a 1 km<br />
hazard zone has been identified around the pipeline as shown in Figure 10 – Appendix B.<br />
The villages in the risk prone areas are:<br />
TABLE 12: RISK PRONE VILLAGES ALONG PIPELINES<br />
Pipeline<br />
from<br />
Bhagyam<br />
well pad to<br />
Mangala<br />
Processing<br />
Terminal<br />
(MPT)<br />
Chinchewalakar Mangananiyon<br />
Chokla<br />
Bothiya<br />
Daluwaniyon ki Dhani<br />
Junejo Mehron ki Basti, Bhad<br />
Pipeline from<br />
Aishwariya<br />
well-pad to<br />
MPT<br />
Nagana<br />
Sangner ka Dhora<br />
Jogasariya<br />
Kangalpura<br />
Badla Talar<br />
Khatiyon ka Tala<br />
Chittar ka Par<br />
Lumbhoni Janiyon ki Dhani,<br />
Nagana<br />
Gajali Jakhdo ki Dhani<br />
Bahton ki Dhani<br />
Gajani Jokhron ki Dhani<br />
Jasnathpura<br />
Kaukhera<br />
2.4 NATURAL HAZARDS ASSESSMENT<br />
The potential natural hazards prevalent in <strong>Barmer</strong> and its surrounding areas are flash<br />
floods, earthquake of moderate intensity and minor epidemics.<br />
[50]
2.4.1 FLOODS<br />
Floods are rare due to poor rainfall in the region but unusually high quantum of rain can<br />
result in flash floods as seen in Kawas region of <strong>Barmer</strong> district in 2006. In August 2006,<br />
the usually drought prone <strong>Barmer</strong> district was hit by flash floods. As of August 27, 2006,<br />
103 deaths were reported in Rajasthan due to floods. The village of Kawas was the most<br />
affected and located close to Mangala Processing Terminal. The water level as on March 6,<br />
2007 was about 3 feet to 10 feet above ground in Kawas. People had to live in make shift<br />
camps for several months. The loss included the death of 75,194 cattle and damage to<br />
Kharif crop was worth Rs.1300 crore. In <strong>Barmer</strong> Tehsil, Aati and Undkha villages alone<br />
nearly 600 people were affected by 2006 floods.<br />
In August 2006, unprecedented floods hit the region and destroyed many buildings and<br />
infrastructure elements. It was for the first time in recorded history of 200 years that such<br />
severe flooding had taken place in this desert, normally known for its perennial droughts.<br />
Many school buildings in rural <strong>Barmer</strong> were destroyed or<br />
severely damaged, rendering them unusable and unsafe for<br />
occupation. Even after the rain stopped, the water did not<br />
drain out, because of an impermeable layer of subsurface<br />
gypsum. A layer of gypsum below the sandy surface prevented<br />
flood waters from seeping into the ground in the region,<br />
slowing down relief efforts. Gypsum is a mineral used in the<br />
building industry. Bodies of thousands of cattle were floating in<br />
the flood waters, causing a foul smell in some areas and raising concern about the spread of<br />
disease in <strong>Barmer</strong>.<br />
2.4.2 EARTHQUAKE<br />
Rajasthan state falls under earthquake zones II, III and IV. Some area of Jalore, Sirohi,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> and Alwar districts fall in zone IV where as many parts of<br />
Bikaner, Jaisalmer, <strong>Barmer</strong>, Jodhpur, Pali, Sirohi, Dungarpur, Alwar,<br />
Banswara , fall in zone III.<br />
Recent Earthquakes in the Area<br />
09 April 2009. A moderate earthquake (M5.0-5.9 termed as<br />
moderate) struck the Thar Desert near Jaisalmer on 9 April 2009. It<br />
had a magnitude of Mb=5.1 and was felt in a large part of the region along the India-<br />
Pakistan border. The earthquake was centred 2 kms N of Mokal (27 kms NW of Jaisalmer)<br />
166 kms NNW of <strong>Barmer</strong>.<br />
26 Jan 2001. Bhuj quake of Kutch in 2001 was felt in many parts of Rajasthan as well. Its<br />
effect was felt more severely in Jalore, <strong>Barmer</strong> and Jaisalmer. Many buildings in these<br />
[51]
districts like schools, rest houses and privately owned buildings had developed huge cracks<br />
and had been rendered unsafe. Many other buildings developed cracks making them unsafe<br />
for further use without proper retrofitting. Many of the public buildings mainly schools are<br />
still lying in dilapidated conditions.<br />
8 November 1991. A 5.4 magnitude earthquake near Jaisalmer caused some damage in the<br />
village of Konoi and was felt as far as New Delhi.<br />
Note: The area where Mangala processing terminal and the well pads are located fall in a<br />
MODERATE seismic zone (Zone III) and there are no incidents of severe seismic activities<br />
till date as per the records available with the local district authorities. However all its<br />
facilities are built to withstand earth quakes of the expected intensity in Zone III category.<br />
2.4.3 DROUGHT<br />
The major natural hazard in the region is drought brought about due to the hot arid climate<br />
and very dry sandy soils. Moderate to severe drought occurs every year. In 2009 alone, 269<br />
villages in the <strong>Barmer</strong> Taluk were affected by drought.<br />
2.4.4 SANDSTORM<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> region where the Cairn facilities are located are prone to frequent sandstorms<br />
which disrupt the normal functioning and operations.<br />
PHOTOGRAPH 5: SANDSTORM NEAR CAIRN FACILITY<br />
DURING DAYTIME<br />
2.4.4 EPIDEMICS<br />
Biological hazards facing <strong>Barmer</strong> comprise high temperatures (heat stroke), fires (burns),<br />
accidents and diseases. In terms of epidemics, <strong>Barmer</strong> has faced mainly small scale<br />
[52]
epidemics of swine flu, malaria and chikungunya. The main reason behind the limited<br />
spread of disease in this region is the sparse population. Thus the impact scale of the<br />
epidemics is small, generally covering not more than 50 people. The single largest epidemic<br />
in recent years was the swine flu epidemic where 35 were infected of which 9 died. The<br />
other major disease is malaria which is endemic to the region due to the large-scale usage<br />
of open water storage tanks.<br />
[53]
CHAPTER<br />
3<br />
3 PREVENTIVE MEASURES<br />
3.1 OVERVIEW OF RECENT DISASTERS<br />
During 2009 and the first half of the year 2010, the petroleum industry has witnessed a few<br />
major disasters, both on-shore and off-shore. These disasters have provided valuable<br />
insights on the root causes and ways whereby the disasters could have been prevented.<br />
The disasters and their causes are outlined below. Lessons learnt from these disasters can<br />
be used to prevent such events happening in <strong>Barmer</strong> district.<br />
3.1.1 JAIPUR FIRE INCIDENT<br />
A major disaster involving loud explosions from hydrocarbon storage tanks took place on<br />
October 29, 2009 at IOC Jaipur Terminals at the Sitapura industrial area. The flames due to<br />
explosion from three of the 11 tankers containing petrol and diesel spread to the nearby<br />
settlements causing several casualties. Further, the explosion also resulted in<br />
environmental degradation of the area. Black smoke formed dark clouds in a two-three<br />
kilometre radius around the depot causing respiratory distress to a large segment of the<br />
population. It is noted from the incident investigation report by Oil Industry Safety<br />
Directorate (OISD) that the IOC Jaipur Terminal incident is attributable to one or more of<br />
the following probable causes:<br />
• Loss of containment and subsequent pool of large quantities of highly volatile<br />
flammable liquid giving rise to a massive vapour cloud explosion,<br />
• Encroachment on to the Terminal premises by land use developments<br />
• <strong>Plan</strong>t/process engineering practices and design susceptible to human errors<br />
• Layout congestion due to successive plant expansion with the finite land area<br />
• Proliferation of vegetative growth within the facility premises<br />
• Non-adherence to standard operating procedures (SOP)<br />
• Unascertainable level of fire fighting readiness capability and training<br />
[54]
Lessons Learnt from the Incident<br />
Cairn has set high standard of health, safety and environmental (HSE) practices and has<br />
conducted various HSE studies to better understand the hazards and risks of the facility. In<br />
addition, the recommendations of the QRA and FERA reports are being strictly followed.<br />
Based on the lessons learned from the Jaipur incident, the following measures/steps can be<br />
considered:<br />
• A buffer zone can be set up around the Cairn facility to prevent establishment of<br />
new settlements and businesses. This has to be promulgated by the District<br />
Authorities<br />
• Periodic training of Cairn field personnel to improve their competency and to enable<br />
them to assess hazards and mitigate potential risks<br />
• In addition to regular mock drills conducted by Cairn, District Authority should hold<br />
multi-stakeholder (involving community, industries concerned, district<br />
administration etc.) mock drill exercises periodically.<br />
• When new wells are being drilled, an area of 1km radius around the facility should<br />
be considered as buffer zone. No new settlements should be allowed to reside<br />
within this zone.<br />
3.1.2 MEXICAN OIL SPILL<br />
On 20 April 2010, a British Petroleum (BP) off-shore oil rig “deepwater horizon”<br />
exploded in the Gulf of Mexico spewing 4.9 million barrels of crude oil in open sea. Five<br />
teams dispersed about 13,000 gallons of chemical dispersants into the sea to remediate<br />
the pollution caused by the hydrocarbons. The cause was apparently a sub-standard<br />
pressure control device which failed to activate at the right time thereby releasing crude<br />
out of the bore hole. Financial loss of approximately USD 30 billion has been estimated by<br />
BP<br />
Lessons Learnt from the Incident<br />
• All rig safety measures, as per international standards, must be checked and<br />
approved by an external agency.<br />
• All rig safety measures should be followed at all times.<br />
• Quality of devices/contractors shall not be compromised during award of contract.<br />
[55]
3.2 HUMAN/ INDUSTRY INDUCED DISASTERS<br />
3.2.1 POTENTIAL CAUSES OF FIRE:<br />
1. Spark generated from grinding works.<br />
2. Open flame hot works in hazardous area.<br />
3. Spark generated due to static charge generation.<br />
4. Spark from defective electrical fittings.<br />
5. Spark from defective instrument / equipment or equipment not confirming to the<br />
area classification.<br />
6. Lightening<br />
7. Sparks from the exhaust of road tankers/ vehicles.<br />
8. Gas cloud formation due to abrupt stoppage of flaring; followed by explosion due to<br />
delayed ignition.<br />
3.2.2 PREVENTIVE MEASURES ADOPTED BY CAIRN<br />
Cairn has taken pro-active steps for prevention of potential fire disasters. Emergency<br />
management teams are in place at facilities, regional and corporate levels. Various training<br />
activities have already taken place including mock drills for testing preparedness and<br />
response. This fire hazards and prevention plan have been prepared with inputs from<br />
Cairn’s previous studies and assessments as below:<br />
1. Quantitative Risk Assessment for MPT and RGT with Risk Reduction Measures<br />
for Occupational Accidents & Risk Prevention/Reduction Measures for the Loss of<br />
Containment.<br />
2. Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment with risk results (individual and societal<br />
risk) with measures for reducing risks.<br />
3. Environment Impact Assessment The environmental baseline monitoring has<br />
been carried out during pre-monsoon season of year 2007<br />
4. Social Impact Assessment to map the risks on the society due to the project.<br />
5. RNAO Incident Response <strong>Plan</strong> 2010<br />
6. Rajasthan Incident Response <strong>Plan</strong> 2008 for managing incidents and emergencies<br />
in Rajasthan (shared with <strong>Barmer</strong> District collector).<br />
7. Emergency <strong>Management</strong> <strong>Plan</strong> 2008 for dealing with incidents escalated to<br />
corporate level for supporting the incident response teams in field. EMT is based in<br />
Gurgaon and follows as weekly rotation system of members and functions from a<br />
well equipped EMT Room and ready to deploy at short notice. The EMT members<br />
meet every Monday to take stock of emergencies and also to hand over to the next<br />
team.<br />
[56]
8. Mangala Development – Pipeline Project (MPP) Team Incident response <strong>Plan</strong><br />
9. RGT Incident Response <strong>Plan</strong> 2010<br />
10. RNAO Fire Contingency <strong>Plan</strong> 2010<br />
11. RGT Fire Contingency <strong>Plan</strong> 2010<br />
12. RNAO Oil Spill Contingency <strong>Plan</strong> 2010<br />
13. Bridging Document of IRPs for the 90 km cross-country pipeline between MPT<br />
and RGT<br />
14. Bridging Document of IRPs for the crude oil export line between MPT, RGT and<br />
Midstream Operations<br />
The fire prevention mechanisms in Rajasthan upstream operations in place are as follows:<br />
• The fire fighting philosophy is aimed to protect the life of personnel and on loss<br />
prevention.<br />
• The fire fighting media in CIL usage shall always be optimized to reduce the effect<br />
on the environment.<br />
• The fire protection systems are kept in a state of readiness which will act as the key<br />
components of fire protection at the facility. These systems will come into operation<br />
immediately during any emergency and will actuate before the response of the fire<br />
crew.<br />
• Containment of any spill and fire fighting facilities around the tank are in place to<br />
extinguish any fire as early as possible<br />
• The fire team is trained about the layout and hazards associated with the facility.<br />
They will be stationed along with the Foam Tenders at MPT Fire station and at RGT<br />
and shall approach only in upwind direction.<br />
• In RGT, the slug catcher with significant inventory and condensate transfer pumps<br />
(on account of large number of valves, flanges and piping) has the potential for leaks<br />
as well as seal failures associated with the pumps. The ability to stop the pump from<br />
a remote location isolates the inventory in case of such leakages. It is therefore<br />
recommended that provision is made to stop each of the pumps from a remote<br />
location in case of any exigency<br />
• Shutting down crude pumping operation and isolation of affected section of Pipeline<br />
(Shut upstream & downstream valves) minimizes potential for fire scenarios<br />
• Fire team shall extend its efforts to mitigate the fire within the given possibilities<br />
and available resources. In case of additional support, mutual help between MPT<br />
and RGT fire teams will be sought by the respective Installation Managers. External<br />
help from nearby agencies / District administration will be sought as required and<br />
all out efforts will be made to control and extinguish the fire.<br />
• The response time should be less than 4 minutes for MPT facilities and for the well<br />
pad 1-18, it will be less than 12 minutes within RNAO.<br />
[57]
• If the fire is beyond control, then the fire will be allowed to burn in a controlled<br />
manner. However the affected facility will be isolated from producing / supplying<br />
oil.<br />
• Emergency Response plans are in place to control any fire incident within the<br />
facility<br />
• Adequate fire protection systems are installed at various stages of process<br />
management to control minor fires. Enhanced fire protection systems are located at<br />
oil separators, well heads, flare area and knock out area, diesel and condensate<br />
settling tanks, electrical sub stations, buildings and chemical laboratory area. The<br />
fire protection includes portable fire extinguishers, Inergen system, fire hydrant<br />
systems, fire tenders at strategic locations within the facility<br />
• Release of VOCs may result from evaporative losses during storage (typically<br />
referred to as “breathing, storage, or flash losses” resulting from operational<br />
activities such as filling, withdrawal and loading / unloading of transport links<br />
(referred to as “working losses”), and due to leaks from seals, flanges, and other<br />
types of equipment connections (known as “fugitive losses”). Additional emissions<br />
may occur from vapour combustion units and vapour recovery units. Systems are in<br />
place at most bulk fuel storage tanks, as well as aboveground piping and pump<br />
systems to monitor emissions and to prevent and control the emission of VOCs from<br />
storage and working losses.<br />
• Where vapour emissions contribute or result in ambient air quality levels in excess<br />
of health-based standards, installation of secondary emissions controls such as<br />
vapour condensing and recovery units, catalytic oxidizers, vapour combustion units,<br />
or gas adsorption media is recommended<br />
• Periodic monitoring of fugitive emissions are to be carried out from pipes, valves,<br />
seals, tanks and other infrastructure components with vapour detection equipment,<br />
and with subsequent maintenance or replacement of components are in place.<br />
• Training of all field personnel/contractor to detect leaks and identify potential<br />
hazard at an early stage will serve as an important preventive measure in the long<br />
run<br />
3.2.3 PREVENTION OF OTHER MAN-MADE RISKS<br />
War: The project area is about 150 km away from Munabo on the Indo –Pak border and<br />
hence the chances of collateral damage during war are high. Cairn India has plans in place<br />
for rapid evacuation of all project areas in case of early indications of war are received<br />
Terrorism / Sabotage: Cairn India has undertaken security hardening measures in place<br />
to deal with these incidents at all its assets in Rajasthan<br />
[58]
Risk of third party activities: With the rapid pace of urbanization and population<br />
explosion, we expect a moderate increase in construction and infrastructure works along<br />
our pipeline route. Hence one cannot rule out unauthorized excavation or construction<br />
works by third parties close to our pipeline. To guard against such activities like<br />
construction or digging up of ground close to our pipeline area which in any manner<br />
damages or affect normal functioning of pipeline, pipeline markers have been placed all<br />
along the length of pipeline and at important crossings indicating presence of pipeline.<br />
Risk <strong>Management</strong> plans are in place for all risks listed above. Cairn will ensure a Permit to<br />
Work and NOC regime is followed for any excavation works along the pipeline. Cairn<br />
security and safety personnel will keep constantly monitoring for any illegal or<br />
unauthorized activities along the pipe line route and take suitable actions to protect the<br />
assets.<br />
Pilferage: The risk of anti-social elements, including organised gangs, puncturing the<br />
pipelines to pilfer oil and gas is also high. People with the mistaken belief that crude oil can<br />
be used directly for domestic purposes can attempt to puncture the pipeline. Normal crude<br />
oil is often pilfered for use in furnace oil for which it is a good substitute. However people<br />
will not be aware of the properties of Cairn crude and attempt to tap into oil pipeline. There<br />
have been instances of pilferage from other oil and gas pipelines in India and is a risk for<br />
Cairn too. As the Cairn crude solidifies under ambient weather conditions, it may not pose<br />
any serious threat either to the surrounding environment or the community. The Union<br />
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gases is working on a legislation that would entail<br />
prison term up to10 years to anyone found guilty of tampering with the pipeline.<br />
Road Tanker related Emergencies: Prior to operational readiness of 24” heated pipeline<br />
for exporting crude oil from MPT to various buyers in Gujarat, crude oil was transported<br />
through road tankers from August 2009 to May 2010. Since June 2010, crude oil is being<br />
transported via 24” heated export pipeline. Therefore, there are no road tanker related<br />
emergencies pertaining to Cairn operations.<br />
Domestic Fire: <strong>Barmer</strong> district has high frequency of fire accidents at homes. Hence<br />
following precautions may be useful from community perspective or even for schools.<br />
In the event of a fire:<br />
• Sound alarm<br />
• Call Fire, Police, and Medical services<br />
• In case of minor fire, use the extinguisher or water spray<br />
[59]
• If the fire goes out of control, then implement evacuation procedures to outside<br />
Assembly Area<br />
• Intimate immediately to District administration to coordinate with other line<br />
departments.<br />
• Implement plan for people needing special assistance<br />
• Follow standard head counting procedures<br />
• Arrange for first-aid and ambulance services as per need<br />
• Do not re-enter building until the “all clear” signal is given<br />
• Determine if arrangements need to be made for transportation to alternate location.<br />
3.3 NATURAL DISASTERS<br />
3.3.1 PREVENTIVE AND MITIGATION MEASURES FOR FLOODS<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> District has witnessed the flood situation during August - 2006 in Kawas and<br />
surrounding areas. The Kawas town is situated approximately 7 KM away from Yennai’s<br />
Loading Bay.<br />
Actions for Flood Preparedness Following precautions have to be taken:-<br />
• Mangala Processing Terminal ground level is approximately 1.0 meter higher than<br />
Kawas area.<br />
• The terminal is connected with a 60ft bitumen road which joins the NH-112 at a<br />
distance of 2.5 KM.<br />
• Around 1.2 meter height concreted Dyke wall/ Bund wall has been provided around<br />
the storage tanks which will protect the tanks in case of flood as well as to contain<br />
any spillage from flanges/ pipelines installed within the dyked area.<br />
• The entire plant shall be shut down safely in case of any forecast of flood situation.<br />
• Linkages with local government in <strong>Barmer</strong> and NGOs for disaster relief being<br />
established to ensure pooling of resources and efforts for flood relief and mitigation<br />
measures.<br />
• Cairn will extend all possible help to the district administration in providing<br />
temporary relief to the surrounding local villagers in case their dwellings are<br />
marooned in the floods.<br />
General tips for flood management<br />
Flooding is usually caused by excessive rain with lack of proper drainage system; it could<br />
be slow accumulation or rapid flash flooding.<br />
• Ensure proper drainage and sewage system in and around the Cairn facilities and<br />
for community habitation areas too.<br />
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• Cairn in coordination with District Administration shall monitor the flood situation<br />
with updates from IMD and CWC<br />
• Related timely alarm/early warning siren could be activated<br />
• Ensure that power systems are shut down to avoid electrical accidents<br />
• Monitor the flood situation and provide proper updation and counselling so as to<br />
avoid panic and rumours<br />
• Have inventory of rescue materials like spade, crowbar, ladder, rope, sand bags, etc<br />
to handle floods<br />
• Intimate Fire and rescue, police and medical departments as per need and ensure<br />
safe assembly in elevated floors/ platforms<br />
• Arrange proper evacuation and have safety verification and structural stability<br />
before re-entry into buildings.<br />
General Precautions for Flood<br />
1) Follow the emergency plan for your staff and neighbourhood.<br />
2) Activate first aid team including cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) trained<br />
personnel.<br />
3) Evacuate to safe zones during floods<br />
4) Use the emergency kit with essential materials like water, dry food, first aid<br />
material, etc.<br />
Emergency Supply Kit:<br />
It shall consist of:<br />
• Purified water for drinking<br />
• Food<br />
• First aid kit<br />
• Simple clothing set/ per person<br />
• Simple bedding with warm blankets for winter<br />
• Tarpaulin tent sheets<br />
• Soap, towel and sanitary napkins<br />
• Chlorine powder<br />
Other Essential items<br />
• Battery-powered AM/FM radio and spare batteries at workplace.<br />
• Flashlight and spare batteries conforming to electrical area classification<br />
• Hammer and nails, crowbar, pry bar, axe<br />
• Mosquito repellent<br />
• Plastic sheeting/tarpaulin<br />
• Cutting pliers<br />
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• Rope, duct tape<br />
• Small shovel<br />
• Pen, marker, note pad<br />
• Pocket knife<br />
• Whistle<br />
Family records and documents<br />
• Cash/ Bank passbook<br />
• Ration card<br />
• Voting card<br />
• Certificates-Birth, school, community<br />
• Insurance policies<br />
• Driving licence/ passports<br />
3.3.2 EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS AND MITIGATION<br />
After an earthquake a large number of people will be rendered homeless and will require<br />
to be assembled at suitable places to administer the immediate basic needs of food, water,<br />
clothing and medical care. It is expected that in an earthquake, injuries will exceed the<br />
number of deaths. Also, if the earthquake occurs at night the numbers affected in both the<br />
categories will be substantially more. Accordingly in earthquake planning this has been<br />
taken into consideration for working out the expected casualties to provide adequate<br />
medical cover. There would be high number of surgical cases in an earthquake and<br />
therefore establishment of mobile hospitals/operation theatres have to be planned by the<br />
district administration. Rescue and rehabilitation operations may be required which may<br />
call for huge requirement of JCB excavators, earth movers and professional rescue teams.<br />
According to NDMA Earthquake Guidelines, six pillars of earthquake management are<br />
highlighted as follows:<br />
• Ensure the incorporation of earthquake resistant design features for the<br />
construction of new structures.<br />
• Facilitate selective strengthening and seismic retrofitting of existing priority and<br />
lifeline structures in earthquake-prone areas.<br />
• Improve the compliance regime through appropriate regulation and enforcement.<br />
• Improve the awareness and preparedness of all stakeholders.<br />
• Introduce appropriate capacity development interventions for effective earthquake<br />
management (including education, training, R&D, and documentation).<br />
• Strengthen the emergency response capability in earthquake-prone areas.<br />
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Here CIL in coordination with district and state administration could take up the above<br />
mentioned points for coordination and implementation follow-ups.<br />
Further community awareness is imperative to tackle earthquakes and children in<br />
particular need practical trainings because they may spend lot of their time in schools.<br />
Earthquakes can strike without warning; the immediate need is to protect lives by taking<br />
the best available cover. All other actions must wait until the tremor subsides. If persons<br />
are protected from falling objects, they could be eventually evacuated to safe areas.<br />
The following safety procedures are to be followed<br />
If inside a building:<br />
• Initiate Drop, Cover and Hold procedures<br />
• If no cover is available, get against inside doorway or crouch against inside wall and<br />
cover head; stay away from outside walls, windows or other expanses of glass,<br />
potential falling objects<br />
• Leave doors open to minimize jamming if the building shifts<br />
• Do not attempt to run through building or outside due to risk of falling objects<br />
• If in a room with no desks or furniture, get against inside wall or inside doorway and<br />
crouch<br />
• After initial shock, initiate evacuation and standard accounting procedures<br />
If outside in open areas:<br />
• Move quickly away from building and overhead electrical wires<br />
• Lie flat, face down, and wait for shocks to subside<br />
• Do not attempt to enter building until authorized to do so<br />
• Do not light fires or touch fallen wires<br />
Identification of safe assembly Areas:<br />
• Earthquake safe areas will be away from the building and overhead power lines<br />
• Keep everyone away from underground gas and sewer lines<br />
• Call Fire, Police, and Medical services<br />
• In the event of aftershocks, staff or community shall be encouraged to remain<br />
calm and stay sitting close to the ground<br />
• Administer emergency first aid as needed<br />
• Do not re-enter building until given “all clear” from person in charge<br />
General Precautions to be taken:<br />
1. Follow the emergency plan for your staff and neighbourhood.<br />
2. Conduct search and rescue<br />
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3. Provide first aid for the injured<br />
4. Assemble at safe places place during an earthquake<br />
5. Take cover in safe places; like under heavy tables or desks; inside hallways; corners<br />
of rooms or strong archways.<br />
6. Avoid dangerous places like; near windows or mirrors; under any heavy objects<br />
that can fall; the kitchen where the stove, refrigerator or contents of cupboards may<br />
fall on you; doorways where the shaking may slam the door on you.<br />
Measures to be taken:<br />
(a) Cairn Team<br />
• Follow the “Drop-Cover-Hold” procedure and follow safe evacuation<br />
• Turn off the water and electricity.<br />
• Evacuate to safe ground<br />
• Conduct head count to ascertain safety of all personnel<br />
• Use the emergency supply kit which contains the following<br />
• Water Bottles<br />
• Food<br />
• First aid kit<br />
• Simple clothing set/ per person<br />
• Simple bedding with warm blankets for winter<br />
• Tarpaulin tent sheets<br />
• Soap, towel and sanitary napkins<br />
• Chlorine powder<br />
Other Essential items<br />
• Class ABC fire extinguisher (make sure everybody knows how to use it)<br />
• Keep a battery-powered AM/FM radio and spare batteries at workplace and at<br />
home<br />
• Flashlight and spare batteries conforming to electrical area classification. Have<br />
spare batteries in each location<br />
• Hammer and nails, crowbar, pry bar, axe (spare pry bar should also be stored<br />
outside in tool-shed or garage)<br />
• Mosquito repellent<br />
• Plastic sheeting/tarpaulin<br />
• Cutting pliers<br />
• Rope, duct tape<br />
• Small shovel<br />
• Pen, marker, note pad<br />
• Pocket knife<br />
[64]
• Whistle<br />
(b) Neighbourhood Community - Assess the level of hazard and accordingly take the<br />
evacuation steps in coordination with district administration<br />
• Follow the “Drop-Cover-Hold” procedure and follow safe evacuation<br />
• Conduct head count to ascertain safety<br />
• The following family records and documents should be carried out.<br />
• Cash/ Bank passbook<br />
• Ration card<br />
• Voting card<br />
• Certificates-Birth, school, community<br />
• Insurance policies<br />
• Driving licence/ passports<br />
3.3.3 OTHER PREPAREDNESS MEASURES<br />
Wind and Sand storm<br />
Sand storm is recurrent throughout the year in the operational region and it may impact<br />
the business continuity also. So some safety measures like reduction in transport, personal<br />
protection like wearing goggles and face masks could be promoted.<br />
Drought and Famine<br />
Drought is perennial in this region. Effective water management and counter strategies are<br />
already adopted by community based organisations.<br />
Biological Hazards<br />
Epidemic diseases are likely to create havoc. Hence preparedness is required. The major<br />
factor in controlling the spread of diseases is information and awareness of the community<br />
about disease. The community should be made aware of the following<br />
• Types of diseases prevalent in the region and their symptoms<br />
• Contact numbers and addresses of nearby community/primary health care centre<br />
• Basic hygiene training (like washing hands, boiling water, etc.) to prevent diseases<br />
such as dysentery and cholera<br />
General Precautions during Epidemic<br />
1. Follow basic hygiene procedures like regularly washing hands with soap<br />
2. Avoid or minimize contact with infected persons<br />
3. Always wash hands after handling any of the patient’s belongings<br />
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4. Cover your mouth and nose when coughing or sneezing.<br />
5. Only give food and medicines to the patients as prescribed by the doctor/nurse<br />
6. Drink only purified (boiled and filtered) water<br />
3.4 TRAINING NEEDS ANALYSIS<br />
The advanced fire fighting and SCBA training shall be imparted to identified group of<br />
personnel who will act as a fire response team to fight the fires. A basic fire fighting<br />
training is compulsory to all employees, consultants, contract personnel and catering staff<br />
in order to have a fundamental knowledge of first aid fire fighting and to respond to the<br />
fires in the incipient stage. There shall be regular mock drills once a month. IM shall be<br />
responsible for conducting the drills on regular basis. Field HSE team shall be responsible<br />
for maintaining records of the drills. Besides this, CIL could also consider participatory<br />
training for neighbourhood community.<br />
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CHAPTER<br />
4<br />
4 MAINSTREAMING DM CONCERNS INTO<br />
DEVELOPMENTAL PLANS/PROGRAMMES<br />
4.1 DISASTER DEVELOPMENT CONTINUUM<br />
Natural disasters occur when societies or communities are exposed to potentially<br />
hazardous events, emanating from both natural hazards such as extremes of rainfall,<br />
temperature, sandstorm, tectonic movements, and human/ industry induced hazards like<br />
gas/oil pipeline leakage or tank fire or well blowout or any other chemical leakages.<br />
Reducing the number and effects of nature induced or industry triggered disasters means<br />
consolidating development gains which in turn promotes sustainability. With increasing<br />
frequency of disasters, countries face situations in which scarce resources that were<br />
earmarked to development projects have to be diverted for relief and reconstruction.<br />
<strong>Disaster</strong> is defined as a cause and product of failed development, outlining the relationship<br />
between the two concepts i.e. ‘disaster’ and ‘development’. Sustainable Development is<br />
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of<br />
future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the<br />
concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding<br />
priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and<br />
social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs<br />
(Brundtland Commission report, 1987). <strong>Disaster</strong>s and development are inversely related as<br />
evident in the following facts:<br />
4.1.1 DISASTERS AFFECT DEVELOPMENT<br />
<strong>Disaster</strong>s resulting from natural hazards killed on an average more than 60,000 people<br />
each year between 1992 and 2001. They affected on an average 211 million people per<br />
year (1991-2000) through damage to homes, property, crops, livestock and local<br />
infrastructure. Associated economic losses from major disasters currently exceed US $90<br />
billion a year; this excludes losses from to small and medium scale disasters. Some single<br />
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disaster impacts result in economic losses in excess of national Gross Domestic Product<br />
(GDP), generating negative growth as witnessed in the case of Indian Ocean Tsunami of<br />
2004.<br />
The number of people affected indirectly by disasters, for example by rising prices or losses<br />
to livelihoods caused by adverse economic consequences is incalculable. Additionally,<br />
disasters (small, medium and large) erode the gains of social welfare. Lack of disaster risk<br />
considerations in the recovery following major disasters leads to investing in “construction<br />
and reconstruction of risk” thereby perpetuating unsustainable human development.<br />
Poverty alleviation, good governance and other sustainable development activities in line<br />
with the Millennium Development Goals (placed by United Nations in 2000) are challenged<br />
owing to compounding disaster losses and risks.<br />
4.1.2 DEVELOPMENT AFFECTS DISASTERS<br />
Developing countries are hit hardest by disasters. Between 1992 and 2001, 96 per cent<br />
deaths from natural disasters were reported in countries classified by the UNDP as medium<br />
and low on human development. Over the same period, 98 per cent of those directly<br />
affected lived in these countries. While only 11 per cent of the people exposed to natural<br />
hazards live in countries with low levels of human development, they account for more<br />
than 53 per cent of total recorded deaths.<br />
Levels of development and disaster risks of a country are clearly, closely linked.<br />
Appropriate development policies, by factoring disaster risk concerns, can help reduce<br />
disaster losses, protect existing development gains and avoid new risks. <strong>Disaster</strong>- sensitive<br />
development policies can thus, help in the achievement of the Millennium Development<br />
Goals. For example a study conducted on the impacts of disaster portrays nearly: 12 % of<br />
national revenue is lost in disaster response, 2 % of Gross Domestic Product is eroded due<br />
to disasters and 6 % of population are affected by <strong>Disaster</strong>s either directly or indirectly.<br />
The growing body of knowledge on the relationships between disasters and development<br />
indicates four basic themes. These themes are captured in the Figure given below.<br />
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(- +)<br />
Development can increase<br />
vulnerability<br />
Development Realm<br />
Development can decrease<br />
vulnerability<br />
(- +)<br />
Negative<br />
Realm<br />
<strong>Disaster</strong> can set back<br />
development.<br />
<strong>Disaster</strong>s can provide development<br />
opportunities.<br />
Positive<br />
Realm<br />
(- -)<br />
<strong>Disaster</strong> Realm<br />
(+ -)<br />
FIGURE 16: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISASTERS AND DEVELOPMENT<br />
Source: UNDP, India<br />
4.2 NEGATIVE REALM<br />
<strong>Disaster</strong>s set back development programme destroying years of development<br />
initiatives.<br />
The examples in this realm include infrastructure destroyed by flood or drought which<br />
predominantly affect rural economy and similarly, earthquake or Industrial <strong>Disaster</strong> may<br />
affect urban economy. We can take the example of Bhopal Gas tragedy which has affected<br />
millions of people and the people are still battling over litigation and compensation issues.<br />
The Mexican Gulf oil spill recently involving British Petroleum has a huge impact on<br />
environment and the full scale of impact is yet to be ascertained. BP is overall spending<br />
nearly US $30 billion for overall <strong>Disaster</strong> response consisting of compensation and<br />
environmental cleanup.<br />
Artificial embankments along rivers restrict the natural movement of rivers and prevent<br />
spill -over onto the floodplains during monsoons. Human settlements come up on these<br />
low-lying floodplains. Often during the monsoon season, very heavy rainfall along with<br />
release of water from reservoirs upstream lead to rivers breaching their embankments and<br />
flooding human settlements.<br />
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4.3 POSITIVE REALM<br />
Rebuilding after a disaster provides significant opportunities to initiate<br />
development programmes<br />
The ownership-driven housing reconstruction programmes initiated by the Government of<br />
Gujarat after the 2001 Gujarat earthquake helped build local community’s skills in safer<br />
reconstruction and strengthened community leadership. After the 2004 tsunami, several<br />
state governments in India expressed that the disaster presented them with an opportunity<br />
to apply the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) notification. This would help them regulate<br />
development activities and land-use along India’s coasts in the area falling within 500<br />
meters of the high tide line and in the inter-tidal zone, by rebuilding coastal villages out of<br />
the immediate CRZ. It is said that every disaster is an opportunity to improve the resilience<br />
and safety of communities. It provides opportunities to overall revamp the mitigation<br />
efforts to prevent future disasters from happening.<br />
4.4 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES ADDRESSING DRR<br />
There are a number of ongoing development initiatives of the Government of India that<br />
have included components to help reduce disaster vulnerability. Some of these are:<br />
• Integrated Wasteland Development Programme (IWDP)<br />
• Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP)<br />
• Desert Development Programme (DDP)<br />
• Flood Control Programmes<br />
• National A forestation and Eco development Programme (NA&ED)<br />
• National Rural Health Mission (NHRM)<br />
• Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM)<br />
• National Cyclone Mitigation Project<br />
• National Programme for Capacity Building of Engineers in Earthquake Risk<br />
<strong>Management</strong> (NPCBEERM)<br />
[70]
• National Programme for Capacity Building of Architects in Earthquake Risk<br />
<strong>Management</strong> (NPCBAERM)<br />
• Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP)<br />
• Crop Insurance<br />
• Indira Awaz Yojana (IAY)<br />
• Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rojgar Yojana (SJSRY)<br />
• Sampoorna Grameen Rojgar Yojana (SGRY)<br />
• Food for Work<br />
4.5 ROLE OF CIL<br />
Now taking cue from the disaster-development linkage, it is pertinent to address the<br />
mainstreaming disaster management in to all facets of development. It is not enough to<br />
merely address the short term disaster management with stand alone programmes. Both<br />
government agencies and CIL may be required to work together on long term<br />
developmental issues in <strong>Barmer</strong> region which is backward, socially and economically. It is<br />
an opportunity to mainstream sustainable development and disaster management<br />
concerns into development. This could cover building disaster resilient schools, better<br />
water management, improving green cover, improvising livelihood programmes for youth<br />
and poor, promoting gender equity, etc. Finally what is most important is to inculcate the<br />
‘culture of safety’ among people.<br />
4.5.1 CIL DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES<br />
CIL has already initiated number of development programmes through its CSR wing in<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> district. According to the Human Development Report of 2009, it is recorded and<br />
appreciated that CIL is able to make meaningful developmental impacts. The extract is<br />
stated below:<br />
“Cairns when set its foot on the soil of <strong>Barmer</strong> to explore oil, it took projects under<br />
Corporate Social Responsibility and its dairy project is one the major programme. The<br />
breed improvement programme, which is a part of the Dairy initiative, was also launched<br />
with the presentation of a good breed bull to one of the Self Help Groups. The project aims<br />
to increase the income of rural milk producers by facilitating the establishment of a<br />
[71]
collection network of milk in the villages and bulk milk sales to the end user and thus<br />
providing the farmers an assured and remunerative outlet for their milk production.<br />
“For us it is like fortune has knocked upon our door,” said Mukna Ram a resident of village<br />
Raawli Naadi where the dairy collection centre had started making it the fifth village<br />
connected to the project. As part of IFC- Cairn India Linkage Programme, activities have<br />
been started to support the dairy development initiative in a number of villages in the<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> district. The NGO– Society to Uplift Rural Economy (SURE), <strong>Barmer</strong>- is responsible<br />
for implementing the programme.<br />
4.5.2 CIVIL SOCIETY PARTNERSHIP<br />
CIL has been proactively engaging civil society partners for various developmental<br />
programmes and now it is initiating vulnerability reduction and risk management as part<br />
of disaster management.<br />
Due to the high incidence of fires in the settlements, emphasis is being laid by local NGOs in<br />
partnership with CIL on the protection of life and property from fire. SURE has initiated a<br />
programme to build fire-proof huts using local materials and incorporating indigenous<br />
knowledge and traditional practices. This fire proofing scheme have been initiated in two<br />
villages as a pilot project. SURE and Dhara Sansthan are also working on raising awareness<br />
among community about fire safety and fire prevention measures.<br />
During the flood of 2006, the local NGOs and Cairn jointly contributed to rescue, relief and<br />
rehabilitation. Cairn provided boats and helicopters to rescue stranded people. They also<br />
initiated relief measures like providing food, water, sanitation and temporary shelter.<br />
Dhara Sansthan prepared a damage assessment report on the impact of disaster on<br />
community.<br />
[72]
CHAPTER<br />
5<br />
5 PREPAREDNESS MEASURES<br />
<strong>Disaster</strong> preparedness is the key to prevent and mitigate major disasters. As the saying<br />
goes every hazard does not have to turn in to a disaster what divides them is the level of<br />
preparedness. Here, the community participation and involvement in all phases of disaster<br />
management is essential.<br />
5.1 RESOURCES AVAILABILITY<br />
Resource Inventory (personnel and equipments) and contingency plan are pertinent part<br />
of preparedness. For example in India <strong>Disaster</strong> Resource Network (IDRN) various <strong>Disaster</strong><br />
<strong>Management</strong> related resource information is collated and shared at national and state<br />
levels. IDRN is an online inventory designed as a decision making tool for the government<br />
administrators and crisis managers to coordinate effective emergency response operations<br />
in the shortest possible time (http://www.idrn.gov.in).<br />
An inventory of resources available at Cairn and district level was carried out and is<br />
provided in Appendix E. This DMP plan suggests that inventory of resources shall be<br />
periodically updated and uploaded in both Cairn and <strong>Barmer</strong> District administration<br />
websites respectively.<br />
5.2 COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN DISASTER PREPAREDNESS<br />
It is imperative to have community involvement in the <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>Plan</strong> with<br />
focus on all phases of disaster management: Pre-disaster, during disaster and post disaster<br />
phases. CIL already has strong community linkages through its Corporate Social<br />
Responsibility (CSR) programmes as stated in the previous chapter. This community base<br />
could be used with participatory approaches to address the hazards and risk factors as part<br />
of disaster management plan. Here the community-based disaster management (CBDM)<br />
model could be used extensively as a part of comprehensive <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> vis-a-vis<br />
CIL operations.<br />
[73]
5.2.1 NEED FOR COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION<br />
Community participation in disaster risk reduction is one of the key factors in reducing<br />
vulnerability and increasing resilience of people. Analyses of response to past disasters<br />
could be useful for review and preventive action. This has resulted in developing<br />
mechanisms to mitigate disasters at the grassroots level through participation of<br />
communities. Communities being the first responder and having more contextual<br />
familiarity with hazards and available resources are in better position in planning and<br />
executing immediate rescue and relief actions. In areas that have experienced repeated<br />
disasters, the communities are realizing that they need to work out a plan to prevent losses<br />
and at the same time enable faster recovery in the event of an emergency situation. To<br />
convert this realization into an effective plan, they need guidelines which will help them to<br />
prepare their own Community Based <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> plans to safeguard lives,<br />
livelihood and property.<br />
PHOTOGRAPH 7: COMMUNITY CONSULTATION<br />
AT JOGASAR KUAN<br />
PHOTOGRAPH 6: CONSULTATION WITH<br />
VILLAGE HEAD AND MEMBERS<br />
5.2.2 SALIENT FEATURES OF CBDM<br />
The primary goal of CBDM is to reduce vulnerability of the concerned community and<br />
strengthen its existing capacity to cope with disasters. The approach of preparing the<br />
CBDM plans should be facilitated by government and civil society organisations with<br />
people’s participation as a necessary pre-requisite for disaster management. By involving<br />
the community in the preparedness phase, it not only increases the likelihood of<br />
coordinated-action by the communities to help in mitigating disasters but also brings the<br />
community together to address the issue collectively. There are evidences of collective and<br />
coordinated action yielding good results and to a great extent it has been effective in<br />
lessening the impact of disaster.<br />
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5.2.3 COMPONENTS FOR CBDM<br />
a. Formation of Village <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Committee (VDMC)<br />
VDMC can be ideally formed in each village which is prone to multihazards for initiating<br />
disaster preparedness activities. It consists of local elected representatives, grass root level<br />
government functionaries, local Non-Government Organisations (NGOs)/Community Based<br />
Organizations (CBOs), members of youth groups such as the National Service Scheme (NSS)<br />
and Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangatan (NYKS), women groups, youth club members, grass root<br />
level government functionaries, etc. The size of VDMC is based on the population and need<br />
of the villagers. The head of the VDMC takes a lead in mobilizing the community for the<br />
preparation of the CBDP plans.<br />
b. Review & Analysis of Past <strong>Disaster</strong>s:<br />
It refers to prioritizing disasters based on its frequency and analysis of past <strong>Disaster</strong>s and<br />
the estimated losses. This can be carried out by taking the help of elderly people of the<br />
village. The villagers analyze the losses that they had incurred during various disasters and<br />
learn the best practices carried out. This is an important activity as it forms the basis for<br />
preparedness and mitigation plans.<br />
c. Seasonality Calendar of <strong>Disaster</strong>s<br />
While analyzing the past experiences pertaining to various natural disasters, communities<br />
develop the seasonality calendar based on the occurrence of disaster events.<br />
d. Mapping Exercises<br />
One of the most important activities of the CBDP is the mapping of risk, vulnerabilities and<br />
capacities of the village by the community itself. This is done through Participatory Rural<br />
Appraisal (PRA) exercise. It aims to provide a pictorial base to the planning process<br />
especially for the semi – literate populace and ensures maximum community involvement<br />
across gender, caste, class and other divides. The mapping excercise includes: a) Social<br />
Mapping, b) Resource Mapping, c) Risk and Vulnerability Mapping d) Opportunity Mapping<br />
and e) Evacuation Routes Mapping<br />
5.2.4 CULTURE OF PREVENTION<br />
With the ever increase in the number of disasters causing huge loss to life and property,<br />
the urgency of developing a culture of prevention is of prime importance. The culture of<br />
prevention harnesses human potential with adequate skill, knowledge and confidence to<br />
cope with the severe impacts of various hazards. Experiences have shown that some of the<br />
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most successful risk reduction initiatives have involved communities in understanding the<br />
risk of that locality and designing appropriate preparedness and response plan. The<br />
Community Based <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>Plan</strong> (CBDM) transforms vulnerable groups into<br />
disaster resilient communities. NGOs play a key role in facilitating and supporting the<br />
community in the development of Community Based <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>Plan</strong>s to built<br />
disaster resilient communities.<br />
5.3 CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF COMMUNITY BASED DISASTER<br />
MANAGEMENT<br />
Normally CBDM programme needs to include the following elements in its design,<br />
adaptation and implementation:<br />
Participation: It is necessary to involve community members in the entire cycle of disaster<br />
management: risk assessment, preparedness and mitigation, and response. Community<br />
participation in decision-making and implementation increases the programme ownership<br />
and benefits and brings accountability.<br />
Inclusiveness: The programme needs to target the most vulnerable sectors and groups,<br />
along with other communities. Including social groups with least access to resources has an<br />
empowering impact. The vulnerable groups include women, children, elderly, people with<br />
disabilities, chronically ill, etc.<br />
Responsiveness: The programme needs to be based on the community’s felt and urgent<br />
needs. It should consider the community’s perception and prioritisation of disaster risks,<br />
and risk reduction measures so that the community can be fully prepared for response<br />
coordination during emergencies.<br />
Integrated: It needs to have an integrated approach under which pre-, during and postdisaster<br />
measures are planned and implemented as necessary by the community. It also<br />
requires an inter-sectoral and multi-disciplinary (water conservation, livelihood<br />
enhancement, safe shelters, etc.) approach for sustainable solutions.<br />
Proactive: The programme needs to follow a proactive approach emphasizing pre-disaster<br />
measures of prevention, mitigation and preparedness. It should encompass structural and<br />
non-structural measures, with emphasis on regulation, education, training, and capacitybuilding.<br />
Cairn is making significant contribution to various community based programmes. One of<br />
the significant problems faced in <strong>Barmer</strong> district is perennial drought situation. To address<br />
the water shortage problem rain water harvesting model is initiated with community<br />
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participation. Here either ‘tanka’ or ‘nadi’ (artificial storage pond) is created to store water<br />
during rainy season. CIL is supporting such programmes wherever possible in villages<br />
adjoining <strong>Barmer</strong> district.<br />
Similarly biological hazards like H1N1 Pandemic Influenza, malaria, etc are handled with<br />
community awareness through circulation of IEC material in vernacular languages, regular<br />
medical camps are organised, and preventive steps are taken by district administration and<br />
CAIRN- CSR team. During the brief meeting with office of Chief Medical and Health<br />
department, it is learnt that many awareness programmes are conducted for community<br />
health preparedness. The district health department is conducting regular Integrated<br />
Disease Surveillance Programmes (IDSP) to combat any epidemic outbreak. There nearly<br />
14 Community Health Centres and 60 Primary Health Centres in <strong>Barmer</strong> district. Some of<br />
the specific recommendations provided by the district medical and health services are to<br />
increase the ambulances, X-ray machines, trained staff in orthopaedic and gynaecology.<br />
Road safety is another concern, since transport vehicles have increased manifold in the<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> district. It has been reported that many accidents do take place involving<br />
significant number of persons. Hence a need is felt to improve road safety awareness of the<br />
vehicle drivers as well as the community members in <strong>Barmer</strong> district.<br />
Community level fire accidents are recurrent phenomena in and around <strong>Barmer</strong> district,<br />
for this strong community preparedness is the key. Community awareness on preventing<br />
house fire is important; besides this, fire resilient shelter construction practices could be<br />
promoted among the community members.<br />
5.4 CONDITIONS FOR CBDM<br />
Social Consciousness: It is necessary that local people see themselves and their communities<br />
as central to effective disaster management and expect to have a say in the development of<br />
local policies and programmes. Social consciousness regarding hazards, risks and disasters<br />
in a more inclusive context of community living and sharing natural resources is an<br />
essential pre-condition for a successful intervention.<br />
Social Organisation: A shared perception of risk and vulnerability brings people together,<br />
leading to formation of non-governmental or community-based organisations. NGOs or<br />
community organisations develop and implement preparedness and mitigation<br />
programmes and promote self-reliance, mutual aid, community obligations through these<br />
programmes.<br />
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Access to Resources: One of the most important conditions is access to resources for<br />
households and communities. It is necessary that adequate financial support is made<br />
available through NGOs, government or financial institutions for implementing a<br />
programme and making it sustainable. It is also important to recognise that other<br />
programmes too have resources, methods, skills and knowledge that complement disaster<br />
management.<br />
Adaptive to Innovations: Local people have knowledge, skills and capacities which they can<br />
use for making necessary changes and adjustments in their living conditions and<br />
environment. These community capabilities need to be harnessed for improving their<br />
preparedness and mitigation measures.<br />
Institutional Framework and Accountability: Such a framework lays down regulations for<br />
sharing and use of natural resources and living spaces, and how transparency could be<br />
brought in the entire process of implementation. Accountability is necessary to ensure that<br />
even at local level there is a culture of compliance with norms, statutes, and codes.<br />
Setting up a Community-<strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>Plan</strong>: Through an incremental approach,<br />
communities need to be guided through small and definite steps towards disaster risk<br />
reduction. It may not be a grand plan. The programme needs to build upon community’s<br />
experiences, and the available internal support and resources.<br />
Community-specific risk reduction measures: Focus on risk and vulnerability to which the<br />
community is particularly exposed. The community needs to establish its own structures<br />
and processes to reduce their risks.<br />
Reliance on Community’s Resilience and Capacity: Recognise community’s resilience and<br />
capacity in terms of resources, skills, networks and social organisations which a<br />
community can use in responding to a disaster.<br />
5.5 RISK KNOWLEDGE<br />
Risk knowledge is foundational cornerstone for community resilience. The awareness<br />
about risk, vulnerability and capacity in the form of existing resources are essential for<br />
community resilience. As the saying goes ‘to know risk = no risk’, therefore the community<br />
members require full orientation on the potential risks and hazards they may be exposed,<br />
so that accordingly the community can be encouraged to be prepared for multihazards.<br />
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5.6 DISASTER RISK REDUCTION STRATEGIES<br />
5.6.1 FINANCIAL AND LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES<br />
Community needs to avail financial services to their households—savings, credit, and<br />
insurance to cope up with the impact of any major <strong>Disaster</strong>. Many households borrow,<br />
more do save, and all seek informal, if not formal, insurance. The choice of these services<br />
depends upon the household situation. Credit is obtained more for economic activities, and<br />
helps to reduce risk (income smoothing). Savings can provide more efficient self-insurance<br />
to help mitigate and cope with risk (consumption smoothing). Formal insurance may not<br />
be affordable for the lower income households, but they seek insurance through their<br />
savings and other physical assets as part of risk transfer. People have been provided<br />
financial resources for income-generation activities largely in the context of either post<br />
disaster situation or even in the predisaster context. Such an access to financial services<br />
often helps people to diversify their income-earning opportunities.<br />
5.6.2 MICROFINANCE<br />
Microfinance services are targeted at poor households, who are excluded from the formal<br />
banking sector. The timing of introducing microfinance for the affected communities is<br />
critical. Though microfinance is strongly linked to poverty alleviation efforts for more than<br />
a decade, its potential for helping households in crisis or disaster situations has been<br />
recognized.<br />
Multiple income-earning opportunities and asset-building through microfinance help poor<br />
households in dealing with disasters better. Besides, MFIs provide temporary loans,<br />
postpone debt repayment and allow clients to withdraw their savings to cope with<br />
disasters and sustain their consumption.<br />
5.6.3 INSURANCE<br />
The insurance coverage of vulnerable and low income populace is usually very thin. The<br />
small number of policyholders and the limited geographical area in which insurance<br />
companies operate make it very difficult for them to spread their risks. If the insurance is<br />
provided on a group basis, it can enlarge the risk pool and provide insurance at affordable<br />
price. As some of the recent disasters have shown (Orissa Super cyclone, Gujarat earth<br />
quake, Indian Ocean tsunamis, Kashmir earthquake or recurrent floods) the catastrophic<br />
risk insurance is still far beyond the reach of economically vulnerable population. Hence a<br />
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proactive risk transfer mechanism in the form group insurance scheme can be promoted for<br />
the risk prone communities in and around CIL operations.<br />
5.6.4 SOCIAL FUNDS<br />
Social funds have established themselves as important instruments for social protection in<br />
disaster management context. Generally, social funds are not coping instruments. Instead,<br />
they are most widely known for their investments in social infrastructure, particularly<br />
health, education, water supply, and sanitation. Social funds at present are not sufficiently<br />
broad-based to cover a large number of risk reduction measures. However, as social funds<br />
increase their scope of functioning, they could be used for supporting community-based<br />
disaster preparedness and mitigation. Already CIL through its CSR initiatives is able to<br />
provide social infrastructure / development programmes. Now it can be fine tuned towards<br />
<strong>Disaster</strong> Risk Reduction.<br />
For engaging the community the following steps are to be taken:<br />
Step 1: Initial awareness building to the community<br />
Step 2: Formation of Task force<br />
Step 3: Participatory learning and action<br />
Step 4: Task force Training<br />
Step 5: Developing <strong>Disaster</strong> Preparedness <strong>Plan</strong><br />
Step 6: Assign responsibilities for the task force and its sub teams<br />
Step 7: Conduct Mock Drills & Simulation Exercise<br />
Step 8: Provide necessary equipments and Links with the Local Body<br />
Step 9: Ensure sustainability on long term mitigation programmes<br />
Step 10: Revision of CBDP plan every year as a need based<br />
5.7 SUPPORT BY EXTERNAL ACTORS<br />
Besides CAIRN’s CSR programmes the community needs to seek the support of district<br />
administration, NGOs and experts. Though the community remains the principal actor, it<br />
always requires the support of external agencies for resources, knowledge, and expertise to<br />
tackle natural and as well as human/ industrial induced hazards.<br />
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Local Stakeholders: As part of community based approach CAIRN could synergise with<br />
other local stakeholders as follows:<br />
5.7.1 NEHRU YUVA KENDRA:<br />
The Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangatan is an autonomous body affiliated with Ministry of Youth<br />
Affairs and Sports. In <strong>Barmer</strong> district it is reasonably active and it has nearly 325 village<br />
level NYK clubs with 20 to 30 members each. The age criterion for membership in NYK is<br />
between 18 to 35 years, which is potentially useful for disaster management volunteers.<br />
Already NYK is conducting few blood donation camps and community programmes. CAIRN<br />
in collaboration with district administration could promote disaster management training<br />
and awareness programmes.<br />
5.7.2 NSS, NCC, RANGERS/ROVERS AND SCOUTS/ GUIDES:<br />
The Education department promotes community services and volunteerism among<br />
students through National Service Scheme (NSS), National Cadet Corps (NCC) and Bharat<br />
Scouts and Guides. CAIRN and district administration could use this youth organisations for<br />
disaster management. As of now disaster management trainings are yet to be initiated for<br />
them. Many teachers are part of Civil Defence, which is useful resource. Meeting the NSS<br />
Coordinators at MBC Government Girls College, it is learnt that two NSS units with 200 NSS<br />
Volunteers are trained in each college. They have taken part in <strong>Barmer</strong> flood relief work in<br />
2006. Apart from relief and food aid they have addressed post flood malaria and<br />
chikungunya outbreak. In addition they have worked in drought and famine as well. The<br />
PG Government College has 3 units of NSS Volunteers and two more government colleges<br />
have 2 units each. So overall six units of NSS volunteers are available which is potentially<br />
useful to promote disaster management awareness and preparedness among the<br />
community members.<br />
5.7.3 CIVIL DEFENCE:<br />
The <strong>Barmer</strong> district Civil Defence is coordinated with Border Home Guards. There are<br />
nearly 836 volunteers trained in fire fighting, search and rescue and other community<br />
activities. The civil defence volunteers are pooled from Doctors, Nurses, Teachers and<br />
Police. This could be used by CIL for any fire emergency and community coordination. The<br />
Civil Defence has one fire tender has 3600 litre capacity of water and 1800 litres of foam. It<br />
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has six member team consisting of one lead fireman, four fire fighters and one driver. Any<br />
emergency communication has to be routed through police control room or district<br />
administration.<br />
5.7.4 HOME GUARDS:<br />
The <strong>Barmer</strong> district Urban Home Guards is manned by one deputy Commander, two<br />
Platoon Commanders, one Head Constable and two constables. It has nearly 360<br />
volunteers. As of now only basic training is given on search and rescue. It requires more<br />
detailed training on disaster management and mitigation.<br />
5.7.5 BARMER MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION<br />
PHOTOGRAPH 8: DURING THE DMP<br />
PRESENTATION MEETING AT BARMER<br />
COLLECTORATE<br />
PHOTOGRAPH 9: DMP PRESENTATION BEING<br />
MADE BY EGSS AT BARMER COLLECTORATE<br />
9 th September 2010<br />
9 th September 2010<br />
It has done minimum disaster preparedness and mitigation activities to tackle hazards.<br />
Nevertheless the municipal administration has fire response mechanism consist of two fire<br />
vans manned by six firemen and three drivers. The recommendation given by them is<br />
primarily to upgrade the Fire and Rescue services. Additional feature is that Emergency<br />
ambulance ‘108’ system is working well with 4 such ambulance plying regularly.<br />
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5.7.6 DISTRICT ZILLA PARISHAD<br />
The Chairperson recommended that disaster management has to be holistic and integrated<br />
in which livelihood, water and developmental issues has to be connected with it. She<br />
opined the need for disaster management trainings and awareness programmes at village<br />
level, especially for women.<br />
5.7.7 JESAI ARMY COMMAND, RAJASTHAN<br />
It is one of the front line army posts bordering Pakistan. Because of sensitivity this army<br />
command centre has good fire safety standby systems. They have 8 fire tenders each with a<br />
capacity of 3200 litres water, 425 litres foam, 2 cylinders each of 22.5 kg of CO2, 75 kg of<br />
DCP. These are available with multiple fire dousing facilities as part of preparedness<br />
measures undertaken at his command base, especially the fire safety measures and fire<br />
tender vehicles with multiple capacities. Each truck is manned by 6 people of which 1 is the<br />
driver, 1 is the head fireman and 4 fire men. Most of the trucks are conventional two wheel<br />
drive vehicles. The following suggestions can be adopted for better coordination: (i) to<br />
have a civilian phone connection for coordination with district administration for any<br />
emergency situation and (ii) to simplify the coordination procedure between CIL and Army<br />
unit for emergency coordination. In this regard the Rajasthan State government can<br />
facilitate a direct communication facility by simplifying the procedures for coordination<br />
and emergency management between CAIRN and Army command.<br />
5.8 OPERATIONAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS<br />
CIL shall have the means to independently deal with all on-site emergencies. These are<br />
identified as potential occurrences in the designated areas within the State of Rajasthan<br />
that are legally placed under the sole jurisdiction and control of CIL.<br />
CIL has developed and implemented a site specific Incident Response <strong>Plan</strong> (IRP) for its<br />
various facilities in the State of Rajasthan. The purpose of the IRP is to provide guidance to<br />
personnel based at the site who are appointed to the Incident Response Team (IRT) on the<br />
actions to be taken in the event of an incident or emergency. It details the procedures to be<br />
followed by members of the IRT to ensure a prompt and efficient response, should an<br />
incident or emergency situation occur. IRT organisations are staffed by site personnel who<br />
are assigned and trained in their respective emergency roles and responsibilities.<br />
The IRP is complemented by the Rajasthan Operations Fire Contingency <strong>Plan</strong> the intent of<br />
which is to provide the Forward Control Team or Incident Response Team (IRT) with all<br />
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necessary details, data and tactical procedures to enable facility based personnel to<br />
expeditiously deal with fire related emergencies in their early stages.<br />
The Incident Response Team will be composed of Field Managers, Supervisors and<br />
personnel based at the site who will be on call at all times while on location for their tour of<br />
duty. Personnel who form an IRT will be informed of their responsibilities and trained in<br />
their role.<br />
If an incident or emergency situation develops, the site IRT will be mobilised, and<br />
depending on circumstances at the time, resources from adjacent facilities will be called<br />
upon to provide assistance.<br />
This IRP contains Incident <strong>Management</strong> Guides (IMG’s) based on the most likely incidents<br />
that may occur; these IMG’s are provided as an aid for those involved with managing<br />
incidents or emergency situations.<br />
5.8.1 MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF EMERGENCIES<br />
The Site / Installation Manager (or authorised deputy) shall assume command and control<br />
of any emergency occurring within the respective facility in southern/ northern area of<br />
operations. Details of the IRT member’s roles and responsibilities are covered in the<br />
respective IRP. All personnel based in or visiting the site are to be briefed on the<br />
emergency procedures and advised of their responsibilities.<br />
Mitigation measures have been deployed at sites to protect personnel, equipment and<br />
property from the effects of fire and explosion. The site Safety Induction covers the rules to<br />
be followed by employees, contractors and visitors in case of an emergency at any one of<br />
the locations within Cairn operational facility.<br />
Control measures employed to limit or prevent the escalation of accidents, incidents and<br />
hazards include, but are not limited to:<br />
• Remotely operated equipment such as ESD and blow-down systems, specific to<br />
the area.<br />
• Deployment of the Forward Response Team, if it is safe to do so, to proceed to<br />
the incident and manually operate equipment, e.g. isolation valves.<br />
• Remote operation of equipment and co-ordination of the Forward Response<br />
Team is carried out by personnel located in the Incident Control Centre.<br />
In all foreseeable circumstances, the prior preparedness arrangements are made for<br />
incident response and the management of emergencies. These arrangements will ensure, as<br />
far as is reasonably practicable, the safety of all persons involved or connected with them<br />
and prevent damage to equipment and the environment.<br />
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These arrangements include:<br />
• <strong>Plan</strong>ning for emergencies.<br />
• Incident prevention, detection, control and mitigation measures.<br />
• Manual intervention.<br />
• Informing relevant personnel of what their emergency response roles are.<br />
• Informing all personnel of hazardous conditions; their response and accounting<br />
for all personnel following an incident.<br />
• Partial or full terminal evacuation.<br />
• Fire fighting and rescue.<br />
• Co-ordination of the response and the co-operation of all those involved.<br />
• External Support and response.<br />
FIGURE 17: ORGANISATION LINKS FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN CIL<br />
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These arrangements extend to the Cairn Gurgaon Emergency <strong>Management</strong> Team (EMT) so<br />
that they will respond promptly if additional logistical, medical, environmental, media or<br />
business continuity assistance is required.<br />
The formation of Incident Response Organisations for Rajasthan is fundamentally the same<br />
for all sites and facilities. The site Incident Control and Forward Response organisations<br />
and numbers are determined by the size of the facility and the location of the site and<br />
organisation in relationship to the Rajasthan Emergency Response Team and Supporting<br />
groups. Figure 14 presents the Organisational links for Emergency <strong>Management</strong>.<br />
5.8.2 PREPARATION AND PLANNING<br />
Cairn <strong>Management</strong> is cognisant of its obligations under the various statutory regulations to<br />
identify, and manage all hazards and their risks associated with Rajasthan upstream<br />
operations and put in place control measures to reduce these risks to 'As Low as<br />
Reasonably Practicable' (ALARP) levels.<br />
The overriding strategy in this regard is to accord paramount importance to the<br />
preservation of life and the prevention of injury. Accordingly, the safety of personnel,<br />
including those directly responding to the incident, will take priority over environmental,<br />
property and business considerations.<br />
5.8.3 SUFFICIENT COMPETENT PERSONNEL<br />
Cairn Senior <strong>Management</strong> and their site managers have an obligation to ensure sufficient<br />
competent personnel are available to cover the roles identified in the site Incident<br />
Response organisation. All personnel on the upstream operations’ site will be competent to<br />
respond, as appropriate, to emergencies. This can vary from responding to alarms and<br />
simple instructions and going to a muster station, to assessing complex situations, taking<br />
correct decisions and allocating tasks.<br />
Selection, Training and Competency Assessment<br />
A formal process exists for the selection of personnel for critical emergency roles. This<br />
selection process includes a formal assessment of competency. Details of the training,<br />
competency and assessment are contained in the Rajasthan Incident Response <strong>Plan</strong>.<br />
All personnel working at the Rajasthan upstream operations facilities shall receive<br />
appropriate instruction on how they will respond to emergencies. This is briefly covered in<br />
the site Safety Induction process as well.<br />
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5.8.4 DETECTION OF INCIDENTS<br />
Incidents and potential incidents are detected primarily by either:<br />
• Fire and Gas Detection System<br />
• Automatic detection of process deviations or leaks<br />
• Personnel at site<br />
The site’s Automatic detection systems are described in the site safety induction booklet.<br />
Instruction on the correct procedure for raising alarms is provided through site Safety<br />
Induction training and contained in Permit-to-Work and other related procedures.<br />
Personnel are trained on manually raising alarms - e.g. manual alarm call points, by<br />
telephoning or calling by radio to the site control centres.<br />
5.8.5 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Reliable communications equipment and support are available for use during an<br />
emergency situation and enable communications to be made throughout the Rajasthan<br />
Field with neighbouring sites, the regional emergency centre and Gurgaon. The radio<br />
centre will be located in a dedicated facility within the operating site.<br />
Communication facilities are available at the radio centre include the following:<br />
• UHF radios<br />
• HF Single Side band (SSB) facility in MPT and RGT control room for interfacing<br />
with Midstream operations.<br />
• Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) phones in all well pads, Sub-stations and<br />
other office buildings.<br />
• Analog phones at all well pads and production facilities<br />
• Mobile phones (outside the rig / operations sites)<br />
• Public Address and General Alarm (PAGA) System at well pads.<br />
• General Alarm System (as part of PAGA) with 3 different tones signifying<br />
emergency categories.<br />
• Emergency siren.<br />
Details of emergency numbers and contacts are found in Appendix A of this document.<br />
During any incident, it is essential that the MPT communications centre be manned by a<br />
competent radio operator, who is responsible for maintaining communications with all<br />
sections of the IRT and the ERT and for passing on information as required to the Incident<br />
Controller.<br />
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All personnel who are issued with communications equipment such as UHF Radios must be<br />
competent in its use and familiar with emergency communications procedures such as<br />
usable channels, telephone and alternative systems and procedures if primary system fails<br />
to raise help.<br />
5.8.6 MEDICAL FACILITIES AND SUPPORT<br />
To ensure prompt response and minimise delays in the treatment and transportation of<br />
patients needing hospital care, medical facilities such as clinics or first response units such<br />
as mobile clinics or ambulances are available in O.B.Camp / MPT medical centre and in<br />
RGT. Rajasthan operations being round the clock operations, the Installation Manager<br />
should ensure that sufficient medical support is available to cover the period of the<br />
operation.<br />
5.8.7 SECURITY INCIDENTS<br />
How to manage security incidents, (e.g. unauthorised entry to the terminal or site,<br />
extortion, kidnapping, etc.) are covered by the Cairn India Emergency <strong>Management</strong> Manual<br />
and site related security procedures.<br />
5.8.8 EXTERNAL SUPPORT<br />
Cairn’s corporate Crisis <strong>Management</strong> <strong>Plan</strong> provides details of the Cairn India Crisis<br />
<strong>Management</strong> Team’s activities in Support of the field response teams in such aspects as the<br />
involvement of external emergency services i.e. Police, public and media enquires etc.<br />
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CHAPTER<br />
6<br />
6 RESPONSE<br />
A response plan constitutes a part of disaster management cycle which takes place<br />
immediately after an incident/disaster which could emanate from either human industry<br />
induced or nature induced. It has components like (a) Alarm/ Early Warning System; (b)<br />
Shutting down plant operations; (c) Communication with authorities (if required); (d)<br />
Setting up coordination mechanism; (e) Search and rescue; (f) First aid and medical<br />
response; (g) Relief and (h) Rehabilitation. The response includes design of plans<br />
developed for immediate response which would be initiated on a trigger mechanism based<br />
upon the occurrence of an event of extreme nature. It also covers the emergency command<br />
structure and operational readiness of Emergency Response Centre (ERC).<br />
6.1 INCIDENT CLASSIFICATION<br />
CIL defines emergency situations in three tiers of severity, related to the scale of the<br />
incident and the capability to respond effectively. The tier levels are based on the Cairn<br />
Risk Evaluation guidelines and their details are given below.<br />
Tier 1 Emergency<br />
• Emergency or incident can be effectively and safely managed, and contained within<br />
the site, location or facilities by operations staff<br />
• Emergency or incident has no impact outside the site, location or facility<br />
• There is unlikely to be danger to life, the environment or to company assets or<br />
reputation.<br />
Tier 2 Emergency<br />
• The incident cannot be effectively and safely managed or contained at the site,<br />
location or facility by operational staff and additional support is required<br />
• The incident is having, or has the potential to have an effect beyond the site, location<br />
or facility and external support may be involved<br />
[89]
• There is likely to be danger to life, to the environment, to company assets or<br />
reputation<br />
Tier 3 Emergency<br />
• The incident has escalated to a level where it has, or has the potential to, adversely<br />
affect the public, the Company’s operations or reputation<br />
• The incident will have technical, media, public affairs and personnel implications,<br />
which require immediate action<br />
• There will be one or a combination of the following:<br />
o Death and / or serious injury to employees, contractors or the public<br />
o Pollution or the potential to cause environment damage<br />
o Damage to Company or Public property<br />
FIGURE 18: TIER CLASSIFICATION IN CIL<br />
6.2 INCIDENT RESPONSE STRUCTURE<br />
The Company’s emergency management procedure for Rajasthan uses four primary<br />
organisations for response and management of incidents and emergencies. These are:<br />
1. Incident Response Team (IRT) based at the various field operating facilities.<br />
[90]
2. Emergency Response Team (ERT) based in the town of <strong>Barmer</strong> in Rajasthan<br />
3. Emergency <strong>Management</strong> Team (EMT) based in the Company head office in<br />
Gurgaon.<br />
4. Crisis <strong>Management</strong> Team (CMT) based in the Company head office in Gurgaon.<br />
Clearly defined and understood roles and responsibilities minimise confusion and ensure<br />
all the onsite emergencies are effectively handled. This in turn will assist operations to<br />
resume to pre-emergency status as quickly as possible after mitigation of the emergency.<br />
Cairn has established an Incident Response Team to respond to any potential emergency<br />
scenario including oil spill incidents.<br />
CIL defines emergency situations in three tiers of severity, related to the scale of the<br />
incident and the capability of the organisation to respond effectively.<br />
FIGURE 19: TIERS AND RESPONSE TEAMS<br />
Details of the linkages between the organisations and how assistance is provided to the IRT<br />
by the ERT and EMT is given below.<br />
6.2.1 INCIDENT RESPONSE TEAMS (IRT)<br />
The Incident Response Team will comprise the following two main organisations:<br />
• Incident Response Team, (IRT) responsible for management and control of the<br />
incident<br />
• Forward Response Team (FRT) responsible for controlling the emergency at the<br />
affected area.<br />
Note: On all occasions that an Incident Response Team is mobilised, the Emergency<br />
Response Team (ERT) Leader and the Emergency <strong>Management</strong> Team (EMT) Leader shall<br />
be notified.<br />
[91]
The IRTs have the responsibility for dealing with all incidents and emergency situations<br />
which may occur at or within their respective area of operation. Where additional support<br />
in the way of resources and advice is required by the IRT, the same will be requested<br />
through and provided by the adjacent sites or in the first instance by ERT.<br />
The leader of the Incident Response Team is the Installation Manager or their nominated<br />
deputy and the Forward Response Team will be led by the designated site Senior<br />
Supervisor who will be trained and assessed prior to being authorised for the role. The HSE<br />
Coordinator will provide Support to the Incident Controller and the Installation Manager<br />
will appoint a scribe to maintain a record of events.<br />
Members of the Forward Response team (Fire Fighting and Rescue) are trained in the use<br />
of all available equipment and operate under the instructions of the Incident Controller and<br />
“guidance and control” of the Forward Controller. All CIL personnel assigned to the IRT,<br />
dependent on their roles during an incident, are trained in Incident Response which<br />
enables them to fulfil their respective roles in a competent manner and trained in the use of<br />
Tier-1 response equipment.<br />
6.2.2 EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (ERT)<br />
The <strong>Barmer</strong> based Emergency Response Team (ERT) will provide support to the site teams<br />
in the event of an incident or emergency, particularly for any Tier 1 & 2 events. The ERT at<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> and EMT at Gurgaon are composed of trained Cairn personnel on a single duty<br />
shift. Sufficient personnel are trained to ensure that emergency positions are filled at all<br />
times. The active duty roster is maintained by the respective Radio Officers and is also<br />
accessible on Cairn’s Intranet.<br />
6.2.3 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT TEAM (EMT)<br />
Based in the CIL Gurgaon Office, the Emergency <strong>Management</strong> Team (EMT) is responsible<br />
for providing tactical response, support, assistance and advice to all Tier 2 & 3 incidents<br />
and emergency situations occurring in upstream facilities.<br />
When the Emergency <strong>Management</strong> Team (EMT) is activated, the Crisis <strong>Management</strong> Team<br />
Leader will be informed immediately and will be updated on a timely basis on all matters<br />
relating to the incident including any investigative findings and decisions regarding the<br />
status of the operation.<br />
The Emergency <strong>Management</strong> Team Leader will normally be located in Gurgaon and based<br />
on information received from the Incident Response Team (IRT), will assess the situation<br />
and activate the full EMT, if appropriate. As part of the transition to the EMT, the IRT<br />
[92]
Incident Controller will provide a situation status report for the Emergency <strong>Management</strong><br />
Team Leader.<br />
Personnel in the Emergency <strong>Management</strong> Team (EMT) are responsible for: responding to<br />
emergencies; participating within an assigned section/role; contributing to the<br />
development of specific response procedures; and for completing any training required to<br />
carry out their role effectively.<br />
The activation level of the EMT will be determined by the Emergency <strong>Management</strong> Team<br />
Leader, according to the size and severity of the incident. Normally, all the positions within<br />
the Emergency <strong>Management</strong> Team will be filled if the EMT is activated. The various roles<br />
within each team will be carried out by the relevant authority unless the scale of the<br />
incident requires additional personnel to fulfil these roles. The exception to this is the role<br />
of Environment Manager, which will be taken up as soon as the EMT is activated. For<br />
environmental events the core ERT and EMT teams will be supplemented by the<br />
Environmental and CSR Coordinators.<br />
6.2.4 CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM (CMT) – STRATEGIC RESPONSE<br />
The Crisis <strong>Management</strong> Team is the CIL corporate body located in the Corporate Office in<br />
Gurgaon with the responsibility for defining response strategy for major Tier 3 incidents.<br />
Cairn’s Rajasthan operations are supported by the Gurgaon based EMT and CMT and a<br />
regional Emergency Response Organisation based in <strong>Barmer</strong>. Mutual assistance is provided<br />
to upstream facilities by the adjacent drilling and construction groups.<br />
6.2.5 OIL SPILL SUPPORT AGENCIES<br />
Tier 2 & 3 Contractor<br />
Cairn has an associate membership with an organisation namely “Oil Spill Response (OSR)”<br />
at Singapore which is the world’s largest international oil spill preparedness and response<br />
organisation. Upon activation/ request from CIL, they provide technical response and<br />
resources to mitigate Tier 2 and 3 oil spills. In addition to the supply of equipment, they<br />
also provide experienced personnel to assist in the response. The Incident Controller can<br />
notify ERT / EMT to activate OSR’s services from Singapore, during major oil spill related<br />
incident and place them on alert. It is the Emergency <strong>Management</strong> Team Leader’s<br />
responsibility to initiate the mobilisation of the contractor.<br />
[93]
6.2.6 HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY<br />
In order to minimise the potential hazards of the spilled oil and the environment in which<br />
the incident response team may be operating in, a number of steps must be taken. In order<br />
to protect the response team, it is essential that a safe working environment be established<br />
before commencing spill control, cleanup and / or repair operations.<br />
Each spill response shall follow standard health and safety procedures in order to protect<br />
the health and safety of those responding and the non-response personnel who may be in<br />
the vicinity and if applicable, the general public.<br />
6.2.6.1 HEALTH AND SAFETY PLANS<br />
Risk Evaluation<br />
A risk evaluation is required as part of the Health and Safety <strong>Plan</strong>ning process. It must be<br />
carried out prior to undertaking any response task (irrespective of Tier size) and shall<br />
define the possible hazards likely to be encountered. All personnel involved must be fully<br />
aware of the hazards and the procedures for reducing or eliminating, where possible, the<br />
impact of the hazard before performing any task. This assessment includes characterisation<br />
of both on-site and potentially, impacted off-site areas. Information collected will be used<br />
to determine the following:<br />
• Need for evacuation of threatened areas;<br />
• Establishment of clearly marked safety zones and restricted areas;<br />
• Procedures to be followed by response personnel in the different zones; and<br />
• Decontamination procedures.<br />
6.2.6.2 SAFETY PLAN (TIER 2 & 3 INCIDENTS)<br />
A Safety <strong>Plan</strong> shall be developed for each Tier 2 / 3 incident scenario. The Environment<br />
Manager is responsible for preparation of a Safety <strong>Plan</strong>, the basis of the plan will come from<br />
a Site Safety Assessment.<br />
6.2.6.3 SITE SAFETY ASSESSMENT<br />
The Site Safety Assessment is intended to prevent uncontrolled incidents occurring which<br />
may cause further damage to the environment or loss due to damage, injury or illness. The<br />
Site Safety Assessment should comprise the following sections:<br />
A. Site Survey – including a site survey form addressing the safety of those personnel<br />
taking part in the clean-up as well as those members of the public who may also be<br />
involved<br />
B. Operations Analysis – involving assessment of the way in which any containment/<br />
clean-up operation is to be conducted<br />
[94]
C. Site Control – including arrangements for closing area using barriers, policing,<br />
briefing and vetting of personnel, restriction of access.<br />
D. Logistics and Supplies – including appropriate equipment, protective clothing,<br />
temporary shelter, accommodation, food / refreshment, sanitation and first aid<br />
Each section should be addressed and the appropriate steps taken to ensure that<br />
requirements of the Safety Assessment are adequately met.<br />
6.2.6.4 SAFETY BRIEFINGS<br />
Prior to initiating work on assigned tasks, personnel will attend a ‘toolbox’ safety briefing<br />
to receive information and objectives of their assignments, locations where assignments<br />
are to be carried out, hazards present in the work areas, measures to be instituted to<br />
protect against the hazards and First aid and Medical Evacuation procedures.<br />
6.2.7 OIL SPILL RESPONSE MANAGEMENT<br />
This part consists of guidance on preparation for action. It includes assessment of risk to<br />
those responding, the response objectives and strategy, the organisations involved and<br />
details of response equipment. This section is designed to help those responding to spills to<br />
understand in advance the expected oil spill scenarios, the ways and means to respond<br />
effectively and minimise pollution of the environment.<br />
6.2.7.1 INCIDENT RESPONSE ACTIVATION<br />
Activation of the Rajasthan Incident Response Team is coordinated via the site Radio Room,<br />
the radio operator will establish contact with the EMT Duty Manager who will, depending<br />
on the level of spill, mobilise the EMT. Contact details of the EMT and support organisations<br />
are maintained in the Incident Response <strong>Plan</strong>- Appendix A – Contact Directory.<br />
Depending on the size and complexity of the incident, a coordinated response to an<br />
emergency situation may be activated at a variety of levels.<br />
The Safety of responding personnel will be a primary consideration in all response<br />
activities.<br />
6.2.7.2 OIL SPILL RESPONSE DECISION TREE<br />
Figure 17 ‘Oil Spill Response Decision Tree’ provides a guide to the Installation / Site<br />
<strong>Management</strong> team in formulating their response to an oil spill.<br />
[95]
FIGURE 20: OIL SPILL RESPONSE DECISION TREE<br />
6.2.7.3 RESPONSE STAGING AND MOBILISATION<br />
Effective response to an oil spill requires rapid mobilisation of resources depending on a<br />
number of factors, one of the most critical of which is the time taken to activate this plan<br />
and mobilise equipment and resources to the scene of the spill.<br />
To ensure efficiency of response, a Tiered approach is employed by CIL in line with national<br />
guidelines. This OSRP takes into account the response time needed to mobilise, transport<br />
and deploy increasing amounts of resources to the scene of a spill for spills of different<br />
sizes and locations.<br />
[96]
6.2.7.4 REMOTE LOCATION<br />
Remote location events i.e. at well pad-18 or some point along the inter-field pipeline<br />
require coordinated control between all elements of the Incident Response Team<br />
particularly when the Forward Response Team is mobilised to the scene. Upstream<br />
facilities specific plans describe the provisions for initial emergency response and the<br />
contingencies which are under the control of the Incident Response Team (IRT) and how<br />
they interact with the ERT / EMT. Checklists/prompt cards to assist the IRT in the<br />
management of oil spills have been provided.<br />
6.2.7.5 OIL SPILL RESPONSE EQUIPMENT<br />
CIL has prepared an oil spill response plan and maintaining minimum required spill<br />
response/ clean-up equipment. Some of the oil spill equipment will be stored at the site<br />
with the bulk material stored at the nearby warehouse.<br />
6.2.7.5.1 Off-Site Spill<br />
The objective of surface containment is to prevent the spread of oil on the soil or substrata<br />
surface and to prepare it for recovery or treatment. This usually can be achieved using<br />
easily available materials (i.e., shovels, earth-moving machinery, trucks, damming<br />
materials, sorbents etc.) to construct berms, dams, barriers, and trenches to divert and<br />
contain the flow.<br />
Containment and damming to pool the oil are important if the oil is to be pumped and/or<br />
sucked up. Several techniques are also discussed to contain and divert subsurface flow.<br />
6.2.7.5.2 Methods<br />
Terrestrial containment techniques are summarised in Table 8.1, with some of the more<br />
common methods for containment being:<br />
• Earth containment or diversion berm<br />
• Containment or diversion trench<br />
• Sorbent barrier<br />
• Culvert and drain blocking<br />
• Soil interceptor trench<br />
TABLE 13: SUMMARY OF TERRESTRIAL CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL TECHNIQUES<br />
No Technique Description Limitation<br />
Potential<br />
Environmental<br />
Effects<br />
1<br />
Earth<br />
Containment<br />
Berm<br />
Low barriers constructed with locally<br />
available materials (e.g., earth, gravel,<br />
sandbags, etc.) are used to contain<br />
• Steep terrain<br />
• Accessibility<br />
• Implementation time<br />
• Highly permeable soils<br />
Environmental<br />
damage<br />
inflicted by<br />
excavation of<br />
[97]
surface oil flow. and low-viscosity oils berm<br />
materials.<br />
2<br />
Earth<br />
Diversion<br />
Berms<br />
Low barriers are constructed of<br />
available materials (earth, gravel,<br />
sandbags, etc.) to direct oil flows to a<br />
recovery point or around a sensitive’s<br />
area.<br />
• Steep or rugged terrain<br />
• Accessibility<br />
• Implementation time<br />
• Highly permeable soils<br />
Environmental<br />
damage<br />
inflicted by<br />
excavation of<br />
berm materials.<br />
3 Trenches<br />
Dug by machinery to contain and<br />
collect oil for recovery or to intercept<br />
surface oil flows.<br />
Used on most terrain types and redirect<br />
them to recovery points or around<br />
sensitive areas.<br />
Likely would have to be likely would<br />
have to be lined to prevent penetration.<br />
• Limited accessibility<br />
• Implementation time<br />
• Low-viscosity oils on<br />
highly permeable soils<br />
• High water table<br />
Environmental<br />
damage<br />
inflicted by<br />
trench<br />
excavation and<br />
if not lined<br />
greater oil<br />
penetration.<br />
4<br />
Sorbent<br />
Barrier<br />
Low elevation sorbent barriers are used<br />
on relatively flat or low-slope terrain to<br />
contain or immobilize minor oil flows<br />
and recover a portion of the used to<br />
block culverts as a means of containing<br />
courses that feed into culverts;<br />
• Implementation time<br />
• Steep slopes<br />
• Storage area behind<br />
culvert size<br />
Winds may<br />
blow sorbents<br />
into the<br />
surrounding<br />
environmental<br />
5<br />
6<br />
Culvert<br />
Blocking<br />
Drain<br />
Blocking<br />
Board, sandbags, inflatable plug or<br />
earthen materials are used to block<br />
culverts as a means of containing oil<br />
flow into drainage courses that feed<br />
into culverts;<br />
Sandbags, boards, mats or other<br />
materials are used to prevent oil spilled<br />
on roadways and paved areas from<br />
entering storm drains or pipes.<br />
For kerb inlets, potion a board over the<br />
kerb inlet and it in place with a<br />
sandbag.<br />
• Limited accessibility<br />
• Storage area behind<br />
culvert<br />
• Culvert size<br />
• Implementation time<br />
Street inlets can be similarly blocked<br />
with a board or plastic sheeting.<br />
7<br />
Soil<br />
interceptor<br />
trench<br />
Trenches are contracted across the<br />
migration path to intercept the<br />
horizontal movement of spilled oil<br />
within the subsoil, i.e., floating above<br />
the water table and moving with the<br />
groundwater.<br />
• Rocky ground<br />
• Water tables >3m below<br />
the surface<br />
• Implementation time<br />
Environmental<br />
damage<br />
inflicted by<br />
trench<br />
excavation<br />
[98]
6.2.8 LOGISTICS<br />
In addition to the initial spill response, on-going response operations must be supported<br />
with personnel, equipment and materials. These additional resources may be stored at the<br />
existing response bases or at pre-determined forward holding points. As each incident will<br />
have unique requirements, incident-specific logistics planning will be required and this<br />
function will be undertaken by the Logistics Coordinator.<br />
6.2.9 COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Reliable communications equipment and support are available for use during an<br />
emergency situation and enable communications to be made throughout the Rajasthan<br />
Field with neighbouring sites, the Regional Emergency Centre at <strong>Barmer</strong> and Emergency<br />
and Crisis <strong>Management</strong> Centre at Gurgaon. Each response/ emergency centre is provided<br />
with a radio room and manned by radio officers round the clock. Communication facilities<br />
that are available in the Rajasthan field include the following:<br />
The operations, drilling, seismic and construction sites in Rajasthan are provided with:-<br />
• UHF radios<br />
• HF Single Side band (SSB) facility in MPT and RGT control room for interfacing with<br />
Midstream operations<br />
• Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) phones in all well pads, Sub-stations and other<br />
office buildings.<br />
• Analog phones at all well pads as well as in the plants<br />
• Mobile phones (outside the rig / operations sites)<br />
• Public Address and General Alarm (PAGA) System in the plants and well pads.<br />
• General Alarm System (as part of PAGA) with 3 different tones for emergency<br />
alerting / evacuation of plant personnel.<br />
• Emergency siren.<br />
• Details of emergency numbers and contacts are found in Rajasthan IRP.<br />
During any incident, the communications centre is manned by a competent radio operator,<br />
who is responsible for maintaining communications with all sections of the IRT and the<br />
ERT and for passing on information as required to the Incident Controller. All personnel<br />
who are issued with communications equipment such as UHF Radios, mobile telephones<br />
are competent in its use and familiar with emergency communications procedures such as<br />
[99]
usable channels, telephone and alternative systems and procedures if primary system fails<br />
to raise help.<br />
UHF Channel 16 is for making initial contact in an emergency, once contact has been<br />
established the caller must change to one of the agreed communications channels for<br />
passing messages and information. It should be remembered that UHF radio is open to<br />
anyone to listen and hence it must not be used to pass sensitive and confidential<br />
information.<br />
6.2.10 OIL SPILL SCENARIOS<br />
Oil is produced at a number of remote well sites and transported from the sites via a<br />
network of interfiled pipelines to the Mangala Processing Terminal (MPT) where the<br />
product is processed and oil separated. The oil is then sent to either the off-spec tanks,<br />
settling tanks or bulk storage tanks. From the bulk storage the oil is currently pumped into<br />
the 24” crude oil export pipeline to Radhanpur / Viramgam / Salaiya in Gujarat and later to<br />
Bhogat Terminal.<br />
6.2.11 CAUSES AND SOURCES OF SPILL<br />
A Tier 1 scenario for oil spill will typically originate from a pipeline leak or a leak from<br />
valve at the well pad or along the section of interfiled pipe work. Other Tier 1 spills will<br />
most probably be from leakages during transfers to road vehicles. Spill size should not be<br />
more than a few tons for these scenarios. Tier 2 & 3 spills are more likely to be the result of<br />
a major failure of equipment or rupture in the interfiled pipeline network<br />
An analysis of the probabilities of various potential sources of oil and fuel spills to the<br />
environment from CIL’s operations in the RJ-ON-90/1 block are listed below<br />
TABLE 14: PROBABILITIES OF POTENTIAL SOURCES OF OIL SPILLS<br />
Oil spill from drilling operations caused by:<br />
o Well blow-out<br />
o Operator error<br />
o Collision incident and loss of<br />
containment<br />
o Failure in storage facilities; and<br />
o Fuelling operations<br />
Oil spill from storage facilities:<br />
o Operator error<br />
o Loss of structural integrity; and<br />
o Structural failure due to corrosion,<br />
manufacturing fault or induced<br />
o Physical stress; and<br />
o Natural disaster.<br />
[100]
Oil spill from pipeline failure caused by:<br />
o<br />
o<br />
Direct impact (collision, sabotage)<br />
Resulting in loss of structural integrity;<br />
and<br />
o Structural failure due to corrosion,<br />
manufacturing fault due to corrosion,<br />
manufacturing fault or induced<br />
o<br />
o<br />
Physical stress; and<br />
Natural disaster.<br />
Oil spilling from transport trucks caused by:<br />
o Driver’s negligence / fatigue /<br />
misjudgement / error;<br />
o Collision incident and loss of<br />
containment ;<br />
o Structural failure due to corrosion<br />
Cairn has developed an Oil Spill Response <strong>Plan</strong> to address/ handle Tier-I oil spill<br />
emergency.<br />
Tier II / Tier III incidents would result from an uncontrolled well blowouts and pipeline<br />
rupture causing a spill of national significance, leading to significant soil and / or<br />
groundwater contamination followed by a clean-up operation. The likely occurrence of Tier<br />
II and Tier III oil spill incidents is considered remote.<br />
6.3 ESCAPE & EVACUATION ASSESSMENT (EEA)<br />
The Escape and Evacuation Assessment (EEA) has been conducted in conjunction with the<br />
results of the Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) and Quantitative Risk<br />
Assessment (QRA). The word escape can be defined as the process of getting personnel to<br />
the Assembly Points and evacuate can be defined as the process of getting personnel<br />
outside the facility fence line and to a safe location.<br />
The purpose of the EEA is to identify safe muster areas, propose primary as well as<br />
alternative escape routes, and estimate the time needed for personnel to escape to the<br />
muster areas in case of an emergency. The Escape and Evacuation Analysis has included<br />
the following tasks:<br />
Identify safe muster areas: In order to assess escape routes, safe locations for mustering<br />
must first be identified. Risk contours and hazard zones from the Risk Assessment are used<br />
to help identify potential locations for muster areas.<br />
Evaluate and propose primary and alternative escape routes: The escape routes have<br />
been identified based on the risk contours and the consequence calculations from risk<br />
assessment (specifically the FERA and QRA studies), high risk areas and hazard zones are<br />
identified. Both routes lying within the hazardous zone and leading away from the zones<br />
are evaluated in order to identify primary and alternative escape routes.<br />
Estimate escape and evacuation time to safe areas: The methodology used for<br />
estimating escape and evacuation time is based on the Emergency Preparedness Guidelines<br />
from Det Norske Veritas – Safety Analysis Handbook. The methodology splits the escape<br />
[101]
and evacuation analysis into several sub-activities in order to get a more detailed and<br />
accurate estimation of the time needed to evacuate from a hazardous area. All activities<br />
from the occurrence of the incident until the personnel have reached a muster station must<br />
be identified. Along with the measured length of the escape routes, the time needed for<br />
each activity and thereby the total escape and evacuation time is estimated.<br />
6.3.1 ESCAPE AND EVACUATION PROCEDURES<br />
The escape and evacuation procedures are limited to on-site emergencies, which are<br />
caused by accidents taking place within the plant boundaries.<br />
Steps in an Immediate Response <strong>Plan</strong><br />
• Personnel safety and accounting of all employees at the site (roll call). This is of<br />
paramount importance.<br />
• Provide medical (or First Aid) assistance to the injured.<br />
• Call for Emergency Response Team (ERT) and secure the site.<br />
• If rescue is required (e.g., confined space), rescue shall be attempted only by trained<br />
persons. Rescue shall not be attempted if it endangers lives of the rescuers.<br />
Securing the site means cessation of all operations related activities including electrically<br />
powered tools, all gas, diesel, propane powered equipment or equipment with open flames,<br />
or any motorized equipment. Vehicles shall be parked-off the site roads and shall clear the<br />
area for mobile fire fighting appliances. An incident commander/Emergency Response<br />
Team will evaluate the incident, organize the team, and give strategic direction to the team.<br />
6.3.2 IMPAIRMENT OF ESCAPE AND EVACUATION MEANS<br />
Escape Routes may be impaired by;<br />
• Thermal radiation exceeding the criteria for personnel (12.5kW/m 2 , threshold value<br />
to be used for escape routes as personnel are expected to escape from the situation<br />
within the time of giving extreme pain, 20 sec.).<br />
• Temperature above the human tolerance level if escape route is unprotected.<br />
• Smoke/toxicity above the human tolerance level.<br />
• Debris blocking the escape route.<br />
[102]
Muster Points may be impaired by the same criteria as those for escape routes, but as this<br />
is a location where personnel will stay for a longer time, the threshold values need to be<br />
stricter; therefore, the criteria for thermal radiation should be set to 5.0 kW/m 2 only.<br />
6.3.3 SAFE MUSTER AREAS<br />
Figure 18 shows the suggested Mustering points at MPT along with the Individual Risk<br />
Contours from the QRA. These suggested muster points are evaluated here in order to<br />
determine whether they are in located in safe areas.<br />
As can be seen in Figure 20, all suggested muster points as shown in Orange Squares are<br />
outside the 10 -8 Individual Risk contours, although one of the muster points is very close.<br />
This means that all the suggested muster points are in areas with an individual risk lower<br />
than 10 -8 per year, meaning the likelihood of having fatalities is very low.<br />
The hazards included in these Individual Risk contours are fire and explosions from<br />
hydrocarbons in the process, steam explosions and steam and hot water leaks. The risk to<br />
personnel in these contours is due to the initial hazard event, and thus the risk from<br />
escalated events is not included.<br />
FIGURE 21: RISK CONTOURS AT MPT SHOWN ALONG WITH MUSTER POINTS<br />
The suggested locations for muster points at MPT can also be assessed against<br />
Recommended Design Total Radiation exposure for locations “where personnel with<br />
appropriate clothing may be continuously exposed” as per API 521. This API standard<br />
[103]
ecommends a value of 500 Btu/hr/ft 2 or 1.58 kW/m 2 (including solar radiation – about<br />
300 Btu/hr/ft 2 ) as the threshold value for continuous exposure to radiation without<br />
shielding. Although some high consequence but very low frequency flammable events may<br />
potentially produce radiation levels exceeding the API recommended value, the IR contours<br />
show that these would impact the muster points at a frequency of less than 10 -8 per year,<br />
which is acceptable to CIL.<br />
Furthermore, not all muster points would be impacted by such an event and enough safe<br />
locations have been identified to provide alternative muster points should one of these<br />
become impaired due to radiation. Therefore, DNV believe that these suggested muster<br />
points are acceptable in regards to API 521.<br />
Raageshwari gas and condensate pipeline events also contribute a risk to personnel at<br />
MPT. These pipelines from Raageshwari arrive at the southern end of the plant and so the<br />
risk from pipelines may affect the mustering points in this area.<br />
6.3.4 COMMUNICATION SYSTEM<br />
It is CIL’s intent to provide a communication system that will operate as follows:<br />
“The PA/GA system shall be suitable to annunciate both audible and visual addresses and<br />
alarm when required to do so. Distinct tones and alarms for muster, GA and toxic gas shall<br />
be developed in detailed design. These tones and alarms shall be addressed simultaneously<br />
throughout MPT, including the Central Control Room (CCR), Operation Base (OP) and MPT<br />
buildings including fire station.”<br />
“In areas of high noise amber/orange flashing beacons shall compliment the speaker<br />
system.”<br />
“The design of the Public Address and General Alarm (PA/GA) system shall ensure any<br />
abnormal event is automatically activated from input actions from any of the safety<br />
shutdown systems, or where activated manually by the CCR from a process upset or other<br />
abnormal event. During any call to muster or abnormal event the PA/GA system design<br />
shall permit operator over-ride for the annunciation of information relating to muster or<br />
abnormal event throughout the facilities”.<br />
The operating facilities will have a recognisable and identifiable emergency signal and/or<br />
alarm to notify all personnel on the site, plant that an incident or emergency situation has<br />
occurred. The alarm tones and their duration comply with the requirements of applicable<br />
OISD guidelines.<br />
[104]
6.3.5 ESTIMATED ESCAPE TIME TO SAFE AREA<br />
The total escape and evacuation process with respect to time are assessed for the following<br />
sub activities.<br />
A: Emergency Situation (hazard evaluation, initiation of alarm)<br />
This is the time from initiation of the incident to the time when personnel have been<br />
warned, which means the incident has been announced on the PA/GA. Some initial<br />
incidents, i.e. an explosion, can be detected all over the plant area and personnel will start<br />
the escape immediately before initiation of the alarm has occurred. Other incidents, like<br />
hydrocarbon leaks, need to be detected by gas/fire detectors or visually by personnel. For<br />
this analysis, it is assumed 2 minutes from when an incident occurs until warning to<br />
personnel has been initiated. This time has also been used in many other DNV assessments.<br />
B: General Alarm on the PA/GA-system (Human reaction, secure site, select escape<br />
route)<br />
Delays in the mustering can also be caused by the time needed to make decisions, i.e. the<br />
time people use to detect the alarm, decide whether to take action, wait, or otherwise.<br />
Experiments and studies of real scenarios have shown that the decision making times can<br />
be much longer than the time needed to move out of the area. This is an important point as<br />
the most preferable escape route given weather conditions and hazard type may not be<br />
intuitive - proper training and drills must be performed to ensure emergency<br />
preparedness. Also, as much information as possible should be communicated via the<br />
PA/GA system to help maintain order and give guidance to the escape and evacuation<br />
procedures.<br />
It should be noted that personnel in the middle of performing an activity or job will<br />
normally be slower to react. Furthermore, the incident itself may cause significant noise or<br />
confusion, thus slowing the warning time as well as reaction time of personnel on the<br />
facility. These factors, together with the possibility of stress, fatalities/injuries, and<br />
management delays, can be used a basis for assuming a certain delay in the response time<br />
from workers. Therefore, 4 minutes has been used as an estimate of the time from<br />
initiation of alarm until the escape activities actually begin.<br />
C: Escape to Mustering Area<br />
DNV has made use of specifications provided by CIL on where personnel are to be located<br />
in the terminal, together with the proposed escape routes, estimated distances to each<br />
preferred mustering point(s), and typical walking speeds to estimate the time needed to<br />
reach mustering points.<br />
Typical walking speeds are:<br />
[105]
• 1 m/s on walk ways on same level, corridors, roads, etc.<br />
• 0.8 m/s in stairs<br />
• 0.3 m/s in ladders (includes the time to go on and off the ladder.)<br />
Actual data on speed of going down a ladder demonstrates that necessary variations based<br />
on personnel behaviour are more meaningful than any variations due to clothing or<br />
differences between day and night. Nevertheless the illumination level will affect the speed<br />
of walking. Presence of smoke or lack of emergency lighting will also affect the speed in<br />
addition to causing confusion. The time to reach the mustering points will be estimated by<br />
using distances estimated from the GA plan, combined with the speeds given above.<br />
D: Time to go to alternative Muster point if main escape route is blocked<br />
This time is estimated based on measured distance of the secondary escape route.<br />
E: Assemble at Muster Area and count personnel<br />
This time will include the time needed to perform a count of all personnel at the Mustering<br />
Point. This will vary depending on how many workers from a given area all muster at a<br />
same location and how structured this process is in practice. Training and dedicated roles<br />
will make this process more effective. As an estimate of this, time to assemble and count<br />
personnel at mustering points has been set to 3 minutes.<br />
F: Emergency Preparedness organization<br />
The time needed for organizing emergency preparedness measures can be estimated as the<br />
time needed for the emergency teams to reach their mustering stations. This time estimate<br />
must also take into account the time needed for emergency teams to prepare emergency<br />
response equipment and to put on appropriate PPE. Therefore, estimating the time needed<br />
for organizing and deploying emergency response teams will be the same as for time to go<br />
to alternative muster point, with a few additional minutes added to account for preparing<br />
emergency response equipment and to put on appropriate PPE.<br />
G: Search and rescue time<br />
The time available for the emergency preparedness crew to carry out their tasks is<br />
estimated here. One of the main duties of any emergency response is to search for and<br />
transport casualties/injured personnel. The time needed to perform these activities<br />
inevitably depends on the situation at hand and will only be allowed if conditions are<br />
considered safe.<br />
In some situations the time available for doing emergency preparedness tasks could be<br />
limited if the potential for escalation of the initial event exists. It is most likely that search<br />
and rescue should be done after the situation is under control and there is no potential for<br />
escalation.<br />
[106]
In order to account for heavy clothes/equipment and the need to find, treat and transport<br />
injured personnel, it is therefore assumed that the search and rescue teams will take three<br />
times as long to return to the muster points as normal escape personnel would take.<br />
H: Transfer to muster area.<br />
It is assumed that search and rescue teams will use three times as long time to transfer<br />
than for normal escape. It might be the case that the emergency preparedness teams return<br />
directly to the mustering points and this time will then be included in point G. Time<br />
estimate is not included for this sub-activity.<br />
I: Evacuation (out of the MPT area).<br />
This is the time needed to transfer to a mustering point outside of the MPT area. This will<br />
be done if decided by the incident commander. If the primary mustering point is outside<br />
the MPT, no further time is needed.<br />
The Primary escape routes are marked as green on the drawings. The alternative escape<br />
routes are marked with yellow and the one included in the time estimate is the shortest of<br />
the different alternative routes leading out of the MPT. The distances have been measured<br />
from the furthest part of the selected areas to the mustering points.<br />
TABLE 15: TOTAL TIME FOR ESCAPE AND EVACUATION IN MPT<br />
Area<br />
Escape and Evaluation Time for Personnel With no Emergency<br />
Preparedness Duties (minutes)<br />
North Route (Back<br />
Gate)<br />
Route (East)<br />
Route (South West) –<br />
Nearby Main Gate<br />
Diesel Tank Area 20 36 23<br />
Oil Prod. Area 21 29 26<br />
Power Gen. Area 32 42 20<br />
Setting Tanks 25 37 29<br />
Stream Area 31 - 21<br />
Export Oil Tank<br />
Storage<br />
29 43 20<br />
Water Treatment Area 34 42 26<br />
[107]
The longest time for the escape and evacuation when the primary route has been chosen is<br />
from the water treatment area and is estimated to be 26 minutes. If an alternative route<br />
needs to be chosen the longest time from the water treatment area and is estimated to be<br />
34 minutes.<br />
6.3.6 MAPPING OF EVACUATION ROUTES FOR SETTLEMENTS<br />
Evacuation routes are mapped for all villages within the maximum hazard zone of the well<br />
fields. The evacuation routes are mapped from the village near the hazard to the nearest<br />
village outside the hazard zone. In case the main evacuation route is blocked, alternate<br />
evacuation routes are to be provided. Model Evacuation routes are provided in Figures 3, 4,<br />
6 and 9 in Appendix B.<br />
The evacuation route to be followed will be decided by Cairn Emergency Response Team<br />
and communicated to the villagers by phone or loud speakers. Mock drills should be<br />
conducted to ensure that the villagers are familiar with the route to be taken in case of<br />
disaster.<br />
6.3.7 EARLY WARNING AND EVACUATION (EWS) FOR COMMUNITY<br />
Warning and evacuation consist of three essential parts: an early warning system in place,<br />
evacuation plans, and a well informed community. Communities need to possess early<br />
warning systems that provide the best available information on potential hazards in a<br />
timely manner, implement effective evacuation plans, and have the training and capacity to<br />
respond appropriately to the information- planned by them in a well consulted and<br />
coordinated manner.<br />
An effective early warning system consistently detects potential hazards and<br />
communicates the threat in a manner that ensures that ample warning is received by the<br />
community. Warning messages inform individuals on what is happening, what this means<br />
to an individual, and how the individual should take action. Warning messages are<br />
delivered in clear, simple language, with enough lead time for recipients to respond.<br />
Resilient communities have local early warning systems that are operational at all times<br />
and are linked to national and state hazard detection and warning systems. These linkages<br />
and other components of the warning system also require backup mechanisms that ensure<br />
fail-safe operation during hazard events. This redundancy ensures that if one component of<br />
the system is not functioning, then the warning message is still delivered.<br />
[108]
Resilient communities also have well publicised evacuation plans in place well in advance<br />
of receiving any hazard warning. The development of effective evacuation plans requires<br />
expert and local knowledge of the hazard risk, including information on the location of<br />
hazard areas and vulnerable populations such as women, children, physically challenged<br />
and elderly.<br />
Effective evacuation plans also require a high degree of coordination and planning for the<br />
development of proper evacuation routes and signs. Regular evacuation drills are needed<br />
to ensure that all sectors of society are knowledgeable of the warning and evacuation<br />
procedures.<br />
Resilient communities also conduct assessments of evacuation drills and post-event<br />
warning and evacuation procedures.<br />
These assessments provide information to disaster managers and community leaders on<br />
how to improve and adapt systems and plans to further reduce or avoid risks from coastal<br />
hazards. A warning system cannot be effective without education and community<br />
orientation.<br />
No matter how expensive or sophisticated the system, if individuals are not able to<br />
understand the warning information or do not know how to respond, there is increased<br />
risk that lives may be lost. Comprehensive public awareness campaigns should provide<br />
constant reminders about hazard risks, warning procedures, and evacuation plans within<br />
coastal communities.<br />
Some of steps to strengthen EWS are:<br />
• Clearly defined roles and responsibilities for CAIRN staff and district administration<br />
for disseminating warning information<br />
• Clear and well publicised standard operating procedures for warning at-risk<br />
populations<br />
• Appropriate technology combined with appropriate human coordination to<br />
facilitate rapid communication of warning information<br />
• Periodic testing and evaluation of all aspects of warning systems and evacuation<br />
procedures<br />
• Use of clear, simple language in warning messages<br />
• Identification, preparation and periodic updation of data of at-risk segments of the<br />
population who are in the vicinity of MPT and RGT.<br />
[109]
CIL has installed flood warning equipment at the following villages –<br />
1. Hathi Singh ka Gaon<br />
2. Dangari<br />
3. Nagarda<br />
The system will be integrated to the existing control system at MPT Control Room to<br />
provide the information across all the sections of the existing plant. The main objective of<br />
this system is to provide sufficient notice to the company and community to evacuate to<br />
higher grounds.<br />
6.3.8 MEDICAL EVACUATION<br />
In the event of a medical evacuation being required, the site medical team shall<br />
immediately notify the Incident Controller of the need to evacuate a patient (s). The<br />
Incident Controller or their nominated deputy shall immediately inform the ERT Leader<br />
who will mobilise the ERT and ensure that the medical and logistical support organisations<br />
are prepared and pressed into service.<br />
The MPT doctor in consultation with the Incident Controller will determine the method of<br />
evacuation and location for treatment. For medical evacuation by road ambulance, it is the<br />
Doctor’s responsibility to ensure sufficient medication is available in the ambulance to<br />
cover the whole period of the journey.<br />
6.4 REPORTING AND NOTIFICATION REPORTING<br />
6.4.1 INCIDENT REPORTING<br />
All incidents and emergencies are reported and investigated in order to establish what<br />
happened and the causes of the incident or emergency in order to introduce measures to<br />
prevent such incidents recurring.<br />
The incident reporting procedure is contained in the Cairn HSE procedures. An initial<br />
Incident Notification Report shall be compiled and submitted by the concerned Line<br />
Manager to the relevant management levels, through Cairn Incident management System<br />
(CIMS) within 12 hours of the incident occurring.<br />
[110]
6.4.2 NOTIFICATION<br />
The primary responsibility for notifying the relevant organisations is the site Incident<br />
Controller who notifies the Emergency Response Team Leader, who in turn notifies the<br />
Emergency <strong>Management</strong> Team Leader.<br />
A list of categories and notification times is covered in Section 2 of the Rajasthan Incident<br />
Response <strong>Plan</strong> document. If any incident or emergency situation occurs which is not<br />
specifically listed, the site Incident Controller must use his discretion with a view to<br />
notifying the Emergency Response Team Leader and Emergency <strong>Management</strong> Team Leader<br />
as soon as reasonably practicable.<br />
6.5 MEDIA COMMUNICATION<br />
In the event of an incident or emergency, there will inevitably be some media interest.<br />
Media at times, attempts to exaggerate or sensationalise the event. Therefore, CIL needs to<br />
systematically feed in the right information to media through a media bureau as per the 3-<br />
tier structure.<br />
6.6 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES (ERP)<br />
The Emergency Response Procedures (ERP) serves as a guide to the team managing the<br />
incident or emergency situation. The most effective method for ensuring a successful<br />
outcome is by training and practice by those charged with the responsibility of responding<br />
to and controlling incidents and emergencies. The Company requires that all Incident<br />
Controllers and staff at their sites, plants and field locations to become familiar with the<br />
content of these procedures and guides through frequent and regular exercises and drills.<br />
Appendix C of this document contains a set of Incident Action <strong>Plan</strong>s; these have been<br />
prepared as an aid to the Incident Controller and his team.<br />
6.7 SPHERE STANDARDS<br />
In any post disaster context, it is pertinent to address the community needs through a<br />
systematic and prompt response. For effective post-disaster response a brief note on<br />
universally accepted minimum standards drawn from “Sphere Standards” are provided<br />
here for reference.<br />
[111]
The Sphere Standards consists of Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in<br />
disaster response which is the product of the collective experience of many people and<br />
agencies. The project was launched in 1997 to develop a set of universal minimum<br />
standards in core areas of humanitarian assistance. The aim of the project is to improve the<br />
quality of assistance provided to people affected by disasters, and to enhance the<br />
accountability of the humanitarian system in disaster response.<br />
The Minimum Standards covers the following sectors (Ref: “The Sphere Project –<br />
Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in <strong>Disaster</strong> Response”, 2000)<br />
• Minimum Standards in Water Supply and Sanitation,<br />
• Minimum Standards in Nutrition<br />
• Minimum Standards in Food Aid<br />
• Minimum Standards in Shelter and Site <strong>Plan</strong>ning,<br />
• Minimum Standards in Health Services<br />
The purpose of the Humanitarian Charter and the Minimum Standards is to increase the<br />
effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, and to make humanitarian agencies more<br />
accountable. It is based on two core beliefs: first, that all possible steps should be taken to<br />
alleviate human suffering that arises out of conflict and calamity, and second, that those<br />
affected by a disaster have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to assistance.<br />
Agencies’ ability to achieve the Minimum Standards will depend on a range of factors, some<br />
of which are within their control, while others such as political and security factors, lie<br />
outside their control. Of particular importance will be the extent to which agencies have<br />
access to the affected population, whether they have the consent and cooperation of the<br />
authorities in charge, and whether they can operate in conditions of reasonable security.<br />
Availability of sufficient financial, human and material resources is also essential.<br />
[112]
CHAPTER<br />
7<br />
7 PARTNERSHIP WITH OTHER<br />
STAKEHOLDERS<br />
Partnership and synergy of efforts with other stakeholders is essential to ensure<br />
effectiveness of disaster management plans. This would result in better command and<br />
control, coordination, economy of effort and better preparedness and response.<br />
7.1 STAKE HOLDER ANALYSIS<br />
As a part of project studies (Social Impact Analysis) Cairn India has carried out a detailed<br />
stakeholder analysis. The stakeholders having an interest in disaster management are:<br />
• Settlements around Cairn facility<br />
• Villages where Cairn, invests in development<br />
• Gram Panchayat<br />
• Tehsildars<br />
• Block Development Office<br />
• District administration –Collector , police , medical officer, revenue department<br />
• Directorate General of Mines Safety<br />
• Chief Controller of Explosives<br />
• Local contractors<br />
• Joint venture partners ONGC<br />
• Media<br />
• NGOs working on <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
• NGOs outside Rajasthan but has interests in the state<br />
• Elected representatives<br />
• Other opinion leaders<br />
• Other relief agencies<br />
• Rajasthan state Government<br />
• Rajasthan state disaster management authorities<br />
• Rajasthan Pollution Control Board<br />
[113]
• The Centre for <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> in the Rajasthan State Institute of Public<br />
Administration<br />
The stakeholder details and their various activities are elaborated in Part 1, Chapter 5,<br />
and Section 5.7 of this document.<br />
7.2 DISTRICT AUTHORITIES IN BARMER<br />
Effective coordination with district authorities is required to ensure coordination of efforts<br />
for disaster management. The District Medical officer and revenue authorities will be<br />
actively involved. Cairn India ERT (Emergency Response Team) will ensure effective liaison<br />
with the District Authorities. Coordination with the following will have to be ensured:<br />
• District <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Authority<br />
• Fire brigade<br />
• Police<br />
• District Medical Officer<br />
• Civil defence<br />
• Army and Air Force Bases (through district administration)<br />
7.3 COMMUNITY BASED DISASTER ORGANIZATIONS<br />
There are 14 prominent NGOs working in <strong>Barmer</strong> district. In the aftermath of the floods,<br />
the NGOs were engaged in rescue, relief and rehabilitation in <strong>Barmer</strong> district. Already few<br />
of them are working in partnership with Cairn’s CSR wing. Some of the NGOs include (i)<br />
Help Age India, (ii) Society for Upliftment of Rural Economy (SURE), and (iii) Dhara<br />
Sansthan<br />
7.3.1 SELECT NGOS<br />
Mittal Foundation engaged with the local authorities and village communities to take up<br />
the work of restoring twenty of the worst affected schools through repairs/retrofitting,<br />
additions and reconstruction interventions, depending on the specific needs of each school.<br />
Sustainable Environment & Ecological Development Society (SEEDS) a Delhi based<br />
NGO was actively involved in reconstruction in villages, built over 300 houses, basic<br />
Community Facilities for 5,000 people and Shelter Construction Training: 100 workers<br />
[114]
Children’s Investment Fund Foundation CIFF joined with the Mittal Foundation to help<br />
build and restore 21 schools that were damaged or destroyed in the flooding. More than<br />
2,900 students benefit from this programme. CIL will carry out further analysis and work<br />
with suitable organisations for building community based disaster capabilities.<br />
7.4 ROLE OF MEDIA<br />
Media throughout the world plays a vital role in educating the public about disasters;<br />
warning of hazards; gathering and transmitting information about affected areas; alerting<br />
government officials, relief organizations, and the public to specific needs; and facilitating<br />
discussions about disaster preparedness and response. Communications can educate,<br />
warn, inform, and empower people to take practical steps to protect themselves from<br />
natural hazards. For the media to fill these roles most effectively, the organizations need to<br />
establish and strengthen working relationships with the media as partners for disaster<br />
management.<br />
Corporate Communication Department of Cairn India will be dealing with all media<br />
related issues during disasters.<br />
7.4.1 BEFORE A DISASTER<br />
• Analysis of risk sources and patterns , factors increasing vulnerability of<br />
communities<br />
• Public Information on potential dangers and risks<br />
• Early Warning providing proper information on Early Warning Systems<br />
• Preparedness Information<br />
• Advocate for risk reduction<br />
• Encourage people’s participation in disaster management<br />
7.4.2 DURING A DISASTER<br />
• Inform the public with timely and factual information<br />
• Advice the public about actions to be taken (e.g. Evacuation, Escape useful<br />
techniques)<br />
• Inform on actions being taken by authorities and aid groups<br />
• Provide messages concerning the welfare of marginalized or trapped groups<br />
[115]
• Facilitate communication among affected people and their relatives, friends, families<br />
in other parts of the country<br />
• Highlight the needs of survivors<br />
• Communicate potential secondary risks to minimize further disasters or damages<br />
• Prevent panic<br />
• Avoid sensationalism<br />
7.4.3 AFTER A DISASTER<br />
• Highlight learning's<br />
• Project gaps in relief efforts<br />
• Highlight success stories<br />
• Responsible reporting to prevent reliving trauma<br />
7.4.4 NGOs ROLE IN MEDIA<br />
NGOs working in disaster management should seek to provide reliable information to the<br />
media, as early as possible, in a concise and readily understandable form, and linked, where<br />
possible, to newsworthy events.<br />
• Never misrepresent facts<br />
• Identify and communicate specific themes and messages, both through the mass<br />
media and in other alternative forms of communication<br />
• Issue holding statements where appropriate<br />
• Provide relevant training for reporters and field personnel to enhance disaster<br />
preparedness, mitigation and relief efforts and the timeliness, quality, and accuracy<br />
of reporting about disasters.<br />
• Cairn India has a media communication plan for disasters and has effective<br />
relationships in place with media.<br />
Corporate Communication Department of Cairn India has suitably trained staff for<br />
coordination with media during disasters and will lead communication during any disaster.<br />
[116]
CHAPTER<br />
8<br />
8 FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS<br />
As per the emerging disaster management structure formally at the state and district levels,<br />
SDMA and DDMA respectively, there is likelihood for clear cut fund allocation for both<br />
disaster preparedness and response.<br />
CIL through its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is already having annual budget<br />
allocation earmarked for various developmental activities. It also includes funds to create a<br />
reserve for emergencies and natural disasters. Henceforth, CIL could earmark a separate<br />
fund allocation for the promotion of community based disaster management. The financial<br />
powers are vested with various operating levels as per Company delegation of authority<br />
(DOA). Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is the custodian of the DOA.<br />
8.1 FUNDS<br />
Funds will cater for<br />
• Integrating disaster management concerns into operations and construction stages<br />
for design and operations<br />
• Purchase & maintenance of equipment for disaster management<br />
• Setting up and construction of response centres<br />
• Training of personnel –Cairn staff, communities in disaster preparation and<br />
response<br />
• Joint exercises<br />
• <strong>Disaster</strong> Education and awareness campaigns among people<br />
• Production of leaflets, posters and other educational material<br />
• Capacity building and training of local communities<br />
• Response actions during disasters like food packets, medical facilities etc<br />
• Recovery actions for repair and rebuilding facilities<br />
• Funding of NGOs for disaster management partnerships<br />
o For promoting disaster awareness<br />
o Actual relief and recovery<br />
o Rebuilding<br />
[117]
8.2 ANNUAL BUDGETS<br />
Annual budgets will have the following provisions:-<br />
• Adequate funds will be catered for in the annual budgets for disasters and<br />
emergencies · Funds earmarked for projects and expansions by Cairn India also will<br />
have specific funds for ensuring mitigation of disasters.<br />
• All heads of departments are aware of the requirement for earmarking funds for<br />
disaster management.<br />
• The executive committee (ExCo) form the approving hierarchy for budget approvals<br />
8.3 FUND ALLOCATION FOR HAZARD PREPAREDNESS<br />
In addition to allocation of funds for prevention of hazards and improve the preparedness<br />
of emergency team, it is also suggested that CIL can earmark a fund to mitigate and control<br />
any major emergency.<br />
[118]
PART 2: DISASTER SPECIFIC ACTION<br />
PLAN<br />
[119]
CHAPTER<br />
9<br />
9 PREFACE FOR SOPs<br />
A. ON-SITE FIRE RELATED EMERGENCIES<br />
Fires at an industrial installation can severely interrupt production, disrupt the lives of<br />
those who depend upon the plant for livelihood and weaken the economy of the<br />
community. Although the primary purpose of any fire prevention strategy is to protect lives<br />
and losses of company but it is important (and often a legal responsibility) for every<br />
employee working within the installation area to be fully aware of fire hazards, fire<br />
prevention rules, fire fighting techniques and emergency action plan.<br />
CIL has compiled all relevant information pertaining to the recognition of fire hazards,<br />
potential scenarios, strategies and tactics, fire protection systems and emergency response<br />
resources into the upstream Fire Contingency <strong>Plan</strong>, for its operations in the State of<br />
Rajasthan.<br />
B. FIRE SCENARIOS & EMERGENCY RESPONSE<br />
The following Emergency scenarios are anticipated /visualized in the operations phase.<br />
Incident Action <strong>Plan</strong>s to deal with these scenarios are shown in Appendix C.<br />
1. Fire in the well head / well pads<br />
2. Oil fire at Inlet Separator<br />
3. Fire at the flare area & knockout drum<br />
4. Fire in the Diesel Storage, Export Oil, Condensate, Off spec and Settling tanks<br />
5. Fire in Electrical sub stations.<br />
6. Buildings (Central Control Building)<br />
7. Fire in Chemical Laboratory Building<br />
8. Oil & Gas Leakage in Pig Launcher Area followed by fire.<br />
9. Fire in cross country pipe line (90 Kms.) between Raageshwari Gas Terminal (RGT)<br />
and MPT<br />
10. Fire in Mangala Train-1 (MT-1) facilities<br />
11. Enhanced Oil Recovery (EoR) near Train-1 (Phase I expected project completion by<br />
Q3-’10 and Phase II by Q1-‘11).<br />
[120]
12. <strong>Barmer</strong> Hill Project (EWT) (expected project completion by 2011).<br />
13. Major Construction Activities within MPT /RGT/ Well pads<br />
14. Operation Base (O.B.) Camps / Offices<br />
C. OIL SPILL RELATED EMERGENCIES<br />
Prevention of accidental spillage is Cairn India Limited’s (CIL’s) first priority. To support<br />
this strategy, all land based production and drilling facilities are designed, installed and<br />
operated to minimise possibility of oil spills. Facilities and resources supplied by third<br />
parties are also required to meet national pollution prevention guidelines and operation<br />
standards.<br />
Cairn shares the community’s concern for the protection of the natural environment from<br />
oil spills. Cairn will work and consult with appropriate government bodies and the local<br />
community to address any issues relating to oils spills. Where third party interests are<br />
involved such as products or transport vehicles or drill rigs, the company will assess the<br />
situation and take timely and appropriate action.<br />
The company is committed to integrating into its plans and operations a process to identify<br />
oil spill risks and to implement appropriate spill response and clean-up strategies. This Oil<br />
Spill Response <strong>Plan</strong> details Cairn’s organisational framework for preparedness and<br />
response to oil spill incident that may arise from its operations in Rajasthan. The principal<br />
strategy is for rapid Response, Containment and Clean–up.<br />
The following chapters comprise SOPs for six credible disaster scenarios.<br />
9.1 SOP for Crude pipeline leak<br />
9.2 SOP for Well/rig blowout<br />
9.3 SOP for gas well blowout<br />
9.4 SOP for earthquake<br />
9.5 SOP for flood<br />
9.6 SOP for biological hazard<br />
[121]
9.1 SOP: CRUDE OIL PIPELINE LEAK<br />
Equipment/Facility<br />
Material<br />
Physical<br />
State<br />
Crude Oil<br />
Liquid (High Viscosity)<br />
Atmospheri<br />
c condition<br />
Prevailing<br />
Wind<br />
direction<br />
Pressure<br />
From 5 (at the receival facility)<br />
to 70 (at the inlet point of the<br />
export pipeline) kg/cm 2<br />
NNE, SSW<br />
Operating<br />
Condition<br />
Pipe diameter<br />
Ambient Temperature<br />
(℃)<br />
24 inches<br />
43 – 48 (Summer), 6 – 20<br />
(Winter)<br />
Prevailing<br />
Wind speed<br />
(m/s)<br />
Flow Rate 125,000 BOPD 1.5<br />
[122]
Liquid release rate: 5mm<br />
Liquid release rate: 25mm<br />
Liquid release rate: Full<br />
bore<br />
50 LPM<br />
500LPM<br />
5000 LPM<br />
Potential Scenario - Crude release with ignition<br />
Initial Crude Release (No ignition)<br />
Crude release with ignition<br />
Special Hazard(s) / Precautions<br />
1. Evacuate the people and livestock from the hazard zone (1 km radius) in<br />
coordination with district administration<br />
2. Communicate with District Administration and alert Electrical, Water Resources,<br />
Agricultural, Roads and Railway departments about the incident, if required.<br />
3. Monitor for respiratory hazards e.g. products of combustion, VOC, etc.<br />
4. Identify surface water bodies, agricultural/pasture land and settlements. Take<br />
containment measures to prevent crude from reaching/ contaminating.<br />
[123]
Hazard Zone (for cross-country crude pipeline) of 1 km radius for<br />
evacuation purposes<br />
For resources please refer Appendix D<br />
Resources Requirement<br />
Fire Fighting Operational Requirements (Minimum)<br />
Foam Tenders (complete with crew:<br />
Water Supply<br />
4 Nos<br />
5000 LPM<br />
Manpower<br />
Additional Firefighters<br />
Support Personnel<br />
48 Nos<br />
100 Nos<br />
Medical Support<br />
Ambulances (complete with emergency medication) 4<br />
[124]
Doctors 2<br />
Nurses 12<br />
Medical Attendants ( stretcher bearers, medical support) 24<br />
District administration- Line Departments, Revenue Department ( Village Administrative<br />
Officers, Village Assistants), Police, Fire and Rescue, Medical and Health dept, Rescue<br />
volunteers from Home guards, Civil Defence, etc.<br />
Incident Action <strong>Plan</strong> (IAP)<br />
Cross-Country Crude Pipeline Failure - Crude release with ignition<br />
Task<br />
Action<br />
Party<br />
1. Raise Alarm<br />
• Trigger fire alarm CIL<br />
• Call Hotline Numbers – Refer Emergency Contacts in Appendix A CIL<br />
• Cairn MPT Emergency Alarm/Notification CIL<br />
2. Notify Authorities & external agencies ( Fire and rescue – 101, Police<br />
-100, District Administration – 1077)<br />
CIL/DC<br />
3. Shut down crude pumping operation CIL<br />
4. Isolate affected section of Pipeline (Shut upstream & downstream<br />
valves)<br />
CIL<br />
5. Cordon off the area DC/CIL<br />
6. Initiate mobilization of Fire Fighting operational resources (Refer<br />
Resources section)<br />
7. Establish Unified Command (for liaison with responding agencies)<br />
CIL (smallscale<br />
fires)<br />
DC (largescale<br />
fires)<br />
8. Initiate community evacuation (Refer Fire Incident Evacuation <strong>Plan</strong><br />
given below)<br />
[125]<br />
DC.<br />
CIL<br />
to
assist DC<br />
9. Assess hazards – potential for explosion CIL<br />
• Evaluate escalation potential – explosion probability CIL<br />
• Fire Exposure CIL<br />
10. Assess if crude can be removed safely and initiate safe disposal of<br />
collected crude<br />
CIL<br />
Fire Evacuation <strong>Plan</strong> for Community<br />
1. Initiate alarm/ early warning system and evacuate community within 1 km radius.<br />
2. Conduct search and rescue operations.<br />
3. Trained community volunteers shall provide first aid to the injured and transport<br />
them to hospitals<br />
4. Prepare the people by sharing the real impact of incident and seek their<br />
cooperation<br />
5. Coordinate and organize evacuation of community members as per priority.<br />
6. Provide temporary shelter with water, food and sanitation facilities<br />
7. Conduct damage assessment if any, with community participation.<br />
8. Only after thorough check up and formal clearance community shall return to their<br />
habitation<br />
9. Help them to restore normal life with necessary repair works.<br />
[126]
9.2 SOP: OIL WELL BLOWOUT<br />
Equipment/Facility – Oil Well<br />
Material<br />
Crude Oil<br />
Atmospheric<br />
condition<br />
Physical<br />
State<br />
Liquid (High Viscosity)<br />
Prevailing<br />
direction<br />
Wind<br />
Pressure 30-35 kg/cm2 NNE, SSW<br />
Well Bore Diameter<br />
(production casing)<br />
8.5 inch or 12.25 inch<br />
Prevailing Wind<br />
speed(m/s)<br />
Operating<br />
Condition<br />
Ambient Temperature (℃)<br />
43 – 48 (Summer), 6 –<br />
20 (Winter)<br />
Low Producer: 200 –<br />
2500 BOPD<br />
1.5<br />
Well Flow Rate (flow from a<br />
single well varies from well<br />
pad to well pad)<br />
High Producer: 1500 –<br />
7000 BOPD<br />
Horizontal Well –<br />
Maximum 15,000<br />
BOPD<br />
[127]
Potential Scenario - Crude release with ignition<br />
1. Well Blowout w/o<br />
ignition<br />
2. Well Blowout with ignition<br />
Special Hazard(s) / Precautions<br />
1. Evacuate the people and livestock from the hazard zone (1 km radius) in coordination<br />
with district administration<br />
2. Communicate with District Administration and alert Electrical, Water Resources,<br />
Agricultural, Roads and Railway departments about the incident, if required.<br />
3. Monitor for respiratory hazards e.g. products of combustion, VOC, etc<br />
4. Identify exposed water bodies, agricultural/pasture land and settlements. If required,<br />
take containment measures to prevent crude from reaching/contaminating.<br />
5. Blast resulting from ignition of accumulated well gas and vaporization of crude oil pool<br />
as a result of delayed ignition.<br />
6. Extremely high radiant heat, requiring high fire fighting water demand.<br />
7. Specialised well-fire extinguishment services and specialized equipment required to<br />
extinguish fire and/or cap the well.<br />
[128]
Hazard Zone (for oil well) of 1 km radius for evacuation purposes<br />
For resources please refer Appendix D<br />
Fire Protection Requirements<br />
Fixed Fire Protection System<br />
• Water Spray System<br />
Mobile Fire Fighting Units<br />
• Fire Tenders (complete with crew) (For peripheral defensive protection)<br />
Water Supply Requirements<br />
• Application Rate: 100 bbls/min (20,000 LPM)<br />
• Temporary Water supply (24 hour supply): 25,000 bbls<br />
Specialist Resources (Pre-Contracted)<br />
• Well Blowout Control Specialists<br />
• Specialized equipment<br />
[129]
Manpower<br />
• Additional Firefighters<br />
• Support Personnel<br />
Medical Support<br />
• Ambulances (complete with emergency medication)<br />
• Doctors<br />
• Nurses<br />
• Stretcher Bearers<br />
Law & Order Agencies<br />
• Police<br />
Incident Action <strong>Plan</strong> (IAP)<br />
Crude Oil Well Blowout with Ignition<br />
Task<br />
Action Party<br />
1. Raise Alarm<br />
a. Trigger fire alarm<br />
b. Call Hotline Numbers – Refer Emergency Contacts in<br />
Appendix A<br />
c. Cairn MPT Emergency Alarm/Notification<br />
d. Notify Authorities & external agencies ( Fire and rescue –<br />
101, Police -100, District Administration – 1077)<br />
2. Shut down well pad operation<br />
CIL<br />
CIL<br />
CIL<br />
CIL/DC<br />
CIL<br />
3. Turnout Fire fighting appliances (For peripheral defensive<br />
protection)<br />
4. Cordon off the area – Establish “hazard zone” and secure area from<br />
unauthorized entry.<br />
5. Initiate mobilization of Fire Fighting operational resources (Refer<br />
Resources section)<br />
DC/CIL<br />
CIL (smallscale<br />
fires)<br />
[130]
6. Establish Unified Command (for liaison with responding agencies)<br />
DC (largescale<br />
fires)<br />
7. Activate Specialist Resources (Pre-Contracted)<br />
• Well Blowout Control Specialists<br />
CIL<br />
• Specialized equipment<br />
8. Initiate community evacuation (Refer Fire Incident Evacuation<br />
<strong>Plan</strong>)<br />
DC.<br />
CIL to assist<br />
DC<br />
9. Assess Hazards – potential for explosion<br />
a. Evaluate escalation Potential – Explosion probability<br />
b. Fire Exposure<br />
10. Assess if crude can be removed safely and initiate safe disposal of<br />
collected crude<br />
11. Mobilise capping machinery<br />
CIL<br />
CIL<br />
CIL<br />
CIL<br />
Fire Evacuation <strong>Plan</strong> for Community<br />
1. Initiate alarm/ early warning system and evacuate community within 1 km radius.<br />
2. Conduct search and rescue operations.<br />
3. Trained community volunteers shall provide first aid to the injured and transport<br />
them to hospitals<br />
4. Prepare the people by sharing the real impact of incident and seek their cooperation<br />
5. Coordinate and organize evacuation of community members as per priority.<br />
6. Provide temporary shelter with water, food and sanitation facilities<br />
7. Conduct damage assessment if any, with community participation.<br />
8. Only after through check up and formal clearance community shall return to their<br />
habitation<br />
9. Help them to restore normal life with necessary repair works.<br />
[131]
9.3 SOP: GAS WELL BLOWOUT<br />
Equipment/Facility – Gas Well<br />
Material Natural Gas (>95% Methane) Atmospheric condition<br />
Physical State Gas Prevailing Wind direction<br />
Pressure Around 250 kg/cm 2 NNE, SSW<br />
Operating<br />
Condition<br />
Well Bore Diameter<br />
(production casing)<br />
3.5 inch<br />
Prevailing Wind<br />
speed(m/s)<br />
Ambient<br />
Temperature (℃)<br />
43 – 48 (Summer), 6 –<br />
20 (Winter)<br />
1.5 (present rate)<br />
[132]
Well Flow Rate<br />
20 – 35 MMSCFD<br />
Potential Scenario - Crude release with ignition<br />
1. Well Blowout without ignition 2. Well Blowout with ignition<br />
Special Hazard(s) / Precautions<br />
1. Initial efforts should be concentrated on all possible sources of ignition.<br />
2. Restrict access to and activities in the well head area<br />
3. Blast resulting from ignition of accumulated well gas as a result of delayed ignition<br />
4. Extremely high radiant heat, requiring high fire fighting water demand.<br />
5. Specialist well-fire extinguishment services and specialized equipment required to<br />
extinguish fire and/or cap the well.<br />
Hazard Zone (for gas pipeline) of 1 km radius for evacuation purposes<br />
[133]
For resources please refer Appendix E<br />
Fire Protection Requirements<br />
Fixed Fire Protection System<br />
• Water Spray System<br />
Mobile Fire Fighting Units<br />
• Fire Tenders (complete with crew) (For peripheral defensive protection)<br />
Water Supply Requirements<br />
• Application Rate: 100 bbls/min (20,000 LPM)<br />
• Temporary Water Reservoir Capacity (24 hour supply): 25,000 bbls<br />
Specialist Resources (Pre-Contracted)<br />
• Well Blowout Control Specialists<br />
• Specialized equipment<br />
Manpower<br />
• Additional Firefighters<br />
• Support Personnel<br />
Medical Support<br />
• Ambulances (complete with emergency medication)<br />
[134]
• Doctors<br />
• Nurses<br />
• Stretcher Bearers<br />
Law & Order Agencies<br />
• Police<br />
Incident Action <strong>Plan</strong> (IAP)<br />
Gas Well Blowout with Ignition<br />
Task<br />
Action Party<br />
1. Raise Alarm<br />
a. Trigger fire alarm<br />
b. Call Hotline Numbers – Refer Emergency Contacts in<br />
Appendix A<br />
c. Cairn MPT Emergency Alarm/Notification<br />
d. Notify Authorities & external agencies ( Fire and rescue –<br />
101, Police -100, District Administration – 1077)<br />
2. Shut down well pad operation<br />
3. Turnout Fire fighting appliances (For peripheral defensive<br />
protection)<br />
4. Cordon off the area – Establish “hazard zone” and secure area from<br />
unauthorized entry.<br />
5. Initiate mobilization of Fire Fighting operational resources (For<br />
resources refer Appendix D)<br />
6. Establish Unified Command (for liaison with responding agencies)<br />
CIL<br />
CIL<br />
CIL<br />
CIL/DC<br />
CIL<br />
CIL<br />
DC/CIL<br />
CIL (smallscale<br />
fires)<br />
DC (largescale<br />
fires)<br />
7. Activate Specialist Resources (Pre-Contracted)<br />
• Well Blowout Control Specialists<br />
CIL<br />
• Specialized equipment<br />
[135]
8. Initiate community evacuation (Refer Fire Incident Evacuation<br />
<strong>Plan</strong>)<br />
DC.<br />
CIL to assist<br />
DC<br />
9. Assess Hazards – potential for explosion<br />
• Evaluate escalation Potential – Explosion probability<br />
• Fire Exposure<br />
10. Initiate inventory building of extinguishing media and equipment :<br />
CIL<br />
CIL<br />
DC/ CIL<br />
• Water supply – sources, holding pit(s) and associated<br />
pumping equipment<br />
• Capping machinery<br />
Fire Evacuation <strong>Plan</strong> for Community<br />
1. Initiate alarm/ early warning system and evacuate community within 1 km radius.<br />
2. Conduct search and rescue operations.<br />
3. Trained community volunteers shall provide first aid to the injured and transport<br />
them to hospitals<br />
4. Prepare the people by sharing the real impact of incident and seek their<br />
cooperation<br />
5. Coordinate and organize evacuation of community members as per priority.<br />
6. Provide temporary shelter with water, food and sanitation facilities<br />
7. Conduct damage assessment if any, with community participation.<br />
8. Only after through check up and formal clearance community shall return to their<br />
habitation<br />
9. Help them to restore normal life with necessary repair works.<br />
[136]
Natural Hazard-Earthquake<br />
9.4 SOP: EARTHQUAKE<br />
Hazard<br />
Impact<br />
Earthquake<br />
Cairn installations/ neighbourhood<br />
community<br />
4-5 Magnitude Very low risk<br />
Earthquake Zone- III:<br />
moderate risk zone<br />
Not much impact on<br />
buildings and<br />
installations<br />
5-6 Magnitude Moderate impact Evacuation, if required<br />
6-8 Magnitude High Risk Immediate evacuation<br />
[137]
Potential Scenario – Earthquake<br />
Preparing for an earthquake<br />
It has to be noted that earthquakes can neither be predicted nor prevented. When an<br />
earthquake strikes, the district and Cairn team must be ready to respond. To survive,<br />
the Cairn team and neighbourhood community members should be prepared with<br />
‘survival plans’. Preparing for an earthquake takes time and effort. The basic approach<br />
should be: (a) Avoid injury to self and help others; (b) minimize damage to Cairn<br />
installations and property, (c) Be prepared to survive at least 72 hours after an<br />
earthquake without help from emergency response officials.<br />
Special Hazard(s) / Precautions<br />
1. Earthquake impact can cause damage to gas or oil pipelines resulting in pipe<br />
rupture or blast from ignition of accumulated associated well gas and vaporization<br />
of crude oil pool.<br />
2. Immediately shut down all operations and supply in pipeline<br />
3. Depending upon the intensity,
escue operations<br />
5. Emergency coordination team to monitor the situation<br />
6. Only after proper safety inspection, work can be resumed at Cairn facilities.<br />
For resources please refer Appendix D<br />
Emergency Response Resources Requirement<br />
Fixed Fire Protection System<br />
• Water Spray System<br />
Mobile Fire Fighting Units<br />
• Fire Tenders (complete with crew) (For peripheral defensive protection)<br />
Water Supply Requirements<br />
• Application Rate: 100 bbls/min (20,000 LPM)<br />
• Temporary Water Reservoir capacity (24 hour supply): 25,000 bbls<br />
Specialist Resources (Pre-Contracted)<br />
• Search and rescue<br />
• Specialized equipment<br />
Manpower<br />
• Additional Firefighters<br />
• Support Personnel<br />
Medical Support<br />
• Ambulances (complete with emergency medication)<br />
• Doctors<br />
• Nurses<br />
• Stretcher Bearers<br />
Law & Order Agencies<br />
• Police<br />
Incident Action <strong>Plan</strong> (IAP)<br />
Earthquake<br />
1. Raise alarm<br />
Task<br />
Action<br />
Party<br />
• The staff to follow ‘drop-cover-hold’ procedures and<br />
assemble at pre-designated safe muster points<br />
CIL<br />
[139]
• Cairn MPT Emergency Alarm/Notification CIL<br />
• Notify Authorities & external agencies (Refer Emergency<br />
Contact in Appendix A)<br />
CIL<br />
2. Shut down all operations immediately CIL<br />
3. Initiate evacuation of staff CIL<br />
4. Coordinate with district administration for community evacuation<br />
from settlements<br />
DC<br />
CIL to<br />
assist<br />
5. Activate Specialist Resources (Pre-Contracted)<br />
• Search and rescue DC<br />
• Specialized equipment (JCBs, Earth-movers, Gas detectors,<br />
Steel cutters)<br />
6. Establish Unified Command ( for liaison with responding agencies)<br />
7. Coordinate and mobilize specialized medical teams with mobile<br />
operation theatres<br />
8. Coordinate and mobilize transport and logistics<br />
9. Assess Hazards – potential for leakage and consequent explosion.<br />
10. Cordon off the area – Establish “hazard zone” and secure area from<br />
unauthorized entry.<br />
DC<br />
DC<br />
DC<br />
DC/CIL<br />
CIL/DC<br />
DC<br />
Earthquake Evacuation <strong>Plan</strong> for Community –<br />
1. Trigger alarm/ early warning siren and evacuate community to pre-designated<br />
open ground.<br />
2. Ensure speedy coordination for evacuation<br />
3. Attend the injured with first aid and transport them to hospital<br />
4. Assure the people by sharing the real impact of incident and seek their<br />
cooperation<br />
5. Provide temporary shelter with water, food and sanitation facilities<br />
[140]
6. Conduct damage assessment if any, with community participation<br />
7. Only after through check up and formal clearance community can be permitted<br />
to return to their habitation<br />
8. Help district administration in restoring normalcy with possible assistance.<br />
[141]
9.5 SOP: FLOODS<br />
Natural Hazard-Flood<br />
Hazard<br />
Flood<br />
Low frequency – High<br />
intensity event<br />
Impact<br />
Depending on<br />
quantum of flood<br />
On Cairn installations/ neighbourhood<br />
community<br />
Very low risk<br />
Moderate impact<br />
High Risk<br />
Not much impact on<br />
installations<br />
Evacuation as per<br />
requirement<br />
Immediate evacuation<br />
[142]
Potential Scenario – Flood/ Flash Flood<br />
Preparing for flood scenario<br />
Flood in <strong>Barmer</strong> district is a rare occurrence but as in the case of the 2006 flood, it can cause huge<br />
devastation and affect normal life of community in general and CIL operations in particular<br />
Special Hazard(s) / Precautions<br />
1. Flooding can lead to disruption of Cairn operations in Well pads, Rigs, even pipeline<br />
could be damaged.<br />
2. Flooding can lead to disruption in electrical supply and communication and cause<br />
damage to roads, bridges and other infrastructure.<br />
3. Immediate shut down of all operations and supply in pipeline as required<br />
4. Depending upon the level and quantum of water inundation evacuation required for<br />
both within Cairn facility as well as for neighbouring community to move to safe zones.<br />
5. Search and rescue teams to be kept in standby for any emergency rescue operations<br />
6. Emergency coordination team to monitor the situation<br />
7. Ensure the drainage channels are de-silted and bunds are periodically maintained.<br />
8. Only after proper safety inspection, work can be resumed at Cairn facilities.<br />
For resources please refer Appendix E<br />
[143]
Emergency Response Resources<br />
Specialist Resources (Pre-Contracted)<br />
• Search and rescue teams (divers/swimmers, Emergency Medical Technician)<br />
• Specialized equipments- like boats, life jackets, search helicopters, hovercraft, etc.<br />
Manpower<br />
• Support Personnel<br />
Medical Support<br />
• Ambulances (complete with emergency medication)<br />
• Doctors<br />
• Nurses<br />
• Stretcher Bearers<br />
• Oral Rehydration Satchets (ORS)<br />
Law & Order Agencies<br />
• Police<br />
Other Essentials<br />
• Water storage tanks<br />
• Chlorine tablets<br />
• Temporary shelters with sanitation facilities<br />
• Temporary common kitchen or food packets<br />
Incident Action <strong>Plan</strong> (IAP)<br />
Flood<br />
Task<br />
1. Cairn staff and community members to be alerted with inputs<br />
available from Cairn’s flood warning system<br />
2. During Flood situation look out for regular updates from Indian<br />
Meteorological Department (IMD) and Central water<br />
Commission (CWC) for forecast and follow up action.<br />
Action Party<br />
CIL<br />
CIL<br />
3. Shut down all operations as precaution based on forecast CIL<br />
4. Raise alarm if water level is reaching critical level of<br />
jeopardizing safety of infrastructure<br />
CIL, Community,<br />
DC<br />
a. Cairn MPT Emergency Alarm/Notification CIL<br />
[144]
. Notify Authorities & external agencies CIL<br />
5. The CIL staff and community should move to safe zones (high<br />
elevations)<br />
CIL, Community,<br />
DC<br />
6. Activate Specialist Resources (Pre-Contracted)<br />
a. Search and rescue (divers/swimmers, boats, life jackets,<br />
searchlights, nylon ropes)<br />
b. Specialized equipment (helicopters, sandbags, crowbars,<br />
spades, portable motor pumps)<br />
7. Establish Unified Command (for liaison with responding<br />
agencies)<br />
DC/CIL<br />
DC/CIL<br />
DC<br />
8. Establish “hazard zone” and secure area from unauthorized entry DC<br />
[145]
9.6 SOP: BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS<br />
Biological Hazard-Epidemic<br />
Hazard<br />
Impact<br />
Epidemic<br />
Cairn operations/ neighbourhood<br />
community<br />
Examples H1N1 Witnessed 9 deaths in 2009<br />
Potential Scenario – Epidemic<br />
Malaria<br />
Endemic to the region<br />
Chikungunya Reported in 2009, 2010<br />
Epidemics are categorised based on disease outbreak, transmission, and mortality and<br />
morbidity rates. They are monitored by Indian Disease Surveillance Programme (IDSP)<br />
through weekly community visits by Primary Healthcare Centre (PHC) staff.<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> shows limited spread of diseases in this region due to its sparse population<br />
(<strong>Barmer</strong> population density = 69 per sq km). Epidemics can disrupt normal life and<br />
economy of the region impacting business continuity.<br />
Special Hazard(s) / Precautions<br />
1. Gather periodic updates from Chief Medical and Health Officer (CMHO), especially<br />
during monsoons and during outbreaks.<br />
2. Activate a medical coordination team in CIL to monitor and coordinate to minimise<br />
impact of the epidemic among its staff.<br />
3. The CIL medical team should liaise with the CMHO for follow-up actions.<br />
4. Clean and disinfect reusable equipment appropriately.<br />
5. If epidemic spreads, quarantine can be enforced by district authorities.<br />
6. Arrange for immediate removal/disposal of the dead to prevent further spread of the<br />
disease.<br />
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Resources<br />
The district healthcare system comprises district hospitals, CHC and PHC as shown below:<br />
S.<br />
No<br />
Type<br />
Total<br />
Available<br />
Within 20 km radius of CIL facilities<br />
1 Hospitals 9<br />
2 Community Health<br />
Centre<br />
3 Primary Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
14 In Kawas, it is being developed as a<br />
Highway Trauma Centre with 3 doctors, 1<br />
LHV and 4 Compounders<br />
66<br />
CIL has 6 doctors on-call/standby. Please refer Appendix E for additional resources.<br />
Emergency Response Resources Requirement<br />
Medical Support<br />
• Ambulances (complete with emergency medication)<br />
• Doctors<br />
• Nurses<br />
• Stretcher Bearers<br />
• Medicine stocks<br />
• Mobile medical surgeries/vans<br />
• Gloves, masks, disinfectants<br />
Law & Order Agencies<br />
• Police<br />
• Civil Defence<br />
Incident Action <strong>Plan</strong> (IAP)<br />
Epidemic<br />
Task<br />
1. Inform Public Health Department (02982 230462) of<br />
possible epidemic<br />
Action Party<br />
IDSP Survey personnel<br />
2. CIL should activate medical coordination team CIL<br />
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3. Announcement of epidemic Ministry of Health/<br />
CMHO<br />
4. Information to PHCs/CHCs within 5 km radius CMHO<br />
5. Public health warning to nearby communities CMHO, PHCs, CHCs<br />
6. CIL medical team should liaise and coordinate with CMHO CIL<br />
7. Mobilise medical resources at village/block level CMHO<br />
8. Alert hospitals and mobile medical teams at district level CMHO<br />
9. Initiate vaccination programme CMHO<br />
10. Assess requirement for Quarantine<br />
Ministry of health/<br />
CMHO<br />
• Public health warning about quarantine to district DC<br />
• Mobilise resources (food, medicines, water) for<br />
quarantine<br />
• Mobilise police/civil defence to enforce<br />
quarantine. Cordon off the area<br />
DC<br />
DC, CMHO to assist<br />
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PART 3: CROSS- CUTTING ISSUES<br />
[149]
CHAPTER<br />
10<br />
10 REVIEW AND UPDATION OF PLANS<br />
This disaster management plan needs constant review and updation based on the<br />
following requirements.<br />
1. Major change in the operational activities and location<br />
2. Valuable inputs from actual disasters<br />
3. Lessons learnt from training<br />
4. Inputs from mock drills/ simulation exercises<br />
5. Lessons learnt from near-miss incidents<br />
6. Changes in disaster profile<br />
7. Technological developments/ innovations in identifying potential hazards<br />
8. Changes in regulatory requirements<br />
9. Updation of databases using GIS<br />
10. Change in demography of surrounding population<br />
11. Changes in geo-political environment<br />
The review will be undertaken in coordination with the district administration and other<br />
relevant key stakeholders like civil society agencies, community based organisations,<br />
youth organisations, etc. Besides this, other national and state level agencies like NDMA<br />
and SDMA will be apprised of the reviews and updates.<br />
CIL will periodically update the DMP components based on the national and state disaster<br />
management guidelines.<br />
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CHAPTER<br />
11<br />
11 COORDINATION AND IMPLEMENTATION<br />
CIL will liaise and coordinate with key stakeholders involved in the comprehensive<br />
disaster management for ensuring the implementation of the components involved in the<br />
DMP. The plan will address the cross-cutting nature of the activities and issues that<br />
emanate from onsite and offsite areas with vertical and horizontal linkages between and<br />
within CIL and district administration. The coordination will also address linkages with<br />
NGOs, CBOs and local bodies for ensuring the implementation of the plan.<br />
The most important component of testing this DMP is to conduct mock drill or simulation<br />
exercise in order to identify the positive elements as well as gaps.<br />
11.1 NEED FOR MOCK DRILL<br />
Mock drill exercise is pertinent to verify the level of preparedness and improve the<br />
coordination during emergencies. This has to be based on past experiences and lessons<br />
learnt. Mock-drills help in evaluating response and improving coordination within CIL,<br />
with various government departments, non-government agencies and communities. They<br />
help in identifying the extent to which the <strong>Plan</strong>s are effective and also aid in revising these<br />
if required. These drills enhance the ability to respond faster, better and in an organized<br />
manner during the response and recovery phase.<br />
The approach for conducting a mock-drill varies as per the complexity of scenario<br />
depending upon the potential hazards, response system of the institution and the target<br />
community. Therefore, to ensure proper implementation of a drill programme, roles and<br />
responsibilities (SOPs) of the concerned personnel, departments, corporate bodies,<br />
stakeholders, and mechanisms for conducting the drill should be delineated clearly.<br />
11.1.1 FOR EFFECTIVE MOCK DRILL<br />
Regardless of the size, complexity and risk involved in the implementation of the drill, an<br />
effective drill/exercise programme should have the following essential elements as prerequisites:<br />
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• Emergency Response <strong>Plan</strong> explaining institutional response structure, emergency<br />
response functions and standard operating procedures for various departments<br />
• Team personnel at headquarters and field level trained on their standard operating<br />
procedures<br />
• Updated database of resources, equipment and manpower available<br />
• Updated Emergency Directory with important contact details of members of<br />
various Departments of the Government<br />
• Mock-drill Scenario and detailed action plan for Mock-drill<br />
• Evaluation formats for concerned departments and definite criteria for evaluation<br />
• Observers and Qualified evaluators<br />
Lessons learnt from the actual drills and exercises would be useful to revise operational<br />
plans and serve as a basis for the training of various stakeholders across different sectors.<br />
The drills and exercises will help to -<br />
• Identify planning gaps<br />
• Revise Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to enhance coordinated emergency<br />
response<br />
• Increase public awareness and community readiness<br />
• Enhance capacities of professionals, departments and trained volunteers<br />
• Test plans and systems in simulation exercises<br />
11.1.2 TYPES OF DRILLS AND EXERCISES<br />
There are several different types of drills and exercises.<br />
11.1.2.1 DRILL<br />
A drill is a supervised activity with a limited focus to test a procedure that is a component<br />
of the overall emergency management plan. That is, drills usually highlight and closely<br />
examine a limited portion of the overall emergency management plan. For example, a<br />
disaster management unit might conduct a drill for the use of a radio system with those<br />
responsible for communicating on it. Drills are designed to impart specific skills to<br />
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technical personnel (e.g., search and rescue, ambulance, fire fighting). A perfect drill is one<br />
that leads to a flawless repetition of the intended task under any circumstance.<br />
11.1.2.2 FUNCTIONAL EXERCISE<br />
A functional exercise simulates a disaster in the most realistic manner without moving<br />
real people or equipment to a real site. A functional exercise utilizes a carefully designed<br />
and scripted scenario, with timed messages and communications between players and<br />
simulators. The emergency operations centre (EOC)—the facility or area from which<br />
disaster response is coordinated—is usually activated during a functional exercise and<br />
actual communications equipment may be used.<br />
11.1.2.3 FULL-SCALE EXERCISE OR FIELD EXERCISE<br />
It tests the participation of as many members as possible for effectively responding to a<br />
disaster. This is an exercise which takes place in “real time,” employs real equipment, and<br />
tests several emergency functions. Full-scale exercises are generally intended to evaluate<br />
the operations capability of emergency management systems in a community and to<br />
evaluate interagency coordination. While these exercises cannot realistically reproduce<br />
the dynamic and chaos of real life disasters, they are useful when intended to detect the<br />
inevitable errors, lack of coordination, or deficiencies of the simulated response. A critical<br />
evaluation is the essential conclusion of these exercises.<br />
11.1.3 COMPOSITION OF PARTICIPANTS<br />
The participants should be from community volunteers, <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Team<br />
(DMT) members and decision makers from various departments (Emergency Support<br />
Functions). The DMTs should consist of the following groups:<br />
• Early Warning/Communication<br />
• Evacuation and Temporary Shelter <strong>Management</strong><br />
• Search & Rescue<br />
• Damage Assessment<br />
• First-Aid/Medical Health/ Trauma Counselling<br />
• Water & Sanitation<br />
• Relief (Food & Shelter) Coordination<br />
Note: The number of teams may vary as per the multi-hazard scenario in the area or for<br />
specific scenario like gas leakage.<br />
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11.1.4 OBSERVERS/EVALUATORS<br />
Their role is to observe the actions and decisions of the players, in order to later report<br />
what went well and what did not. The main focus is on the performance of functions and<br />
or/agencies, institutions and facilities being tested, keeping in mind the objectives of the<br />
exercise.<br />
11.1.5 COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION<br />
The community themselves are the first responders for carrying out rescue and<br />
emergency services. Community taskforces initiate responses at field level where<br />
specialized quick response teams join them for faster recovery. The field level team<br />
leaders of ESFs and local incident commander coordinate with community taskforces and<br />
quick response teams to understand the requirements of the situation and provide<br />
essential assistance to perform operations.<br />
11.2 PREPARATORY PROCEDURE<br />
Familiarize the participants (multi-stakeholders) about the mock drill exercise in prior<br />
and explain how they are an extremely important part of preparedness and response plan.<br />
Equip the CIL Staff, Community, District administration, Line Department officials, Police,<br />
Teshildar, Village Administrative Officer and other stakeholders on how to respond to an<br />
actual disaster. It is an opportunity to test and evaluate how well all sections of the<br />
emergency plan work together and how the community and stakeholders are trained to<br />
respond to actual emergency situation.<br />
The CIL staff, District administration and Community representatives should study the<br />
emergency plan carefully in prior and make sure they understand all aspects of the plan.<br />
The early warning team must decide on the mode and type of alarm for that particular<br />
hazard (for example gas leakage from RGT). It could be alarm bell or siren. The evacuation<br />
team must designate the safe assembly areas and evacuation routes with proper sign<br />
boards.<br />
All the CIL staff and community members must know how to respond with appropriate<br />
procedures related to the notified hazard once they hear the alarm. First priority in<br />
evacuation process should be of vulnerable persons, elderly persons, children, People with<br />
disability (PWD-visually challenged, physically challenged/ differently-abled, etc.),<br />
Paralysed, chronically ill, etc., as they are the most vulnerable during emergency. Search<br />
and evacuation team members must help in evacuation as per the procedures appropriate<br />
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to the notified hazard. After the safe assembly a proper head count can be carried out to<br />
ascertain the safety of all persons.<br />
The external agencies such as District Administration, Teshildar, Police, Fire and Rescue<br />
services, Medical team etc. must be informed of the mock drill and requested to be present<br />
during the drill. Take feedback from all participants for improvisation to handle the real<br />
time emergency situations. Record (documentation and video shoot) the entire mock drill<br />
process for future improvements.<br />
11.2.1 TIPS FOR CONDUCTING SAFE MOCK DRILL<br />
• Organise the mock drill which is representative of a real situation.<br />
• Create a list of all participants before starting the drill.<br />
• Explain the objectives, duration, “do’s and don’ts” clearly to all participants<br />
• Ensure the participation of vulnerable groups that need assistance, such as women,<br />
children, elderly persons, people with disabilities (PWD), paralyzed, etc.<br />
• Inculcate the practice of escorting the vulnerable to safe assembly areas<br />
• Finally there shall be a head count to ascertain everybody has safely reached the<br />
safe spot.<br />
• The participants should be advised not to panic during the mock drill. At the same<br />
time, they should be advised to be alert and participate seriously.<br />
• Prior to conducting the drill, the drill team members should be trained in the<br />
duties, responsibilities and activities related to their respective positions in the<br />
conduct of the drill.<br />
CAUTION: Mock drills are known to cause casualties if NOT CONDUCTED SYSTEMATICALLY<br />
or not taken seriously by the participants.<br />
11.3 GUIDELINES FOR MOCK DRILL DESIGN<br />
All drills should be conducted in accordance with the drill scenario as prepared by CIL and<br />
with prior permission from district administration. The participation of the district<br />
administration, Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) of all line departments, tehsildars,<br />
police, VAOs, voluntary agencies such as Civil Defence, NSS, NYKS, Bharat Scouts and<br />
Guides, Rangers and Rovers, Red Cross, Industrial Safety Managers/Technical Experts and<br />
groups or individuals specifically identified to conduct the drills is to be ensured. The<br />
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number of controllers, simulators and evaluators are decided based on the type of drill to<br />
be conducted, the scenario and the resources available to conduct the exercise (personnel,<br />
equipment, funding etc).<br />
11.3.1 SCOPE<br />
The scope defines the boundaries of the drill. While conducting the mock drill, the scope<br />
could also include the possible collateral hazards associated with the main hazard that<br />
triggers other events. The following five aspects should be considered while defining the<br />
scope -<br />
1. Hazards – Identify one specific hazard/collateral hazards for the exercise<br />
2. Geographic area – Identify a defined location for the event and identify a hazard<br />
impact scenario<br />
3. Agencies and personnel – Identify which agencies will participate and the<br />
personnel required<br />
4. Exercise type – Identify the type of exercise to be conducted based on realistically<br />
achievable results within the drill scenario<br />
5. Operating Procedures – Identify SOPs as per the scenario to test emergency<br />
response functions and coordination<br />
11.3.2 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE<br />
It is a statement to communicate the scope of the exercise to the entities participating in<br />
the mock drill.<br />
11.3.3 OBJECTIVES<br />
Objectives should be clear, concise, specific, performance based and attainable. The<br />
number of objectives needed for an exercise may vary according to the scale and expected<br />
output of the exercise. Objectives can be classified into “general/functional/specific”.<br />
General objectives will provide the overall scope of the exercise with reference to the<br />
community, agency, institution, industry or organization.<br />
Functional or specific objectives form the core of the mock drill. These further define the<br />
statement of purpose for the exercise by clearly describing the expected outcomes<br />
(performance) of the disaster management functions being tested.<br />
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11.3.4 SCENARIO NARRATIVE<br />
The scenario narrative describes the events leading up to the time the exercise begins. It<br />
sets the scene for later events and also captures the attention of the participants. It could<br />
include answers to questions such as:<br />
• What event<br />
• How was the information relayed<br />
• What damages have been reported<br />
• What was the sequence of events<br />
• Was there any advance warning issued and how long before the event<br />
• What factors influence emergency procedures<br />
11.3.5 DRILL ACTIVITY<br />
Activities should be planned in such a way that it provides sufficient scope to test the preidentified<br />
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), drill scenario and the needs of the<br />
identified participants (e.g. members of ESF teams, schools, industries, public/commercial<br />
settings).<br />
11.3.6 EXPECTED ACTIONS/ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES<br />
This describes the expected response to actions undertaken. Each ESF and its respective<br />
team members should be listed by name so that there is no confusion as to who is<br />
responsible for each function.<br />
11.3.7 EXPECTED RESPONSE/EVALUATION CRITERIA<br />
The expected response is already pre-identified and defined in a procedure. Specific areas<br />
need to be identified for evaluation in the design stage of the mock drill. Details of the<br />
procedure must be included so that evaluation is properly carried out. The criteria for<br />
evaluation should focus on response recovery based on the hazard scenario stimulated<br />
and emergency functions conducted.<br />
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11.4 GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCTING MOCK DRILL<br />
When conducting drills, a set process should be followed in order to minimize risks of<br />
injury to personnel, damage to equipment or the environment.<br />
11.4.1 PRE-DRILL BRIEFING<br />
The drill coordinator should hold a pre-drill briefing with the participating agencies,<br />
observers/evaluators to explain the scene and the ground rules for executing the drill.<br />
Operational procedures should be reviewed and safety precautions should be considered<br />
and reviewed with the participants. In a scenario which has a potential to cause damage to<br />
the habitat, it is important to involve the community and discuss the possible chain of<br />
events with them.<br />
11.4.2 DRILL INITIATION<br />
The drill should be initiated by the mock drill coordinator in accordance with the planned<br />
drill scenario. The exact actions (such as alarm or announcement) for the initiation should<br />
be identified.<br />
11.4.3 DRILL ACTIVITY<br />
After the drill is initiated, every activity and response should be carried out according to<br />
the scenario and respective SOPs. Methods for receiving and delivery of messages can be<br />
verbal or written; on paper, by telephone, radio or fax. The drill scenario should be<br />
allowed to continue till completion of the stated objectives or as stated by the mock drill<br />
coordinator.<br />
CAUTION: An abnormal termination is possible when actions taken by operating<br />
personnel would adversely affect the safety of the participants or cause damage to the<br />
facility, equipment or environment.<br />
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11.5 GUIDELINES FOR DRILL EVALUATION<br />
Evaluation process is an important component of the drill. It is the act of observing and<br />
recording mock drill activity, by comparing the performed actions against the drill<br />
objectives.<br />
Evaluation serves three functions:<br />
• To evaluate personnel actions<br />
• To evaluate the ability of the responding agencies to implement a plan<br />
• To check the effectiveness of the standard operating procedures<br />
During the pre-drill briefing, the drill planner, mock drill coordinator and evaluation team<br />
will review the drill activity and SOPs. An evaluation worksheet outlining the action<br />
processes to be observed as per the set timeline decided in the scenario exercise should be<br />
circulated. After the drill, an evaluation report will be prepared and the comments can be<br />
incorporated into the SOPs.<br />
11.5.1 EVALUATION TEAM<br />
The team members may be identified from within or outside the participating agencies.<br />
The mock drill coordinator may also serve as an evaluator. The size of the evaluation team<br />
will depend on the complexity and scale of the drill. Evaluators should be familiar with the<br />
local emergency management system, have expertise and knowledge of the plan and have<br />
analytical skills in keeping with the exercise design.<br />
11.5.2 ELEMENTS FOR EVALUATION<br />
The evaluators should consider the following elements in their evaluation<br />
• Notification, alerting and mobilization of disaster response personnel<br />
• Adequacy of alerting procedures<br />
• Timely activation and staffing of response facilities<br />
• Accurate and timely assessment of emergency situation<br />
• Emergency response facilities<br />
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• Timely activation<br />
• Adequate personnel as per the Response <strong>Plan</strong><br />
• Adequate response equipment<br />
• <strong>Disaster</strong> preparedness plans and procedures<br />
• Assigned task forces, personnel’s demonstrated familiarity with the plans and<br />
standard operating procedures<br />
• Following the set process of the procedures and plans<br />
• Communications capabilities between response facilities<br />
• Adequate timely communication with field teams<br />
• Use of primary and back-up communication systems<br />
• Satisfactory handling of messages and communication from CIL’s control room to<br />
the field site and vice-versa<br />
• Adequate communications between emergency support functions<br />
• Situation assessment<br />
• To be able to demonstrate timely and coordinated information exchange between<br />
response facilities<br />
• To be able to assess the emergency situation, classify the situation and develop<br />
initial mitigation/restoration activities in a timely and accurate manner<br />
• Overall adequacy of the drill scenario to assess the response plan, facilities,<br />
resources, personnel/task forces according to functional areas and standard<br />
operating procedures<br />
11.6 FEEDBACK & IMPROVEMENTS<br />
Following the drill, the mock drill coordinator will hold a session to critique the drill along<br />
with the evaluators and drill team. The critical analysis highlights the successes,<br />
shortcomings of the drill scenario, personnel’s actions, equipment accessibility etc. The<br />
feedbacks and improvements include an analysis of the expected versus the actual<br />
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operating actions including a critical evaluation of the response mechanisms and response<br />
time. The process should first involve –<br />
• Self-evaluation by the participants<br />
• Discussion of the evaluation notes, checklists and actions taken<br />
• Overall drill performance.<br />
Lessons learnt should be generated and shared with all the participating agencies to<br />
ensure improvements and effectiveness for live scenarios. The mock drill coordinator<br />
shall make the final determination of whether the drill objective was met or not.<br />
11.6.1 MOCK DRILL EVALUATION REPORT<br />
The evaluation report summarizes the development, conduct and results of the<br />
drill/exercise. The report should present an overall evaluation of the exercise, state<br />
whether the exercise objectives were achieved, and cite any areas of noteworthy<br />
performance, discoveries, determinations, problems, and solutions identified as a result of<br />
the exercise.<br />
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CHAPTER<br />
12 3<br />
12 RECOMMENDATIONS<br />
1. CIL shall enhance the Coordination Mechanism with <strong>Barmer</strong> District Administration and<br />
respective line Departments for effective <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong><br />
2. CIL’s Preparedness shall include systems and mechanisms including Community<br />
Participation for ensuring integrated and comprehensive <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong>.<br />
3. CIL and District administration shall lay down the sequence of actions to be taken by all the<br />
relevant agencies in the emergency/crisis situations as per the formulated Cairn’s<br />
Emergency Command Structure.<br />
4. The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) evolved as part of this DMP shall be used as<br />
joint operating procedures for both Cairn and District Administration during emergencies<br />
5. Periodical updation of <strong>Disaster</strong> <strong>Management</strong> Inventory consisting of critical resources<br />
and storage locations.<br />
6. CIL shall ensure periodic execution of mock drills as prescribed in the DMP.<br />
7. CIL shall undertake Capacity Building in the field of Community based <strong>Disaster</strong><br />
<strong>Management</strong> to improve Community Resilience.<br />
8. State Administration shall be requested by CIL to ensure a 1 km radius of Buffer Zone<br />
around MPT and RGT facility to prevent any new commercial establishments or<br />
settlements.<br />
9. CIL shall periodically maintain Emergency <strong>Management</strong> Kits<br />
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10. The Inventory of Resources shall be periodically updated and uploaded in both Cairn and<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> District administration websites respectively<br />
11. CIL shall improve the Community based Early Warning Systems for multihazards<br />
12. CIL shall liase and network with neighbouring corporate houses and other agencies on<br />
Sharing of Resources during emergencies<br />
13. This DMP (English Version) shall be translated into Hindi and disseminated to appropriate<br />
district/state departments and CIL management.<br />
14. GIS based pipeline survey and periodical monitoring shall be conducted.<br />
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APPENDIX A – EMERGENCY CONTACT NUMBERS<br />
1 HOTLINE NUMBERS<br />
Department Hotline Number Telephone number<br />
Police 100 02982 221 822<br />
Ambulance 108<br />
District Collectorate 02982 220 003<br />
Municipality/ Fire 02982 225 781, 220 098<br />
Home guard 02982 220 075<br />
2 WIRELESS CALL SIGNS<br />
S. no Name of station Call sign Mobile call sign<br />
1 Police Firing Range Romeio.18<br />
2 Police Control Room Control Mobile control<br />
3 Collector, DM Echo<br />
4 S.P.Chamber Tiger Tiger<br />
5 Repeater Station Chohtan Gita.25<br />
6 Police City Kotwali Gita. 1 Mike.1<br />
7 Police Station, Sadar Gita.2 Mike.2<br />
8 Police Station, Baytu Gita.3 Mike.3<br />
9 Police Station, Gida GitaA Mike.4<br />
10 Police Station, Sheo Gita.5 Mike.5<br />
11 Police Station, Girab Gita.6 Mike.6<br />
12 Police Station, Dhorimana Gita.7 Mike.7<br />
13 Police Station, Gudamalani Gita.8 Mike.8<br />
14 Police Station, Balotra Gita.l1 Mike.ll<br />
15 Police Station, Kalyanpur Gita.12 Mike.12<br />
16 Police Station, Mandalee Gita.13 Mike.13<br />
17 Police Station, Samdari Gita.14 Mike.14<br />
18 Police Station, Siwana Gita.15 'Mike.15<br />
19 Police Station, Sindhari Gita.16 Mike.16<br />
20 Police Station, Chohtan Gita.19 Mike.19<br />
21 Police Station, Ramsar Gita.20 Mike.20<br />
22 pblice Station, GadaraRoad Gita.21 Mike.21<br />
23 Police Station, Binjrad Gita.22 Mike.22<br />
24 Police Station, Sedawa Gita.23 Mike.23<br />
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25 Police Station, Bakhasar Gita.24 Mike.24<br />
26 Police Station, GRP BMR Gita.26 Mike.26<br />
3 CONTACT NUMBERS OF DISTRICT DISASTER MANAGEMENT<br />
CELL<br />
Telephone numbers<br />
S. No Name of post<br />
STD Code Work Home<br />
1 District collector Chairman 02982 220003 220004<br />
2 District Police<br />
Superintendent<br />
3 Chief works Officer, District<br />
Administration<br />
4 Additional district collector<br />
(Administration)<br />
Member 02982 220005 220006<br />
Member 02982 220292 220296<br />
Member 02982 220007 220008<br />
5<br />
Special Additional Works<br />
Officer,<br />
District<br />
Administration<br />
Member 02982 220053 220063<br />
6 Chief Medical and Health<br />
Officer<br />
7 Sub-Director, Pushpalen,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
8 Special director, Technical<br />
Mission, PHED<br />
9 Assistant engineer, Water<br />
resources division<br />
Member 02982 220562 220204<br />
Member 02982 230284<br />
Member 02982 220253 220243<br />
Member 02982<br />
10<br />
Superintendent engineer,<br />
Jodhpur Electricity<br />
Distribution Board<br />
Member 02982 223788 221390<br />
11 Sub controller, Civil<br />
Defence<br />
Member 02982 220075<br />
12 District Education Officer,<br />
Secondary<br />
Member 02982 230228 227711<br />
13 Superintendent, railway Member 02982 220146 227575<br />
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station, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
14 District information officer Member 02982 220973 221295<br />
15 District Statistics officer Member 02982 220682<br />
16 District transportation<br />
officer<br />
Member 02982 220615 222377<br />
17 District information and<br />
public relations officer<br />
Member 02982 220485 220168<br />
18 District supply officer Member 02982 220164 223277<br />
19 Commandant, Homeguard Member 02982 220075<br />
20 District manager, BSNL Member 02982 221100 221200<br />
21 Station commander, Jalipa<br />
Army<br />
22 Deputy inspector general,<br />
BSF<br />
Member 02982 221582<br />
Member 02982 220837 220838<br />
4 TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF THE IMPORTANT OFFICIALS IN THE<br />
DISTRICT<br />
S. No<br />
Name of the<br />
official<br />
1 Ravi Jain<br />
2 H. S. Meena<br />
3 Mitusingh<br />
4<br />
Rajesh<br />
Chauhan<br />
5 B. L. Naga<br />
6 C. L. Devasi<br />
Post<br />
District Collector and<br />
Magistrate<br />
Assistant District<br />
Collector<br />
Subdivision Officer,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Subdivision Officer,<br />
Baalothara<br />
Subdivision Officer,<br />
Shiv<br />
Subdivision Officer,<br />
Gudaamalani<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> Headquarters<br />
STD<br />
Code<br />
02982<br />
02982<br />
02982<br />
Telephone<br />
Work Home Mobile<br />
220003 220004 9414 649900<br />
220007 220008 9828 153204<br />
220009 220009 9413 001325<br />
02988 220005 220005 9413 305432<br />
02987 253301 253301 9414 689965<br />
02982 221837 221837 9414 404982<br />
[166]
7 Neeraj Mishra<br />
8 Lalith Jain<br />
9<br />
Choonaram<br />
Poonad<br />
Financial Officer,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
District supply official,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Additional Charge<br />
Officer, <strong>Disaster</strong><br />
Mitigation and<br />
<strong>Management</strong><br />
10 C. S. Bhati Tahsildar, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
14<br />
Bhanwar<br />
Singh<br />
Dhanraj<br />
Choudary<br />
Dheerendrasin<br />
gh Soni<br />
Manmohan<br />
Vaas<br />
15 Rajesh Mevda<br />
16<br />
Ramchandr<br />
Panchar<br />
Tahlsildar, Baayuthi<br />
Tahlsildar, Sivana<br />
Tahlsildar,<br />
Gudaamalani<br />
Assistant Tahlsildar,<br />
Shiv<br />
Tahlsildar,<br />
Pachpadara<br />
Tahlsildar, Chauhatan<br />
17 Naresh Joshi Tahlsildar, Ramsar<br />
18<br />
Kailash<br />
Choudary<br />
19 Harphoolsingh<br />
20 Tanuram<br />
21 Mehtabsingh<br />
22 Ayidansingh<br />
23 L. R. Vishnoi<br />
24 Bhagaram<br />
25<br />
Donngarsingh<br />
Choudary<br />
Development Officer,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Development Officer,<br />
Baayuthi<br />
Development Officer,<br />
Sivana<br />
Development Officer,<br />
Dhoreenmna<br />
Development Officer,<br />
Shiv<br />
Development Officer,<br />
Baalothara<br />
Development Officer,<br />
Chauhatan<br />
Development Officer,<br />
Sindheri<br />
02982 220404 230309 9829 795150<br />
02982 220164 9414 307813<br />
02982 222226 225283 9414 308166<br />
02982 220224 220224 9414 493101<br />
02982 241183 241183 9414 678411<br />
02901 230613 230613 9414 544638<br />
02983 280031 280031 9828 930418<br />
02987 253095 253095 8003 332335<br />
02988 281241 281241 9414 526707<br />
02989 286130 286130 9414 430682<br />
02985 270078 270078 9829 588882<br />
02982 220062 222990 9414 452089<br />
02982 241128 241128 9414 664013<br />
02901 230603 230625 9001 091051<br />
02986 264224 264291 9413 527300<br />
02987 253036 253036 9414 627699<br />
02988 220007 220007 9414 425388<br />
02989 286126 286126 9950 111783<br />
02984 284444 284555 9413 163662<br />
[167]
5 POLICE OFFICIALS<br />
S. No<br />
Name of the<br />
official<br />
1 Navjyothi Gogai<br />
2 Sriraam Meena<br />
3 Jasaram Bans<br />
4 Kajod Mal Peena<br />
5 Banjiram Meena<br />
6<br />
7<br />
Budharam<br />
Vishnoi<br />
Ramesh<br />
Sharma<br />
8 Manoj Mood<br />
Kumar<br />
9 Jagdish Vishnoi<br />
10 Manoj Sharma<br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
14<br />
Lakshminarayan<br />
an<br />
Jayram<br />
Choudary<br />
Dinesh<br />
Meena<br />
Bhanwarlal<br />
Devasi<br />
15 Udaysingh<br />
Kumar<br />
Post<br />
District Police<br />
Superintendent<br />
Additional District<br />
Police superintendent<br />
Assistant<br />
Superintendent,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Assistant<br />
Superintendent,<br />
Chauhatan<br />
Assistant<br />
Superintendent,<br />
Baalothara<br />
Inspector of Police,<br />
main Police Station,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Police chief inspector,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Sub-inspector,<br />
Baayuthi Police<br />
station<br />
Sub-inspector, Gida<br />
Police station<br />
Inspector, Girab<br />
Police station<br />
Inspector, Shiv Police<br />
station<br />
Sub-inspector,<br />
Dhorimana Police<br />
station<br />
Inspector,<br />
Gudaamalani Police<br />
station<br />
Inspector, Baalothara<br />
Police station<br />
Sub-inspector,<br />
Kalyanpura Police<br />
[168]<br />
STD<br />
Code<br />
02982<br />
02982<br />
Telephone<br />
02982 223900<br />
02989<br />
02988<br />
02982 220100<br />
02982 200774<br />
02982 241125<br />
02982 210115<br />
02981 276310<br />
02987 253032<br />
02986 264226<br />
02983 280025<br />
02988 220010<br />
02980 255010<br />
Work Home Mobile<br />
220005 220006<br />
220930 220078<br />
220079<br />
286139 224964<br />
221007 224964<br />
9799<br />
397243<br />
9928<br />
431600<br />
9414<br />
754280<br />
9414<br />
712666<br />
9414<br />
006081<br />
9414<br />
430238<br />
9414<br />
980142<br />
9414<br />
525090<br />
9828<br />
798031<br />
9982<br />
366262<br />
9413<br />
363434<br />
9414<br />
373723<br />
9414<br />
306790<br />
9414<br />
101010<br />
9414<br />
842698
station<br />
16 Mishrilal<br />
Sub-inspector,<br />
Samdhadi Police 02990 276226<br />
station<br />
17 Narpathdan<br />
Sub-inspector, Sivana<br />
02901<br />
Police station<br />
230610<br />
18 Khiyaram<br />
Sub-inspector,<br />
Mandali Police station<br />
02980 244240<br />
19 Moolaram<br />
Sub-inspector,<br />
Sindhari Police station<br />
02984 284240<br />
Sub-inspector,<br />
20 Kaliashdaan Chauhatan Police 02989 286123<br />
station<br />
21 Hanjaariram<br />
Sub-inspector,<br />
Beejrad Police station<br />
02989 233010<br />
22 Surajmal Meena<br />
Inspector, Ramsar<br />
Police station<br />
02985 270124<br />
23 Surendra Kumar<br />
Inspector, Sedva<br />
Police station<br />
02903 214333<br />
24 Dhanaram<br />
Inspector, Gadraroad<br />
Police station<br />
02981 270124<br />
25 Mohansingh<br />
Inspector, Bakhasar<br />
Police station<br />
02903 269310<br />
Sub-inspector,<br />
26 Jagdish Prasad Pachpadara Police 02988 281807<br />
station<br />
27 Babulal Vishnoi NPRIPL, <strong>Barmer</strong> 02982 220010<br />
9982<br />
494390<br />
9680320<br />
656<br />
9413092<br />
511<br />
9784<br />
417157<br />
9414301<br />
026<br />
9799<br />
518080<br />
9414<br />
722983<br />
9414<br />
273413<br />
9414<br />
915802<br />
9829<br />
367944<br />
9928<br />
370591<br />
9460<br />
431894<br />
6 MUNICIPALITY<br />
S. No<br />
Name of the<br />
official<br />
1 Usha Jain<br />
2 Srimathi<br />
3 Choonaram<br />
Post<br />
Chairman N. P,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Chairman N. P,<br />
Baalothara<br />
Commissioner N. P,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
STD<br />
Code<br />
[169]<br />
Telephone<br />
02982 220048<br />
02988 220024<br />
Work Home Mobile<br />
02982 220048 222754
4 Mangatram Officer, Baalothara 02988 220024 221156<br />
9929<br />
105943<br />
7 HEALTH DEPARTMENT<br />
S. No Name of the<br />
official<br />
Post<br />
1<br />
Chief physician and health<br />
Ganpathsingh<br />
officer<br />
2 Jeetendrasing Additional chief physician and<br />
h<br />
health officer (P.K.)<br />
3 Govardhan Additional chief physician and<br />
singh<br />
health officer (health)<br />
4<br />
M. L. Bohra RCMO, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
5 R K<br />
Maheshwari<br />
6<br />
G C Vadera<br />
7<br />
8<br />
9<br />
10<br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
14<br />
15<br />
P R Rati<br />
D K Charan<br />
Shamburam<br />
N K Kotiwala<br />
S S Shomani<br />
Vishnuram<br />
Jagdish lal<br />
Government hospital, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Government<br />
Baalothara<br />
Block CMO, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Block CMO, Baalothara<br />
Block CMO, Chauhatan<br />
Block CMO, Shiv<br />
Block CMO, Sivana<br />
Block CMO, Dhorimanna<br />
Block CMO, Baayuthi<br />
S. Lal Block CMO, Sindhari<br />
Shamburam<br />
16 Phusaram<br />
Vishnoi<br />
17 Virendra<br />
Gandhi<br />
MOSHC, Chauhatan<br />
MOSHC, Gudaamalani<br />
MOSHC, Pachpadara<br />
hospital,<br />
Telephone<br />
STD<br />
Code<br />
Work Mobile<br />
02982 230462 9414633819<br />
02982 230307 9460088345<br />
02982 230276 9001892727<br />
02982 231155 9001892666<br />
02982 230369 9414106651<br />
02988 220910 9414384393<br />
02982 231062 9413527068<br />
02988 224011 9414531056<br />
02989 286117 9414531575<br />
02987 253364 9414493491<br />
02901 223245 9460087626<br />
02986 264279 9414106662<br />
02982 241400 9460310636<br />
02984 284300 9413527825<br />
02989 286117 9414531575<br />
02983 280808 9414530058<br />
02988 281296 9414282386<br />
[170]
18<br />
19<br />
20<br />
21<br />
22<br />
23<br />
F R Rati<br />
J S Rathod<br />
N K Kotiwala<br />
G S Rathod<br />
B S Doodi<br />
R R Suthar<br />
24 Sanjeev<br />
Mithal<br />
25<br />
Tarachand<br />
26 Harish<br />
Chauhan<br />
MOSHC, Ramsar<br />
MOSHC, Samdhadi<br />
MOSHC, Shiv<br />
MOSHC, Sivana<br />
MOSHC, Kavas<br />
MOSHC, Kalyanpur<br />
MOSHC, Gadra Road<br />
MOSHC, Bishaala<br />
MOSHC, Sindhari<br />
02985 270156 9414527068<br />
02900 275210 9828658765<br />
02987 253364 9414493491<br />
02901 230677 -<br />
02982 248506 9414756114<br />
02980 255210 9414133179<br />
02981 278100 9784312011<br />
- - 9413307987<br />
02984 284300 9461217477<br />
8 HEALTHCARE CENTRES IN BARMER<br />
S. No<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
Name of<br />
the<br />
Hospital<br />
Governmen<br />
t Hospital<br />
Governmen<br />
t hospital,<br />
Nahata<br />
District<br />
decay<br />
prevention<br />
centre<br />
Community<br />
health<br />
center<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Place<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Balothara<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Shiv<br />
Goonga<br />
Post<br />
SS,JS,SMO,<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
SS,JS,SMO,<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
MO<br />
SMO,MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Name of<br />
official<br />
incharge<br />
R K<br />
Maheshwari<br />
G C Vadera<br />
Govardhansi<br />
ngh Charan<br />
Anuj Sharma<br />
telephone<br />
Work<br />
02982<br />
220204<br />
(home)<br />
230369<br />
(work)<br />
02988-<br />
220910<br />
02982<br />
230276<br />
02987<br />
253354<br />
02987<br />
252361<br />
Other<br />
9414106651<br />
9414984393<br />
9001892777<br />
9828159506<br />
Arjanram MN<br />
II<br />
9414493329<br />
[171]
[172]<br />
6<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Bhiyond<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Khushwant<br />
Khatri<br />
02987-<br />
202102<br />
9001892700<br />
7<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Girab<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Gotham MN<br />
II<br />
9772387811<br />
8<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Harsaani<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Hari<br />
Singh<br />
MN II<br />
02901-<br />
111505<br />
9828969435<br />
9<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Jaisindhar<br />
Village<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Tulcharam<br />
Megval<br />
921483688<br />
9<br />
9214836889<br />
10<br />
Community<br />
health<br />
center<br />
Gadraroad<br />
JS,SMO,MO<br />
&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Prakash<br />
Bhansali<br />
02981<br />
278489<br />
9414531796<br />
11<br />
Village<br />
Family<br />
welfare<br />
unit<br />
Detani MO Prahaladram<br />
12<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Jaisindhar<br />
Station<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
02981-<br />
279429<br />
13 Community Ramsar<br />
JS,SMO,MO<br />
&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Pharasram<br />
Rati<br />
02985<br />
270156<br />
9001892602<br />
14 Community Vishala<br />
SMO.MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Tarachand<br />
Bhagora<br />
029852040<br />
89<br />
9001892597<br />
15<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Khadeen<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Peerusingh<br />
Bhati<br />
02985-<br />
205015<br />
9001892588<br />
16<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Ranigaon<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Matilal<br />
Khatri<br />
02982<br />
263165<br />
9001892592<br />
17<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Taratara<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Rajiv Jain 9001892595<br />
18<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Gaagariya<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Mohammad<br />
Akram<br />
02985-<br />
217200<br />
9001892604<br />
19<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Sanavada<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Mahipal<br />
Chaudry<br />
02986-<br />
9001892590
[173]<br />
Centre Staff 263254<br />
20<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Bhinde<br />
ka<br />
paar<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Mohammad<br />
Akram<br />
02985-<br />
217240<br />
9001892604<br />
21<br />
Village<br />
Family<br />
welfare<br />
unit<br />
Rathasar<br />
MO<br />
Mohammad<br />
Akram<br />
9001892604<br />
22<br />
Community<br />
health<br />
center<br />
Chauhatan<br />
JS,SMO,MO<br />
&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Shamburam<br />
Gadveer<br />
02989-<br />
286117<br />
9414531575<br />
23<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Bakhasar<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Shankaram<br />
Gahloth<br />
029032144<br />
45<br />
9950349196<br />
24<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Sedva<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Dinashadath<br />
Sharma<br />
029032141<br />
65<br />
9001892701<br />
25<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Mitdaoo<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Rakesh Azad 8107115814<br />
26<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Kailnor<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Gopesh<br />
Panwar<br />
9414562201<br />
27<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Sata<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Shiraj<br />
Vishnoi<br />
02903-<br />
268330<br />
9799701219<br />
28<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Dhanaoo<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Ajay Kumar<br />
Sharma<br />
02989-<br />
288013<br />
9414314845<br />
29<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Saarla<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Birbalram<br />
Khileri<br />
9460613435<br />
30<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Bhawanr<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Bashidar<br />
Balai<br />
9001892650<br />
31<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Bhurhan ka<br />
tala<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Ajkumar<br />
Khandelwal<br />
9928724369<br />
32<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Bavdi Kala<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
9414271027
[174]<br />
33<br />
Community<br />
health<br />
center<br />
Baytu<br />
JS,SMO,MO<br />
&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
S K Singh<br />
Bist<br />
02982<br />
241400<br />
9001892780<br />
34<br />
Community<br />
health<br />
center<br />
Kavas<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Jagdish<br />
Lal<br />
Mali<br />
9001892834<br />
35<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Bhadka<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Jasraj Bohra 9001892840<br />
36<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Savaupdam<br />
singh<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Prakash<br />
Kumar<br />
Chaudry<br />
02902<br />
256888<br />
37<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Batadu<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
S K Singh<br />
Bist<br />
02902-<br />
221210<br />
9001892780<br />
38<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Bhimda<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Shivram<br />
Prajaapath<br />
0-<br />
212100290<br />
2<br />
9829570544<br />
39<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Gida<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Prakashmal<br />
Vishnoi<br />
9001892795<br />
40<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Kanod<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Deepak<br />
Kumar<br />
941363337<br />
5<br />
9001892776<br />
41<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Jhank<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Kamalkant<br />
Sharma<br />
9413507539<br />
42<br />
Village<br />
Family<br />
welfare<br />
unit<br />
Pareyu<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Bannaram<br />
02983<br />
280880<br />
9414530058<br />
43<br />
Community<br />
health<br />
center<br />
Gudamaalan<br />
i<br />
JS,SMO,MO<br />
&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Tusaram<br />
Vishnoi<br />
02986<br />
264900<br />
9414106662<br />
44<br />
Community<br />
health<br />
center<br />
Dhorimana<br />
JS,SMO,MO<br />
&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Vishnuram<br />
Vishnoi<br />
9001892729<br />
45<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Gandhavkur<br />
da<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Ajay Yadav 9461070471<br />
46<br />
Primary Bakharpura MO& Ashok<br />
9784422477
[175]<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Vishnoi<br />
47<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Peeparali<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Kimraj Patel 9950452003<br />
48<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Sonadi<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Dharmapal<br />
02933-<br />
214427<br />
9509290441<br />
49<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Ogala<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Jainarayan<br />
Bhairava<br />
029332144<br />
39<br />
9587775911<br />
50<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Bhuniya<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Shaitansingh<br />
Vishnoi<br />
029892891<br />
26<br />
9001892714<br />
51<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Gangasara<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Mangalchan<br />
drayadaav<br />
8784814406<br />
52<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Araniyali<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Omprakash<br />
Vishnoi<br />
9001892644<br />
53<br />
Village<br />
Family<br />
welfare<br />
unit<br />
Begana<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Hemantkum<br />
ar (Ayush)<br />
9610508694<br />
54<br />
Community<br />
health<br />
center<br />
Sindheri<br />
JS,SMO,MO<br />
&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Sanjeev<br />
Mittal<br />
02984<br />
284300<br />
9001892838<br />
55<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Payala kala<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Navaneet<br />
Dadhish<br />
56<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Dhanka<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Praful<br />
Kumar<br />
9001892368<br />
57<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Chava<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Bajranglal<br />
Kataria<br />
02982-<br />
245101<br />
9511129876<br />
58<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Sarunu<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
02982-<br />
243145<br />
Mr.<br />
Lalkha<br />
Ram MN II<br />
9001892425<br />
59<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Nokada<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Sudhirkuma<br />
r Darjee<br />
02986-<br />
267337<br />
9001892410
[176]<br />
60<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Hodu<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
A K Purohit<br />
02984-<br />
289105<br />
9001892419<br />
61<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Shivkaar<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Nanda<br />
Tai<br />
(Ayush)<br />
02982-<br />
232038<br />
9460465074<br />
62<br />
Village<br />
Family<br />
welfare<br />
unit<br />
Nosar<br />
MO<br />
Ketaram<br />
Soni<br />
9001892430<br />
63<br />
Community<br />
health<br />
center<br />
Sivana<br />
JS,SMO,MO<br />
&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Ghuamnsing<br />
h Rathod<br />
029012306<br />
77<br />
9413032956<br />
64<br />
Community<br />
health<br />
center<br />
Samdhadi<br />
JS,SMO,MO<br />
&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Ghisalal<br />
Rathod<br />
02900<br />
276210<br />
9002189250<br />
65<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Padaru<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Natwarsingh<br />
02901-<br />
234716<br />
9001892460<br />
66<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Rakhi<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Lakshminar<br />
ayan<br />
9001892476<br />
67<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Ajit<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Suresh<br />
Kumar<br />
Raina<br />
9001892502<br />
68<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Ramaniya<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Hukmichand<br />
Rathod<br />
9001892469<br />
69<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Mokalsar<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
S D Bhoda<br />
029012327<br />
80<br />
9001892746<br />
70<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Khandap<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Omprakash<br />
9001892481<br />
71<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Indrana<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Santosh<br />
Kuma Soni<br />
9001892452<br />
72<br />
Village<br />
Family<br />
welfare<br />
unit<br />
Majal<br />
MO<br />
Malik<br />
Esar<br />
Ahmed<br />
9413254491
73<br />
74<br />
75<br />
76<br />
77<br />
78<br />
79<br />
80<br />
81<br />
Community<br />
health<br />
center<br />
Community<br />
health<br />
center<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Pachpatra<br />
Kalyankuma<br />
r<br />
Mandali<br />
Patodi<br />
Parloo<br />
Jasol<br />
Araba<br />
Asada<br />
Thob<br />
JS,SMO,MO<br />
& Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
JS,SMO,MO<br />
& Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Virendra<br />
Gandhi<br />
R R Sudhar<br />
Kuldeep<br />
Solanki<br />
Dharmendra<br />
Soni<br />
Prem<br />
prakash<br />
Vishnuprasa<br />
d<br />
02988<br />
281517<br />
9001892302<br />
255210 9001892301<br />
02980-<br />
210201<br />
02980-<br />
254720<br />
02988-<br />
243015<br />
02988<br />
240306<br />
9001892306<br />
9001892303<br />
9001892305<br />
9001892304<br />
Karthi Bhati 9413252900<br />
Rameshwar<br />
(Ayush)<br />
9468553419<br />
Mr. Dinesh<br />
Ranga MN II<br />
9983370902<br />
82<br />
83<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Primary<br />
Healthcare<br />
Centre<br />
Navatala<br />
Kitnod<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
MO&<br />
Nursing<br />
Staff<br />
Rajendra<br />
Kiradia<br />
Rajesh<br />
Jhanku<br />
212323 9001892851<br />
9829090060<br />
9 HOSPITALS<br />
S. No Name of the hospital STD Code Phone Managing doctor<br />
1 Manak hospital, <strong>Barmer</strong> 2982 222964 50 Chaganlal Bohra<br />
2<br />
Eye hospital, Rain<br />
Basera, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
2982 220791 60 Omprakash Mehra<br />
3 Sagar hospital, <strong>Barmer</strong> 55 Bhanuparatap<br />
[177]
4<br />
Jeevanjoyth hospital,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
2982 223170 40 Sayaman Megwan<br />
5 Khati hospital, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
6 Daga hospital, Balothara 2988 222717 35 Ashokji<br />
7<br />
Sant Haridas hospital,<br />
Balothara<br />
2988 222164 24 Satish Agarwal<br />
8 B H T Hospital, <strong>Barmer</strong> 2982 223811 50 Hariprakash<br />
10 VETERINARY HOSPITALS/PHARMACIES IN THE DISTRICT<br />
S. No Name of the official Post Place Telephone<br />
number<br />
1 B R Jetiya Assistant Workplace, 9829183935<br />
director <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
2 Ajash Sharma VO Veterinary 9414532931<br />
hospital<br />
3 Narayan Singh VO Animal<br />
9928383230<br />
husbandry<br />
development<br />
4 Hemant Kumar VO Workplace, 9414417856<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
5 Pushpendar Singh VO Bakhasar 9928245409<br />
6 Ajaynath Goswami VO Kavas 9680788611<br />
7 Ghenaram VA Dhorimanna 9414529372<br />
8 Banwarlal VO Mitda<br />
9 Adharam VO Niyad 9468550023<br />
10 Vishnuvrithisurvase VO Mool ki Daani 9829782494<br />
11 Milind Sadarve VO Ramsar 9413005835<br />
12 Ravendra Kumar VO Beejrad 9413635856<br />
13 Ganesh Somaji VO Bhaidana 9414719745<br />
14 Rajesh M Nimbarte VO Navatala 9970059343<br />
15 Harisingh SVO Sivana 02901230260<br />
16 Deshpal Singh SVO Chauhatan 9414294657<br />
17 Parmeshwarlal SVO Balothara 9414721143<br />
18 Shravankumar Vaishna VO Tapra 02988-240007<br />
19 Madangiri Swami VO Kitnod 9414294860<br />
20 Vijay Kaidar VO Gadraroad 9460491269<br />
21 Ajaykumar Teesal VO Baythu 9413030458<br />
22 Kunamaram Venival VO Dhorimanna 9414107475<br />
23 Dhanshyam Marodia VO Bakhasar 9414171819<br />
[178]
24 Avinash Kumar VO Kanana 9460887035<br />
25 Sanjay Sharma VO Pachpatra 9414275244<br />
26 Jeetendra Singh VO Naithrad 9414529937<br />
27 Kamendra Kumar VO Samdhadi 9414755044<br />
28 Ratanlal Jhinkar VO Mokalsar 9414900579<br />
29 Jaydeep Bathoria VO Sedva 9415160671<br />
30 Ajaypalsingh VO Patodi 9829029855<br />
31 Kamlesh Kumar VO Kalyanpur 9460769423<br />
32 Jagdish Kumar VO Gudamalaani 9799045501<br />
33 Punamachand Vishnoi VO Sonadi 9784814644<br />
34 Banwarsingh Deniwal VO Chava 9484376257<br />
35 Hemant Kumar VO Savaoo<br />
9414417856<br />
Padamsingh<br />
36 Vijay Chandan VO Araniyali 9414529222<br />
11 PUBLIC HEALTH ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT<br />
S. No Name of the Post<br />
Telephone<br />
official<br />
STD Work Home Mobile<br />
Code<br />
1 D C Vishnoi Special Director 02982 220253 220243 9772205701<br />
2 D D Jhangad Special Officer and 02982 220253 9460008323<br />
T. S. First<br />
3 B L Jatol Special Officer, 02982 220610 220613 9783802666<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> city<br />
4 Hanjariram Technical officer 02982 9982866677<br />
Balwa<br />
5 Sonaram Assistant Special 02982 223270 9413904543<br />
Chaudry Officer,<br />
Production<br />
Subdivision,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> city<br />
6 S P Avasthi Assistant Special 02982 220073 9414013801<br />
Officer,<br />
Production and<br />
Finance<br />
Subdivision,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> city<br />
7 Khetaram Assistant Special 02981 278330 278345 9783031150<br />
Choudry Officer,<br />
[179]
Gadararoad and<br />
Finance<br />
subdivision,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
8 Mahesh<br />
Assistant Special<br />
Sharma<br />
Officer, Shiv<br />
subdivision<br />
9 Aarti Parihar Officer, Revenue<br />
section<br />
10 Tilokchand Officer,<br />
Geharvar distribution<br />
section<br />
11 Jayram Das Officer, Bhadka<br />
section (1st and<br />
2nd)<br />
12 Mahesh<br />
Officer, Vishala,<br />
Sharma<br />
Shiv, Nimbala<br />
section<br />
13 Kaalooram<br />
Meena<br />
Officer, Gadraroad<br />
section (1st and<br />
2nd)<br />
14 Ramdeen Jyani Special Officer,<br />
North district<br />
division<br />
15 Sonaram Assistant Special<br />
Beneval Officer, 2nd<br />
district<br />
subdivision,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
16 Meharam Assistant Special<br />
Choudry Officer, Baayuthi<br />
subdivision<br />
17 Sanjay Jain Assistant Special<br />
Officer, Undoo<br />
Subdivision<br />
18 Sanjay Jain Assistant Special<br />
Officer, Bhiyad<br />
subdivision<br />
19 Gopaldas Officer, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Bhoda<br />
section<br />
20 Bhanwarlal Officer, Nagaana<br />
Ghoyal<br />
Section<br />
02987 253050 9413992066<br />
02982 220073 9413904399<br />
9214584958<br />
9413163788<br />
9413992066<br />
9950374636<br />
02982 220612 220254 9461146048<br />
02982 222610 9413904543<br />
02982 241162 9414530212<br />
02987 251822 9413308568<br />
9413308568<br />
9928496310<br />
9413503403<br />
[180]
21 Jeetendra<br />
Kumar<br />
Officer, Pooniyon<br />
ki Daani section<br />
22 Kamlesh Officer, Bayuthi<br />
Mathur<br />
section<br />
23 Jaychand Officer, Kavas and<br />
Kheechad Bhimda section<br />
24 Lakshmikanth Officer, Bhiyad<br />
Damor<br />
and Kanasar<br />
section<br />
25 Kailash Purohit Officer, Khokhsar<br />
section<br />
26 Bhanwarlal Charge officer,<br />
Ghoyal<br />
Undoo 2nd section<br />
27 Bhanwarlal Charge officer, S P<br />
Ghoyal<br />
Singh section<br />
28 Bhanwarlal Charge officer,<br />
Ghoyal<br />
Heera ki Daani<br />
section<br />
29 R R Sharma Special Officer,<br />
South district<br />
division<br />
9982320540<br />
9414918904<br />
9694540192<br />
9602200493<br />
9928774756<br />
9413503403<br />
9413503403<br />
9413503403<br />
02982 220482 220480 9413957525<br />
30 Jogeshwar<br />
Prasad<br />
Technical officer 9829213626<br />
31 Mangilal Jain Assistant Special<br />
Officer, Chauhatan<br />
section<br />
32 B L Malav Assistant Special<br />
Officer, Ghanau<br />
section<br />
02989 286153 9414302074<br />
02989 286153 9928089028<br />
33 Shivjiram<br />
Chaudry<br />
Assistant Special<br />
Officer,<br />
Dhorimanna<br />
section<br />
02986 264221 264254 9414302111<br />
34 Radheshyam<br />
Meena<br />
Officer,<br />
section<br />
SKT<br />
9783814368<br />
35 Radheshyam<br />
Meena<br />
Officer, Chauhatan<br />
1st section<br />
9783814368<br />
[181]
36 Radheshyam<br />
Meena<br />
Officer, Chauhatan<br />
2nd section<br />
9783814368<br />
37 Radheshyam<br />
Meena<br />
Officer,<br />
section<br />
Sanvlaur<br />
9783814368<br />
38 B L Malav Officer, Sevada<br />
section<br />
39 V V Vashisht Officer, Buran ka<br />
Tala section<br />
40 B L Malav Charge officer and<br />
Officer, Sihania<br />
section<br />
41 B L Malav Charge officer and<br />
Officer, Ghanau<br />
section<br />
9928089028<br />
9602440516<br />
9928089028<br />
9928089028<br />
42 Kailash Meena Officer,<br />
Dhorimanna<br />
section<br />
1st<br />
9799144687<br />
43 Shivjiram<br />
Chaudry<br />
Officer,<br />
Dhorimanna 1st<br />
and 2nd section<br />
9414302111<br />
44 Kailash Meena Charge officer and<br />
Officer, Ramji ka<br />
Gol section<br />
45 S K Gupta Officer, Raijep<br />
division, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
46 Sukhram Soni Officer,Raijep<br />
subdivision,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
47 Sukhram Soni Charge officer and<br />
Officer, Ramsar<br />
subdivision<br />
48 Babulal Meena Assistant Special<br />
Officer,<br />
Gudaamalani<br />
9799144687<br />
02982 222228 9414182973<br />
02982 222695 9414529940<br />
02985 270131 9414529940<br />
02983 280239 9928015609<br />
[182]
subdivision<br />
49 Radhakishan<br />
Meena<br />
Officer,<br />
section<br />
Ranigaon<br />
9413054391<br />
50 Pramod Mathur Officer, Mahabar<br />
section<br />
51 D N Ladhad Officer, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
section<br />
9414383765<br />
9414529941<br />
52 Radhakishan<br />
Meena<br />
53 Radhakishan<br />
Meena<br />
Officer, Ramsar<br />
1st section<br />
Officer, Ramsar<br />
2nd section<br />
9413054391<br />
9413054391<br />
54 Gangaram<br />
Girab<br />
Officer,<br />
section<br />
Girab<br />
9783453091<br />
55 Bhairulal<br />
Meena<br />
Officer,<br />
Gudaamalani<br />
section<br />
9413101490<br />
56 Bhairulal<br />
Meena<br />
Officer,<br />
section<br />
Bhatala<br />
9413101490<br />
57 Bhairulal<br />
Meena<br />
58 Dharmendrasin<br />
gh Parihar<br />
Officer, Poliniyon<br />
ki Daani section<br />
Special Officer,<br />
Baalothara<br />
division<br />
9413101490<br />
02988 220706 220736 9414531514<br />
59 Sanjay Mathur Assistant Special<br />
Officer, Baalothara<br />
subdivision<br />
02988 220873 9414882490<br />
60 Shankarram<br />
Chaudry<br />
Assistant Special<br />
Officer,<br />
Pachpadara<br />
subdivision<br />
02988 281270 9414550113<br />
61 J P Mathur Assistant Special<br />
Officer, Sivana<br />
subdivision<br />
02981 230690 9414689307<br />
[183]
62 Bharatsingh<br />
Chaudry<br />
Assistant Special<br />
Officer, Sindhari<br />
subdivision<br />
02984 284432 9414282434<br />
63 Sanjay Mathur Officer, Baalothara<br />
1st sub division<br />
64 Ramlala Meena Officer, Revenue<br />
section<br />
9414882490<br />
9983471323<br />
65 Pavan Kumar<br />
Bagga<br />
Officer,<br />
Production<br />
section<br />
66 Sanjay Mathur Officer, Asada<br />
section<br />
9414282490<br />
67 Maangilal<br />
Khitliya<br />
Officer,<br />
Pachpadara<br />
section<br />
1st<br />
9414561398<br />
68 Tulsidas Dabhi Officer,<br />
Pachpadara<br />
section<br />
2nd<br />
02988 240548<br />
69 Harjisingh Officer, Mandali<br />
section<br />
70 Jagdishsingh Officer, Sivana<br />
section<br />
71 Jagdishsingh Officer, Samdhadi<br />
section<br />
72 Jagdishsingh Officer, Bamseen<br />
section<br />
9414761206<br />
9414476546<br />
9414476546<br />
9414476546<br />
73 Ramnath<br />
Meena<br />
74 Roshanlal<br />
Mathur<br />
Officer, Sindhari<br />
1st section<br />
Officer, Sindhari<br />
2nd section<br />
9460045170<br />
9460045170<br />
75 Ravindrasingh Officer, Padroo<br />
section<br />
9828582972<br />
[184]
12 PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT<br />
S. No<br />
Name of the<br />
official<br />
1 T C Chajed<br />
2 K D Charan<br />
3 R K Jhinjha<br />
4 Mukesh Bhati<br />
5 M R Chaudry<br />
6 D D Bhati<br />
7 R S Purohit<br />
8 R K Mangal<br />
9 S S Moyal<br />
10<br />
Mohanam<br />
Chaudy<br />
11 C L Khatri<br />
12 P C Chajed<br />
13 Vineeth Gupta<br />
14 Sura Ram Jaani<br />
Post<br />
Superintending<br />
Officer, SNV, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Superintending<br />
Officer, SNV,<br />
Balothara<br />
Superintending<br />
Officer, SNV,<br />
Balothara<br />
Superintending<br />
Officer, SNV, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Superintending<br />
Officer, SNV, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Superintending<br />
Officer, SNV,<br />
Gudamalani<br />
Superintending<br />
Officer, SNV,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Superintending<br />
Officer, SNV,<br />
Chauhatan<br />
Superintending<br />
Officer, SNV, Shiv<br />
Superintending<br />
Officer, SNV, NH,<br />
BMR<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision I,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision II,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision III,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision, Nagar,<br />
Telephone<br />
STD<br />
Code<br />
Work Home Mobile<br />
02982 226295 226425 9414291073<br />
02988 227023 - 9413329818<br />
02988 220453 - 9414106607<br />
02982 220064 220607 9414135836<br />
02982 222380<br />
- - - 9414129034<br />
- - - 9414206173<br />
02989 220672 - 9414196757<br />
- - - 9414528996<br />
02982 220595 - 9799496410<br />
02982 9414493084<br />
9414529931<br />
9413308861<br />
9414384202<br />
[185]
15 Hari Babu<br />
16 P D Khatri<br />
17 Veerchand Soni<br />
18 Surenda Basani<br />
19 Mangaldas<br />
20 P C Sharma<br />
21 Pamendra Singh<br />
22 Chunnilal Sharma<br />
23<br />
Champalal<br />
Sharma<br />
24 Ananth Prajapath<br />
25 Mahaveer Bohra<br />
26 Sujaram Vishnoi<br />
27 Babulal Setiya<br />
28 M L Parihaar<br />
29<br />
30<br />
Mohanlal Naik<br />
Babulal Vishnoi<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision,<br />
Ranigaon<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision, Vishala<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision,<br />
Bachdau<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision IV,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision, I<br />
Gadraroad<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision II<br />
Gadraroad<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision, Bhiyad<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision, Harsani<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision II, Guda<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision V, Guda<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision I, Guda<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision II<br />
Dhorimanna<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision,<br />
Chauhatan<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision, II<br />
Balothara<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision II,<br />
Balothara<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision<br />
[186]<br />
9414084627<br />
9414384210<br />
9460538448<br />
9828421329<br />
9414130768<br />
9413132712<br />
9414195105<br />
9414633424<br />
9414988024<br />
9414306882<br />
9414307155<br />
9414105947<br />
9414123685<br />
9460008073<br />
9414152589
31<br />
32<br />
P M Singhodia<br />
Champalal<br />
33 Jodharam<br />
Chaudry<br />
34<br />
35<br />
36<br />
Sohanlal<br />
Sukhram Machra<br />
Girdhariram<br />
37 Sohansingh<br />
Rathod<br />
38<br />
Anil Gupta<br />
39 Deeparam<br />
Chaudry<br />
40<br />
K K Sindhal<br />
41 Jeetendra<br />
Sharma<br />
42<br />
43<br />
44<br />
45<br />
Tejaram Chaudry<br />
Suresh Vyas<br />
Surendra Mohan<br />
Narsingharaam<br />
Samdhadi<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision,<br />
Kalyanpur<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision, Sivana<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision I, Gida<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision I, Kanod<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision II, Gida<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
SubdivisionVI,<br />
Kanod<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision, V,<br />
Balothara<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision, Kavas<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision II,<br />
Kanod<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision IV<br />
Sindheri<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision I,<br />
Sindheri<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision II,<br />
Sindheri<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision QC-1,<br />
BMR<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision QC,<br />
Balothara<br />
Assistant Officer<br />
Subdivision, QC-III<br />
BMR<br />
9413302950<br />
9414391038<br />
9414107128<br />
9414130412<br />
9414267847<br />
9413507685<br />
9251302365<br />
9414128918<br />
9414560792<br />
9414301052<br />
9460957650<br />
9414531618<br />
9001507955<br />
9414141780<br />
9414492949<br />
[187]
46<br />
Pukhraj Meg<br />
Assistant<br />
Subdivision,<br />
BMR<br />
Officer<br />
QC-II<br />
9414634348<br />
13 OTHER OFFICIALS<br />
S. No<br />
Name of the<br />
official<br />
Post<br />
[188]<br />
STD<br />
Code<br />
Telephone<br />
Work Home Mobile<br />
1<br />
Ramavatar<br />
Meena<br />
CEO, GP, <strong>Barmer</strong> 02982 220292 220296 9414431433<br />
2<br />
Deepprakash<br />
Mathur<br />
ATI CEO, GP, <strong>Barmer</strong> 02982 220053 220063 9414260968<br />
3<br />
Pemsingh Assistant Collector,<br />
Chaan<br />
Bayuthi<br />
02982 241212 241211 9928031634<br />
4 M L Nehra LAO, ONGC, <strong>Barmer</strong> 02982 225317 222612 9828844459<br />
5 G S Raanavath LAO. RSMM. <strong>Barmer</strong> 02982 227035 - 9413024579<br />
6 Deepal Jain DID, NIC, Banner 02982 220973 221295 9928018289<br />
7 Harindra Singh<br />
District excise officer,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
02982 220427 221836 9413340074<br />
8 P R Kadela<br />
Superintendent of<br />
Post Office, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
02982 220443 220394 9413228199<br />
Superintendent,<br />
9 Bhimsingh Railway station, 02982 220146 227575 9413639576<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
10 Priyah Nandan<br />
Sub Forest officer,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
02982 220442 220616 9413311079<br />
11<br />
Dhoodmal Main depot manager,<br />
Yadav<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
02982 224698 220538 9413327899<br />
12<br />
Subash<br />
TDM (telephone),<br />
Agarwal <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
02982 221100 221200 9414001447<br />
13 Bhagwandaan SDOT 02982 225600 225601 9414401987<br />
14 L R Meena SDOT 02982 220233 223426 9414001696<br />
15 R K Mishra<br />
Special Engineer,<br />
Joodbaludi, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
02982 220408 220329 9829047260<br />
16 N R Gulzar<br />
District<br />
transportation 02982 220615 222377 9413313399<br />
Officer, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
17<br />
Hariram Commercial tax<br />
Chaudry officer, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
02982 220512 220972 9414490879
18<br />
Shravan District Public<br />
Chaudry Relations executive<br />
02982 220485 220140 9414106698<br />
19 H S Kaviya<br />
Assistant Director of<br />
Public Welfare<br />
02982 230009 - 9414391308<br />
20 R K Satiya<br />
Sub-director of<br />
Industry department<br />
02982 220320 - 9414509906<br />
21<br />
Valalram Sub-director,<br />
Sonlakhi Agriculture<br />
02982 220672 220673 9414383493<br />
22 Hariram Weather department 02982 220631 - -<br />
14 VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS AND NGOs IN THE REGION<br />
S. No Name and address of the organisation STD code Phone/mobile<br />
1 Action end (Indian), <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
2 Shyor station, <strong>Barmer</strong> 02982 222614<br />
3 Mahila mandal, <strong>Barmer</strong> Aaghor 02982 225575<br />
4 Seema Jan Kalyan Samithi, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
5 Indian Redcross Society, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
6 Dhara Sansthan, <strong>Barmer</strong> 02982 221556<br />
7 Reds, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
8 Jan Vikas Sansthan, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
9 Nakoda, Trust, Mevanagar 240005<br />
10 Distirct addiction prevention committee, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
11<br />
Nehru youth development and welfare Organisation,<br />
Chithat ka paar<br />
12 Maru Mandhan organisation, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
13 Prani Mitr organisation, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
14 District Bharat Sevak Samaj, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
15 Mahaveer, International Sivana<br />
16 Narayan Seva Sansthan, Samdhadi 36270<br />
17 SBBJ, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
18 Prayag Sansthan, Sindheri<br />
19 Vasundhara Seva Samithi, Pachpatra 02980 55226<br />
20 Grameen Pragati Sansthan, Gida<br />
21 Sandesh Sansthan, Shiv<br />
22 Idea Sansthan, Balothara<br />
23 Grameen Vikas and Seva Samithi, Khara 9413292491<br />
24 Grameen Vikas Gau Seva Samithi 9413292491<br />
25 Krishna Sanstha <strong>Barmer</strong>, Nehru Nagar, <strong>Barmer</strong> 9413307897<br />
[189]
26 Marudhara Sansthan <strong>Barmer</strong> 9413163736<br />
27<br />
Reds Sansthan <strong>Barmer</strong>, Ramnagar Chauki, Sindheri<br />
Road, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
9414384269<br />
28 Seva Sansthan, Kolu 9414531700<br />
29<br />
Tar.C.D. Samaj Seva Sansthan, St. Paul School. <strong>Barmer</strong> 9214801758<br />
Richa Sansthan <strong>Barmer</strong>, Gaudara Villa, Patrkar<br />
30<br />
Colony, GM, 2 Patrkar Colony, Mahaveer Nagar,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
31 Parivarthan Sansthan, <strong>Barmer</strong>, in front of Raj Hotel,<br />
Baldev Nagar, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
32 Ankur Vikas Sansthan, Halepotharon ki Basti, near<br />
Jaydu Marwad Tent House, Malgodam road, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
33<br />
Nehru Yuva mandal Karchi village, Babuguleria<br />
9414106366<br />
9413459505<br />
9414753637<br />
34 District village All caste development Society, Nehru<br />
Nagar, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
9784571671<br />
35 Arunima Sansthan, Gokul Krishna Nagar, Roycolony,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
9414302064<br />
36 Loktarag Granvin Sansthan, near Panchayat Samithi,<br />
Shiv<br />
02987 253337<br />
37 Gangotri Sansthan, <strong>Barmer</strong>, NH 40, Mahveer Nagar,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
9983304701<br />
38 Prerna Sansthan, New Vegetable Market, Rico Road,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
9414107423<br />
39 Khetheshwar Vikas Sansthan, Kanod House,<br />
Mahaveer Nagar, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
2902 257113<br />
40<br />
Khemababa Prani Seva Sansthan, Bayuthi 9414532827<br />
41 Silpi Sansthan, near Sonnadi, Khagale Mauhalla,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
42 Matheshwari Shodh Sansthan, behind the high<br />
school, Sundar Nagar, Chauhatan<br />
43 Khetheshwar Sansthan, Balera, Matheshwari Steel<br />
Station Road, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
44<br />
Tadarsh Vikas Sansthan, Girab<br />
45<br />
46<br />
47<br />
9414106887<br />
9414529600<br />
9829464887<br />
Samrathal Sansthan, Mitda Khurd 2nd 9414655774<br />
Shade Sansthan, CL 10, Mahaveer Nagar, <strong>Barmer</strong> 9929066617<br />
Malini Grameen Vikas Sansthan, Bhojariya 9460287?~<br />
[190]
48<br />
49<br />
Upkar Sansthan, <strong>Barmer</strong> 9413818203<br />
Bandua Makthi Morcha, Sindheri, Chauraha , <strong>Barmer</strong> 9214715168<br />
50 Chaman Seva and Jan Kalyan Samithi, <strong>Barmer</strong>, G C 15,<br />
9414271044<br />
Mahaveer Nagar, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
51<br />
Nehru Yuva Mandal New Bhurtiya 9460885200<br />
52 Samagra Vikas Sansthan, Jatiyon ka Naya Mohalla,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
53 Thar Yuva Vikas and Shod Sansthan, Aachal Cinema<br />
Complex, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
54 Balaji Vikas Sansthan, Ramnagar Rico Puvi Shetr,<br />
Shivkar Road, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Shri Doongarpuri Jan Kalyan Seva Samithi, Soda<br />
55<br />
Bhavan, in front of Mayur Noble Academy, Gandhi<br />
Nagar, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
56<br />
Gau Seva Samithi, Nimbaniyon ki Daani<br />
9414391464<br />
9829462485<br />
9414529524<br />
9414302064<br />
57 Sant Sri Garvaji Maharaj Seva Trust, Kumavat Nagar,<br />
9414106534<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
58<br />
Sangharsh Sansthan, <strong>Barmer</strong> 9414612913<br />
59<br />
60<br />
61<br />
62<br />
63<br />
64<br />
65<br />
66<br />
67<br />
68<br />
69<br />
Sri Malani Sansthan, <strong>Barmer</strong> 9413183249<br />
Taman Sansthan, Chauhatan 9413459085<br />
Balaji Vikas Sansthan, Balaoo 9414529524<br />
Sri Jasnath Jan Vikas Sansthan, <strong>Barmer</strong> 9413308582<br />
Marwad Seva ad Jan Kalyan Seva Samithi, Balothara 9414531708<br />
Seema Jan Kalyan Samithi, Chauhatan 02989 286463<br />
Mahaveer International, Chauhatan 02989 286151<br />
Jeevdaya Samithi, Chauhatan 9414108625<br />
Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Chauhatan 9414106363<br />
Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh, Chauhatan 9414201915<br />
Nehru Yuvak Mandal, Chauhatan 9983759846<br />
[191]
15 LIST OF DIVERS/SWIMMERS IN THE DISTRICT<br />
S. No Name Address<br />
Mobile<br />
number<br />
1 Yusaf Khan S/o Masare Khan Mussalman Asothara 9828924575<br />
2 Doodharam S/o Devaram Bhiel Asothara<br />
3 Ashokdas S/o Pokerdas Sant Asothara<br />
4 Jaganlal S/o Shamburam Sant Asothara<br />
5 Yusaf Khan S/o Kani khan Mussalman Asothara 9983974921<br />
6 Mohandas S/o Shamburam Sant Asothara<br />
7 Vasudev S/o Purushotam Sant Asothara 9413291002<br />
8 Kojaram S/o SHobaram Harijan Asothara 9460014274<br />
9 Mangilal S/o SHobaram Harijan Asothara<br />
10 Javeridas S/o Shambudas Sant Asothara<br />
11 Alabaks S/o Sultan Khan Moyala Asothara<br />
02988-<br />
272440<br />
12 Kalu Khan S/o Dhinekhan Moyala Asothara<br />
02988-<br />
272456<br />
13 Ghanikhan S/o Sultankhan Moyala Asothara 9414688908<br />
14 Misarkhan S/o Mishrekhan Moyala Asothara 9413767685<br />
15 Ghanikhan S/o Kareemkhan Moyala Asothara<br />
16 Anwarkhan S/o Bharkatkhan Moyala Asothara<br />
17 Dayaram S/o Tulacharam Chaudry Kitnod 9413031687<br />
18 Karnaram S/o Prabhuram Kumar Kitnod 9413209336<br />
19 Padmanram S/o Vijamanaram Kumar Kitnod<br />
9413492793<br />
PP<br />
20 Devaram S/o Padmaram Kumar Kitnod<br />
9413492793<br />
PP<br />
21 Parsamal S/o Ratiram Paliwal Jasol 9414755264<br />
22 Parsamal S/o Sonaji Nai Jasol<br />
23 Bhanvarlal S/o Sonaji Nai Jasol<br />
24 Rupa S/o Harkaram Kanchi Jasol<br />
25 Mangilal S/o Amararam Mali Jasol<br />
26 Gobarram S/o Bagadaram Megval Bituja 9413506863<br />
27 Mangilal S/o Sonaji Megval Bituja<br />
28 Babulal S/o Bayaji Megval Bituja<br />
29<br />
Shankarlal S/o Savaram Mali<br />
Balothara<br />
30<br />
31<br />
Deramaram Mali Balothara 9414855657<br />
Devarchand S/o Deramaram Mali Balothara 9414855657<br />
[192]
32<br />
33<br />
34<br />
35<br />
36<br />
37<br />
38<br />
39<br />
40<br />
41<br />
42<br />
43<br />
44<br />
45<br />
46<br />
47<br />
48<br />
49<br />
50<br />
51<br />
52<br />
53<br />
54<br />
55<br />
Deeparam S/o Champalal Malli Balothara 9460889839<br />
Gevarchand S/o Ramaji Mali<br />
Champalal S/o Magajimali<br />
Balothara<br />
Balothara<br />
02988-<br />
240562<br />
Memaram S/o Baubuji Mali Balothara 9414633696<br />
Ashok S/o Bikaji Mali<br />
Goparam S/o Kanji Mali<br />
Balothara<br />
Balothara<br />
Gevarchand S/o Rameshwarji Mali Balothara 9252543494<br />
Vanaram S/o Deramji Mali<br />
Balothara<br />
Mangalaram S/o Deramji mali Balothara 9460889839<br />
Parasmal S/o pukhaji Mali Balothara 9414754837<br />
Rameshwar S/o Keshaji Mali<br />
Balothara<br />
Devarchand S/o Keshaji Mali Balothara 9461155960<br />
Omprakash S/o Samvalji Balothara 9413524441<br />
Sitaram S/o Savaji<br />
Mohanlal S/o Mangilal<br />
Balothara<br />
Balothara<br />
Parasmal S/o Moolji Balothara 9413361915<br />
Gevarchand S/o Roopji Balothara 9414384979<br />
Govarchand S/o Devji<br />
Omprakash S/o Badraji Mali<br />
Balothara<br />
Balothara<br />
Ishwar S/o Bhimji Balothara 9461155960<br />
Pukhraj S/o Jorji<br />
Omprakash S/o Mangilal Palivala<br />
Babulal Meena Batwari from Ramsar<br />
Jalampuri Gosawmi<br />
Balothara<br />
Balothara<br />
Ramsar<br />
Chauhatan<br />
9413307973<br />
9784327277<br />
[193]
56<br />
57<br />
58<br />
59<br />
60<br />
61<br />
62<br />
63<br />
64<br />
65<br />
66<br />
67<br />
68<br />
69<br />
70<br />
71<br />
72<br />
Kamalsingh S/o Indrasingh Rajput<br />
Harisingh S/o Jalamsingh Rajput<br />
Savisingh S/o Virajsingh R Rajput<br />
Hira S/o Navala<br />
Gopal S/o Narayan Joshi<br />
Gautumchand S/o Namichand Jain<br />
Shaitan Singh S/o Udaysingh Rajput<br />
Ashok Kumar S/o Mevaram Jain<br />
Ranigaon<br />
Rohili<br />
Rohili<br />
Undkha<br />
Vishala<br />
Vishala<br />
Kapoordi<br />
Joona, Keradu Road,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
9414493290<br />
Nanaji S/o Javan Megval Sindhavasachauhan 9929761243<br />
Baira S/o Veerakalbi<br />
Pukhram S/o Hariram Mali<br />
Dala S/o Kesamegval<br />
Bava S/o Mevaguru<br />
Baira S/o Kevala Megval<br />
Oma S/o Pirakalbi<br />
Bhoompa S/o Prabhu Megval<br />
Pratapa S/o Harji Rabari<br />
Bakarpura<br />
Bakarpura<br />
Sindhavasachauhan<br />
Sindhavasachauhan<br />
Barkhadpura<br />
Sindhavasaharniyan<br />
Sindhavasachauhan<br />
Gandhav Kala<br />
9610634784<br />
9929877669<br />
9929761245<br />
9829473457<br />
9960899781<br />
02983-<br />
284845<br />
73<br />
Peelaram S/o Borkharam Kumar<br />
Gandhav Kala<br />
02983-<br />
284845<br />
74<br />
Narana S/o Savai Lauhar<br />
Gandhav Kala<br />
02983-<br />
284845<br />
75<br />
Sukhdev S/o Amadas Sant<br />
Gandhav Kala<br />
02983-<br />
284845<br />
76<br />
77<br />
Bhoompa S/o Kevarabari<br />
Dagaria<br />
9928289526<br />
Raimal S/o Kehra Rabari Dagaria 9928289526<br />
[194]
78<br />
79<br />
80<br />
81<br />
82<br />
83<br />
84<br />
85<br />
86<br />
87<br />
88<br />
89<br />
90<br />
91<br />
92<br />
93<br />
94<br />
95<br />
96<br />
97<br />
98<br />
99<br />
100<br />
101<br />
102<br />
Joga S/o Lichmana Rabari Gandhav Kurda 9799180758<br />
Banwarpuri S/o Kisthurpuri Gandhav Kurda 9799180758<br />
Thidsingh S/o Pratap Singh Rajput Gaadevi 9461005656<br />
Silekhan S/o Gulaal Khan Mussalman Banta 9950588678<br />
Sidhik S/o Ahmed Mussalman Banta 995058867/8<br />
Sikander S/o Ahmed Mussalman Banta 995058867/8<br />
Ada S/o Bhima Purohit Ratnapura 9929468317<br />
Nethi S/o Jeta Kalbi Megani Meg Daani 9950058731<br />
Choga S/o Chamela Kumhar Ratnapura 9929031764<br />
Manga S/o Bharta Purohit Soda Ki Daani 9928995107<br />
Moga S/o Choga Megwal Ratnapura 9799836403<br />
Mubarak S/o Sajankhan Moyla Kumhar Khudala 9929917418<br />
Gaphur S/o Sajankhan Moyla Kumhar Khudala 9929917418<br />
DenaS/o Sajankhan Moyla Kumhar Khudala 9929917418<br />
Babu S/o Sajankhan Moyla Kumhar Khudala 9829435479<br />
Karna S/o Motiram Jat<br />
Khudala<br />
Shankaram S/o Hariram Kalbi Alpura 9928587968<br />
Madararam S/o Kesararam Bheel Alpura 9928587968<br />
Kherajram S/o Chelaram Bheel Alpura 9928587968<br />
Rameshkumar S/o Poonmaji R Rajput Alpura 9799372327<br />
Rajusingh S/o Kishoresingh Rajput Alpura 9928587968<br />
Himtharam S/o jasrooparam Megval Alpura 9928587968<br />
Shyamaram S/o Bhairaram Rabari Alpura 9929761394<br />
Okhaaram S/o Prabhuram Rabari Alpura 9929761394<br />
Moda S/o Gaji Kumhar Lolava 9829471994<br />
[195]
103<br />
104<br />
105<br />
106<br />
107<br />
108<br />
109<br />
110<br />
Magookhan S/o Laadukhan Lolava 9829471994<br />
Rehman S/o Usman Khan Goliya Jeevraj 9829471994<br />
Kaloonkha S/o Usman Khan Goliya Jeevraj 9829471994<br />
Babukhan S/o Sajankhan Tikiya 9950306802<br />
Abdul S/o Hakim Moyala Kumhar Sada 9829402399<br />
Satar S/o Moyala Kumhar Sada 9784192507<br />
Usa S/o HakimMoyala Kumhar<br />
[196]<br />
Sada<br />
02984-<br />
280390<br />
Mohammed S/o Rahim Moyala Kumhar Sada 9799372470<br />
111 Mustaq Khan S/o Hakim Khan Moyala<br />
Sada 9680348790<br />
Kumhar<br />
112<br />
Chaina S/o Ramji Megval Sada 9602392633<br />
113<br />
114<br />
115<br />
116<br />
Naan Giri S/o Choon Giri Swami Sada 9928304391<br />
Deepa S/o Sava Rabari Sada 9928979714<br />
Latif S/o Alam Kumhar<br />
Batada<br />
02984-<br />
288257<br />
Naseer S/o Lakhe Khan Kumhar Batada 9829755281<br />
117 Sameer Khan S/o Khudabaksh Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
118 Jamal Khan S/o Khudabaksh Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
119 Vali Mohammad S/o Raydhan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
120 Sadik Khan S/o Lakhe Khan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
121 Mohammed S/o Gul Mohammed Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
122 Tajmohammed S/o Gul Mohammad<br />
Mussalman Kumhar<br />
123 Valimohammad S/o Ramjan Khan<br />
Mussalman Kumhar<br />
124 Mehboob Khan S/o Ramjan Khan<br />
Mussalman Kumhar<br />
125<br />
Sultan Khan S/o Bage Khan Mussalman<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira
Kumhar<br />
126 Sumar Khan S/o Sultan Khan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
127 Mohammad S/o Deen Mohammad<br />
Mussalman Kumhar<br />
Sindhari Chausira 9799372097<br />
128 Ganimohammad S/o Ramjan Khan<br />
Mussalman Kumhar<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
129 Noormohammad S/o Ramjan Khan<br />
Mussalman Kumhar<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
130 Lateef Khan S/o Ramjan Khan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
131 Taj Mohammad S/o Sultan Khan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
Sindhari Chausira 9413028865<br />
132 Sultan Khan S/o Basera Khan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
133 Jamalkahn S/o Imankhan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
134 Safimohammad S/o Imankhan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
135<br />
Ibrahim S/o Imankhan Mussalman Kumhar Sindhari Chausira 9413292213<br />
136 Safimohammad S/o Akoolkhan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
137 Musekhan S/o Badarkhan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
138 Najirmohammad S/o Isakhan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
139 Valimohammad S/o Isakhan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
140<br />
Iqbal S/o Nijamkhan Mussalman Kumhar<br />
141 Mubarak S/o Phatekhan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
142 Valimohammad S/o Mubarak Khan<br />
Mussalman Kumhar<br />
143 Jamalkhan S/o Badarkhan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
144 Satarkhan S/o Gufirkhan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
145<br />
Ilias S/o Gufirkkhan Mussalman Kumhar<br />
146<br />
Ahmed S/o Isakhan Mussalman Kumhar<br />
[197]<br />
Sindhari Chausira 9828125321<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira 9660361583<br />
Sindhari Chausira 9950270640<br />
Sindhari Chausira 9828125354<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira
147 Rehmad S/o Ahmed Khan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
148 Mittonkha S/o Hammed Khan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
149 Umardeen S/o Fakir Mohammed Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
150 Poopookhan S/o Umardeen Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
151 Suamrkhan S/o Umardeen Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
152 Ajeem Khan S/o Askar Khan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
153 Babu Khan S/o Urskhan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
154 Gangaraam S/o Mavaram Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
155 Joonjharam S/o Daluram Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
156 Gul Mohammad S/o Khameesha Khan<br />
Mussalman Kumhar<br />
157 Valimohammad S/o Khamisha Khan<br />
Mussalman Kumhar<br />
158 Radhurakhan S/o Sumarakhann Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
159 Malakhan S/o Sumra Khan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
160 Sadak Khan S/o Achar Khan Mussalman<br />
Kumhar<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira 9413033512<br />
Sindhari Chausira<br />
Sindhari Chausira 9413032199<br />
Sindhari Chausira 9413028461<br />
Sindhari Chausira 9461033364<br />
Gudamalani<br />
Gudamalani<br />
Gudamalani<br />
Gudamalani<br />
Gudamalani<br />
16 LIST OF OFFICIALS TRAINED IN FIRE FIGHTING AND CONTROL<br />
S. No Name of official Address<br />
1 Hemsingh, Fireman <strong>Barmer</strong> Agor<br />
2 Vainsingh Beriyon ka Baas, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
3 Dhanraj Soni<br />
Near the old powerhouse,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
STD<br />
Code<br />
Phone/Mobile<br />
02982 225756<br />
02982 222339<br />
02982 223594 PP<br />
[198]
4 Tejaram Chaudry Gandhi Nagar, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
5 Hebsingh Rathod Gram kudla<br />
6 Bhanaram Chaudry<br />
Jaislamer Chunji, near the<br />
Nake, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
7 Nenumal Beriyon ka Baas, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
8<br />
Suresh Thanvi, Assistant<br />
fire officer<br />
Balothara Municipality<br />
9 Om Prakash, Firemen Balothara Municipality<br />
10 Kailash Narayan Balothara Municipality<br />
11 Danaram Balothara Municipality<br />
12 Gyan singh City safety office, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
13 P N Sharma City safety office, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
14 S K Sharma City safety office, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
15 Ram Karan City safety office, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
16 Mohanlal City safety office, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
17 Gopalsingh City safety office, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
18 Kabulakhan City safety office, <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
02982 224842 PP<br />
02982 246353<br />
02982 226288<br />
02982 226276<br />
02988 220024<br />
02988 220024<br />
02988 220024<br />
02988 220024<br />
02988 220024<br />
02982 220075<br />
02982 220075<br />
02982 220075<br />
02982 220075<br />
02982 220075<br />
02982 220075<br />
[199]
APPENDIX B – MAPS<br />
Figure 1 - Hazard Analysis Map for MPT<br />
Figure 2 - Hazard Analysis Map showing area with maximum hazard in Mangala and<br />
Aishwariya<br />
Figure 3 - Evacuation Routes from villages in Maximum Hazard Zone in Mangala Well<br />
Field<br />
Figure 4 - Evacuation Routes from villages in Maximum Hazard Zone in Aishwariya Well<br />
Field<br />
Figure 5 - Hazard Analysis Map showing area with maximum hazard at Bhagyam<br />
Figure 6 - Evacuation Routes from villages in Maximum Hazard Zone in Bhagyam Well<br />
Field<br />
Figure 7 - Hazard Analysis Map for Raageshwari Gas field<br />
Figure 8 - Hazard Analysis Map showing area with maximum hazard in RGT and Well<br />
pads<br />
Figure 9 - Evacuation Routes from villages in Maximum Hazard Zone in Raageshwari Gas<br />
field and Well Pads<br />
Figure 10 - Hazard Analysis Map for inter-field pipeline<br />
[200]
APPENDIX C – INCIDENT ACTION PLANS (IAPS)<br />
IAPs FOR FIRE RESPONSE ON-SITE<br />
ACTION IN THE EVENT OF A FIRE<br />
(i)<br />
SITE PERSONNEL<br />
• Actuate the Fire Alarm Manual Alarm Call Point (FAMCP) installed in plant area.<br />
Inform the CCR by Radio or VOIP phone to raise an Emergency Alarm.<br />
• Shout “Fire, Fire, Fire” to raise the alarm and alert nearby personnel.<br />
• Initiate activities pertaining to process isolations, if any.<br />
• Check the wind sock for prevailing wind direction and confirm for personnel escape<br />
direction (upwind of emergency) if possible<br />
• Incident Response team members shall muster in the Control Room<br />
• Non-essential personnel / contract worker, drivers etc shall evacuate through the<br />
nearest escape gate and report to muster checker at the assembly point.<br />
(ii)<br />
FIRE RESPONSE TEAM<br />
• Fire team members shall report at the Fire Station Room.<br />
• Fire team members shall immediately don the turn out gear and turn out to the<br />
location of emergency.<br />
• Fire team Leader / Forward Controller shall be in contact with the Incident<br />
Controller and shall act in consultation with Incident Controller.<br />
• Fight the fire from upwind.<br />
• Cut off the source of fuel by isolating approachable upstream isolation valve.<br />
• Always fight fire under protection where there is potential hazard of Boil over /<br />
explosion.<br />
• Operate the fixed water spray and fixed foam system where ever provided.<br />
• In case of gas fires, do not attempt to control or extinguish the fire before plant is<br />
shut down and blown down.<br />
[211]
1. PROPANE POOL FIRE FROM PROPANE STORAGE, REFRIGERATION PACKAGE<br />
(RGT FACILITY)<br />
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:<br />
Propane Liquid and gas<br />
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:<br />
• Fire & Explosion due to release of high pressure gas<br />
• Pool fire due to propane liquid release<br />
• BLEVE of propane vessel due to flame impingement<br />
• Personnel Injuries<br />
SAFETY SYSTEM:<br />
Fire & Gas detection system<br />
FIRE PROTECTION:<br />
• Fixed and portable water monitors<br />
• Propane vessel water spray system<br />
• Fire hydrant network<br />
• Fire tender<br />
IN CASE OF FIRE:<br />
• Report incident to the Control room.<br />
• Sound the emergency siren/ PAGA alarm to evacuate the area<br />
• Alert the fire fighting team<br />
• Isolate propane source<br />
• Turn-on vessel’s water spray system<br />
• Use water monitor streams to dissipate propane vapours safely<br />
• Keep Emergency Response personnel upwind; never enter gas cloud<br />
• Mobilise the fire fighter with fire tender from upwind direction<br />
• Turn on water spray system of neighbouring storage tanks<br />
• If the fire is major, request for additional expert help from ERT, <strong>Barmer</strong> / EMT,<br />
Gurgaon.<br />
[212]
2 FIRE IN THE WELL HEAD IN WELL PAD<br />
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:<br />
Crude Oil & Natural Gas<br />
POTENTIAL FIRE HAZARDS:<br />
• Release of high pressure gas / associated gas with crude oil<br />
• Pool fire escalating to explosion on well head<br />
• Blow out<br />
SAFETY SYSTEM:<br />
Fire & Gas Detection System and plant safe shut down/ blow down systems<br />
FIRE PROTECTION:<br />
• Fire Extinguishers<br />
• Fire tenders from MPT/ RGT depending on the location of the well.<br />
IN CASE OF FIRE:<br />
• Barricade the affected Well heads.<br />
• STOP the road side traffic<br />
• Communicate to Central Control Room as per Communication chart.<br />
• Mobilize the Fire Tender(s)<br />
• Evacuate the Nearby villagers & alert the public<br />
• If the fire is major, request for additional expert help from ERT, <strong>Barmer</strong> / EMT,<br />
Gurgaon.<br />
3. CRUDE OIL FIRE AT PRODUCTION SEPARATOR (MPT)<br />
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:<br />
Crude Oil & Associated Natural Gas<br />
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:<br />
• Fire & Explosion due to release of associated gas with crude oil<br />
• Pool fire due to Crude Oil leakage<br />
• Escalation of pool fire to other nearby equipments.<br />
• Serious Environment effects ( Soil & Air Contamination)<br />
[213]
• Personnel Injuries<br />
SAFETY SYSTEM:<br />
Fire & Gas detection system and plant safe shut down systems<br />
FIRE PROTECTION:<br />
• Fire Extinguishers<br />
• Fire hydrant network<br />
• Fire tenders<br />
IN CASE OF FIRE:<br />
• Communicate to the Control room.<br />
• Use the fire extinguishers / foam system available nearby<br />
• Blow the manually operated electrical siren/ PAGA alarm to evacuate the area<br />
• Alert the fire fighting team<br />
• Mobilise the fire fighter with fire tender from upwind direction<br />
• Start cooling nearby facility / equipment.<br />
• If the fire is major, request for additional expert help from ERT, <strong>Barmer</strong> / EMT,<br />
Gurgaon.<br />
4. FIRE AT THE FLARE AREA & KNOCK OUT DRUM<br />
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:<br />
Condensate & Natural Gas<br />
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:<br />
• Pool fire due to natural gas / Condensate release<br />
• Pool fire escalating to other nearby equipment<br />
• Serious Environment effects ( Soil & Air Contamination)<br />
• Personnel Injuries<br />
SAFETY SYSTEM:<br />
Fire & Gas detection system and plant safe shut down system<br />
[214]
FIRE PROTECTION:<br />
• Fire Extinguishers<br />
• Fire hydrant network<br />
• Fire Tenders<br />
IN CASE OF FIRE & EXPLOSION<br />
• Communicate to the Control room.<br />
• Use the fire extinguishers / foam system available nearby<br />
• Blow the siren to evacuate the area<br />
• Alert the fire fighting team<br />
• Mobilise the fire fighter with fire tender from upwind direction<br />
• Start cooling nearby facility / equipments<br />
• If the fire is major, request for additional expert help from ERT, <strong>Barmer</strong> / EMT,<br />
Gurgaon.<br />
5. FIRE IN THE DIESEL STORAGE, EXPORT OIL, CONDENSATE, OFF SPEC AND<br />
SETTLING TANKS<br />
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:<br />
Crude Oil, Condensate, Diesel<br />
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:<br />
• Pool fire due to Crude Oil or Diesel leakage.<br />
• Pool fire escalating to explosion of the storage tank.<br />
• Serious Environment effects (Soil & Air Contamination)<br />
• Personnel Injuries<br />
SAFETY SYSTEM:<br />
• Fire & Gas detection system<br />
• Foam application (top application) system<br />
• <strong>Plan</strong>t safe shut down system<br />
FIRE PROTECTION:<br />
• Fire water spray system<br />
• Foam system<br />
[215]
• Fire tenders<br />
IN CASE OF FIRE & EXPLOSION<br />
• Communicate to the Control room.<br />
• Use the fire extinguishers / foam system available nearby.<br />
• Activate the water spray system, if available.<br />
• Start the foam system and area water monitor<br />
• Blow the siren to evacuate the area<br />
• Alert the fire fighting team<br />
• Mobilise the fire fighter with fire tender from upwind direction<br />
• Start cooling nearby facility / equipments<br />
• If the fire is major, request for additional expert help from ERT, <strong>Barmer</strong> / EMT,<br />
Gurgaon.<br />
6. ELECTRICAL SUB STATIONS<br />
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:<br />
Electrical Switchgear & Combustible Associated Spares<br />
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:<br />
• Electrical panel fire<br />
• Heavy smoke in the substation<br />
• Serious Environment effects (Air Pollution)<br />
• Personnel Injuries<br />
SAFETY SYSTEM:<br />
F & G System<br />
FIRE PROTECTION:<br />
• Fire Extinguishers<br />
• Fire water Network<br />
• Fire tenders<br />
IN CASE OF FIRE:<br />
• Inform Central Control Room.<br />
[216]
• Shutdown the substation or concerned breaker<br />
• Use CO2 or DCP fire extinguisher in case of small fire<br />
• Evacuate the area and substation<br />
• Use fire hydrant water after ensuring the power has been shutdown / isolated.<br />
• If the fire is major, request for additional expert help from ERT, <strong>Barmer</strong> / EMT,<br />
Gurgaon.<br />
7. BUILDINGS (CENTRAL CONTROL BUILDING & FIRE STATION)<br />
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:<br />
Paper, wood, plastic & other combustible material<br />
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:<br />
• Smoke<br />
• Fire escalating to the nearby offices<br />
• Inhalation hazard<br />
SAFETY SYSTEM:<br />
• Fire & Gas Detection System<br />
• The building is manned round the clock<br />
FIRE PROTECTION:<br />
• Fire Extinguishers<br />
• Inergen system (only at central control room)<br />
• Fire Hydrant Network<br />
• Fire Tender<br />
IN CASE OF FIRE:<br />
• Raise the emergency siren<br />
• Evacuate the building & muster<br />
• Use the fire extinguisher if the fire is small and under control<br />
• Activate the Inergen system in case fire is big & uncontrollable<br />
• Use fire hydrant / tender depending on requirements<br />
• If the fire is major, request for additional expert help from ERT, <strong>Barmer</strong> / EMT,<br />
Gurgaon.<br />
[217]
8. FIRE IN CHEMICAL LABORATORY BUILDING<br />
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:<br />
Chemical, paper, wood, plastic & other combustible material<br />
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:<br />
• Smoke<br />
• Fire escalating to the nearby offices<br />
• Inhalation hazard<br />
SAFETY SYSTEM:<br />
• Fire & Gas Detection System<br />
• The building is manned round the clock<br />
FIRE PROTECTION:<br />
• Fire Extinguishers<br />
• Inergen system<br />
• Fire Hydrant network<br />
• Fire Tender<br />
IN CASE OF FIRE:<br />
• Raise the emergency siren<br />
• Evacuate the Chemical Laboratory / building & muster at the assembly point<br />
• Use the fire extinguisher if the fire is small and under control<br />
• Use the fire water after ensuring water compatibility with the chemical<br />
• If the fire is major, then evacuate the area and request for additional help from ERT,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> / EMT, Gurgaon.<br />
9. OIL & GAS LEAKAGE IN PIG LAUNCHER AREA (AT MPT/ RGT) FOLLOWED BY<br />
FIRE<br />
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:<br />
Crude Oil & Natural Gas<br />
[218]
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:<br />
• Pool fire & explosion due to Crude Oil & Natural Gas leakage<br />
• Serious Environment effects ( Soil & Air Contamination)<br />
• Personnel injuries<br />
SAFETY SYSTEM:<br />
• Manned operation<br />
• Fire & Gas Detection System<br />
• Kerbed facility<br />
FIRE PROTECTION:<br />
• Fire Extinguishers<br />
• Fire water network<br />
• Fire tenders from the nearby fire Station.<br />
IN CASE OF FIRE:<br />
• STOP Pigging operation<br />
• Inform Central Control Room<br />
• Use fire extinguisher if in case of fire is small<br />
• Mobilise the fire team & use fire hydrant water / foam if the fire is big and<br />
uncontrollable<br />
• If the fire is major, then evacuate the area and request for additional help from ERT,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> / EMT, Gurgaon.<br />
10. FIRE/ GAS LEAK IN CROSS COUNTRY PIPE LINE.<br />
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:<br />
Crude oil, Condensate & Natural Gas<br />
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:<br />
• Pool fire due to crude oil Leakage<br />
• Explosion from release of natural gas.<br />
• Explosion from release of Condensate followed by delayed ignition<br />
• Dense heavy smoke from burning crude<br />
• Serious Environment effects (Soil & Air Contamination)<br />
[219]
• Injury to public<br />
SAFETY SYSTEM:<br />
• Security Patrolling<br />
• Thermal Sensor across the pipeline<br />
• Information by public<br />
FIRE PROTECTION:<br />
Fire tenders from the nearby fire Station (MPT/ RGT)<br />
IN CASE OF FIRE:<br />
• Barricade the affected section of pipeline<br />
• Isolate at appropriate AGI (Above Ground Installation)/ sectional valve<br />
• STOP Traffic on the road or nearby pipeline area<br />
• Communicate the Central Control Room at MPT/ RGT<br />
• Communicate to nearest Police station & Fire Brigade.<br />
• Alert Public for preparing to evacuate from the area.<br />
• If the fire is major, then evacuate the area and request for additional help from ERT,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> / EMT, Gurgaon.<br />
11. FIRE IN MANGALA TRAIN 1 FACILITIES<br />
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:<br />
Crude Oil & Natural Gas<br />
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:<br />
• Pool fire & explosion due to Crude Oil & Natural Gas leakage<br />
• Serious Environment effects ( Soil & Air Contamination)<br />
• Personnel injuries<br />
SAFETY SYSTEM:<br />
• Manned Operation<br />
• Fire & Gas Detection System<br />
FIRE PROTECTION:<br />
• Fire Extinguishers<br />
[220]
• Fire water network<br />
• Fire tenders from the nearby fire Station.<br />
IN CASE OF FIRE:<br />
• Stop all the related operations<br />
• Inform Central Control Room<br />
• Use fire extinguisher if in case of fire is small<br />
• Mobilise the fire team & use fire hydrant water / foam if the fire is big and<br />
uncontrollable<br />
• If the fire is major, then evacuate the area and request for additional help from ERT,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> / EMT, Gurgaon<br />
12. FIRE IN ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY (EOR)<br />
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:<br />
Crude Oil, Natural Gas & Chemical<br />
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:<br />
• Smoke<br />
• Fire escalating to the nearby facilities<br />
• Inhalation hazard<br />
SAFETY SYSTEM:<br />
Manned 24 hrs<br />
FIRE PROTECTION:<br />
• Fire Extinguishers<br />
• Fire water system<br />
• Fire Tender<br />
IN CASE OF FIRE:<br />
• Stop all the related operations<br />
• Inform Central Control Room at MPT or Mangala Train 1 control room<br />
• Use fire extinguisher in case fire is small<br />
• Mobilise the fire team & use fire water / foam if the fire is of large magnitude<br />
[221]
• If the fire is major, then evacuate the area and request for additional help from ERT,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> / EMT, Gurgaon.<br />
13. FIRE SITUATIONS IN BARMER HILL PROJECT (EWT)<br />
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:<br />
Crude Oil & Natural Gas<br />
POTENTIAL FIRE HAZARDS:<br />
• Release of high pressure associated gas with crude oil<br />
• Pool fire escalating to explosion on well head<br />
• Blow out<br />
SAFETY SYSTEM:<br />
Fire & Gas Detection System<br />
FIRE PROTECTION:<br />
• Fire Extinguishers<br />
• Fire tenders from MPT<br />
IN CASE OF FIRE:<br />
• Barricade the affected Well heads.<br />
• Stop the road side traffic<br />
• Communicate to MPT – Central Control Room as per Communication chart.<br />
• Mobilize the Fire Tender<br />
• Evacuate the Nearby villagers & alert the public<br />
• If the fire is major, request for additional expert help from ERT, <strong>Barmer</strong> / EMT,<br />
Gurgaon.<br />
16. FIRE SITUATION “MAJOR CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES WITHIN MPT / RGT/<br />
MT-1 / WELL PADS”<br />
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:<br />
Chemical, paper, wood, plastic & other combustible material<br />
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:<br />
[222]
• Smoke<br />
• Fire escalating to the nearby facilities, Hydrocarbon live equipment & offices,<br />
• Inhalation hazard<br />
• Personnel Injuries<br />
SAFETY SYSTEM:<br />
Manned 24 hrs<br />
FIRE PROTECTION:<br />
• Fire Extinguishers<br />
• Fire Hydrant water system<br />
• Fire Tender<br />
IN CASE OF FIRE:<br />
• Raise the emergency siren<br />
• Evacuate the construction area<br />
• Inform Central Control Room.<br />
• Use the fire extinguisher if the fire is small and under control<br />
• Use the fire hydrant water after ensuring water compatibility with the chemical &<br />
electrical system is switched off<br />
• If the fire is major, then evacuate the area and request for additional help from ERT,<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> / EMT, Gurgaon.<br />
17. FIRE IN “OB CAMPS & OFFICE BUILDING”<br />
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:<br />
Chemical, paper, wood, plastic & other combustible material<br />
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:<br />
• Smoke<br />
• Fire escalating to the nearby offices<br />
• Inhalation hazard<br />
SAFETY SYSTEM:<br />
• Fire & Gas Detection System<br />
• Manned 24 hrs<br />
[223]
FIRE PROTECTION:<br />
• Fire Extinguishers<br />
• Fire Hydrant water system<br />
• Fire Tender<br />
IN CASE OF FIRE:<br />
• Raise the emergency siren<br />
• Evacuate the building & muster<br />
• Use the fire extinguisher if the fire is small and under control<br />
• Inform Central Control Room<br />
• Mobilise the Fire Tender<br />
• If the fire is major, then evacuate the area and request for additional expert help<br />
from ERT, <strong>Barmer</strong> / EMT, Gurgaon.<br />
[224]
APPENDIX D – FIRE PROTECTION<br />
ARRANGEMENTS<br />
1 MANGALA PROCESSING TERMINAL<br />
Mangala Processing Terminal Fire Protection system has been installed as per OISD 116.<br />
The fire water system is designed to combat two major fires simultaneously with a<br />
minimum of four hour’s water supply.<br />
Fire Water Storage<br />
Two dedicated above ground fire water storages tanks of 5000 KL capacity each, total<br />
10000 KL of water is available for fire fighting purpose.<br />
Fire Water Pumps<br />
Four Diesel driven pumps are provided each with a capacity of 908 M3 per hour at 102<br />
meters head and two electrical driven pumps Jockey pumps each with a capacity of 110 M3<br />
per hour at 88 meters head. The jockey pump will maintain a pressure of 8.5 bars pressure<br />
in the fire main header. When the fire water mains pressure is reduced to 7.5 bars, the<br />
jockey pump will start. If the pressure in the fire water main falls to 6.5 bars the first main<br />
fire water pump will start and if the pressure remains in 6.5 bar or below for more than 30<br />
seconds the second pump will start, in the same way third and fourth pump<br />
Distribution Network<br />
Fire water ring main is installed throughout the plant area to ensure availability of water as<br />
and when required for fire fighting purpose and the line working pressure is 10.5 bars. The<br />
fire water network is laid in closed loops to ensure multi-directional flow. Isolation valves<br />
are provided in the network to enable isolation of any section of the network without<br />
affecting the flow in the rest. The isolation valves are normally located near the loop<br />
junctions. Additional valves are provided in the segments where the length of the segment<br />
exceeds 300 M. Fire water distribution ring main is sized for 120% of the design water rate.<br />
Piping<br />
Piping network is laid underground. The fire water main has at least one meter earth<br />
cushion in open ground and 1.5 metre earth cushion under the roads and is provided with<br />
protection against soil corrosion by suitable coating/wrapping.<br />
[225]
Hydrant Monitors<br />
Hydrants and monitor are installed along the water ring main to cover entire hazardous<br />
area. Distance between the two hydrants or two monitors are maintained at 30 metres in<br />
the hazardous area as per OISD 116. Monitors are installed in such a manner so as to cover<br />
all the tanks as well as group unit area. Height of the hydrant valve from the ground level is<br />
not more than 1.2 metres where as in the non hazardous area it is maintained at a distance<br />
of 45 meters. High Volume Long Range Monitor photo can be seen below:<br />
Hose Boxes<br />
Provision of hose boxes are installed at critical locations for housing hoses and nozzles.<br />
Storage Tank Protection<br />
Fixed foam systems are installed for all the tankages (Export oil tanks D250 A/B/C/D,<br />
Diesel tank D857, Off-spec tanks D255A/B and Settling tanks D214/D224) The systems<br />
includes conveying system comprising of fixed piping for water supply at adequate<br />
pressure, foam concentrate tank, eductor, suitable proportioning equipment for drawing<br />
foam concentrate and making foam solution, fixed piping system for onward conveying to<br />
foam makers for making foam, vapour seal box, and foam pourer. For the Diesel tank in<br />
addition to foam system automatic Medium Velocity water spray deluge system operated<br />
by Quartzoid bulb is provided with.<br />
Protection for Other Units<br />
Automatic Medium Velocity water spray system is provided for the following process<br />
equipment:<br />
1. Off spec oil pumps (P 255 A/B)<br />
2. Stabilised oil pumps (P225 A/B/C)<br />
3. Export oil pumps (P252 A/B/C/D)<br />
4. Vapour Recovery Unit Compressor Package (Z-300, Z310, Z320)<br />
5. Dehydrator (V217, V227).<br />
6. RGT pig receivers (condensate and natural gas)<br />
Total Flooding System - Inergen system<br />
Inergen system has been installed in the following areas:-<br />
1. Well pad switch gear rooms.<br />
2. Sub Station (SS) #s 1A, 1B and 4A.<br />
3. Chemical lab building.<br />
[226]
4. Central Control Room – DCS console area and panel.<br />
Total Flooding – CO2 system<br />
CO2 system has been installed for the following equipment:-<br />
1. Emergency Diesel Generator (EMDG) - A.<br />
2. Emergency Diesel Generator (EMDG) - B.<br />
3. Emergency Diesel Generator (EMDG) - C.<br />
DETAILS OF FIRE VEHICLES<br />
1 Multi Task Fire Vehicle of Rosenbauer having 6000 litres water capacity, 4000 litres<br />
foam concentrate, Pump of 5000 LPM at 10 bar and 400LPM at 40 bar, Roof turret<br />
output of 3800 LPM at 7 bars and throw of 80metres, 1000 kg DCP, DCP Turret 15-40<br />
kg/sec and a throw of 10m-40m , DCP hose reel Discharge output of 5 kg/sec and throw<br />
of approx.12 m and powered rescue tools<br />
2 Multi Task Fire Vehicle of Rosenbauer having 3000 litres water capacity,2000 litres foam<br />
concentrate, Pump of 4000 LPM at 7 bar and 300 LPM at 35 bar, Roof turret output of<br />
4000 LPM at 7 bars and throw of 80 metres, 500 kg DCP, DCP Turret 15-40 kg/sec and a<br />
throw of 10m-40m , DCP hose reel Discharge output of 5 kg/sec and throw of approx. 12<br />
m<br />
3 Foam Nurser having 10000 litres foam capacity; pump 4000 LPM at 8 bars and 1800<br />
LPM at 15 bars. Roof turret output of 4000 LPM at 7 bars and throw of 80 metres<br />
1 No.<br />
2 Nos.<br />
1 No.<br />
Portable Fire Fighting Equipments<br />
Adequate numbers of DCP/CO2 extinguishers are provided at strategic locations and all<br />
extinguishers are clearly visible and easily accessible. The extinguishers are installed in<br />
such a way that the top of the extinguisher does not exceed 1.5 mts from the ground level.<br />
The travel distance to any extinguisher in process area does not exceed 15 mts where as in<br />
the offsite area it does not exceed 30 mts as per OISD.<br />
INVENTORY OF FIRE EQUIPMENTS IN MANGALA PROCESSING TERMINAL (MPT)<br />
Ser. No Equipments Quantity<br />
1. Fire water Monitors 86<br />
2. Fire hydrants with Double Landing valves 287<br />
3<br />
DCP ( ABC Type) Fire Extinguisher 10 Kg Stored pressure type<br />
as per IS 13849<br />
249<br />
4 UL listed Foam Trailer with Monitor capacity of 2250 LPM 1<br />
5<br />
Trolley Type DCP fire Extinguisher 50 KG Capacity as per IS<br />
10658<br />
15<br />
[227]
6<br />
CO2 Type Fire extinguisher 4.5 Kg Capacity CCOE approved<br />
and as per ISI.<br />
119<br />
7<br />
CO2 Type Fire extinguisher 6.5 Kg Capacity CCOE approved<br />
and as per ISI 2878<br />
27<br />
8<br />
Permaline Delivery Hose 63 mm Type B as per IS 636 and UL<br />
listed<br />
284<br />
9 Jet Nozzles 63mm ISI marked 142<br />
10 Fire Sand Buckets with Stand ( each with four buckets) sets 16<br />
11 Self Contained Breathing Apparatus sets 12<br />
12 Fire proximity suit 8<br />
13 Fire Entry Suit 2<br />
2 MANGALA TRAIN - 1 (START UP PRODUCTION<br />
PACKAGE)<br />
Mangala Train-1 (Start Up Production Package / SUPP) has been installed as per Early<br />
Production Set-Up (EPS) concept as per OISD 189. The fire water system is designed in<br />
such a manner that at least one monitor of capacity approx.1600 LPM or two (2) hydrants<br />
can be operated in full pressure (7.0 kg/cm2) in case of any emergency.<br />
FIRE WATER STORAGE<br />
Two Open Fire water ponds of 500 KL capacity each with a total of 1000m3 of water are<br />
available for fire fighting purpose.<br />
One additional Trailer Pump Connection (TPC) is also provided in the Fire water storage<br />
tank for connection to external fire tender in case of an emergency. Regular filling<br />
arrangement for the fire water reservoir is also provided.<br />
FIRE WATER PUMP<br />
Two electrical driver pumps have been provided for MANGALA TRAIN - 1 facility. Each<br />
pump has a capacity of 100 M3 per hour.<br />
A diesel driven trailer mounted fire pump of 1800 LPM capacity is available as a back up to<br />
the electrical driven fire water (submersible) pumps.<br />
FOAM TENDER<br />
Presently a Foam Tender with foam tank capacity of 800 Litres capacity and water tank<br />
capacity of 2250 Litres is available on standby to meet plant emergencies. The Foam<br />
[228]
Tender is manned round the clock by a trained Fire Crew of 5 personnel in Day and Night<br />
shifts.<br />
FIRE WATER DISTRIBUTION NETWORK<br />
A fire water ring main of 8” size is installed around the facility along the road side to ensure<br />
availability of water as and when required for fire fighting purpose. This line is hooked up<br />
with the delivery of the electrical driven fire pumps drawing water from the 600m3<br />
storage.<br />
A TPC is also available to feed water supply directly from the trailer pump to the fire water<br />
main by taking direct suction from the Fire water reservoirs. The fire water ring main is<br />
laid above the ground with supports provided at every 6.0 metres distance.<br />
HYDRANT/MONITORS<br />
Hydrants and monitors are installed on the Fire water main to cover entire hazardous area.<br />
Distance between the two hydrants or two monitors are maintained at 30 metres in the<br />
hazardous area. Monitors are strategically installed to cover all the tanks as well as group<br />
unit area. Height of the hydrant valve from the ground level is not more than 1.2 mtrs. In<br />
the non hazardous area, the distance between each hydrant is maintained at 45 metres.<br />
PORTABLE FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENTS<br />
Sufficient numbers of DCP / CO2 extinguishers are provided at strategic locations and all<br />
the extinguishers are clearly visible and easily accessible. The extinguishers are installed in<br />
such a way that they can be easily lifted and operated. The travel distance to any<br />
extinguisher in process are does not exceed 15 mts where as in the offsite area it does not<br />
exceed 30 mts as per OISD requirements.<br />
INVENTORY OF FIRE EQUIPMENT IN MANGALA TRAIN 1 (START UP PRODUCTION<br />
PACKAGE)<br />
Sr.<br />
No<br />
Equipment<br />
Quantity<br />
1. Foam Tender with water and foam tanks (800 Lts. Foam) 1 No.<br />
2. Fire water Pumps of 100 M3 capacity at Train-1 and Loading Bay 4 Nos.<br />
3. Fire water Monitors 8 Nos.<br />
4. Fire hydrants with Double Landing valves 13 Nos.<br />
5. Trailer pump of 1800 LPM capacity 1 no.<br />
6. DCP ( ABC Type) Fire Extinguisher 10 Kg Stored pressure type as per IS 13849 30 Nos.<br />
7. DCP ( ABC Type) Fire Extinguisher 10 Kg Stored pressure type as per IS 13849 10 Nos.<br />
8. Foam Trailer with UL listed Monitor 2250 LPM 1 Nos.<br />
[229]
9. Trolley Type DCP fire Extinguisher 50 KG Capacity as per IS10658 4 Nos<br />
10. CO2 Type Fire extinguisher 6.5 Kg Capacity PESO approved and as per ISI 2878 4 Nos.<br />
11. Permaline Delivery Hose 63 mm Type B as per IS 636 and UL listed 20 Nos.<br />
12. Multi-purpose Nozzles 63mm ISI marked 5 Nos.<br />
13. Fire Sand Buckets with Stand (each with four buckets) 4 sets.<br />
14. Self Contained Breathing Apparatus 2 Nos.<br />
15. Fire proximity suit 2 Nos.<br />
16. CO2 Type Fire extinguisher 22.5 Kg Capacity PESO approved and as per BIS. 2 Nos.<br />
[230]
APPENDIX E – EMERGENCY RESOURCES<br />
CAIRN RESOURCES<br />
Subject<br />
Mangala<br />
Processing<br />
Terminal<br />
Mangala Train 1<br />
Raageshwari Gas<br />
Terminal<br />
Fire<br />
Fire tenders Quantity 1 Multi Purpose<br />
Rescue Tender & 1<br />
Foam Tender<br />
1 Foam Tender 1 Foam Tender<br />
Capacity<br />
Vehicle No. 1 (Multi<br />
Purpose Rescue<br />
Tender) – 6000 L<br />
water/4000 L foam<br />
/ DCP 1000 Kgs.<br />
Pump capacity –<br />
5000 LPM at 10 bar<br />
Vehicle No. 3 (Foam<br />
Tender) – 3000 L<br />
water/2000 L foam<br />
/ DCP 500 Kgs.<br />
pump capacity –<br />
4000 LPM at 7 bar<br />
3500 L water/500 L<br />
foam / DCP 2000<br />
Kgs. pump capacity<br />
– 2250 LPM at 7 bar.<br />
Additional Jerry<br />
cans - 300 Liters<br />
Vehicle No. 2 (Foam<br />
Tender) – 3000 L<br />
water/2000 L foam<br />
/ DCP 500 Kgs.<br />
pump capacity –<br />
4000 LPM at 7 bar<br />
Foam Nurser Quantity 1<br />
Capacity<br />
10,000 L of foam<br />
with pump capacity<br />
of 4000 LPM at 8<br />
bar<br />
Fire Water<br />
Storage<br />
Quantity 2 tanks 2 open ponds 2 tanks<br />
Capacity 5000 KL each 500 KL each 1000 KL each<br />
Fire Water<br />
Pumps (Diesel<br />
Driven)<br />
Quantity 4 pumps 2 electrical<br />
submersible pump<br />
& 1 trailer mounted<br />
diesel driven pump<br />
Capacity 908 m 3 /hr at 10.2 108 m 3 /hr each &<br />
trailer pump 1800<br />
[231]<br />
1 diesel driven<br />
pump at Saraswati<br />
filed and 2 diesel<br />
driven fire pump at<br />
RGT<br />
40 M3/hr at<br />
Saraswati & 908
kg/cm 2 LPM m 3 /hr each at RGT<br />
Fire Water<br />
Pumps<br />
(Electrical<br />
driven)<br />
Quantity<br />
2 electrical driven<br />
Jockey Pumps<br />
Capacity 110 m 3 /hr at 8.6<br />
kg/cm 2<br />
Nil<br />
NA<br />
2 Nos. electrical<br />
driven jockey pump<br />
55 M3/hr at 10 bar<br />
Firewater<br />
monitor (fixed)<br />
86 nos. 8 nos. 1 nos. at Saraswati -<br />
1<br />
17 Nos. at RGT<br />
Fire Hydrants<br />
(with double<br />
landing valves,<br />
fixed)<br />
264 nos. 13 nos. 2 nos. in Saraswati<br />
and<br />
18 Nos. at RGT<br />
Portable fire<br />
extinguisher<br />
249 DCP type, 146<br />
CO 2 type,<br />
40 DCP type, 6 CO 2<br />
type<br />
11 DCP type, 1 CO 2<br />
type at Saraswati 1<br />
15 DCP type, 4 CO 2<br />
type at EGF<br />
Trolley type<br />
fire<br />
extinguisher<br />
(50 kg)<br />
Trailer<br />
mounted foam<br />
monitor<br />
15 nos. 4 nos. 6 at Saraswati 1<br />
1 at EGF<br />
4 nos. 1 nos. 1 nos.<br />
Sand buckets 16 sets 4 sets 1 set<br />
Self contained<br />
breathing<br />
apparatus<br />
Fire proximity<br />
suit<br />
Fire entry suit<br />
12 nos. 2 nos. 2 nos.<br />
8 nos. 2 nos.<br />
2 nos.<br />
Diesel driven<br />
trailer mounted<br />
fire pump<br />
4 pumps of 1800<br />
LPM capacity each<br />
1 pump of 1800<br />
LPM capacity<br />
[232]
DISTRICT/GOVERNMENT RESOURCES<br />
Subject<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
District<br />
Jesai Army<br />
Base<br />
Army Base,<br />
Jodhpur<br />
Public fire<br />
brigade<br />
Fire<br />
Fire tenders Number, 1 each with<br />
Mining<br />
Department<br />
and Civil<br />
Defence, 3 nos.<br />
With <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Municipality, 1<br />
with Balotra<br />
Municipality<br />
8 nos. 03 crash +<br />
domestic<br />
02 / one<br />
working and<br />
another<br />
under<br />
breakdown<br />
from 2 yrs<br />
Capacity<br />
3028 l water<br />
(Civil Defence)<br />
3200 l water/<br />
425 l foam<br />
9000 ltrs /<br />
3000 foam<br />
8000 litres<br />
Portable mobile<br />
monitors<br />
Personnel<br />
available<br />
Earthquake<br />
5 firemen (Civil<br />
Defence), 6<br />
firemen<br />
(<strong>Barmer</strong><br />
Municipality),<br />
4 firemen<br />
(Balotra<br />
Municipality)<br />
90 Not disclosed<br />
42 firemen 24 personnel 7 personnel<br />
in each shift<br />
total 21 + one<br />
supervisor in<br />
each shift<br />
JCBs 63 nos. 2 JCBs<br />
Excavators<br />
Evacuation<br />
related<br />
Logistics<br />
Temporary<br />
accommodation<br />
(tents etc)<br />
Buses/mini<br />
coaches, LMVs/<br />
Air evacuation<br />
11 tent houses, Tents /<br />
Permanent<br />
shelter<br />
Food supplies 6 godowns Canteen /<br />
Meshes<br />
[233]
Flood<br />
Boats<br />
Life jackets<br />
2 with Water<br />
Resources<br />
Department<br />
20 with Water<br />
Resources<br />
Department, 8<br />
with Civil<br />
Defence, 4 with<br />
Home Guard,<br />
16 with Police<br />
Helicopters –<br />
search and<br />
rescue<br />
Sandbags<br />
Divers/swimm<br />
ers/rescue<br />
personnel<br />
Many<br />
160 nos. Enough nos<br />
Medical<br />
List of hospitals 8 hospitals, 60<br />
Primary<br />
healthcare<br />
centres<br />
5 beds medical<br />
centres<br />
Govt.<br />
Hospital<br />
Doctors, nurses<br />
939 nurses/<br />
paramedics<br />
3 doctors +<br />
males nurses<br />
27<br />
18 doctors /<br />
50 nurses<br />
Mobile<br />
operation<br />
theatres<br />
One stabilising<br />
equipment<br />
Nil<br />
Ambulances 2 nos. 03 03 - 108 &<br />
03 of hospital<br />
Rapid response<br />
team<br />
1 team at<br />
district HQ<br />
[234]
OTHER CORPORATE RESOURCES<br />
Subject<br />
Fire<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> JSW -Dilip<br />
Narwani<br />
Giral Lignite Power Limited<br />
Fire tenders Number 02 03<br />
Capacity 5 m 3 / 200 liters 5 m 3 / 200 liters<br />
Portable mobile<br />
monitors<br />
70, capacity 5 – 10 kgs 500, Capacity 5-10 kgs<br />
Personnel available 32 fire man, 7 DCO, 4<br />
supervisor out sourced<br />
12 per shift, 2 supervisors, 2<br />
driver, 8 fireman<br />
AGM – safety, 1 sr,<br />
Manager, 2 Dy. Manager, 5<br />
Engineers<br />
Earthquake<br />
JCBs 2 nos/ 18 tonnes 1Hydra, 1 JCB /20 Tonnes<br />
Excavators Nil Dozzer -08<br />
Evacuation related Logistics<br />
Transport to<br />
temporary<br />
accommodation<br />
(tents etc)<br />
Food supplies<br />
Flood<br />
16 trucks that can be used<br />
in case of evacuation &<br />
personnel cars which can<br />
be hired<br />
Canteen facility serving<br />
500 people<br />
Company buses in general<br />
shift, individual car<br />
Boats --<br />
Life jackets --<br />
Helicopters – search<br />
and rescue<br />
Proposed --<br />
Sandbags 50 Nos --<br />
Divers/swimmers/r<br />
escue personnel<br />
--<br />
[235]
Medical<br />
List of hospitals<br />
Occupational health<br />
center<br />
--<br />
Doctors, nurses 2 beds/ one doctor / 4<br />
male nurse / 1 female<br />
nurse<br />
--<br />
Mobile operation<br />
theatres<br />
No arrangement --<br />
Ambulances Number 2 1 Ambulance + 3 jeeps<br />
Telephone<br />
number<br />
9783802704<br />
9982249075<br />
02982229321<br />
No dedicated number<br />
[236]
APPENDIX F – BARMER DISTRICT PROFILE<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> is located at 25.75° N 71.38° E. It has an average elevation of 227 metres (744 feet).<br />
The total area of <strong>Barmer</strong> district is 28,114 km².<br />
TOTAL AREA<br />
Villages<br />
Towns/cities<br />
Total<br />
28114.03 sq km<br />
59.29 sq km<br />
281703.32 sq km<br />
The whole district lies between 24°58′ - 26°32′ N and 70°5′ – 72°52′. On its north is<br />
Jaisalmer, to the south is Jalore, and Pali and Jodhpur are to the east. <strong>Barmer</strong> district is<br />
3,727 ft (1,136 m) above sea level and 22 km in length. The longest river in the district is<br />
the Luni. It is 480 km in length and drain into the Gulf of Kutch passing through Jalore. The<br />
variation in temperature in various seasons is quite high.<br />
ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS IN BARMER<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> district consists of <strong>Barmer</strong>, Baytu, Shiv, Chauhatan, Gudamalani and Balotara<br />
Tehsils. The distribution of villages in these tehsils is given below.<br />
Village Distribution in <strong>Barmer</strong> District<br />
Collectorat<br />
e<br />
District<br />
collectorate<br />
Taluk<br />
Panchayat<br />
Samithi<br />
Villages in Panchayat Samithi in<br />
2001 based on status of<br />
habitation<br />
Habitabl<br />
e<br />
Nonhabitable<br />
Total<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> <strong>Barmer</strong> <strong>Barmer</strong> <strong>Barmer</strong> 269 0 269<br />
Ramsar <strong>Barmer</strong> 142 2 144<br />
Baytu Baytu Baytu 321 0 321<br />
Shiv Shiv Shiv 284 1 285<br />
Chauhatan Chauhatan Chauhatan 367 2 369<br />
[237]
Chauhatan Dhorimana 0 0 0<br />
Gudamalani Gudamalani Dhorimana 401 0 401<br />
Gudamalani Sindhri 0 0 0<br />
Balotara Pachpadara Balotara 259 2 261<br />
Sivana Sivana 128 1 129<br />
Total 2171 8 2179<br />
POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHICS<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> had population of 1964835 in 2001 of which males were 1038247 (52.84%) and females<br />
were 926588 (47.16%), table 2.1. The district has 3.48 percent of state’s population and 8.29<br />
percent area. The population growth during 1991-2001 was 36.83 percent compared to 28.27<br />
percent during 1981-1991. The rural population stood at 1819431 (92.6%), while the urban<br />
population was 145404 (7.4%). The 5-14 years population was 545120, 15-59 years old were<br />
978039 and 60 plus population was 139461. 15 percent of the population is under 6 years of age.<br />
The district has an area of 28387 sq.km and density of population of 69 in 2001. The population<br />
statistics are given below:<br />
POPULATION IN BARMER<br />
S. no Year Males Females Total Increase/decrease<br />
1 1981 587648 531244 1118892 (+)344087<br />
2 1991 759077 676145 1435222 (+)316330<br />
3 2001 1038247 926588 1964835 (+)529613<br />
POPULATION DENSITY<br />
S. no Year<br />
Village<br />
Density<br />
City/town<br />
Total<br />
% Increase/<br />
decrease<br />
1 1981 36 1401 39<br />
2 1991 46 2432 51 +12<br />
3 2001 65 2452 69 +18<br />
[238]
POPULATION TEHSIL WISE<br />
S.<br />
No<br />
Block<br />
Village<br />
1991 2001<br />
City/<br />
town<br />
Total<br />
Village<br />
City/<br />
town<br />
Total<br />
1 <strong>Barmer</strong> 201455 68625 270080 203331 83591 286922<br />
2 Ramsar 0 0 0 79764 0 79764<br />
3 Baytu 140601 0 140601 192746 0 192746<br />
4 Shiv 121551 0 121551 178539 0 178539<br />
5 Chauhatan 256570 0 256570 344330 0 344330<br />
6 Gudamalani 244259 0 244259 341477 0 341477<br />
7 Pachpadara 192132 46858 238990 265596 61813 327409<br />
8 Sivana 134488 28683 163171 213648 0 213648<br />
Total 1291056 144166 1435222 1819431 145404 1964835<br />
POPULATION IN 2001<br />
District No. of Households Persons Males Females<br />
Total 309739 1964835 1038247 926588<br />
Rural 284796 1819431 959844 859587<br />
Urban 24943 145404 78403 67001<br />
Source: Statistical Abstract of Rajasthan, 2005<br />
The district has 309739 households of which 91.95 percent are rural areas and only 8.1<br />
percent in urban areas (table 2.1). Of the rural population, 52.78 percent are males while<br />
this proportion is 53.92 percent in urban areas. Given the number of households in the<br />
district at 309739, the average household size comes to 6.34. The average household size in<br />
rural areas is 6.39 compared to urban household size of 5.83. The family size in urban<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> is thus lower than the rural family size. 28.3 percent houses are permanent type<br />
followed by 14 percent that are semi-permanent and 57.8 percent are temporary type.<br />
[239]
DEMOGRAPHICS<br />
S. No Base Total Number<br />
1 Males 1038247<br />
2 Females 926588<br />
3 Total 1964835<br />
4 Villagers 1819431<br />
5 Cities/towns 145404<br />
6 Population density 69<br />
7 Total literacy rate 59.00<br />
8 7a. Males 72.80<br />
9 7b. Females 43.04<br />
10 Population in cities/towns 145404<br />
11 Sex ratio per 1000 males 892<br />
12 Increase in population in 10 years (1991-2001) (+)36.90<br />
LAND UTILISATION<br />
The district has a geographical area of 2.82 million hectares. In 2004-05, about 1.12<br />
percent of the area had forest cover, 7.2 percent constituted pasture land, 25.13 percent<br />
was fallow land and 51.63 percent was cultivated crop land. The remainder was either not<br />
available for cultivation or culturable wasteland. Gross cropped area in 2004-05 was 1.55<br />
million hectares (1.79 million hectares in 2006-07) and area sown more than once stood at<br />
90762. In 2006-07, some changes took place with net sown area being 60 percent of total<br />
area. The cropping intensity for the year stood at 106.24. It is the condition of the district<br />
that allows it to have only 6.24 percent area under double cropping.<br />
LAND UTILISATION IN BARMER<br />
Items Area in hectares %<br />
Reporting Area 2817332 100<br />
Forest 31677 1.12<br />
[240]
Area under Non-agricultural Uses 72926 2.59<br />
Barren & Uncultivable Land 126147 4.48<br />
Permanent Pasture & other Grazing Land 202739 7.20<br />
Land under Misc. Tree Crops & Groves 301 0.01<br />
Culturable Waste Land 220963 7.84<br />
Fallow Lands other Than Current Fallow 355854 12.63<br />
Current Fallows 352234 12.50<br />
Net Area Sown 1454491 51.63<br />
Gross Cropped Area 1545253<br />
Area Sown More Than Once 90762<br />
Source: Statistical Abstract of Rajasthan 2005.<br />
FOREST COVER<br />
The forest cover marginally increased to 1.13 percent and permanent pastures and other<br />
grazing lands constituting 15.38 percent and barren and cultivable land another 18<br />
percent.<br />
AREA OF FOREST – 2009 – 2010<br />
S. no Name of forest<br />
Not under<br />
protection<br />
Protected Unclassified Total<br />
1 <strong>Barmer</strong> 0 54199.24 2156.33 56355.57<br />
Total 0 54199.24 2156.33 56355.57<br />
LAND HOLDINGS<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> district in 2003 had 27048 holdings of which majority were 4 hectares and above<br />
(70.24%). Across tehsils, such holdings were 72.75 percent in <strong>Barmer</strong>, 73.48 percent in<br />
Baytu, 83.57 percent in Chohtan, 57.61 percent in Gudamalani, 59.51 percent in Pachpatra,<br />
89.43 percent in Ramsar, 80.90 percent in Sheo, 50.42 percent in Siwana as against the<br />
district average of 70.24 percent. Large holding does not mean much in rainfed areas.<br />
However, this pattern of holdings would reflect on agricultural practices. Large land<br />
[241]
holdings are a reflection of the harsh environmental conditions, and hence low population<br />
density (69 people/ km²).<br />
CLIMATE<br />
The characteristic features of the climate of the district are its (dryness, extremes of<br />
temperature and the fitful and erratic nature of the rainfall. The year may, be divided into<br />
four seasons, winter from November to March, summer season from April to June,<br />
monsoon from July to mid-September, and the post-monsoon season up to the end of<br />
October.<br />
In summers the temperature soars to 46 °C to 48 °C. In winters it drops to 5 °C (41 °F).<br />
Primarily <strong>Barmer</strong> district is a desert where average rainfall in a year is 277 mm. However,<br />
extreme rainfall of 549 mm rain between August 16 and August 25, 2006 left many dead<br />
and huge losses. As many as 20 new lakes formed, and 6 covered an area of over 10 km².<br />
RAINFALL<br />
The normal annual rainfall at the district headquarters is 27.75 cm. while the actual rainfall<br />
in 1989 was only 26.62 cm. During the period the humidity percentage at <strong>Barmer</strong> Centre<br />
was 56.84. The rainfall decreases towards the west. The average number of rainy days<br />
(days with rainfall of 2.5 mm. or more) in a year is only taking the district as a whole. The<br />
winter season sets in by November, when both day and night temperatures begin to drop,<br />
reaching the lowest point in January. The minimum temperature often records below<br />
freezing point in January and trees and vegetation get injured by frost. Temperatures rise<br />
rapidly after March and attain the peak in May or June. Day temperatures have been known<br />
to reach as high as 49°C in May. Throughout summer, the heat is intense and scorching<br />
winds prevail. Even during monsoon, the air is dry in between the fitful spells of rain. The<br />
district is prone to droughts.<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> has an average rainfall of 26.04 cm. Table 3.4 (also fig. 3.2) shows wide annual<br />
variations since 1991. This period had a lowest rainfall of 5 cm in 1991 and the highest<br />
rainfall of 61 cm in 1994. The average rainfall during this period is 29.5 cm. The normal<br />
rainfall of the district is 27.75 cm. Most the rainfall is received between June and<br />
September and the number of rainy days has gone down in the recent times. In these 14<br />
years, the negative deviations lead to drought situation. Of the years since 1991, only 7<br />
years there was excess rainfall; higher than the normal rainfall and the highest deviation<br />
was recorded in 1994. Since 1991, initially there were three years when it rained more<br />
[242]
than normal (1992-1994), then it was two years (1997-1998) and then one year (2001 and<br />
2003). This means that during last 15 years the cycle of such events has reduced. However,<br />
one can question the concept of drought in desertic condition. 1991 and 2002 appears to be<br />
serious dry years. The rainfall pattern among the regions is very much uncertain.<br />
Therefore, kharif cropping is too much uncertain in all the regions.<br />
RAINFALL (IN MM)<br />
S.<br />
No<br />
Taluk<br />
name<br />
Averag<br />
e<br />
rainfall<br />
200<br />
1<br />
2002 2003<br />
200<br />
4<br />
200<br />
5<br />
200<br />
6<br />
200<br />
7<br />
2008<br />
200<br />
9<br />
1 <strong>Barmer</strong> 286.8 264 126 475 220 140 759 243 186 166<br />
2 Ramsar 269.1 238 56 702 234 66 666 198 306 142<br />
3 Baytu 360.3 480 56 207 118 180 779 306 192 224<br />
4 Shiv 280 325 81 267 181 176 478 270 171 145<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
Chauhat<br />
an<br />
Gudamal<br />
ani<br />
Pachpad<br />
ara<br />
348 482 72 474 182 200 875 173 274 196<br />
275.5 272 36 556 156 207 578 361 353 161<br />
337.9 270 107 609 262 223 500 287 418 186<br />
8 Sivana 292.4 236 166 506 291 266 543 289 420 154<br />
320.<br />
8<br />
320.87 470.07 205 182 647 266 290 178<br />
SOILS<br />
The soils of the district are broadly desertic type. Qualitatively the soils are very poor and<br />
devoid of humus content. These soils are very deep and sandy, associated with dunes, inter<br />
dunes and sandy plain covering about 31 percent of the area. Dunes are the spectacular<br />
feature of the district and these occur scattered all over the area. In some parts of <strong>Barmer</strong>,<br />
red desert soils are also found. Soil texture varies from sandy loam to sandy clay loam,<br />
becoming slightly heavier with depth. Calcium carbonate is at varying depths and is<br />
frequently cemented. Solanchak (saline soils) are also found in the district. Kolu, Chirai,<br />
Shergarh, Pal and Bap soil series have been identified in the district. The most common<br />
characteristics of the soil are as follows:<br />
[243]
• Poor fertility with a zone of lime strata in the sub-soil.<br />
• The soils are characterised by incomplete leaching of soluble salts, ill defined profile<br />
development and accumulation of lime at some point in the profile; and<br />
• The soils are deep, structure less and porous on account of which water and other<br />
liquids such as liquid hydrocarbons percolate easily and rapidly.<br />
WATER RESOURCES<br />
Potable water in the district comes mainly from rain water harvested in large tanks. Wells,<br />
tube wells and hand pumps are also in use. The seasonal rivers, Luni and Jojree and the<br />
Narmada canal also flow through this district. However the water from the rivers is not<br />
potable.<br />
In 2004, of the 8 blocks, 12.5 percent were safe, 25.0 percent were critical and 62.5 percent<br />
were over-exploited (dark). As per the ground water quality status in <strong>Barmer</strong>, 97.6 percent<br />
habitations are chemically affected (PHED, GOR). So the ground water situation is quite bad<br />
in <strong>Barmer</strong>. During the summer months, acute water scarcity occurs in many parts of the<br />
district like <strong>Barmer</strong> and Balotra.<br />
AVAILABLE POTABLE WATER SOURCES<br />
Taluk<br />
Total<br />
villages<br />
Wells/tube wells<br />
Hand pumps<br />
Working Discarded Total Working Discarded Total<br />
Shiv 267 206 6 212 178 9 187<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> 227 193 4 197 876 57 933<br />
Chauhatan 339 344 14 358 221 54 275<br />
Gudamalani 369 338 7 345 388 57 445<br />
Baytu 321 45 2 47 95 3 98<br />
Sivana 126 119 5 124 82 33 115<br />
Ramsar 132 48 2 50 121 3 124<br />
Pachpadara 249 128 3 131 321 20 341<br />
Total 2030 1421 43 1464 2282 236 2518<br />
Cities<br />
[244]
<strong>Barmer</strong> 1 24 0 0 69 2 71<br />
Balotara 1 26 0 0 0 0 0<br />
Sivana 1 8 0 8 0 0 0<br />
Samdadi 1 7 0 7 0 0 0<br />
Total 4 65 0 15 69 2 71<br />
NATURAL WATER SOURCES<br />
S. No Taluk Name of river<br />
1 Baytu<br />
2 Chauhatan<br />
3 Ramsar<br />
4 <strong>Barmer</strong><br />
5 Gudamalani Luni, Narmada Canal<br />
6 Sivana Luni, Jojree<br />
7 Shiv<br />
8 Pachpadara Luni<br />
Rivers that flow during the monsoon only do not contain potable water<br />
DAMS IN BARMER<br />
Name Length in metres Capacity in MCFT Affected population<br />
Melee dam 529 164.00 1000<br />
Nanereenbagunda dam 1008 25.40 2000<br />
Peeploon 1243 17.78 2000<br />
Telwadaa dam 525 14.20 800<br />
Mavadi dam 530 11.55 1500<br />
Gudaanaal dam 1026 5.96 500<br />
Chandr dam 300 37.00 600<br />
[245]
Kitnod dam 255 10.69 400<br />
Mandalee dam 980 7.17 300<br />
DROUGHT<br />
The district is heavily affected by drought mainly due to the low amount of rainfall and<br />
sandy soils. Some statistics regarding drought are given below.<br />
DROUGHT IN BARMER<br />
S. No Year of drought Affected/year<br />
No of drought affected<br />
villages<br />
1 1992 2048 1636<br />
2 1993 2049 0<br />
3 1994 2050 1639<br />
4 1995 2051 0<br />
5 1996 2052 1650<br />
6 1997 2053 1430<br />
7 1998 2054 192<br />
8 1999 2055 1850<br />
9 2000 2056 1889<br />
10 2001 2057 1771<br />
11 2002 2058 1311<br />
12 2003 2059 1975<br />
13 2004 2060 0<br />
14 2005 2061 1916<br />
15 2006 2062 1811<br />
16 2007 2063 1231<br />
17 2008 2064 1714<br />
[246]
18 2009 2065 1761<br />
19 2010 2066 2179<br />
DROUGHT AFFECTED VILLAGES<br />
S. No Taluk name 50-74% >75%<br />
Total no of<br />
affected villages<br />
1 <strong>Barmer</strong> 0 269 269<br />
2 Ramsar 0 144 144<br />
3 Baytu 1 320 321<br />
4 Shiv 5 280 285<br />
5 Chauhatan 0 369 369<br />
6 Gudamalani 2 399 401<br />
7 Pachpadara 25 104 129<br />
8 Sivana 0 261 261<br />
Total 33 2146 2179<br />
FIRE<br />
Fire is one of the biggest hazards in <strong>Barmer</strong>. The high temperatures and the preponderance<br />
of thatched houses in the area result in a large number of fires every summer.<br />
VILLAGES PRONE TO FIRE<br />
Taluk Year Village<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong> 2006 Golaberi, Doodhabera, Maadpurasaani, Sondi, Bhurtiya, Visaala<br />
Aaghor, Maarudi, Bandra, Bholra, Bhadkha, Undhkha, Jhakdon ki<br />
Daani, Sanjhta, Radva<br />
2007 Doodiyon ka Tala, Shivbaakhri, <strong>Barmer</strong> Magra, <strong>Barmer</strong> Gaadaan,<br />
Baankasar, Dhanoda, Aati, Raavthasar, Berivalatala, Sondi, Malva,<br />
Visala, Teersinghdi<br />
2008 Mahabar, Maaylon ka Der, Sanjhta, Teersingda, Nokh, Doogeron ka<br />
Tala, Para, Koodhala, Dholoniyon ka Tala, Mangne ki Daani,<br />
Dableessara, Sarnee Panji, Sura Jagir, Naad, Radva<br />
2009 Aadarsh Basti Vishala, Sanjhta, Danta, Aati, Bhilo ki Basti, Meghvalon<br />
[247]
ka Tala, ishwarpura, Langra, Ravathsar, Sutharon ka Tala, Rohila<br />
Ramser 2006 Chadaar Dhaknaad, Gangaalaa, Hathma, Khara Rataudaan<br />
2007 Laabrau, Ramsar, Ramsar Aaghor, Sethrau, Pabudansingh ki Daani,<br />
Kantal ka paar, Jhankon ka Tala, Babuguleria, Bootiya<br />
2008 Ibre ka Paar, Lakdiyaali, Maanoniyon ki Basti, Konitliya ka Paar, Pire<br />
ka Paar<br />
2009 Siyagon ki Basti, Chadi, Hindiya, Chadaniyon ka Paar, Paandhi ka Paar,<br />
Kelan ka Paar, Gardiya<br />
Baytu 2006 Khokasar, Panavada, Chidiya, Lapoondhada, Savaoo Moolraj, Revali,<br />
Chokla, Daanpura, Malwa, Kolu, Saajan ki Daani<br />
2007 Laapoondhda Malvechan, Saanyiyon ki Daani, Raychanpura,<br />
Singhodiya, Berinadi, Bhanghdavon ki Daani, Kishne ka Tala, Madasar,<br />
Bhimda, Revali, Moodhon ki Daani, Baagthal<br />
2008 Santra, Naathoni Dhaniyon ki Daani, Megvalon ki Daani, Baytu Panji,<br />
Santra, Khavaliya Sara, Mayalon ki Daani, Mahingoni Moodo ki Daani<br />
2009 Keralpura, Khokhasar, Malwa, Jhoraniyon ki Daani, Khard, Charnaan,<br />
Pathali Naandi, Sanpa Manji, Savaoo Moolraj<br />
Gudamaalani 2006 Aalpura, Maangta, Gaadevi, Baand, Nimbalkot, Nokhda, Arniyali, Sada,<br />
Khara Mahechan, Devnagar, Bhedana, Manavas, Dabad Bhatiyan,<br />
Pooniyo ka Tala, Dholanada, Dhanasar Khurd<br />
2007 Dhoodiya Motisingh, Doodhasar, Bhagbhere ki Beri, Naya Kooan,<br />
Sada, Khara Mahechan, Devnagar, Bhedana, Manavaas, Daabad<br />
Bhatiyaan, Pooniye ka Tala, Nimbalkot, Maghta, Dhoodhoo, Bade ka<br />
Tala, Dholanada, Ranaasar Khurd<br />
2008 Loona Kalan, Balkhadi, Motisara, Peeparali, Bhanamagra, Barasan,<br />
Saaniyon ka Tala, Khudala, Silgun, Neharon ki Daani, Koliyana,<br />
Bhoonka Vagarsingh, Darguda, Khoobdi Beri, Dhanka, Dhadhlavaas,<br />
Paanyaalaakalaan<br />
2009 Jaalberi, Takuberi, Chotu, Bhagbere ki Beri, Bhooka THansingh,<br />
Dhobili, Loonva Jhagir, Dhorimanna, Hodu, Amarpura, Tookiya<br />
Chauhatan 2006 Gangaasara, Paneriya, Aalamsar, Jaanpaliya, Baamdala, Saanva, Sarla,<br />
Bhakasar, Bhooniya, Khonra, Taratara, Sondi, Mathe ka Tala, Jhapda,<br />
Aakoda<br />
2007 Raasbani, Khari, Bhakasar, Bhanvaar, Gida, Taratara Mut, Doodhava,<br />
Rataudon ki Daani, Kelnor, Ghumane ka Tala, Uparla, Nimbhsingh ki<br />
Daani<br />
[248]
2008 Aagola, Rabasar, Bhinjasar, Aalamsar, Paancharla, Bhojariya, Molani,<br />
Singhania, Saalariya Taratara, Aakhoda, Konra, Kekad, Bhandniyan<br />
2009 Chauhatan, Dhok, Bhada, Sherpura, Sandaoo, Manasar, Gumane ka<br />
Tala, Poshaal, Bhakhasar, Bavarvala, Aalamsar, Kayam ka Tala,<br />
Sreeramvala, Goda, Mthdavoo, Paancharla<br />
Pachpatra 2006 Aasodhara, Kitnod, Kattu, Kanan, Navatala, Korana, Mool ki Daani,<br />
Gangavaas, Mandli, Kalyanpur, Bhandiyavaas, Chandesara,<br />
Teersinghadi<br />
2007 Ikrani, Khed, Chilanadi, Bankiyavaas Khurd, Panothadi Naadi, Kyar<br />
Chaarnaan, Aaasaada<br />
2008 Naveri Daana, Molraj Kyar, Revada Maiyya, Balothara, Aasothara,<br />
Saaranon ki Beri, Bhimarlayi Stationn, Khardi, Badla, Khed, Surpura,<br />
Jasol, Gol Soda, Tilvada<br />
2009 Kitnod, Boltara, Kalava, Gol Sataion, Saathuni, Ghadoyi Nadi,<br />
Mandapura, Soda ki Daani, Amarlayi Jaagir, Asada, Banav<br />
Sivana 2006 Ramniya, Bhatikeda, Padru, Khanki, Karmavaas, Itvaya, Googarot<br />
2007 Padaroo, Haripura, Beranadi, Arjiyana, Mitoda, Khanki, Rampura,<br />
Naal, Paoo, Bhimpura, Majal, Googarot<br />
2008 Dharana, Thapan, Padhroo, Bhimgoda, Sivana, Guda, Rakhi, Itvaya,<br />
Devaliyali, Pathon ka Baada<br />
2009 Naal, Paapdardi, Phoolan, Paadroo, Khadvi, Thapan, Sinor, Sivana<br />
Shiv 2006 Negarda, Rajdaal, Nagdadha, Motinada, Jhoonejhan ki Basti,<br />
Paaboosar, Nimbla, Mungeria<br />
2007 Balaee, CHonchra, Kane ka Gaon, Raanaasar, Mandaaliya, Mikhdi,<br />
Harsaani, Baleba, Nimbla<br />
2008 Dhamdali, Jhankali, Unroad, Paboosari, Ravat ka Gaon, Undoo, Ganga,<br />
Utal, Kaashmir, Akalee, Bhiyaad, Balasar, Moodhanon ki Daani<br />
2009 Jaansingh Beri, Beesukala, Baaleba, Onara, Solankhiyan, Dheerji ki<br />
Daani, Khejdali<br />
[249]
ACCIDENTS<br />
There are four major roads in the district; NH-15, NH112, SH-16 and SH-28. There are<br />
tarred roads inside the towns. Most villages are approachable only through kutcha roads<br />
and few have internal roadways.<br />
LIST OF ROADWAYS PRONE TO ACCIDENTS<br />
Roadway<br />
<strong>Barmer</strong>-Jodhpur road<br />
State highway # 28A<br />
National highway # 15<br />
From Shiv to Gaandhav<br />
Accident prone zone<br />
Into Kavas village from <strong>Barmer</strong> at the 77 km stone<br />
From Doodhva towards Baagundi going downhill at the 47 km stone<br />
On <strong>Barmer</strong> to Ahmedabad route, at the village Saansiyonka<br />
On the same route, before Khenthsingh’s pyavoo, uphill from<br />
Loratibataen<br />
22 miles from above place going uphill<br />
\<br />
[250]
GLOSSARY OF TERMS<br />
Acceptable Risk: The level of loss a society or community considers acceptable given<br />
existing social, economic, political, cultural, technical and environmental conditions. In<br />
engineering terms, acceptable risk is also used to assess structural and non-structural<br />
measures undertaken to reduce possible damage at a level which does not harm people and<br />
property, according to codes or “accepted practice” based, among other issues, on a known<br />
probability of hazard.<br />
Biological hazard: Processes of organic origin or those conveyed by biological vectors,<br />
including exposure to pathogenic micro-organisms, toxins and bioactive substances, which<br />
may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or<br />
environmental degradation. Examples of biological hazards: outbreaks of epidemic diseases,<br />
plant or animal contagion, insect plagues and extensive infestations.<br />
Building codes: Ordinances and regulations controlling the design, construction, materials,<br />
alteration and occupancy of any structure to insure human safety and welfare. Building<br />
codes include both technical and functional standards.<br />
Capacity building: Efforts aimed to develop human skills or societal infrastructures within<br />
a community or organization needed to reduce the level of risk. In extended understanding,<br />
capacity building also includes development of institutional, financial, political and other<br />
resources, such as technology at different levels and sectors of the society.<br />
Climate change: The climate of a place or region is changed if over an extended period<br />
(typically decades or longer) there is a statistically significant change in measurements of<br />
either the mean state or variability of the climate for that place or region. Changes in<br />
climate may be due to natural processes or to persistent anthropogenic changes in<br />
atmosphere or in land use.<br />
Coping capacity: The means by which people or organizations use available resources and<br />
abilities to face adverse consequences that could lead to a disaster. In general, this involves<br />
managing resources, both in normal times as well as during crises or adverse conditions. The<br />
strengthening of coping capacities usually builds resilience to withstand the effects of natural<br />
and human-induced hazards.<br />
Counter measures: All measures taken to counter and reduce disaster risk. They most<br />
commonly refer to engineering (structural) measures but can also include non-structural<br />
measures and tools designed and employed to avoid or limit the adverse impact of natural<br />
hazards and related environmental and technological disasters.<br />
[251]
<strong>Disaster</strong>: A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing<br />
widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of<br />
the affected community or society to cope using its own resources. A disaster is a function of<br />
the risk process. It results from the combination of hazards, conditions of vulnerability and<br />
insufficient capacity or measures to reduce the potential negative consequences of risk.<br />
<strong>Disaster</strong> Risk <strong>Management</strong>: The systematic process of using administrative decisions,<br />
organization, operational skills and capacities to implement policies, strategies and coping<br />
capacities of the society and communities to lessen the impacts of natural hazards and<br />
related environmental and technological disasters. This comprises all forms of activities,<br />
including structural and non-structural measures to avoid (prevention) or to limit<br />
(mitigation and preparedness) adverse effects of hazards.<br />
<strong>Disaster</strong> Risk Reduction (DRR): The conceptual framework of elements considered with<br />
the possibilities to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a society, to<br />
avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of<br />
hazards, within the broad context of sustainable development.<br />
Early warning: The provision of timely and effective information, through identified<br />
institutions, that allows individuals exposed to a hazard to take action to avoid or reduce<br />
their risk and prepare for effective response. Early warning systems include a chain of<br />
concerns, namely: understanding and mapping the hazard; monitoring and forecasting<br />
impending events; processing and disseminating understandable warnings to political<br />
authorities and the population, and undertaking appropriate and timely actions in response<br />
to the warnings.<br />
Ecosystem: A complex set of relationships of living organisms functioning as a unit and<br />
interacting with their physical environment.<br />
Emergency management: The organisation and management of resources and<br />
responsibilities for dealing with all aspects of emergencies, in particularly preparedness,<br />
response and rehabilitation. Emergency management involves plans, structures and<br />
arrangements established to engage the normal endeavours of government, voluntary and<br />
private agencies in a comprehensiveand coordinated way to respond to the whole spectrum of<br />
emergency needs. This is also known as disaster management.<br />
Environmental impact assessment (EIA): Studies undertaken in order to assess the<br />
effect on a specified environment of the introduction of any new factor, which may upset<br />
the current ecological balance. EIA is a policy making tool that serves to provide evidence and<br />
analysis of environmental impacts of activities from conception to decision-making. It is<br />
utilised extensively in national programmeming and for international development assistance<br />
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projects. An EIA must include a detailed risk assessment and provide alternatives solutions or<br />
options.<br />
Environmental degradation: The reduction of the capacity of the environment to meet<br />
social and ecological objectives, and needs. Potential effects are varied and may contribute<br />
to an increase in vulnerability and the frequency and intensity of natural hazards. Some<br />
examples: land degradation, deforestation, desertification, wild land fires, loss of biodiversity,<br />
land, water and air pollution, climate change, sea level rise and ozone depletion.<br />
Geological hazard : Natural earth processes or phenomena that may cause the loss of life<br />
or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation.<br />
Geological hazard includes internal earth processes or tectonic origin, such as earthquakes,<br />
geological fault activity, tsunamis, volcanic activity and emissions as well as external<br />
processes such as mass movements: landslides, rockslides, rock falls or avalanches, surfaces<br />
collapses, expansive soils and debris or mud flows. Geological hazards can be single,<br />
sequential or combined in their origin and effects.<br />
Geographic information systems (GIS): Analysis that combine relational databases with<br />
spatial interpretation and outputs often in form of maps. A more elaborate definition is that<br />
of computer programmes for capturing, storing, checking, integrating, analysing and<br />
displaying data about the earth that is spatially referenced. Geographical information<br />
systems are increasingly being utilised for hazard and vulnerability mapping and analysis, as<br />
well as for the application of disaster risk management measures.<br />
Greenhouse gas (GHG): A gas, such as water vapour, carbon dioxide, methane,<br />
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydro chlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), that absorbs and<br />
reemits infrared radiation, warming the earth’s surface and contributing to climate change<br />
(UNEP, 1998).<br />
Hazard: A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may<br />
cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or<br />
environmental degradation. Hazards can include latent conditions that may represent future<br />
threats and can have different origins: natural (geological, hydro meteorological and<br />
biological) or induced by human processes (Environmental degradation and technological<br />
hazards). Hazards can be single, sequential or combined in their origin and effects. Each<br />
hazard is characterised by its location, intensity, frequency and probability.<br />
Hazard analysis: Identification, studies and monitoring of any hazard to determine its<br />
potential, origin, characteristics and behaviour.<br />
Hydro meteorological hazards: Natural processes or phenomena of atmospheric,<br />
hydrological or oceanographic nature, which may cause the loss of life or injury, property<br />
damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation. Hydro<br />
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meteorological hazards include: floods, debris and mud floods; tropical cyclones, storm<br />
surges, thunder/hailstorms, rain and wind storms, blizzards and other severe storms;<br />
drought, desertification, wild land fires, temperature extremes, sand or dust storms;<br />
permafrost and snow or ice avalanches. Hydro-meteorological hazards can be single,<br />
sequential or combined in their origin and effects.<br />
Land-use planning: Branch of physical and socio-economic planning that determines the<br />
means and assesses the values or limitations of various options in which land is to be<br />
utilized, with the corresponding effects on different segments of the population or interests<br />
of a community taken into account in resulting decisions. Land-use planning involves studies<br />
and mapping, analysis of environmental and hazard data, formulation of alternative land-use<br />
decisions and design of a long-range plan for different geographical and administrative<br />
scales. Land-use planning can help to mitigate disasters and reduce risks by discouraging<br />
high-density settlements and construction of key installations in hazard-prone areas, control<br />
of population density and expansion, and in the sitting of service routes for transport, power,<br />
water, sewage and other critical facilities.<br />
Mitigation: Structural and non-structural measures undertaken to limit the adverse impact<br />
of natural hazards, environmental degradation and technological hazards.<br />
Natural hazards: Natural processes or phenomena occurring in the biosphere that may<br />
constitute a damaging event. Natural hazards can be classified by origin namely: geological,<br />
hydro meteorological or biological. Hazardous events can vary in magnitude or intensity,<br />
frequency, duration, area of extent, speed of onset, spatial dispersion and temporal spacing.<br />
Preparedness: Activities and measures taken in advance to ensure effective response to<br />
the impact of hazards, including the issuance of timely and effective early warnings and the<br />
temporary evacuation of people and property from threatened locations.<br />
Prevention: Activities to provide outright avoidance of the adverse impact of hazards and<br />
means to minimize related environmental, technological and biological disasters.<br />
Depending on social and technical feasibility and cost/benefit considerations, investing in<br />
preventive measures is justified in areas frequently affected by disasters. In the context of<br />
public awareness and education, related to disaster risk reduction changing attitudes and<br />
behaviour contribute to promoting a “culture of prevention”.<br />
Public awareness: The processes of informing the general population, increasing levels of<br />
consciousness about risks and how people can act to reduce their exposure to hazards. This<br />
is particularly important for public officials in fulfilling their responsibilities to save lives<br />
and property in the event of a disaster. Public awareness activities foster changes in<br />
behaviour leading towards a culture of risk reduction. This involves public information,<br />
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dissemination, education, radio or television broadcasts, use of printed media, as well as, the<br />
establishment of information centres and networks and community and participation actions.<br />
Public information: Information, facts and knowledge provided or learned as a result of<br />
research or study, available to be disseminated to the public.<br />
Recovery: Decisions and actions taken after a disaster with a view to restoring or<br />
improving the pre-disaster living conditions of the stricken community, while encouraging<br />
and facilitating necessary adjustments to reduce disaster risk. Recovery (rehabilitation and<br />
reconstruction) affords an opportunity to develop and apply disaster risk reduction measures.<br />
Relief / response: The provision of assistance or intervention during or immediately after<br />
a disaster to meet the life preservation and basic subsistence needs of those people<br />
affected. It can be of an immediate, short-term, or protracted duration.<br />
Resilience / resilient: The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed<br />
to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable<br />
level of functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social<br />
system is capable of organizing itself to increase its capacity for learning from past<br />
disasters for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures.<br />
Retrofitting (or upgrading): Reinforcement of structures to become more resistant and<br />
resilient to the forces of natural hazards. Retrofitting involves consideration of changes in<br />
the mass, stiffness, damping, load path and ductility of materials, as well as radical changes<br />
such as the introduction of energy absorbing dampers and base isolation systems. Examples of<br />
retrofitting include the consideration of wind loading to strengthen and minimize the wind<br />
force, or in earthquake prone areas, the strengthening of structures.<br />
Risk: The probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (deaths, injuries,<br />
property, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from<br />
interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions.<br />
Conventionally risk is expressed by the notation Risk = Hazards x Vulnerability. Some<br />
disciplines also include the concept of exposure to refer particularly to the physical aspects of<br />
vulnerability. Beyond expressing a possibility of physical harm, it is crucial to recognize that<br />
risks are inherent or can be created or exist within social systems. It is important to consider<br />
the social contexts in which risks occur and that people therefore do not necessarily share the<br />
same perceptions of risk and their underlying causes.<br />
Risk assessment/analysis: A methodology to determine the nature and extent of risk by<br />
analysing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of vulnerability that could<br />
pose a potential threat or harm to people, property, livelihoods and the environment on<br />
which they depend. The process of conducting a risk assessment is based on a review of both<br />
the technical features of hazards such as their location, intensity, frequency and probability;<br />
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and also the analysis of the physical, social, economic and environmental dimensions of<br />
vulnerability and exposure, while taking particular account of the coping capabilities<br />
pertinent to the risk scenarios.<br />
Structural/ non-structural measures : Structural measures refer to any physical<br />
construction to reduce or avoid possible impacts of hazards, which include engineering<br />
measures and construction of hazard-resistant and protective structures and<br />
infrastructure. Non-structural measures refer to policies, awareness, knowledge development,<br />
public commitment, and methods and operating practices, including participatory<br />
mechanisms and the provision of information, which can reduce risk and related impacts.<br />
Sustainable development : Development that meets the needs of the present without<br />
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within<br />
it two key concepts: the concept of “needs”, in particular the essential needs of the world’s<br />
poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by<br />
the state of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present<br />
and the future needs. Sustainable development is based on socio-cultural development,<br />
political stability and decorum, economic growth and ecosystem protection, which all relate<br />
to disaster risk reduction.<br />
Technological hazards: Danger originating from technological or industrial accidents,<br />
dangerous procedures, infrastructure failures or certain human activities, which may cause<br />
the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or<br />
environmental degradation. Some examples: industrial pollution, nuclear activities and<br />
radioactivity, toxic wastes, dam failures; transport, industrial or technological accidents<br />
(explosions, fires, spills).<br />
Vulnerability: The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental<br />
factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of<br />
hazards. For positive factors, which increase the ability of people to cope with hazards, see<br />
definition of capacity.<br />
Wild land fire : Any fire occurring in vegetation areas regardless of ignition sources,<br />
damages or benefits.<br />
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