Disaster Management Plan - Barmer

Disaster Management Plan
OIL & GAS CAIRN’S RAJASTHAN UPSTREAM
FACILITY
9 th September 2010
Prepared for
Cairn India Limited
Prepared by:
Environmental and Geospatial Solutions
3/14, 1st Cross Street, 1st Main Road, Kalaimagal Nagar, Ekkatuthangal, Chennai – 32
044- 4271 9815, 6515 2789, mails@egssindia.com
www.egssindia.com

CONTENTS
Executive Summary 1
Part 1: General 4
1 Introduction 5
1.1 Disaster Management 7
1.2 Description of CIL Site 11
1.3 District Profile – Social, Economic & Demographic 15
1.3.1 General Profile 15
1.3.2 Demography 17
1.3.3 Socio- Economic Profile 17
1.4 Disaster Management Philosophy 18
1.5 Theme 19
1.6 Objectives 19
1.7 Scope of Work 20
1.8 Methodology 20
2 Vulnerability Assessment and Risk Analysis 23
2.1 Man-Made Hazards Assessment 24
2.1.1 Fires 24
2.1.2 Accidents 25
2.1.3 Other Hazards 25
2.2 Vulnerability Analysis of Cairn Operations 25
2.2.1 Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment at MPT 26
2.2.2 Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment at RGT 41
2.3 Hazard Mapping 47
2.3.1 Mapping of hazard zones for MPT and RGT 48
2.3.2 Mapping of Hazard Zones for well fields 49
2.3.3 Mapping of Hazard Zones for Pipelines 50
2.4 Natural Hazards Assessment 50
2.4.1 Floods 51
2.4.2 Earthquake 51
2.4.3 Drought 52
2.4.4 Sandstorm 52
2.4.4 Epidemics 52
3 Preventive Measures 54
[i]

3.1 Overview of Recent Disasters 54
3.1.1 Jaipur Fire Incident 54
3.1.2 Mexican Oil Spill 55
3.2 Human/ Industry Induced Disasters 56
3.2.1 Potential causes of fire: 56
3.2.2 Preventive Measures Adopted by Cairn 56
3.2.3 Prevention of other Man-made Risks 58
3.3 Natural Disasters 60
3.3.1 Preventive and Mitigation Measures for Floods 60
3.3.2 Earthquake Preparedness and Mitigation 62
3.3.3 Other Preparedness Measures 65
3.4 Training Needs Analysis 66
4 Mainstreaming DM Concerns into Developmental Plans/Programmes 67
4.1 Disaster Development Continuum 67
4.1.1 Disasters affect development 67
4.1.2 Development affects disasters 68
4.2 Negative Realm 69
4.3 Positive Realm 70
4.4 National Development Schemes Addressing DRR 70
4.5 Role of CIL 71
4.5.1 CIL Development Initiatives 71
4.5.2 Civil Society Partnership 72
5 Preparedness Measures 73
5.1 Resources Availability 73
5.2 Community Involvement in Disaster preparedness 73
5.2.1 Need for Community Participation 74
5.2.2 Salient Features of CBDM 74
5.2.3 Components for CBDM 75
5.2.4 Culture of Prevention 75
5.3 Critical Elements of Community Based Disaster Management 76
5.4 Conditions for CBDM 77
5.5 Risk Knowledge 78
5.6 Disaster Risk Reduction Strategies 79
5.6.1 Financial and Livelihood Strategies 79
5.6.2 Microfinance 79
[ii]

5.6.3 Insurance 79
5.6.4 Social Funds 80
5.7 Support by External Actors 80
5.7.1 Nehru Yuva Kendra: 81
5.7.2 NSS, NCC, Rangers/Rovers and Scouts/ Guides: 81
5.7.3 Civil Defence: 81
5.7.4 Home Guards: 82
5.7.5 Barmer Municipal Administration 82
5.7.6 District Zilla Parishad 83
5.7.7 Jesai Army Command, Rajasthan 83
5.8 Operational Emergency Preparedness 83
5.8.1 Management and Control of Emergencies 84
5.8.2 Preparation and Planning 86
5.8.3 Sufficient Competent Personnel 86
5.8.4 Detection of Incidents 87
5.8.5 Emergency Communications 87
5.8.6 Medical Facilities and Support 88
5.8.7 Security Incidents 88
5.8.8 External Support 88
6 Response 89
6.1 Incident Classification 89
6.2 Incident Response Structure 90
6.2.1 Incident Response Teams (IRT) 91
6.2.2 Emergency Response Team (ERT) 92
6.2.3 Emergency Management Team (EMT) 92
6.2.4 Crisis Management Team (CMT) – Strategic Response 93
6.2.5 Oil Spill Support agencies 93
6.2.6 Health, Safety and Security 94
6.2.7 Oil Spill Response Management 95
6.2.8 Logistics 99
6.2.9 Communications 99
6.2.10 Oil Spill Scenarios 100
6.2.11 Causes and Sources of Spill 100
6.3 Escape & Evacuation Assessment (EEA) 101
6.3.1 Escape and Evacuation Procedures 102
[iii]

6.3.2 Impairment of escape and evacuation means 102
6.3.3 Safe Muster Areas 103
6.3.4 Communication System 104
6.3.5 Estimated Escape Time to Safe Area 105
6.3.6 Mapping of Evacuation Routes for Settlements 108
6.3.7 Early Warning and Evacuation (EWS) for Community 108
6.3.8 Medical Evacuation 110
6.4 Reporting and Notification Reporting 110
6.4.1 Incident Reporting 110
6.4.2 Notification 111
6.5 Media Communication 111
6.6 Emergency Response Procedures (ERP) 111
6.7 Sphere Standards 111
7 Partnership with Other Stakeholders 113
7.1 Stake holder Analysis 113
7.2 District Authorities in Barmer 114
7.3 Community Based Disaster Organizations 114
7.3.1 Select NGOS 114
7.4 Role of Media 115
7.4.1 Before a Disaster 115
7.4.2 During a disaster 115
7.4.3 After a disaster 116
7.4.4 NGOs Role in Media 116
8 Financial Arrangements 117
8.1 Funds 117
8.2 Annual Budgets 118
8.3 Fund Allocation for Hazard Preparedness 118
Part 2: Disaster Specific Action Plan 119
9 Preface For SOPs 120
A. On-Site Fire Related Emergencies 120
B. Fire Scenarios & Emergency Response 120
C. Oil Spill Related Emergencies 121
9.1 SOP: Crude oil pipeline leak 122
9.2 SOP: Oil Well blowout 127
9.3 SOP: Gas Well Blowout 132
[iv]

9.4 SOP: Earthquake 137
9.5 SOP: Floods 142
9.6 SOP: Biological Hazards 146
Part 3: Cross-Cutting Issues 149
10 Review and Updation of Plans 150
11 Coordination and Implementation 151
11.1 Need for Mock Drill 151
11.1.1 For Effective Mock Drill 151
11.1.2 Types of Drills and Exercises 152
11.1.3 Composition of Participants 153
11.1.4 Observers/Evaluators 154
11.1.5 Community Participation 154
11.2 Preparatory Procedure 154
11.2.1 Tips for Conducting Safe Mock Drill 155
11.3 Guidelines for Mock Drill Design 155
11.3.1 Scope 156
11.3.2 Statement of Purpose 156
11.3.3 Objectives 156
11.3.4 Scenario narrative 157
11.3.5 Drill Activity 157
11.3.6 Expected actions/roles and responsibilities 157
11.3.7 Expected response/evaluation criteria 157
11.4 Guidelines for Conducting Mock Drill 158
11.4.1 Pre-drill Briefing 158
11.4.2 Drill Initiation 158
11.4.3 Drill Activity 158
11.5 Guidelines for Drill Evaluation 159
11.5.1 Evaluation Team 159
11.5.2 Elements for Evaluation 159
11.6 Feedback & Improvements 160
11.6.1 Mock Drill Evaluation Report 161
12 recommendations 162
Appendix A – Emergency Contact Numbers 164
1 Hotline Numbers 164
2 Wireless Call Signs 164
[v]

3 Contact numbers of District Disaster Management Cell 165
4 Telephone numbers of the important officials in the district 166
5 Police officials 168
6 Municipality 169
7 Health Department 170
8 Healthcare centres in Barmer 171
9 Hospitals 177
10 Veterinary hospitals/pharmacies in the district 178
11 Public Health Engineering Department 179
12 Public Works Department 185
13 Other officials 188
14 Voluntary Organisations and NGOs in the Region 189
15 List of Divers/Swimmers in the district 192
16 List of officials trained in fire Fighting and control 198
Appendix B – Maps 200
Appendix C – Incident Action Plans (IAPS) 211
IAPs for Fire Response On-Site 211
Action In the Event of a Fire 211
1. Propane Pool fire from Propane Storage, Refrigeration Package (RGT Facility) 212
2 Fire in the well head in well pad 213
3. Crude Oil fire at Production separator (MPT) 213
4. Fire at the flare area & knock out drum 214
5. Fire in the Diesel Storage, Export Oil, Condensate, Off spec and Settling tanks 215
6. Electrical sub stations 216
7. Buildings (Central Control Building & Fire Station) 217
8. Fire in Chemical Laboratory Building 218
9. Oil & Gas Leakage in Pig Launcher Area (at MPT/ RGT) followed by fire 218
10. Fire/ Gas Leak in Cross country pipe line. 219
11. Fire in Mangala Train 1 facilities 220
12. Fire in Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) 221
13. Fire situations in Barmer Hill Project (EWT) 222
16. Fire situation “Major Construction Activities within MPT / RGT/ MT-1 / Well pads” 222
17. Fire in “OB Camps & Office Building” 223
Appendix D – Fire Protection Arrangements 225
1 Mangala Processing Terminal 225
[vi]

2 Mangala Train - 1 (Start up production package) 228
Appendix E – Emergency Resources 231
Cairn Resources 231
District/Government Resources 233
Other Corporate Resources 235
Appendix F – Barmer District Profile 237
Glossary of Terms 251
[vii]

List of Figures
Figure 1: Disaster Management Cycle .................................................................................................................................................... 10
Figure 2: CIL's Rajasthan Field – Mangala ........................................................................................................................................... 12
Figure 3: MPT Processing Systems Overview ...................................................................................................................................... 13
Figure 4: CIL Facilities Diagram ............................................................................................................................................................... 15
Figure 5: Risk contours from Process Events at MPT ....................................................................................................................... 29
Figure 6: Risk Contours due to Incoming Raageshwari pipelines at MPT ............................................................................... 30
Figure 7: Individual and Combined F-N curves for Crude and Gas Release Events .............................................................. 31
Figure 8: Process Gas and Liquid Leak Frequencies per Hole-Size Category .......................................................................... 36
Figure 9: Process Gas Leak Frequency per Event and per Hole-Size Category ...................................................................... 37
Figure 10: Process Liquid Leak Frequency per Event and Hole-Size Category ...................................................................... 38
Figure 11: Iso-Risk Contours ...................................................................................................................................................................... 44
Figure 12: F-N Curve Day-Night ............................................................................................................................................................... 45
Figure 13: Iso-Risk Contour of Typical Well Pad ............................................................................................................................... 45
Figure 14: Group Risk F-N Curve, Typical Well Pad .......................................................................................................................... 46
Figure 15: Worst Case Radii ....................................................................................................................................................................... 47
Figure 16: Relationship between Disasters and Development ..................................................................................................... 69
Figure 17: Organisation Links for Emergency Management in CIL ........................................................................................... 85
Figure 18: Tier Classification in CIL ........................................................................................................................................................ 90
Figure 19: Tiers and Response Teams .................................................................................................................................................... 91
Figure 20: Oil Spill Response Decision Tree ......................................................................................................................................... 96
Figure 21: Risk Contours at MPT shown along with Muster points ........................................................................................ 103
List of Tables
Table 1: Largest Risk Contributors to the Societal Risk from Process Events in MPT ......................................................... 32
Table 2: Individual Risks at Specific Buildings/Locations at MPT .............................................................................................. 33
Table 3: Jet Fire Hazard Results IN MPT ............................................................................................................................................... 35
Table 4: Failure Frequencies for Gas Events in MPT ........................................................................................................................ 37
Table 5: Failure Frequency Applied for Liquid Events on MPT .................................................................................................... 38
Table 6: Base Leak Frequency from EGIG ............................................................................................................................................. 40
Table 7: Used Pipeline Failure Frequency for DN100 and DN300 .............................................................................................. 40
Table 8: Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) at Different Reference Points in RGT .................................................... 44
Table 9: Consequence Analysis Results for LFL and Jet Fire Heat Radiation at RGT ........................................................... 46
Table 10: List of Villages within the Hazard Zones at MPT ........................................................................................................... 48
Table 11: Villages within Maximum Hazard Zones for Well Fields ............................................................................................ 49
Table 12: Risk Prone Villages along Pipelines ..................................................................................................................................... 50
Table 13: Summary of Terrestrial Containment and Control Techniques ............................................................................... 97
Table 14: Probabilities of Potential Sources of Oil Spills ............................................................................................................. 100
Table 15: Total Time for Escape and Evacuation in MPT ........................................................................................................... 107
List of Photographs
Photograph 1: Mangala Processing Terminal .................................................................................................................................... 12
Photograph 2: MPT Oil Storage Tanks ................................................................................................................................................... 12
Photograph 3: Raageshwari Terminal .................................................................................................................................................. 14
Photograph 4: MPT Cross-Country Pipeline Valve Pit ..................................................................................................................... 14
Photograph 5: Sandstorm Near Cairn Facility during Daytime .................................................................................................. 52
Photograph 7: Consultation with Village Head and Members ..................................................................................................... 74
Photograph 6: Community Consultation at Jogasar Kuan ............................................................................................................. 74
Photograph 8: During the DMP Presentation Meeting at Barmer Collectorate .................................................................... 82
Photograph 9: DMP Presentation being made by EGSS at Barmer Collectorate .................................................................. 82
[viii]

ABBREVIATIONS
AGI Above Ground Installation
BA Breathing Apparatus
BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour
Explosion
BOPD Barrels of Oil Per Day
BS&W Basic Sediment & Water
CBDM Community Based Disaster
Management
CBEWS Community Based Early Warning
Systems
CBO Community Based Organisations
CIL Cairn India Limited
CMHO Chief Medical Health Officer
CMP Crisis Management Plan
CMT Crisis Management Team
CO 2 Carbon di-oxide
CRA Commissioner for Revenue
Administration
CG Core Group
CSO Civil Society Organisation
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
CWC Central Water Commission
DCP Dry Chemical Powder
DM Disaster Management
DMC District Management Committee
DMP Disaster Management Plan
DRM Disaster Risk Management
DRR Disaster Risk Reduction
EEA Emergency Evacuation Assessment
EGF Early Gas Facility
EGIG European Gas pipeline Incident data
Group
EMP Emergency Management Plan
EMT Emergency Management Team
EOR Enhanced Oil Recovery
EPPR Emergency Prevention, Preparedness
and Response
ERC Emergency Response Centre
ERP Emergency Response Procedures
ERT Emergency Response Team
ESD Emergency Shut Down
EWS Early warning system
FCP Forward Control Point
FRT Forward Response Team
FERA Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment
GIS Geographical Information Systems
GPS Global Positioning System
HSE Health Safety and Environment
IAP Incident Action Plan
IMT Incident Management Team
ICG Intergovernmental Coordination Group
ICC Incident Control Centre
ICS Incident Command System
IDRN India Disaster Resource Network
IDSP Integrated Disease Surveillance Program
[ix]

IM Installation Manager
IMD Indian Meteorological Department
IMG Incident Management Guide
INGOs International Non-Governmental
Organisations
IOC Indian Oil Corporation
IRP Incident Response Plan
IRT Incident Response Team
LHV Lower heating value
MSIHC Manufacture, Storage & Import of
Hazardous Chemicals
MMSCFD Million Standard Cubic Feet per
Day
NCC National Cadet Corps
NDMA National Disaster Management
Authority
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NGO Non-governmental organisations
NIDM National Institute for Disaster
Management
NSS National Social Service
NYK Nehru Yuva Kendra
PLI Public Liability Insurance (1991)
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRI Panchayat Raj Institutions
QRA Qualitative Risk assessment
RGT Raageshwari Gas Terminal
RNAO Rajasthan Northern Area Operations
RTA Road Traffic Accident
SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
SDMA State Disaster Management Authority
SHG Self Help Groups
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
UNDP United Nations Development
Programme
UNISDR United Nations International Strategy
for Disaster Reduction
VHF Very High Frequency Wireless system
VLMC Village Level Monitoring Committee
VOC Volatile Organic Chemical
WATSAN Water and sanitation
OISD Oil Industry Safety Directorate
OSCP Oil Spill Contingency Plan
PAGA Public Address and General Alarm
[x]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• Secretary, State Disaster Management and Relief, Government of Rajasthan
• Deputy Secretary, State Disaster Management and Relief, Government of Rajasthan
• Deputy Secretary, Department of Petroleum
• District Collector, Barmer district
• Office of the District Collector, Disaster Management and Mitigation, Govt. of
Rajasthan, Barmer
• Office of Superintendent of Police, Barmer
• Cairn Staff at Gurgaon and Jaipur
• Cairn Staff at MPT, RGT and Barmer
• Nehru Yuva Kendra, Barmer
• Office of Home Guards, Barmer
• Office of Civil Defence, Barmer
• Office of District Medical and Health Department, Barmer
• Office of District Education Department, Barmer
• Help Age India, Barmer (NGO partners of Cairn)
• SURE, Barmer (NGO partners of Cairn)
• Dhara Sansthan, Barmer (NGO partners of Cairn)
• Office of Army Unit, Jesai
• NSS Unit of MBC Govt College, Barmer
• Office of SSA, Education Department, Barmer
• Community leaders/members of Jogasar Kuan Village
Disaster Management Plan Preparation Team
Ramasami Sundaresan FIFireE - Health & Safety, Emergency Preparedness, Incident
Investigation specialist, 36 years oil & petrochemical industry experience
Dr. K. M. Parivelan Ph.D – is DM Specialist who has worked with UN agencies like UNHCR,
UNDP covering Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management
A. Sivakumar MSc - IIT Mumbai – Hydrogeology and Environmental Professional with 18
years international experience in oil & gas industry
Indira Reddy MSc - Environmental Management Australia – Project Coordination and GIS
expert
[xi]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Cairn India Limited is a BSE listed company with interests in oil and gas exploration,
production and pipeline transportation. It has operating blocks in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat
and Rajasthan. Cairn India has just completed development of major oil and gas fields in
the Barmer district of Rajasthan and commissioned world class processing facilities and a
650 km crude oil pipeline to supply the oil to refineries in Gujarat. Keeping in view the
vulnerability of the communities living surrounding Cairn India’s facilities and along the
pipelines, the Government of Rajasthan directed Cairn India to submit a Disaster
Management Plan that would address all major hazards and the appropriate response.
Cairn India Limited (CIL) commissioned Environmental and Geo Spatial Solutions (EGSS),
Chennai to prepare a robust Disaster Management Plan document covering its upstream
assets based in Barmer district i.e. Mangala Processing Terminal, Raageshwari Gas
Processing Terminal, connected well pads and cross-country pipeline between MPT and
RGT.
Barmer district is one of the developing districts in Rajasthan. With harsh desert
environment and erratic climatic conditions, coupled with poverty, illiteracy and lack of
adequate infrastructure, it suffers very often from severe drought conditions and
occasionally from devastating floods with a devastating impact on human life, economy and
environment. Now with the rapid development of oil and gas fields by companies such as
Cairn India and setting up of cement and power plants in the district, there is a significant
socio-economic changes in the lives of the people of Barmer for good and at the same time
introduced a new risk of potential major industrial accidents or disasters. It is possible to
minimize the potential risks by:
1. Identifying potential hazards and its impact in on-site and off-site areas
2. Prepare and implement developmental plans to provide resilience to such disasters
3. Developing early warning strategies
4. Mobilize resources including communication and medicinal services, and
5. To help in rehabilitation and post-disaster reconstruction.
Thus the DMP document reviews all credible disaster scenarios and presents a systematic
plan with suitable strategies for disaster preparedness and response. It also provides an
operational framework and procedures for effective roll out and execution with effective
engagement of the communities and the local district administration. Further the plan took
into consideration the Jaipur Oil Depot fire (October 2009) incident, and related findings
and recommendations of OISD. In addition the plan focuses on disaster prevention
measures and proactive safety management. The DMP document is prepared in two
separate formats:
[1]

1. A full DMP Main report as per the suggested outline of the Government of Rajasthan
which includes elaborate information on Barmer District Profile, Cairn Oil Field
Facilities (Mangala Processing Terminal, Raageshwari Processing Terminal,
Bhagyam and Aishwarya fields, Resources availability in the District to cope with
disaster etc).
2. A concise Manual with Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for credible disaster
scenarios.
The Disaster Management Plan (DMP) for Cairn's Rajasthan Upstream operations is
developed with the objectives of protecting the communities in the region, their habitat
and livelihood from calamities, both natural and human induced. The Plan is structured
along the format recommended by the Government of Rajasthan and conforms to the
relevant regulations such as the National Disaster Management Act, 2005.The DMP takes
into cognizance the Disaster Management Authority structure at national, state, district,
block and Panchayat levels.
It is apt to mention here that the DMP is developed in line with national disaster
management vision of "shifting the approach from reactive post-disaster response to one of
proactive, pre-disaster preparedness and mitigation measures". The Plan spells out the roles
and responsibilities applicable to all phases of the disaster management cycle:
I. Pre-disaster-preparedness,
II. Mitigation and prevention,
III. Disaster-response action, and
IV. Post-disaster- relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction.
The DMP is structured as follows:
Chapter I covers a brief introduction on Disaster Management, description of Cairn Project
in Rajasthan Upstream facility, note on social, economic, demographic and geographical
profiles of Barmer district;
Chapter II addresses vulnerability assessment and risk analysis, covering human/ industry
induced and natural hazards. It also includes detailed vulnerability analysis for operational
areas in upstream facility with its off-site impact on nearby communities and environment;
Chapter III deals with preventive and mitigation measures and strategies for various type
of hazards covering; earthquake, floods, on-site operational hazards like crude oil/ gas
pipeline leakage, oil well/ pad fire, tank fire, etc.;
Chapter IV covers approaches to mainstream disaster management concerns into all facets
of development;
[2]

Chapter V deals with Preparedness measures involving various stakeholders including
community participation. Here detailed community based disaster management approach
is analysed for enhancement. It also includes an overview of the recent oil industry related
disasters, the causes, consequences and lessons for prevention of such incidents;
Chapter VI covers the Response strategies within CIL emergency management and its
coordination with district administration. It includes emergency command structure, early
warnings and evacuation mechanisms. It also considered the universally accepted ‘Sphere
Standards’ for post disaster response context community needs;
Chapter VII deals with scope for partnership with other stakeholders including academic
institutions, and media.
Chapter VIII deals with financial arrangements
Chapters IX-XIV cover disaster specific action plan with Standard Operating Procedures for
potential scenario, special hazards, precautions to be adhered.
Chapter XV covers a brief note on the importance of reviews and updation of DMP on a
regular basis.
Chapter XVI deals with coordination and implementation aspects covering a detailed note
on conducting mock drill and Business continuity plan.
This DMP further takes into consideration aspects for community participation in all
phases of disaster management. It includes disaster preparedness and mitigation vis-à-vis
required improvements on ground with practical implementations like mock drills,
operational procedures, preventive mechanisms, community awareness, early warning
systems and coordination between private and governmental agencies in the event of a
disaster. Thus the DMP document reviews and presents all credible disaster scenarios and
has formulated a systematic plan in evolving a suitable strategy for disaster preparedness,
mitigation and response.
[3]

PART 1: GENERAL
[4]

CHAPTER
1
1 INTRODUCTION
This comprehensive disaster management plan for Rajasthan Upstream facility was drafted
in accordance with the guidelines of the Government of Rajasthan. The disaster
management plan covers natural and man-made disasters, emergency preparedness plans
for on-site and off-site purposes and disaster relief and mitigation. Its prime objective is to
mitigate the possible risks emanating from Cairn India Limited’s (CIL’s) oil field related
operations onsite and offsite in Barmer District of Rajasthan.
The Indian economy is rapidly industrialising and expanding. Energy is a major demand for
an expanding economy and major oil explorations and oil production are happening now.
Rajasthan is emerging as a key player in this sector and new oil fields are still being
discovered. This rapid expansion has however increased the hazard, risk and vulnerability
to the industry and the environment.
The potential to have hydrocarbon related/ Industrial disasters are low in frequency but
are very significant in terms of loss of lives, injuries, environmental impact and property
damage. Frequency and severity of hydrocarbon related disasters has increased in last few
years due to rapid increase in explorations, storage, processing, transportation of
petrochemical products, specifically in densely populated areas. Hydrocarbon related
accidents can occur due to lack of safety measure, technical breakdown, or due to a human
error.
A single incident can initiate a series of uncontrolled phenomenon such as large spills, fires
and explosions. These eventually target humans, environment and infrastructure/property
in the area and can be in the form of immediate and residual or long term consequences.
Thus, it is imperative to develop preventive measures like adoption of safer engineering
practices, improved performance of safety devices and reduction of human errors by
regular checks.
The government has also issued guidelines and laws for disaster management and
mitigation. The Umbrella Act EPA, 1986 enacted after the incidence of Bhopal Gas Tragedy
in 1984, and the rules MSIHC Rules 1989, EPPR Rules 1996, PLI Act 1991, besides Factories
Act 1948 (amended thereafter) provided a systematic approach to disaster management
[5]

framework at national, state, district and local levels, in the context of hydrocarbon related
accident management and emergency response.
DMPs thus become essential on two fronts: to have on-site and off-site preparedness; and
secondly to comply with disaster management institutional mechanisms such as the
National Disaster Management Act of 2005, National Disaster Management Authority’s
guidelines. Needless to add other sector specific safety norms and guidelines have to be
taken into account such as OISD norms, environmental guidelines, etc.
National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and OISD have also respectively issued
some guidelines for petroleum related disasters. The Guidelines have laid emphasis on
capacity building, risk assessment, information management and coordination of
actions for enhancing the preparedness at various levels. Based on these Guidelines, this
DMP was developed.
With the renewed emphasis of the Government on disaster management and the paradigm
shift in focus from rescue, relief & rehabilitation to prevention/mitigation and
preparedness, a need to revisit the management of hydrocarbon related Disasters has been
felt to establish an institutionalized mechanism so that the hydrocarbon related disasters
can be prevented and if they do occur, for their effective management.
There has been a paradigm shift in the government’s focus from its rescue, relief, and
restoration centric approach to a planning, prevention/mitigation and preparedness
approach. The national vision on disaster management is ‘to build a safe and disasterresilient
India by developing a holistic, proactive, multi-disaster and technology-driven
strategy. This is to be achieved through a culture of prevention, mitigation and
preparedness to generate a prompt and efficient response to tackle disasters. This Policy
framework is also in conformity with the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, the
Rio Declaration, the Millennium Development Goals and the Hyogo Framework 2005-
2015. 1
It has been realised that effective Oil industry Disaster Management (CDM) is possible by
the adoption of preventive and mitigation strategies as most petro-chemical disasters are
preventable in comparison to natural disasters that are difficult to predict and prevent.
The prime objective here is to ensure that the occurrence of hydrocarbon related accidents
are minimised and the risks posed to life, environment and property are reduced. The DMP
calls for a proactive, participatory, well-structured, fail-safe, multi-disciplinary and multisectoral
approach involving all stakeholder groups and is aimed at refining and
strengthening the various mechanisms from stages of planning to field operations.
1 National Disaster Management Authority’s Policy outline, 2005
[6]

1.1 DISASTER MANAGEMENT
Disaster can be defined as “a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a
society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed
the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources.” (Source:
Reducing Disaster Risk, UNDP 2004). Some recent regional disasters include the Indian
Ocean Tsunami in 2004 that affected parts of Asia and Africa and the South Asian
Earthquake in 2005 which affected Pakistan and India. Some recent disasters in India were
the flash floods in Rajasthan in 2006, Mumbai (Maharashtra) and Vadodara (Gujarat) in
2005, the earthquake in Gujarat in 2001, the super cyclone in Orissa in 1999, the Uphaar
Cinema Fire in Delhi in 1997, the recurrent droughts in parts of Rajasthan (1980s
onwards), and the Bhopal Gas Disaster in 1984. Disasters result from the combination of
hazards, conditions of vulnerability and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce the
potential negative consequences of risk. (Source: Living with Risk, UN ISDR 2002)
Hazard is a potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may
cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or
environmental degradation. (Source: Living with Risk, UN ISDR 2002) For example:
Earthquakes, flood and, industrial gas leakages are some examples of hazards. Hazards can
be single, sequential or combined in their origin and effects. Hazardous events can vary in
magnitude or intensity, frequency, duration, area of extent, speed of on set, spatial
dispersion and temporal spacing. Based on their causes, hazards are categorized into two
broad types – Natural hazards and Human/ industry – induced hazards.
Vulnerability is the condition determined by physical, social, economic and environmental
factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of
hazards. (Source: Living with Risk, UN ISDR 2002) The scale of damage to a community from
the impact of a given hazard does not only depend upon the community’s physical
exposure to that hazard, but also on its vulnerability. Here, physical exposure refers to the
elements at risk. These elements may include people, artefacts, infrastructure etc. (Source:
Reducing Disaster Risk, UNDP 2004). Vulnerability, on the other hand, is determined by
aspects in the physical environment, such as nature of housing, available open space etc, as
well as aspects in the socio-economic domain such as level of income, nutritional status,
marginalization, etc.
Capacity is the combination of all the strengths and resources available within a
community, society or organization that can reduce the level of risk, or the effects of a
disaster. Capacity may include physical, institutional, social or economic means as well as
skilled personal or collective attributes such as ‘leadership’ and ‘management.’ Capacity
may also be described as capability. (Source: Living with Risk, UN ISDR 2002) Example: After
the floods in Vadodara district (Gujarat) in 2005, it was seen that villages with existing
[7]

Disaster Management Teams (DMTs) and Disaster Management Committees (DMCs)
responded to the floods well in time, by rescuing people to pre-identified safe areas.
Two concepts within the framework of ‘capacity’ that are often used in Disaster
Management are:
Coping capacity: The manner in which people and organizations use existing resources to
achieve various benefits during unusual, abnormal and adverse conditions of a disaster
phenomenon or process. (Source: Reducing Disaster Risk, UNDP 2004).
An example of coping capacity is the community kitchen set up by local village groups in
community areas like temples and schools of Orissa after the 1999 cyclone.
Resilience: The capacity of a system, community or society to resist or to change in order
that it may obtain an acceptable level in functioning and structure. This is determined by
the degree to which the social system is capable of organizing itself, and the ability to
increase its capacity for learning and adaptation, including the capacity to recover from a
disaster. (Source: Reducing Disaster Risk, UNDP 2004) For example; after the 2001 Gujarat
earthquake, local communities began clearing the debris, retrieving materials and
reconstructing their houses/work place, even before external help came from the government
or other organizations. This was an example of resilience of the community.
Risk is the probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (deaths, injuries,
property, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from
interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions.
Risk is conventionally expressed by the equation: Risk = Hazard x Vulnerability
Now we use the notation: Risk = Hazards x Vulnerability minus (-) Capacity. (Source:
Reducing Disaster Risk, UNDP 2004)
‘Disaster Management’ covers a broad range of interventions undertaken before, during
and/or after a disaster to
• prevent or minimize loss of life and property,
• minimize human suffering and
• Accelerate recovery.
The management of a disaster can be viewed as a series of phases including Prevention,
Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, Relief, and Recovery (Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction).
[8]

i) Prevention: Activities to provide outright avoidance of the adverse impact of hazards
and means to minimize related environmental, technological and biological disasters.
Depending on social and technical feasibility and cost/benefit considerations, investing in
preventive measures is justified in areas frequently affected by disasters.
For example, public awareness and education related to fire safety in public buildings could
lead to prevention of fire-related disasters. Disaster risk reduction professionals express that
changing attitudes and behaviour contribute to promoting a "culture of prevention".
ii) Mitigation: Any action taken to minimize the extent of a disaster or potential disaster.
Mitigation can take place before, during or after a disaster, but the term is most often used
to refer to actions against potential disasters. Mitigation measures are both physical and
structural, such as flood defences or strengthening buildings as well as non-structural, such
as training in disaster management, regulating land-use and public education, among
others.
iii) Preparedness: Activities and measures taken before a hazard event to ensure effective
response to the impact of hazards. It involves measures that enable governments,
community and individuals to respond rapidly to disaster situations and cope with them
effectively.
Preparedness includes
• making of viable emergency plans
• development of warning systems
• maintenance of inventories
• training of personnel
• search and rescue measures
• Evacuation plans for areas that may be ‘at risk’ for a recurring disaster.
iv) Response/ Relief: The provision of assistance or intervention during or immediately
after a disaster to meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected. It can be of an
immediate, short-term, or protracted duration. For example, search and rescue of affected
people and provision of food, temporary shelter and medical care to the persons affected by
the disaster are some common areas of intervention after a disaster.
v) Rehabilitation: The operations and decisions taken after a disaster with a view to
restore an affected community to its former living conditions, while encouraging and
facilitating the necessary adjustments to the changes caused by the disaster.
An example is counselling by professionals or community leaders to help reduce the
psychological trauma of affected groups of children, women and others after a disaster.
[9]

vi) Reconstruction: The action taken to re-establish a community following rehabilitation
after a disaster. These actions would include construction of permanent housing, complete
restoration of all services and physical infrastructure to the pre-disaster state etc.
vii) Recovery: The term refers to decisions and actions related to rehabilitation and
reconstruction taken after a disaster with a view to restoring or improving the pre-disaster
living conditions of the affected community, while encouraging and facilitating necessary
adjustments to reduce disaster risk. It is important to note that recovery (includes both
rehabilitation and reconstruction) affords an opportunity to develop and apply
disaster risk reduction measures.
1.
FIGURE 1: DISASTER MANAGEMENT CYCLE
Generally India has been traditionally vulnerable to natural disasters on account of its
unique geo-climatic conditions. Floods, droughts, cyclones, earthquakes and landslides
have been recurrent phenomena. About 60% of the landmass is prone to earthquakes of
various intensities; over 40 million hectares is prone to floods; about 8% of the total area is
prone to cyclones and 68% of the area is susceptible to drought. In the decade 1990-2000,
an average of about 4344 people lost their lives and about 30 million people were affected
by disasters every year. The loss in terms of private, community and public assets has been
astronomical.
At the global level, there has been considerable concern over natural disasters. Even as
substantial scientific and material progress is made, the loss of lives and property due to
disasters has not decreased. In fact, the human toll and economic losses have mounted. It
was in this background that the United Nations General Assembly, in 1989, declared the
decade 1990-2000 as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction with the
[10]

objective to reduce loss of lives and property and restrict socio-economic damage through
concerted international action, especially in developing countries.
The super cyclone in Orissa in October, 1999 and the Bhuj earthquake in Gujarat in January,
2001 underscored the need to adopt a multi dimensional endeavour involving diverse
scientific, engineering, financial and social processes; the need to adopt multi disciplinary
and multi sectoral approach and incorporation of risk reduction in the developmental plans
and strategies.
Over the past the past few years, the Government of India have brought about a paradigm
shift in the approach to disaster management. The new approach proceeds from the
conviction that development cannot be sustainable unless disaster mitigation is built into
the development process. Another corner stone of the approach is that mitigation has to be
multi-disciplinary spanning across all sectors of development. The new policy also
emanates from the belief that investments in mitigation are much more cost effective than
expenditure on relief and rehabilitation. Disaster management occupies an important place
in this country’s policy framework as it is the poor and the under-privileged who are worst
affected on account of calamities/disasters.
The steps being taken by the Government emanate from the approach outlined above. The
approach has been translated into a National Disaster Framework [a roadmap] covering
institutional mechanisms, disaster prevention strategy, early warning system, disaster
mitigation, preparedness and response and human resource development. The expected
inputs, areas of intervention and agencies to be involved at the National, State and district
levels have been identified and listed in the roadmap. This roadmap has been shared with
all the State Governments and Union Territory Administrations. Ministries and
Departments of Government of India, and the State Governments/UT Administrations have
been advised to develop their respective roadmaps taking the national roadmap as a broad
guideline. There is, therefore, now a common strategy underpinning the action being taken
by all the participating organisations/stakeholders.
1.2 DESCRIPTION OF CIL SITE
Cairn India Ltd. (CIL) is developing the Rajasthan Block RJ-ON-90/1 in the state of
Rajasthan, India. The RJ-ON-90/1 retained block area spreads over an area of about 3200-
km2 and lies between 24°47'08'' to 26°26'01'' N latitude and 71°15'41'' to 72°04'3'' E
longitudes. The RJ-ON-90/1 block is situated in Barmer and Jalore districts of southwestern
Rajasthan i.e. within the Indian Thar desert area. It covers parts of Barmer, Shiv,
Baytu and Gudamalani tehsils in Barmer district and Sanchore and Bagoda tehsils in Jalore
district of Rajasthan.
[11]

FIGURE 2: CIL'S RAJASTHAN FIELD – MANGALA
Oil is mined from the well pads in the Mangala oil field. Bhagyam and Aishwariya oil fields
are under development in the Northern Zone of the block and Saraswati and Raageshwari
oil fields in the southern zone. All the above fields are located in Barmer district, Rajasthan.
The northern fields in the block are envisaged to produce more than 160,000 barrels of oil
per day (25, 437 tons of crude oil). The project comprises of the following key facilities:
Mangala Process Terminal
The production fluids from Mangala field is being processed at Mangala Process Terminal.
The system also includes the 8 pig receivers at the MPT.
Future production from up to 15 well pads at the Bhagyam field and up to 9 well pads at
the Aishwariya fields will also be tied into the MPT via 3 dedicated pipelines.
PHOTOGRAPH 2: MANGALA PROCESSING TERMINAL
PHOTOGRAPH 1: MPT OIL STORAGE TANKS
[12]

The production fluids are received in the inlet manifold and routed to the Inlet Slug
Catchers. Design is premised on allowing dedicated well pad “clusters” and “tiebacks” to be
routed to each train. The function of the slug catcher is to separate out any solids (e.g. sand,
wax) from the production fluid and protect the downstream equipment from fouling, as
well as dampening any slugging that will occur from the pipelines. The vessel will also act
as the primary degasser. As a secondary purpose it is also designed to separate gas and free
water (bulk water separation).
The separated gas passes to the Associated Gas Compressors and the separated water is
routed to the Produced Water Treatment System. The oil /water and emulsion stream is
routed to the Production Heaters, where the temperature is increased to above the
emulsion “break point”. The heater operating temperature is expected to be up to 90 deg C.
The production stream then passes to the Production Separator, where further oil and
water separation occurs and free gas, formed due to pressure let down and generation by
heat addition is also separated. The gas is routed to the suction of the 3rd stage of the
Vapour Recovery Unit. Separated water is routed to the Produced Water Treatment
System. The oil and water stream passes to the Settling Tanks.
The settling tanks provide the primary oil dehydration step; water from the tanks is
removed in under level control and transferred to the Produced Water Treatment System.
Oil from the Settling Tank is pumped to the Dehydrator for final dehydration to BS&W
specification and onward transfer to oil storage. The degassed oil flows through
electrostatic grid(s) for water droplet coalescence and separation.
FIGURE 3: MPT PROCESSING SYSTEMS OVERVIEW
[13]

From the export oil storange tanks, the crude oil is pumped in 24” export pipeline to Gujrat
for sales to Govt. nominated customer.
Raageshwari Field
The Raageshwari Deep Gas field, situated within the RJ-ON-90/1 Contract Area, was
discovered in 2003 by well RJ-E-1 (later renamed Raageshwari-1). Raageshwari Deep Gas
is a tight, lean gas condensate reservoir, with excellent gas quality of approximately 80%
methane, low CO2 and no H2S.
There are 4 well pads located in the gas field. Wells have tested at gas production rates in
the range 2-4mmscfd and producing condensate gas ratios in 40-50 bbl/mmscf range
(based on flashing from well stream conditions to standard conditions). Condensate
density on test has varied but approaches 60 API.
Raageshwari Gas Terminal:
The gas from well pads is feed into the finger type slug catcher to remove all the solids to
prevent fouling of downstream equipments. The gas is then fed into 1st Stage Gas
Separator to separate gas from water. Water produced is transferred to produce-water
flash drums. Condensate from 1 st Stage Separator is feed into Feed/Bottom Exchanger
resulting in a vapour free condensate stream which is routed to condensate storage tank
and a vapour stream which is fed into Stripper Reboiler to eliminate the remaining liquid.
PHOTOGRAPH 3: RAAGESHWARI TERMINAL
PHOTOGRAPH 4: MPT CROSS-COUNTRY
PIPELINE VALVE PIT
The resultant gas is then fed into Gas-Gas Heat exchanger; the cooled gas is then fed to
refrigeration package to separate out the propane. The production gas is then fed into the
2 nd Stage Gas Separator. The separated water is routed to produce water flash drum. The
resulting gas is fed to fuel gas header. Condensate from Stage Separators is fed to produced
water flash drum to further separate water and gas, the resulting gas being routed to gas
flare header.
[14]

Thumbli Water Field:
The crude oil from reservoirs at Mangala and other associated fields would be drilled using
well pads concept. The reservoir will be water flooded in order to maintain reservoir
pressure, provide voidage replacement and to maximize oil recovery. This water will be
sourced from the “Thumbli aquifer” some 20km to the south-east of Mangala. There will be
up to 5 well pads located in Thumbli Water Field. The formation volume factor of the
Mangala crude is approximately 1.1. Therefore approximately 1.1 barrels of make-up water
must be produced and injected for every barrel of oil that is extracted. The overall facilities
diagram for Rajasthan Assets is provided in figure below.
FIGURE 4: CIL FACILITIES DIAGRAM
Since the CIL facilities are situated predominantly in the Barmer District, it is imperative to
have a clear understanding of the geographical profile, natural hazards, risks and
vulnerabilities in the region. In view of this, a short profile of the district has been collated
and is given in the next section.
1.3 DISTRICT PROFILE – SOCIAL, ECONOMIC & DEMOGRAPHIC
1.3.1 GENERAL PROFILE
Barmer district lies between 24°58′ - 26°32′ N and 70°5′ – 72°52′. On its north is
Jaisalmer, to the south is Jalore, and Pali and Jodhpur are to the east. The total area of
Barmer district is 28,114 km². Barmer district is 3,727 ft (1,136 m) above sea level and 22
km in length. The longest river in the district is the Luni. It is 480 km in length and drains
[15]

into the Gulf of Kutch passing through Jalore. Barmer district consists of Barmer, Baytu,
Shiv, Chauhatan, Gudamalani and Balotra Tehsils.
The district has a geographical area of 2.82 million hectares. In 2004-05, about 1.12
percent of the area had forest cover, 7.2 percent constituted pasture land, 25.13 percent
was fallow land and 51.63 percent was cultivated crop land. The remainder was either not
available for cultivation or cultivable wasteland. Gross cropped area in 2004-05 was 1.55
million hectares (1.79 million hectares in 2006-07) and area sown more than once stood at
90,762 hectares. In 2006-07, some changes took place with net sown area being 60 percent
of total area. It is the condition of the district that allows it to have only 6.24 percent area
under double cropping. The forest cover marginally increased to 1.13 percent and
permanent pastures and other grazing lands constituting 15.38 percent and barren and
cultivable land another 18 percent.
The characteristic features of the climate of the district are its dryness, extremes of
temperature and the fitful and erratic nature of rainfall. The year may be divided into four
seasons, winter from November to March, summer season from April to June, monsoon
from July to mid-September and post-monsoon season up to the end of October.
In summers the temperature soars to 48°C and in winters, it drops to 5°C. Primarily
Barmer district is a desert where average rainfall in a year is 277 mm. However, extreme
rainfall of 549 mm rain between August 16 and August 25, 2006 left many dead and caused
huge losses. As many as 20 new lakes were formed and 6 of which covered an area of over
10 km².
Throughout summer, the heat is intense and scorching winds prevail. Even during
monsoon, the air is dry in between the fitful spells of rain. The district is prone to droughts.
The rainfall pattern among the regions is very much uncertain. Therefore, kharif cropping
is too much uncertain in all the regions.
The soils of the district are broadly desertic type. Qualitatively the soils are very poor and
devoid of humus content. These soils are very deep and sandy, associated with dunes; inter
dunes and sandy plain covering about 31 percent of the area. Dunes are the spectacular
feature of the district and these occur scattered all over the area.
Potable water in the district comes mainly from rain water harvested in large tanks. Wells,
tube wells and hand pumps are also in use. The seasonal rivers, Luni and Jojree and the
Narmada canal also flow through this district. However the water from the rivers is not
potable.
[16]

1.3.2 DEMOGRAPHY
Barmer had population of 19,64,835 in 2001 of which males were 10,38,247 (52.84%) and
females were 9,26,588 (47.16%). The district has 3.48 percent of state’s population and
8.29 percent area. The population growth during 1991-2001 was 36.83 percent compared
to 28.27 percent during 1981-1991. The rural population stood at 18,19,431 (92.6%),
while the urban population was 1,45,404 (7.4%). The 5-14 years population was 5,45,120,
15-59 years old were 9,78,039 and 60 plus population was 1,39,461. 15 percent of the
population is under 6 years of age. The district has a population density of 69 per sq km in
2001.
The district has 3,09,739 households of which 91.95 percent are rural areas and only 8.1
percent in urban areas. Of the rural population, 52.78 percent are males while this
proportion is 53.92 percent in urban areas. Given the number of households in the district
at 3,09,739, the average household size comes to 6.34. The average household size in rural
areas is 6.39 compared to urban household size of 5.83. The family size in urban Barmer is
thus lower than the rural family size. 28.3 percent houses are permanent type followed by
14 percent that are semi-permanent and 57.8 percent are temporary type. The total
literacy rate in the district is 59.00 with male literacy at 72.80 and female literacy at 43.04.
1.3.3 SOCIO- ECONOMIC PROFILE
Development is reflected in structure of the economy. Normally in the development
process, it is said that, the contribution of agriculture would decline and the contribution of
manufacturing would increase in the first stage. In the latter stage, the service sector would
become important. In the recent times, Barmer has observed a structural change as
depicted by district income estimates at current prices. According to Human Development
Report, Barmer District, the total income generated in 1999-2000 was Rs.165071 lakh
which increased to Rs. 259338 in 2004-05; a 1.57 time increase or 9.52 percent increase. In
the recent times, the contribution of agriculture and allied sectors declined from 38.4
percent to 32.3 percent from 1999-00 to 2004-05. There is an increase in contribution of
mining and manufacturing sector from 20.5 percent to 24.0 percent during this period. The
contribution of service sector/ tertiary sector improved from 41.2 percent to 43.8 percent.
Despite this structural transformation, one finds that contribution of agriculture sector has
declined by 7.7 percentage points, while contribution of livestock sector has increased by
1.47 percentage points. Within mining and manufacturing sector, mining and registered
manufacturing have gained in contribution while unregistered manufacturing has declined
though still remaining an important contributor (6.53% share). Construction sector has
improved contribution and in 2004-05 contributed 10.1 percent district’s income. The
major activity in service sector is trade, hotel and restaurants (14.4%) and is followed by
[17]

other services (7.175) and real estate activities (7.92%). However, the latter two activities
have lost ground during this period. Transport, banking, railways, other transport,
communication and public administration have gained in their shares in district income.
Employment structure of the district economy is defined in terms of sectoral distribution of
worker and work participation rates. There were 919729 workers in 2001, of which
680208 were main workers and 239521 were marginal workers and 1045106 were nonworkers
which mean the dependency ratio of 53.19 percent. In Barmer main workers
constituted around 74 percent of all workers, while 26 percent were marginal workers.
Among the main workers, 72.4 percent were cultivators and 2.8 percent agricultural
workers, thereby implying that work force dependent on agriculture stood at 75.2 percent.
Household industry just had 2.7 percent main workers. The other workers, those in service
sectors and construction etc. constituted 22.2 percent of all workers.
Barmer district in 2003 had 27048 holdings of which majority were 4 hectares and above
(70.24%). Across tehsils, such holdings were 72.75 percent in Barmer, 73.48 percent in
Baytu, 57.61 percent in Gudamalani, 59.51 percent in Pachpatra, 80.90 percent in Shiv as
against the district average of 70.24 percent. Large holding does not mean much in rain fed
areas. However, this pattern of holdings would reflect on agricultural practices. Large land
holdings are a reflection of the harsh environmental conditions, and hence low population
density (69 people per sq km).
1.4 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY
Cairn India’s Disaster management philosophy is to provide "reasonable assurance that
adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency or
disaster." This document sets forth emergency planning standards and defines the
responsibilities of the organisations involved in emergency response. In addition, it is
suggested that Cairn could also include the pro-active preparedness and mitigation centric
strategies during implementation of this DM plan.
Effective Multi Response Strategy and synergy of efforts is essential both at State and
district level with institutional arrangements, inter-department linkages, role of NGOs,
voluntary agencies and local communities in disaster management.
Briefly stated, the disaster management philosophy is as under:-
• Requires high quality in the design, construction and operation of the facilities to
reduce the likelihood of malfunctions;
• Recognises that equipment can fail and operators can make errors, therefore
requires adequate layers of safety systems to reduce the chances of such
malfunctions which could lead to accidents;
[18]

• Recognises that, in spite of these precautions, accidents may happen, therefore
requiring containment structures and other safety features to prevent escalation
• Has in place organisations capable of responding to incident’s and emergency
situations that may occur involving any of the Cairn India facilities or supporting
operations, to preserve life, prevent injuries and damage to the environment and or
assets.
• Meets all statutory requirements for emergency response and disaster management.
Cairn India Limited’s (CIL) responsibility is to properly manage any emergency or crisis
situation so as to minimise the impact it may have on all personnel associated with its
activities, the environment, the community, the Company’s financial position and
reputation. To respond effectively to emergencies and incidents an agreed and approved
Disaster Management Plan (DMP) is in place supported by a pre-established organisation,
on-call and capable of mobilising and responding effectively to different levels of incidents
that may occur. This organisation is staffed with competent individuals, organised into
teams, with allocated and clearly defined roles and responsibilities and practised in their
roles.
This is in line with NDMA’s objective and vision which is ‘to build a safe and disasterresilient
India by developing a holistic, proactive, multi-disaster and technology-driven
strategy for disaster management. This will be achieved through a culture of prevention,
mitigation and preparedness to generate a prompt and efficient response at the time of
disaster’.
1.5 THEME
The DMP will focus on the following theme:
In line with the National Disaster Management Authority’s vision, this DMP will focus on
the paradigm shift from reactive post-disaster response to proactive pre-disaster
prevention, mitigation and preparedness measures.
1.6 OBJECTIVES
The DMP has the following objectives:
• To contextualise the learning from the IOC Jaipur oil depot fire
• To synergise with the national stipulations on disaster management
• To comprehensively address onsite and offsite emergency preparedness
[19]

• To develop the DMP with community participatory approach
• To have holistic and integrated approach to address all phases of disaster
management; pre-disaster, during disaster and post-disaster
• To improve the incident management system with clear missions and lines of
authority
• Develop a state of readiness for a prompt and orderly response to an emergency and
to establish a high order of preparedness (equipment, personnel) commensurate
with the risk
• To ensure an orderly and timely decision-making and response process
(notification, standard operating procedures)
• Ensure effective coordination between Cairn India, local government, community
and other agencies working to prevent and mitigate disasters.
1.7 SCOPE OF WORK
The DMP scope is to cover the following
• Meeting requirements of Department of Petroleum, Government of Rajasthan
• Guidelines of NDMA and SDMA Rajasthan
• Incident Command System (ICS) based
• Community & stakeholder participation
• Pipeline vulnerability & risk assessment with District Administration
• OISD recommendations vis-a-vis IOC Jaipur Terminal fire incident
• GIS based Hazard Mapping
1.8 METHODOLOGY
EGSS has adopted a multi-disciplinary approach consisting of fire safety, incident
management, risk and vulnerability analysis, disaster management policy review, GIS
mapping and environmental impacts. The DMP is developed on the basis of collation of
secondary data of CIL’s previous studies.
EGSS has fielded a multi-disciplinary team consisting of:
Ramasami Sundaresan FIFireE - Health & Safety, Emergency Preparedness, Incident
Investigation specialist, 36 years oil & petrochemical industry experience
[20]

Dr. K. M. Parivelan Ph.D – is DM Specialist who has worked with UN agencies like UNHCR,
UNDP covering Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management
A. Sivakumar MSc - IIT Mumbai – Hydrogeology and Environmental Professional with 18
years international experience in oil & gas industry
Indira Reddy MSc - Environmental Management Australia – Project Coordination and GIS
expert
The project commenced formally on 14 th April 2010 with a kick-off meeting between CIL
officials and EGSS team. The following secondary and tertiary data /information are
collected from CIL:
• QRA_FERA_EEA Report R1 Chapters – 3,6,13 & 18 (MPT)
• EIA report – complete
• QRA of Early Gas Supply System-Report Rev 1 August 09
• QRA of Raageshwari Gas Terminal - Post Slug Catcher Rev 0 May 09
• QRA of Raageshwari Well Pads-Final
• RGT Bow-Tie Report Rev-2-14Jan2010
• FERA-Early Gas Supply System Report Rev 1 Aug 09
• FERA post Slug Catcher of RGT-Final-DECO-RX-R-REP-0018
• QRA, FERA (RGT)
• MPT process Rev 0 – SOPs
o MPT28 HP-LP Flare Rev A2
o MPT 18 - Sand Wash – Final
o MPT 26 - Fuel Gas System rev
o MPT 50-51-52 - ESD-PCS
o MPT 57 Closed Drains rev
o MPT 58 Hazardous Open Drains
o MPT System 21 - Vapour Recovery Unit rev
• RJON-MPT-OP-PRO-010 - Prod Headers & Pig Rx rev A1
• RJON-MPT-OP-PRO-063 - Hazardous Waste Rev A1
• SOP - Train-2 & 3 start up
• 16 .DECO-MPT-FG-DWG-4601-01-B1 (Fire and safety Emergency lay out)-black –
drawing
• 16 .DECO-MPT-L-DWG-2400-01-B9-ColourPlot plan – drawing
• MPT development overview
• 2, 24 RJON-MRX-HSS-PLN-0001_rev00 Incident Response Plan ( IRP ) for RNAO
• RJON-MRX-HSS-PLN-0002 _rev00 Oil Spill Response Plan for RNAO
• 13, 14, 15, 16 & 24 RJON-MRX-HSS-PLN-0003_rev00 Fire Contingency Plan for
RNAO
[21]

• Barmer Census Synopsis
• Census Rajasthan State
• Human development report-Barmer- Rajasthan Government
• Cairn-White paper on health final
• Reference note 1_ Rajasthan Government State Disaster Management Plan outline
• Note on Chemical Disaster Guidelines by NDMA
• Map of area showing well pad locations, oil field locations, major pipeline and
villages
Following review of secondary data a field visit to CIL site at MPT and RGT was conducted
for collection of primary data. Primary data was collected through visit and interaction
with HSE staff members of Cairn at the Rajasthan Upstream Project, Barmer district
administration, District line departments, civil society organisations, community members
living close to Cairn facilities. Primary and secondary data /information relating to project
location, staff size, operations, logistics involved, hazards, risk, vulnerability, capacity
assessments, etc. was gathered.
A second field visit for community consultation was carried out by EGSS team between 12 th
and 15 th May 2010. EGSS team interacted with the project neighbourhood community for
offsite preparedness planning and gathered inputs for DMP. Through informal interview
and focused group discussion their level of preparedness, hazard awareness, and response
capacities were reviewed. Their inputs were also gathered in terms of their need for early
warning systems, quick transport (evacuation) facilities, etc. The team also interacted with
the Barmer District Administration and line departments on the level of disaster
preparedness and coordination. The primary and secondary data were then reviewed and
analysed. The following relevant national laws/Acts were also referred:
• National Disaster Management Act, 2005
• NDMA Guidelines on Chemical Disasters, April 2007
• NDMA Guidelines on Mine Disasters
• NDMA Guidelines on Environmental Disasters
• The Environment Protection Act, 1994
• The Forest Conservation Act, 1986
• Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974
• Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974
• The Hazardous Wastes ( Management and Handling) Rules, 1989
• Environmental Impact Assessment Notification
• Vulnerability Atlas of India
• NDMA Medical Preparedness and Mass Casualty Management
[22]

2 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT AND RISK
ANALYSIS
CIL’s oil exploration, storage and transportation related activities take place predominantly
in and around Barmer taluk in Barmer District, Rajasthan. The vulnerability assessment
covers past history, geographical feature and the impact and intensity of various hazards
and also the damage assessment of the past disasters. Based on this, a list of most
vulnerable villages around CIL were prepared.
Vulnerability is the condition determined by physical, social, economic and environmental
factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of
hazards.
The scale of damage to a community from the impact of a given hazard does not only
depend upon the community’s physical exposure to that hazard, but also on its
vulnerability. Here, physical exposure refers to the elements at risk. These elements may
include people, artefacts, infrastructure etc. Vulnerability, on the other hand, is determined
by aspects in the physical environment, such as nature of housing, available open space etc,
as well as aspects of community awareness about hazards and related preparedness and
also in the socio-economic domain such as level of income, nutritional status,
marginalization, etc.
During the Gujarat earthquake (2001), for example, people living in the old city of Bhuj
with narrow roads, newly-constructed unsafe high-rise buildings and a high density of
population faced more injuries and loss of life during the earthquake, than those living in
the suburbs. The people in suburbs had broader roads and single/double storied buildings
and a lower density of population, which helped quick exit from falling buildings during the
earthquake. In terms of vulnerability, groups of school children and the elderly who could
not evacuate rapidly faced higher cases of injury and loss of lives than other communities
in the same area. Similarly, as in the case of the Jaipur Oil depot fire, the expansion of
habitations close to the oil depot has increased their vulnerability causing high casualties.
Some indicators of vulnerability are:
CHAPTER
2
[23]

• poverty
• population explosion
• demographic imbalances
• unemployment
• growth of large informal economies in unplanned cities
• increasing migrant flows,
• socio-political tensions and uncertainty
• illiteracy
• women and child development concerns
• absence of sound institutional and legislative/ regulatory practices, and
• Unsustainable environmental practices.
Likely disasters in the project area are:-
Natural Disasters
• Flood
• Earth Quake
• Drought
• Sand Storm
• Epidemics
Man-made Disasters
• Fire/ explosion
• Probable on-site emergencies (e.g. Gas leak)
due to Cairn Operations
• Sabotage and pilferage
• Terrorist activities, war or civil disturbance
2.1 MAN-MADE HAZARDS ASSESSMENT
Fires are the major source of hazard in the region due to the dry climatic conditions. The
other hazards include road accidents and potential disasters from Cairn Operations.
2.1.1 FIRES
The high incidence of fires is due partly to the high temperatures during summer and
partly to the presence of large numbers of kutcha (thatched) houses in the villages. The
percentage of temporary housing made from dried thatch is 57.8% thereby exposing a
large percentage of the population to fire-related hazards. There is also a lack of proper fire
safety awareness among the community members. Annually there are at least 10 – 15
villages badly affected by fire accidents in every taluk of Barmer District.
[24]

2.1.2 ACCIDENTS
There are four major roads in the district; NH-15, NH112, SH-16 and SH-28. There are
tarred roads inside the towns. Most villages are approachable only through kutcha roads
and few have internal roadways. The overall number of accidents in 1997 (among the
general public as per the District Disaster Management Plan) was around 319 which
increased to 435 in 2009. The number of fatalities was 72 in 1997 and 219 in 2009.
2.1.3 OTHER HAZARDS
Hazards and risks can potentially emanate from riots, civil strife, pilferage and sabotage
and may be taken into consideration for disaster preparedness and management.
The project area is about 100 -150 km away from the Indo–Pak border and hence the
chances of collateral damage during a war are high. The proximity of the border also
increases the probability of terrorist attacks.
2.2 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF CAIRN OPERATIONS
It is noted from the incident investigation report by Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD)
that the IOC Jaipur Terminal incident is attributable to one or more of the following
probable causes:
• Loss of containment and subsequent pool of large quantities of highly volatile
flammable liquid giving rise to a massive vapour cloud explosion,
• Encroachment close to the Terminal premises by land use developments
• Plant/process engineering practices and design susceptible to human errors
• Layout congestion due to successive plant expansion with the finite land area
• Proliferation of vegetative growth within the facility premises
• Non-adherence to standard operating procedures (SOP)
• Unascertainable level of fire fighting readiness capability and training.
Given Cairn's high emphasis on health, safety and environmental (HSE) excellence and
enforcement measures evinced by the following report, occurrence of a similar nature
within Cairn's operations is highly improbable.
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) for
Cairn operations have been conducted by independent consultants and these analyses are
summarised below.
[25]

2.2.1 FIRE AND EXPLOSION RISK ASSESSMENT AT MPT
Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) study was commissioned to cover CIL’s
Mangala Process Terminal (MPT), Mangala Oil Well Pads, and in-field pipelines and to
assess the level of risk due to credible release scenarios related to oil and gas processes
within these areas. The production fluid from Mangala Oil Well Pads is assumed to be
combustible due to a mole fraction of around 70% water cut after six to nine months of
commissioning the well-pads.
• It has been identified that Slug catcher, Settling Tank, Dehydrator, the pipelines
connecting Dehydrator to Export oil storage tanks and Oil pig launcher, Raageshwari
gas processing facilities and associated pipelines are contributing significant risks to
MPT.
• The total risk can be expressed either in terms of Individual Risk (IR) or Societal Risk
(SR). The Individual Risk (IR) is the risk experienced by a single individual in a given
time period. It reflects the severity of the hazards and the amount of time the
individual is in proximity to them. It is usually taken to be the risk of death, and
usually expressed as a risk per year.
• Societal Risk (SR) - the risk experienced by a group of people (including workers and
the public) exposed to the hazard. SR can be represented with a graph, F-N curve,
showing explicitly the relationship between the cumulative frequency (F) and number
of fatalities (N). The Potential Loss of Life (PLL) is a measure of Societal Risk and
represents the number of fatalities that can be expected to occur each year, averaged
over a long period.
• IR level at key buildings and other locations at the MPT due to process and pipeline
events were estimated. Steam generation area has the highest IR level than other substation
buildings, with an estimated 7.97 x 10 -6 fatalities/ average year. Substation 2
and 4A are the second and third most exposed areas. The IR at Administration
Building due to Raageshwari gas and condensate pipeline release events is estimated
to be about 1.25 x 10 -5 per year.
• Potential Loss of Life (PLL) has been calculated to be 9.55 x 10 -4 fatality average per
year within MPT. The top contributing events to this predicted risk level are Settling
tanks (D-214/224) fire and Export oil storage tanks (D- 250A/B/C/D) fires which
contribute about 75% of total on-site societal risk.
2.2.1.1 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS
The frequency analysis determines the annual release of hazardous materials from process
equipment at the site as well as from the inter-field oil and gas pipelines. The UK Health &
Safety Executive’s (HSE) Hydrocarbon Release Database HCRD, revision HCRD_06, has been
[26]

applied for the process leak failure frequencies using DNV’s leak frequency calculation tool,
LEAK 3.21. A modification factor has been applied by DNV to the base HCRD frequencies for
the risk assessment in Rajasthan Northern Area Development.
The total hydrocarbon process leak frequency for the Mangala Process Terminal (MPT)
was estimated at approximately 0.15 leaks per year, which means there will in average be 1
leak (of any size) every 6.7 years. The overall leak frequency used for the Raageshwari
Condensate line (DN100) is 2.9x10 -7 leaks per meter per year. The overall leak frequency
for the Raageshwari Gas line (DN300) is 1.7x10 -7 leaks per meter per year. The leak
frequencies for MPT on site storage tanks are 3.0x10 -4 leak per year per tank for a full
surface tank fire and 6.0x10 -5 leak per year per tank for a full bund pool fire.
2.2.1.2 CONSEQUENCE MODELLING
Details on the Methodology and assumptions used in the consequence analysis for the
FERA can be found in the FERA Terms of Reference and Rule set documents (DECO-RX-R-
PRO-0112, DECO-RX-R-PRO-0113 and DECO-RX-R-PRO-0104, respectively). This section
will provide some additional details in order to facilitate the interpretation of the
Consequence Results.
Effect of Horizontal Releases
There is some conservatism in the modelling of both liquid and gas process releases as all
are modelled as horizontal releases at 1m above the ground. For ground level impacts, this
method yields worst case scenarios as far as consequences zones are concerned. This is a
common approach when performing consequence modelling for risk assessments. If gas
releases had been modelled vertically, the downwind hazard zones would have been much
smaller.
Liquid events have also been modelled as horizontal releases, such that the pool fires are
assumed to form at the point where the release rains out i.e. touches ground. So even if the
pool formed due to a cloud raining out is relatively small, it may be at a distance from the
leak point and hence the hazard zones may appear to be quite large in relation to the
release point.
Effect of using a Constant Release Rate
A constant release rate has also been used in modelling both liquid and gas releases (the
model releases the entire inventory at the initial release rate). This is also conservative.
Although a time-varying release would have a longer duration, a constant release rate
[27]

maintains the largest hazard zones (initial impacts) for longer than a time-varying release
would. Using a constant release rate is accurate for estimating risk to personnel, especially
for onshore facilities for several reasons. It accurately reflects the fact that personnel will
either be immediately impacted by an event or they will escape the hazard zone before an
eventual escalation of the event. Whether the release rate drops over time becomes
irrelevant for calculating immediate fatalities for release events.
For impacts to equipment and structures it is essential to be aware of both the size of the
hazard zone as well as the duration of that hazard zone. While a time-varying release
would have a longer duration than a constant rate release, the latter would maintain the
largest hazard zones (initial impacts) for longer than a time-varying release.
Therefore, while fatalities can be accurately estimated based on the initial hazard zones of
a release (i.e. someone standing at a certain spot is assumed to either die or to successfully
escape), impact to equipment and structures deserves (and received) a more detailed look
at the duration of the event.
Modelling Crude pool fires
All crude releases from process equipment as well as full bund pool fires and full surface
tank fires were modelled using N-Heptacosane, a material which closely approximates the
low flash point and low emissive power expected of the Crude Oil at MPT. As described in
the FERA Rule Set, production fluid from the Mangala Oil Well Pads through pig receivers
and slug catchers is not considered flammable, i.e., no crude pool fire events are modelled
from Oil well pads to the Settling Tanks.
2.2.1.3 RISK RESULTS
Individual Risk results at MPT
The overall individual Risk Contour Plot in Figure 1 shows the risk distribution on the
Mangala Process Terminal. The figure presents the combined risk from all process events
modelled at MPT. The Risk is expressed as risk of death on average per year.
The contours are marked and shown as risk intervals. The largest contour represents a risk
level of 10 -8 /average year while the smallest contour (shown in light blue) represents an
individual risk of 10 -4 /average year. The large portion of oil and gas process area, export oil
storage tanks as well as diesel storage area are contributing to 10 -4 /average year, which is
coming under CIL’s risk acceptance criteria.
[28]

According to CIL’s risk acceptance criteria; a summed individual risk becomes intolerable
once it exceeds 10 -3 fatalities / average year and is negligible above 10 -6 fatalities/ average
year. In between those two values, the risk falls in the ALARP region.
From Figure 3, a considerable portion of the Terminal, i.e. Export oil storage tanks, Export
oil booster pumps, Oil process area around dehydrators and Gas process area around
scrubbers seem to be in the risk level of 10 -4 , which is under the risk acceptance criteria.
This can be attributed to high congestion of equipments and also large inventory available
in these areas.
The risk due to the release from Export oil pipeline connecting Export Oil Pumps (P-
252A/B/C/D) to Pig Launcher (L-007) was also estimated considering adequate bund area
under the Pipe Rack No.34. However it has been found that the estimated risk is limited to
10 -5 fatalities /avg. year.
FIGURE 5: RISK CONTOURS FROM PROCESS EVENTS AT MPT
The following areas are not exposed to any risk due to process related fire and explosion
events,
• Areas nearby Water storage tanks (D-411A/B)
• Filtered water storage tank (D-452)
• Treated water storage tank (D-454)
• Central Control Building
• Admin Building
• Main Entrance
[29]

• Fire station, Fire water storage tanks
• Main & A/C Warehouses
• Maintenance Shop
• Chemical Lab building
• Recharge Pit located at Northeast direction
At the north-west and nearby gas processing area of the Terminal, it appears that the risk
beyond plant boundary reaches 10 -5 which is again within CIL’s risk acceptance criteria.
Individual Risk results for Raageshwari Pipelines
Figure 6 shows overall individual Risk Contour Plots for combined risks from the
Raageshwari gas and condensate pipelines within MPT area. Most of MPT is exposed to an
individual risk above 10 -8 / average year and lower than 10 -5 / average year due to these
pipeline events. Clearly the risk contours from pipeline events are wider around the MPT
area due to the fact that the pipelines are under higher pressure and there are many more
ignition sources are within the process area.
FIGURE 6: RISK CONTOURS DUE TO INCOMING RAAGESHWARI PIPELINES AT MPT
To find the total individual risk, the contributions from both process and pipeline events
have to be combined. The worst contribution from the gas and condensate pipelines is in
the order of 10 -5 , and the worst from process events is in the order of 10 -4 .
If presence factor for personnel is to be taken into account it is clear that there would likely
not be a summed individual risk greater than 10 -4 fatalities / average year at any location
on MPT.
[30]

Societal Risk
The individual and overall F-N curves are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively and
give the societal risk for all on-site personnel from the fire and explosion scenarios. No
offsite populations have been included in the calculations. It must be noted that the criteria
lines on the F-N curve are shown as acceptable. ALARP lines as shown in red and green
colour are only intended as guidelines and are not CIL Acceptance criteria as F-N curve
criteria has not been defined for this project.
Considering all process related release scenarios, crude related scenarios at daytime are
contributing to high risk which is close to Intolerable line in the ALARP region. It may be
due to the congestion of processing equipments at oil processing area in between settling
tanks and dehydrator, Export Oil Storage Tank, Diesel Storage Tank and Gas processing
area. In detail, this high risk is caused by tank fire and full-bore rupture from Settling tanks
(D-214/224) and Export oil storage tanks (D-250A/B/C/D) at daytime when most people
are present at the terminal.
Individual
Combined
FIGURE 7: INDIVIDUAL AND COMBINED F-N CURVES FOR CRUDE AND GAS RELEASE EVENTS
Figure 4 shows the combined F-N curve considering all oil and gas release events with in
MPT area. The combined F-N curve shows that all process related risks are within ALARP
region. Economic evaluations should be used for the purpose of comparing different design
options or risk reducing measures for the further reduction of risks into risk negligible
region in future.
[31]

Potential Loss of Life (PLL) The expected Potential Loss of Life (PLL) has been calculated
to be 9.5x10 -4 on average per year within MPT. This can also be explained as 1 fatality per
1,047 years.
Main Risk Contributors to Societal Risk
Table 1 indicates the top 10 process events that contribute most to the societal risk for onsite
personnel.
• Risk Integral (per average year) refers to the total number of fatalities per average
year contributed by a given event. This can also be noted the PLL contribution from
each vent.
• Risk Integral (percent) refers to the proportion of the PLL contributed by that event
in percentage terms. The percentage refers to percentage from process events only.
TABLE 1: LARGEST RISK CONTRIBUTORS TO THE SOCIETAL RISK FROM PROCESS EVENTS IN MPT
S. No Event ID Event description
Risk Integral
(per avg year)
Risk
Integral
(%)
1 D-214Tank fire Tank fire 2.07 E -4 21.7
2 D-224Tank fire Tank fire 1.75 E -4 18.4
3 D-224_FBR
4 D-214_FBR
Full bore rupture from Settling
Tank D-224
Full bore rupture from Settling
Tank D-214
5.18 E -5 5.4
5.14 E -5 5.4
5 D-250D Tank Fire Tank fire 4.92 E -5 5.2
6 D-250C Tank fire Tank fire 4.92 E -5 5.2
7 D-250A Tank fire Tank fire 4.92 E -5 5.2
8 D-250B Tank fire Tank fire 4.92 E -5 5.2
9 V-329_FBR
Full bore rupture from Gas
Scrubber V-329
3.78 E -5 4.0
10 D-250C Tank_FBR Full bore rupture from D-250C 3.54 E -5 3.7
The hazard zone obtained from V-329 due to flash fire will have a damage distance of about
450m. This value corresponds to the Lower Flammable Limit attained after the gas release
[32]

from V-329. This event contributes to about 4.0% to the onsite societal risk. The flash fire
LFL contour is very large (damage distance is 450m). However the likelihood of such an
event occurring is very low.
Individual Risk at Buildings and Key Locations
Table 2 lists the Individual Risk (IR) levels at key buildings and other locations at the site
due to process and pipeline events. Steam generation area has the highest IR of the other
sub-station buildings, with an estimated 7.97 x 10 -6 fatalities/ average year. Substation 2
and 4A are the second and third most exposed areas.
The IR at Administration Building due to Raageshwari gas and condensate pipeline release
events is estimated to be about 1.25 x 10-5 per year. Although these risk levels have been
calculated using impact criteria and vulnerabilities aimed at calculating personnel risk,
they can be interpreted to yield some valuable conclusions on impacts to buildings and
equipment.
Steam Generation Area
The main risk contributor to steam generation area is a leak from gas pipeline connecting
Gas Processing Facility and Steam Boilers. Consequence results shows that the largest
hazard zones of the events will reach the steam generation area. However, the individual
risk at this point is 7.97x10 -7 which is within the risk acceptance criteria.
TABLE 2: INDIVIDUAL RISKS AT SPECIFIC BUILDINGS/LOCATIONS AT MPT
Building
Total Individual Risk
Sub-station 1A 4.82 E -08
Sub-station 1B 1.6 E -10
Sub-station 2 4.46 E -07
Sub-station 3 8.12 E -12
Sub-station 4A 4.99 E -08
Sub-station 4B 5.47 E -09
Steam Generation Area 7.97 E -07
[33]

Individual Risk Discussion – Escape and Evacuation
Some of the biggest contributors to On-site Risk are from crude releases resulting in the
formation of large pools. Risk calculations for immediately ignited pool fires are based on
effect zones from a fully developed steady-state pool (where the burn rate equals the
release rate into the pool). This fully formed pool can take some minutes to be developed.
For the medium leaks from the booster oil pipeline pumps (P-251A/B/C/D), it takes about
2 minutes for a pool of 20m diameter to develop.
Gas leaks on the other hand, do not have the same delayed development. A gas jet will
appear immediately and even a gas cloud can reach its steady state in a short time
(seconds). The Oil Export Storage Tank fire events contribute significantly to the on-site
risk at MPT. Crude Tank fires can lead to boil-over events (as described in the FERA Rule
Set document DECO-RX-R-PRO-0102).
Boil-overs have been known to cause large numbers of fatalities, even though they may not
occur in the initial stages of a fire. It is essential that all nonessential personnel be located
far from the area should the export tanks catch fire. Only trained emergency response
personnel and fire-fighters should be on-site, they should be aware of the potential for boilovers
and thus remain at a safe distance from the tank fire itself. With this in mind remote
operation of any fixed fire fighting systems deploying water, water/foam, should be
considered around hydrocarbon storage tanks.
Escalation Potential
In general all unprotected equipment or structures within a radiation level of 37.5 kW/m 2
for 30 minutes or within the fire itself for a shorter period of time are likely to fail. All fires
from small liquid and gas leaks will have durations that are long enough to cause damage if
impinged directly by the flame, very few of these however actually have hazard zones large
enough to impact neighbouring equipment. As documented in the FERA Rule Set document
DECO-RX-R-PRO-0102, event duration is based on a 5 minute detection and isolation time
followed by the time needed to release the entire inventory within an isolatable section.
Although the steam generation and power generation areas are critical to the operation of
the facility, the area around the oil process equipment is the most exposed to events having
the potential to cause escalation. The main risk of impact to equipment and structures is
from large and full bore rupture events.
Escalation Potential in the Oil and Gas Processing Areas
The pool fire risks in the oil processing area are mainly from Settling Storage Tank (D-
214/224), Dehydrator (V-217/227), Diesel Storage Tank (D-857) and Export Oil Storage
[34]

Tanks (D-250A/B/C/D). The consequence results from these pool fire events clearly show
that the potential for impact to the process equipment is possible especially in case of pool
fire from D-214/224. Because of this tank is located more closely with main pipe racks
(No.21 & 19) which carries most of the process pipelines.
Since the oil processing area is the most congested area in the facility, hazards from pool
fire events are major hazard contributors due to oil leaks. As gas pipelines are also present
in the same area, a possibility of VCE cannot be ruled out. However, other than providing
more open space in the area, the best mitigation for VCE risks is to ensure timely and
reliable gas/fire detection leading to effective isolation and blow down of gas inventories.
Jet fires from slug catcher also present a hazard to equipment and steel structures in the oil
processing area. Limiting the duration of these jet fire events is the key to reducing the
possibility of escalating a release event. Full bore ruptures do not have long durations as
the majority of the inventory will be released in short period of time. Flame lengths and
durations of key jet fire events from V-210/220 are given in Table 3:
TABLE 3: JET FIRE HAZARD RESULTS IN MPT
Event Jet fire length (m) Duration of Release (min)
V-210_L/V-220_L 30 ~7
V-210_FBR/V-220_FBR 68 ~3
It is predicted that pool fire from Settling Storage Tank (D-214/224), Dehydrator (V-
217/227), Diesel Storage Tank (D-857) and Export Oil Storage Tanks (D-250A/B/C/D) and
jet fire from the Slug Catchers (V-210/220) could be the worst process hazard. The
inventories in the storage tanks and slug catchers are quite large, and the duration of
release events can be reduced by reducing the inventory of the isolatable segment.
Isolation points (additional ESVs) should therefore be considered at more locations,
especially if they can isolate the vapour inventories of the different Slug Catchers and
Separators.
Risk Acceptance Criteria
From the Acceptance criteria described in FERA Terms of References, DECO-RX-R-PRO-
0113, the ALARP region holds a summed individual risk of 1 in 1000 on-site and 1 in
10,000 offsite, and above 1 in 1,000,000 per year. A summed individual risk of fatality
below 1 in 1,000,000 per year is negligible and deemed acceptable – requiring no
additional measures except for application of best practices and maintaining normal
precautions.
[35]

If presence factor for personnel is to be taken into account, it is clear that there would likely
not be a summed individual risk greater than 10 -4 fatalities /average year at any location
on MPT. In order to estimate the risk to the most exposed person on-site, the presence
factor of this person within the exposed areas has to be defined.
A conservative estimate of the summed individual risk to a highly exposed individual can
be based on the following assumptions:
• The individual has a shift schedule of 2 weeks on and 2 weeks off throughout the
year
• The individual works one 12 hour shift per day
• This individual is outdoors in the process area (and thus more vulnerable than
indoor personnel)
Based on the above assumptions, this hypothetical individual would be between the 1 x 10 -
4 and 1 x 10 -5 contours for 40% of the year and would therefore be exposed to an individual
risk in the range of 2.5 x 10 -4 to 2.5x10 -6 on average per year. According to CIL’s risk
acceptance criteria this would place the risk levels for the most exposed on-site individual
within the ALARP region.
2.2.1.4 OVERALL RESULTS
Process Leak Frequency
The total hydrocarbon process leak frequency for the Mangala Process Terminal (MPT) has
been estimated to about 0.15 leaks per year, which means there will, on average, be 1 leak
(of any size) in every 6.7 years. The total gas leak frequency is about 0.089 leaks per year
and the total liquid leak frequency is about 0.06 leaks per year. Figure 7 shows the overall
distribution of small, medium, large and rupture hole sizes for gas and liquid releases.
FIGURE 8: PROCESS GAS AND LIQUID LEAK FREQUENCIES PER HOLE-SIZE CATEGORY
[36]

Raageshwari Gas and Condensate Pipeline Leak Frequency
The overall leak frequency used for the Raageshwari Condensate line (DN100) is 2.91x10 -7
leaks per meter per year. The overall leak frequency used for the Raageshwari Gas line
(DN300) is 1.71 x10 -7 leaks per meter per year.
Considering there are nearly 800m of pipelines for both DN100 and DN300, the overall leak
frequency for the entire length of each pipeline is about 2.328x10 -4 leaks per year for
DN100 and 1.368x10 -4 leaks per year for DN300. This is the yearly likelihood of having a
leak of any size at any point along the pipeline.
Tank Fire Leak Frequency
Frequencies applied for a full surface tank fire are 3.0x10 -4 leaks per year per tank and for a
full bund pool fire 6.0x10 -5 leak per year per tank
2.2.1.5 DETAILED FREQUENCY RESULTS
Process Leaks
The leak frequencies applied for each of the identified process failure cases, per hole-size
category are illustrated in Figure 8. Table 26 and Table 27 contain all applied leak
frequencies for gas and liquid process failure cases, respectively.
FIGURE 9: PROCESS GAS LEAK FREQUENCY PER EVENT AND PER HOLE-SIZE CATEGORY
TABLE 4: FAILURE FREQUENCIES FOR GAS EVENTS IN MPT
Full Leak Frequency / Year
Failure Case Id Equipment Small Medium Large Rupture
G1 Pipe Line 6.498E -08 4.959E -08 2.736E -08 3.42E -08
G2 L-360 6.830E -03 6.945E -04 4.921E -05 4.543E -05
G3 V-361 3.045E -03 2.392E -04 4.401E -05 4.742E -05
[37]

G4 Fuel Gas Header 1.978E -02 2.635E -03 4.486E -04 4.274E -04
G5 V-840 6.498E -08 4.959E -08 2.736E -08 3.42E -08
G7 v-843 2.914E -02 2.449E -03 3.718E -04 1.629E -04
G8 Pipe Line 2.025E -02 1.743E -03 2.357E -04 1.230E -04
G9 Pipe Line 6.498E -08 4.959E -08 2.736E -08 3.42E -08
Total for Gas Events 7.9E -02 7.76E -03 1.15E -03 8.07E -04
The failure case G1, which is a leak from the Raageshwari gas pipeline within PT, is the only
gas failure case where a small leak has been excluded. This is due to the reason that the
pipeline is buried and is 1.5m deep. Small and medium leaks resulting from this pipeline
can be neglected as the consequence is very small. The main contributor to the leak
frequency for these cases is the large amount of process piping in this segment (an
estimated total of 5,500m of process piping).
FIGURE 10: PROCESS LIQUID LEAK FREQUENCY PER EVENT AND HOLE-SIZE CATEGORY
TABLE 5: FAILURE FREQUENCY APPLIED FOR LIQUID EVENTS ON MPT
Full Leak Frequency / Year
Failure Case
Id
Equipment Small Medium Large Rupture
L4 D-214 - - 3.00E -04 6.00E -05
L6 V-217 2.63E -03 2.24E -04 3.88E -04 2.26E -05
L8 D-224 - - 3.00E -04 6.00E -05
[38]

L10 V-227 2.63E -03 2.24E -04 3.88E -04 2.26E -05
D-250 A
3.00E -04 6.00E -05
L11
D-250 B 3.00E -04 6.00E -05
- -
D-250 C 3.00E -04 6.00E -05
D-250 D 3.00E -04 6.00E -05
L12 Pipeline 4.23E -03 3.29E -04 5.03E -05 2.25E -05
L13 P-251A/B/C/D 5.51E -04 9.95E -05 2.87E -05 2.88E -05
L17
Raageshwari
condensate
pipeline
1.28E -07 1.08E -07 4.07E -08 3.58E -06
L18
Diesel Storage
Tanks -
- 3.00E -04 6.00E -05
L19
Export Oil
Pipeline
3.65E -02 4.62E -03 9.24E -04 4.16E -03
Total for liquid event 1.04E -02 5.13E -02 5.30E -02 5.12E -03
The largest contributors to the liquid leak frequency are the L19 case, which represent the
isolatable sections containing the MPT export pipelines and L12containing Pipeline from V-
217/227 to export oil storage tanks. The high frequency in this area is because of a large
length of piping.
Pipeline Leaks
The gas and condensate pipeline failure frequencies are based on the failure rates
presented in the 6 th European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG) report which
presents data from 1970 to 2004. The required criteria for an incident to be recorded in the
EGIG database are as follows:
• The incident must lead to an unintentional release
• The pipeline must be made of steel
• The pipeline must be onshore
• The pipeline must have a design pressure higher than 15 bar
• The pipeline must be located outside the fences of the installation
[39]

The failure frequency over the past five years (2000-2004) is equal to less than half of the
primary failure frequency over the entire period (1970-2004), showing the improved
performance over recent years. For new pipelines it is recommended to use the base
frequencies for the 2000 to 2004 period as shown below in Table 3.
TABLE 6: BASE LEAK FREQUENCY FROM EGIG
Period Frequency (Per Km/Yr Frequency
1970 – 2004 4.10E – 04 4.10E – 07
2000 - 2004 1.70E – 04 1.70E - 078
However, the report also shows that large diameter pipelines are less vulnerable to third
party damage due to their thicker walls, and their greater hazard potential may make them
more likely to have procedural controls to prevent external interference. Small diameter
pipelines may be more vulnerable to all types of failure, particularly corrosion and natural
hazards, due to their smaller wall thickness.
Once distributed across the different hole-sizes, the resulting pipeline leak frequencies per
hole-size for DN100 and DN300 are defined as follows in Table 29:
TABLE 7: USED PIPELINE FAILURE FREQUENCY FOR DN100 AND DN300
Frequency (Per/Yr)
Pipe Size Small Medium Large Full Bore Total
100 1.41E -07 1.08E -07 4.25E -08 n/a 2.91E -07
300 6.54E -08 5.01E -08 1.97E -08 3.58E -08 1.71E -07
The condensate line is 100mm in diameter and full bore rupture cases are defined as holes
exceeding 150mm.
The EGIG report also details a number of factors that can be considered in refining these
frequencies for application to a specific pipeline. Effects of pipeline content, pipeline
diameter, pipeline temperature, depth of cover for underground pipeline, material of
construction, corrosion protection and other factors are normally considered in a pipeline
frequency analysis. However, since some details of the pipelines’ corrosion protection
programmes and scheduled pigging activities are not currently available, no modification
factors have as of yet been applied to the base EGIG frequencies. Should this information
[40]

ecome available, a sensitivity study can be performed to assess the impact of the modified
pipeline failure frequencies on the risk results.
Storage Tank Fires
Events that has been included for the tank areas are tank fires in the settling tanks, D-
214/D-224, in the export oil storage tanks, D-250A/B/C/D, and in the diesel tank, D-857.
Full bund pool fires are included for settling tanks, export oil storage tanks and diesel tank.
Frequencies applied for a tank fire is 3.00E -04 leaks per year per tank and for a full bund
pool fire 6.00E -05 leaks per year per tank.
2.2.2 FIRE AND EXPLOSION RISK ASSESSMENT AT RGT
2.2.2.1 FIRES
Slug Catcher
In case of liquid leak, an immediate ignition will result into a Pool fire. The Pool Fire
diameter for moderate leak size (25 mm) is approximately 30 meters while heat radiations
contours of 9.46 KW/m 2 and 4.73 KW/m 2 are approximately 25 meters and 35 meters
respectively. In pool fires flame tilts towards wind direction. It implies that escape routes
downwind up to 25 meters and fire monitors up to 35 meters would not be accessible due
to high heat radiations.
There is no contour of 37.5 KW/m 2 heat radiations for this pool fire; hence no fire
escalation is expected due to failure of any nearby equipment in the vicinity.
In case of slug catcher finger leakage resulting into a high pressure jet fire the flame length
is calculated as 16 meters for leakage size of 25 mm. The duration of leakage would be
approximately 25 minutes taking into account the large gas inventory of slug catcher. This
has a potential of fire escalation if jet flame impinges on any equipment.
1st Stage & 2nd Stage Separator
These equipments have the potential to result into a pool fire in case of liquid release and
jet fire if it is a high pressure release. However the heat radiations from such pool fire / jet
fire are going to be limited to process area north side of pipe rack. Flame of a pool fire will
tilt downwind and jet flame could be in any direction.
1st Stage & 2nd Stage Condensate Transfer Pumps
The leakage could be due to seal failure of external leakage from any valve / flange / piping.
The maximum leakage rate in this case is governed by the max discharge rate of the pump.
The maximum discharge rate of 1st stage & 2nd stage condensate pump is 1.75 kg/s & 0.35
kg/s respectively this can result into a pool fire diameter of 6.7 meters & 3.1 meters. As can
[41]

e seen from detail results the heat radiations from these pool fires are not a significant
issue.
Stripper Column
The release from stripper column is going to be high temperature liquid condensate
expected to be fully ‘stabilized’ which implies insignificant vapours to be generated from
such a release. The main hazard is personal injury due to very high temperature of liquid
condensate. If it does ignite, it will result into a pool with approximate diameter of 12 to 15
meters. Heat radiation hazards would mainly be confined to process area – south side of
pipe rack.
Propane Storage
Leakage of liquid propane will form a pool which may result into a pool fire. Subject to
designing containment for propane leak, the pool fire diameter is calculated around 7
meters. The heat radiations such a pool fire are 40 meters, 31 meters and 13.4 meters for
4.73 kW/m2, 9.46 kW/m2 and 37.5kW/m2 respectively. The distance to condensate
storage tank is about 27 meters.
Another scenario is BLEVE of propane vessel. The consequences of such BLEVE would be
disastrous as it will result into a fireball of approximately 100 meters diameter resulting
into fatalities within 50 meters radius from propane vessel and secondary fires. The best
approach would be to minimize the chance of such occurrence.
Refrigeration Package
The main equipment in refrigeration package is propane compressor operating around 21
bars. Pool fire diameter from a release is calculated around 6 meters. Heat radiations are
confined to refrigeration package boundary limits.
Condensate Storage & Loading
Condensate is stored in cone roof tank. The leakage of condensate could be a small to
moderate leak (25 mm to 50 mm hole size) or a full surface tank fire (in case roof is blown
off) or it could be a full-fledged dyke fire (in case overfill / catastrophic failure).
The pool fire heat radiations are calculated approximately 25 & 30 meters for heat
radiations of 4.73 kW/m 2 and 9.46 kW/m 2 respectively for a full dyke fire case.
If it is a full surface tank fire the pool diameter would be same as tank diameter (~8
meters). The heat radiation would be lower but the duration of fire would be higher. For
full surface tank fire the burning rate calculated is 0.85 kg/s which gives a fire duration of
about 48 hours.
Leakage in tanker loading area will form a condensate pool which can result into
condensate pool fire. Heat radiations for such a fire are calculated as 16, 12.5 & 5 meters
[42]

for heat radiations 4.73 kW/m 2 , 9.46 kW/m 2 and 37.5kW/m 2 respectively. This is on the
assumption that there would be containment around condensate loading.
2.2.2.2 EXPLOSIONS
The main hazard of explosion in RGT is from condensate / propane release which will lead
to heavier than air vapour cloud formation. This cloud will drift downwind and if there is a
delayed ignition it may result into an explosion.
The liquid release from slug catcher, 1st & 2nd stage separator, propane vessel &
refrigeration package have the potential to cause explosion.
The most significant unit with reference to impact of explosion is utility building (housing
control room). As can be seen from the detail results liquid release from slug catcher, 1st
separator, propane vessel & refrigeration package have the potential to cause explosion
overpressure (1 psi to 2 psi) covering the utility building depending upon leakage size.
2.2.2.3 QRA FOR RGT
A QRA study was conducted covering all the proposed facilities under Raageshwari Gas
Terminal. The objective of this study was to establish risk levels and compare them with
appropriate risk acceptability criteria to determine the suitability of the development and
suggest risk remedial measures if required. The risk to life is calculated as “individual risk”
and “Group risk”.
• Individual Risk: It is represented by iso-risk contours, which show the geographical
distribution of risk to an individual.
• Group risk: It is represented by FN curves, which show the cumulative frequency
distribution of accidents causing different numbers of fatalities.
The following results are pertaining to the operation mode when condensate is being sent
to Mangala through 4 inch condensate pipeline at pressure 84 bar. Condensate stripper
column, storage tank and loading are not in operation in this mode of operation.
Risk Results (Individual Risk)
Figure below shows the iso–risk contours representing location specific individual risk
(LSIR). The highest risk contour is of 10 -3 per year which covers ‘Process Area’. However,
the actual risk to a worker will be less after accounting for fraction of time the individual
spends over there.
The other areas where people are expected to be continuously present during plant
operation e.g. Control room/Admin Building; MCC and Canteen etc. are outside 10 -3 per
[43]

year risk contour. The proposed location of LQ is on iso-risk contour of 10 -6 per year. The
individual risk at LQ would therefore be considered broadly acceptable.
FIGURE 11: ISO-RISK CONTOURS
The following table indicates location specific risk at each critical point in the plant. All of
these risks fall within ALARP band.
TABLE 8: LOCATION SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL RISK (LSIR) AT DIFFERENT REFERENCE POINTS IN
RGT
Area
LSIR
1 st Stage Condensate Pump Area 3.50 E -03
1 st Stage Separator Area 2.95 E -03
Slug Catcher Area 1.90 E -03
Generator Area 2.10 E -04
Control Room 3.20 E -05
Admin Building, Workshop,
Warehouse
2.60 E -05
LQ 5.10 E -6
Security Cabin 2.20 E -05
[44]

Risk Results (Group Risk)
The Group risk is shown in Figure below in the form of an FN curve. The results of FN
curves show that the risk is not above unacceptable but it falls under ALARP band. It
implies that the terminal do have the potential of events which may occur in multiple
fatalities.
FIGURE 12: F-N CURVE DAY-NIGHT
Top Risk Contributors (Group Risk)
The main risk contributors in total group risk are Slug Catcher (about 29.35%), 1st stage
condensate pump (about 20.75 %) and 2nd stage condensate pump (about 16.25 %)
followed by refrigeration package and propane storage tank 1st stage separator.
2.2.2.4 QRA FOR RAAGESHWARI WELL PADS
Risk Results (Individual Risk)
Figure below shows the iso–risk contours representing location specific individual risk
(LSIR).
FIGURE 13: ISO-RISK CONTOUR OF TYPICAL WELL PAD
[45]

For a typical well pad (in this case well pad No.1), the highest risk contour is of 10-4 per
year which covers ‘manifold Area’. However, the actual risk to a worker will be less after
accounting for fraction of time the individual spends over there. The other areas where
people are expected to be continuously present during plant operation e.g. guard room are
outside 10-5 per year risk contour. It implies individual risk is quite low.
Group Risk
The Group risk is shown in Figure 10 in the form of an FN curve. The criteria used here is
the CIL Group Risk Criteria for FN curves. The results of FN curves show that the group risk
is “broadly acceptable”. The reason for such low group risk is that there in not much
population in and around the plant.
FIGURE 14: GROUP RISK F-N CURVE, TYPICAL WELL PAD
Top Risk Contributors
The main risk contributors in total group risk are dispatch header (89%) and well blowout (10%)
.2.2.5 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS
TABLE 9: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR LFL AND JET FIRE HEAT RADIATION AT RGT
Leakages
Downwind distances LFL
Concenration (m)
Downwind distances Jet Fire Heat
Radiation (m)
UFL LFL 50% LFL 4 kW/m 2 12.5 kW/m 2 37.5 kW/m 2
Minor – 5 mm 0.8 3.2 5.1 5.4 - -
Medium – 25 mm 4 17 45 35 29 24
[46]

The overall risk levels (both Individual risk and Group risk) are quite low. The individual
risk is low because there are not much process equipments on well pads while group risk is
low because no significant population in and around well pads. The heat radiations of 4
Kw/m 2 in case of medium leak goes up to 35 meters.
Fo
Explosion overpressure worst case radii at
weather condition: 5 m/s
D Flash Fire at weather condition: 5 m/s; D
FIGURE 15: WORST CASE RADII
2.3 HAZARD MAPPING
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) for
Cairn operations have been conducted by independent consultants and these results were
used to map the vulnerability of the civilian population to potential hazards using GIS
techniques. The hazard maps are attached in Appendix B.
[47]

2.3.1 MAPPING OF HAZARD ZONES FOR MPT AND RGT
EGSS has proposed a maximum (high risk) hazard zone of 1000 m (i.e. from 2 to 4 times the
maximum hazard as per FERA) as a conservative estimate. Although the risk from fire does
not exceed 0.5 km, there is a possibility of smoke and initial vapour from crude oil to move
to larger distances due to the action of wind. Thus the moderate and minimal (low risk)
hazard zones are also drawn. The moderate hazard zone is taken to be 3 km and the
minimal hazard zone is taken to be 5 km. The list of villages within the hazard zones are
TABLE 10: LIST OF VILLAGES WITHIN THE HAZARD ZONES AT MPT
S.
No
Location
Villages within minimal
hazard zone (5 km
radius)
Villages within moderate
hazard zone (3 km radius)
Villages within maximum
hazard zone (1 km radius)
1 MPT Legon ki Dhani Legon ki Dhani Legon ki Dhani
2 MPT Khatiyon ka Tala Nagana
3 MPT Memaon ki Dhani Khatiyon Meghwalon ki Dhani
4 MPT Nagneshya Mandir,
Nagana
5 MPT Genero Lego ki Dhani,
Mundo
Khisaraniyon ki Dhani
Sangner ka Dhora
6 MPT Bhilon ki Dhani Bhilon ki Dhani
7 MPT Miyon ki Dhani Gulbaniyon ki Basti, Nagana
8 MPT Jogasariya
9 MPT Sangner ka Dhora
10 MPT Nagana
11 MPT Nagana Tala
12 MPT Lumbhoni Janiyon ki
Dhani
13 MPT Bhaton ka Der
14 MPT Bahton ki Dhani
15 MPT Gulbaniyon ki Basti,
Nagana
16 MPT Khatiyon Meghwalon ki
Dhani
17 MPT Badla Talar
[48]

18 MPT Khisaraniyon ki Dhani
19 MPT Sar ka Par
20 MPT Musalmanon ki Dhani
21 MPT Jasnathpura
22 MPT Jogasarkuan
23 RGT Juni Undri Maliyon ki Dhani
24 RGT Dhinglon ki Dhani Dhandiawas
25 RGT Jalila Dhora
26 RGT Bagta ki Dhani
27 RGT Nagar ka Dhora
28 RGT Junanagar
29 RGT Mandawas
30 RGT Nai Undri
31 RGT Maliyon ki Dhani
32 RGT Dhandiawas
The hazard zone map for MPT is given in the Appendix B
2.3.2 MAPPING OF HAZARD ZONES FOR WELL FIELDS
The maximum hazard zones were drawn for Mangala, Aishwariya, Bhagyam and
Raageshwari fields (including well pads and all operations sites) at a distance of 1 km. The
villages within the Hazard zone are.
TABLE 11: VILLAGES WITHIN MAXIMUM HAZARD ZONES FOR WELL FIELDS
S. No Location Village Name S. No Location Village Name
1 Mangala well field Khisaraniyon ki Dhani 1 Aishwariya Bhellon ki Basti
well field
2 Sangner ka Dhora 2 Madpura
3 Nagana 3 Rauji ki Dhani, Kawas
4 Legon ki Dhani 4 Harupaniyo ki Dhani
5 Jogasarkuan 5 Gajali Jhakdo ki Dhani
[49]

6 Chatarwalon ki Dhani 6 Gajani Jhakron ki Dhani
7 Khanji ka Tala 7 Chittar ka Par
8 Khatiyon Meghwalon ki Dhani 8 Kangalpura
1 Bhagyam well field Bothiya 9 Kau-Khera
2 Bothiya Jagir 10 Sagar Ji Charno ki Dhani
1 RGT and nearby Maliyon ki Dhani
well pads
2 Dhandiawas
2.3.3 MAPPING OF HAZARD ZONES FOR PIPELINES
There will be two major cross-country pipelines, from Bhagyam well pad to Mangala
Processing Terminal (MPT) and Aishwariya well-pad to MPT. Since the pipelines are buried
underground, there is minimal risk of fire. However, as a conservative estimate, a 1 km
hazard zone has been identified around the pipeline as shown in Figure 10 – Appendix B.
The villages in the risk prone areas are:
TABLE 12: RISK PRONE VILLAGES ALONG PIPELINES
Pipeline
from
Bhagyam
well pad to
Mangala
Processing
Terminal
(MPT)
Chinchewalakar Mangananiyon
Chokla
Bothiya
Daluwaniyon ki Dhani
Junejo Mehron ki Basti, Bhad
Pipeline from
Aishwariya
well-pad to
MPT
Nagana
Sangner ka Dhora
Jogasariya
Kangalpura
Badla Talar
Khatiyon ka Tala
Chittar ka Par
Lumbhoni Janiyon ki Dhani,
Nagana
Gajali Jakhdo ki Dhani
Bahton ki Dhani
Gajani Jokhron ki Dhani
Jasnathpura
Kaukhera
2.4 NATURAL HAZARDS ASSESSMENT
The potential natural hazards prevalent in Barmer and its surrounding areas are flash
floods, earthquake of moderate intensity and minor epidemics.
[50]

2.4.1 FLOODS
Floods are rare due to poor rainfall in the region but unusually high quantum of rain can
result in flash floods as seen in Kawas region of Barmer district in 2006. In August 2006,
the usually drought prone Barmer district was hit by flash floods. As of August 27, 2006,
103 deaths were reported in Rajasthan due to floods. The village of Kawas was the most
affected and located close to Mangala Processing Terminal. The water level as on March 6,
2007 was about 3 feet to 10 feet above ground in Kawas. People had to live in make shift
camps for several months. The loss included the death of 75,194 cattle and damage to
Kharif crop was worth Rs.1300 crore. In Barmer Tehsil, Aati and Undkha villages alone
nearly 600 people were affected by 2006 floods.
In August 2006, unprecedented floods hit the region and destroyed many buildings and
infrastructure elements. It was for the first time in recorded history of 200 years that such
severe flooding had taken place in this desert, normally known for its perennial droughts.
Many school buildings in rural Barmer were destroyed or
severely damaged, rendering them unusable and unsafe for
occupation. Even after the rain stopped, the water did not
drain out, because of an impermeable layer of subsurface
gypsum. A layer of gypsum below the sandy surface prevented
flood waters from seeping into the ground in the region,
slowing down relief efforts. Gypsum is a mineral used in the
building industry. Bodies of thousands of cattle were floating in
the flood waters, causing a foul smell in some areas and raising concern about the spread of
disease in Barmer.
2.4.2 EARTHQUAKE
Rajasthan state falls under earthquake zones II, III and IV. Some area of Jalore, Sirohi,
Barmer and Alwar districts fall in zone IV where as many parts of
Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Barmer, Jodhpur, Pali, Sirohi, Dungarpur, Alwar,
Banswara , fall in zone III.
Recent Earthquakes in the Area
09 April 2009. A moderate earthquake (M5.0-5.9 termed as
moderate) struck the Thar Desert near Jaisalmer on 9 April 2009. It
had a magnitude of Mb=5.1 and was felt in a large part of the region along the India-
Pakistan border. The earthquake was centred 2 kms N of Mokal (27 kms NW of Jaisalmer)
166 kms NNW of Barmer.
26 Jan 2001. Bhuj quake of Kutch in 2001 was felt in many parts of Rajasthan as well. Its
effect was felt more severely in Jalore, Barmer and Jaisalmer. Many buildings in these
[51]

districts like schools, rest houses and privately owned buildings had developed huge cracks
and had been rendered unsafe. Many other buildings developed cracks making them unsafe
for further use without proper retrofitting. Many of the public buildings mainly schools are
still lying in dilapidated conditions.
8 November 1991. A 5.4 magnitude earthquake near Jaisalmer caused some damage in the
village of Konoi and was felt as far as New Delhi.
Note: The area where Mangala processing terminal and the well pads are located fall in a
MODERATE seismic zone (Zone III) and there are no incidents of severe seismic activities
till date as per the records available with the local district authorities. However all its
facilities are built to withstand earth quakes of the expected intensity in Zone III category.
2.4.3 DROUGHT
The major natural hazard in the region is drought brought about due to the hot arid climate
and very dry sandy soils. Moderate to severe drought occurs every year. In 2009 alone, 269
villages in the Barmer Taluk were affected by drought.
2.4.4 SANDSTORM
Barmer region where the Cairn facilities are located are prone to frequent sandstorms
which disrupt the normal functioning and operations.
PHOTOGRAPH 5: SANDSTORM NEAR CAIRN FACILITY
DURING DAYTIME
2.4.4 EPIDEMICS
Biological hazards facing Barmer comprise high temperatures (heat stroke), fires (burns),
accidents and diseases. In terms of epidemics, Barmer has faced mainly small scale
[52]

epidemics of swine flu, malaria and chikungunya. The main reason behind the limited
spread of disease in this region is the sparse population. Thus the impact scale of the
epidemics is small, generally covering not more than 50 people. The single largest epidemic
in recent years was the swine flu epidemic where 35 were infected of which 9 died. The
other major disease is malaria which is endemic to the region due to the large-scale usage
of open water storage tanks.
[53]

CHAPTER
3
3 PREVENTIVE MEASURES
3.1 OVERVIEW OF RECENT DISASTERS
During 2009 and the first half of the year 2010, the petroleum industry has witnessed a few
major disasters, both on-shore and off-shore. These disasters have provided valuable
insights on the root causes and ways whereby the disasters could have been prevented.
The disasters and their causes are outlined below. Lessons learnt from these disasters can
be used to prevent such events happening in Barmer district.
3.1.1 JAIPUR FIRE INCIDENT
A major disaster involving loud explosions from hydrocarbon storage tanks took place on
October 29, 2009 at IOC Jaipur Terminals at the Sitapura industrial area. The flames due to
explosion from three of the 11 tankers containing petrol and diesel spread to the nearby
settlements causing several casualties. Further, the explosion also resulted in
environmental degradation of the area. Black smoke formed dark clouds in a two-three
kilometre radius around the depot causing respiratory distress to a large segment of the
population. It is noted from the incident investigation report by Oil Industry Safety
Directorate (OISD) that the IOC Jaipur Terminal incident is attributable to one or more of
the following probable causes:
• Loss of containment and subsequent pool of large quantities of highly volatile
flammable liquid giving rise to a massive vapour cloud explosion,
• Encroachment on to the Terminal premises by land use developments
• Plant/process engineering practices and design susceptible to human errors
• Layout congestion due to successive plant expansion with the finite land area
• Proliferation of vegetative growth within the facility premises
• Non-adherence to standard operating procedures (SOP)
• Unascertainable level of fire fighting readiness capability and training
[54]

Lessons Learnt from the Incident
Cairn has set high standard of health, safety and environmental (HSE) practices and has
conducted various HSE studies to better understand the hazards and risks of the facility. In
addition, the recommendations of the QRA and FERA reports are being strictly followed.
Based on the lessons learned from the Jaipur incident, the following measures/steps can be
considered:
• A buffer zone can be set up around the Cairn facility to prevent establishment of
new settlements and businesses. This has to be promulgated by the District
Authorities
• Periodic training of Cairn field personnel to improve their competency and to enable
them to assess hazards and mitigate potential risks
• In addition to regular mock drills conducted by Cairn, District Authority should hold
multi-stakeholder (involving community, industries concerned, district
administration etc.) mock drill exercises periodically.
• When new wells are being drilled, an area of 1km radius around the facility should
be considered as buffer zone. No new settlements should be allowed to reside
within this zone.
3.1.2 MEXICAN OIL SPILL
On 20 April 2010, a British Petroleum (BP) off-shore oil rig “deepwater horizon”
exploded in the Gulf of Mexico spewing 4.9 million barrels of crude oil in open sea. Five
teams dispersed about 13,000 gallons of chemical dispersants into the sea to remediate
the pollution caused by the hydrocarbons. The cause was apparently a sub-standard
pressure control device which failed to activate at the right time thereby releasing crude
out of the bore hole. Financial loss of approximately USD 30 billion has been estimated by
BP
Lessons Learnt from the Incident
• All rig safety measures, as per international standards, must be checked and
approved by an external agency.
• All rig safety measures should be followed at all times.
• Quality of devices/contractors shall not be compromised during award of contract.
[55]

3.2 HUMAN/ INDUSTRY INDUCED DISASTERS
3.2.1 POTENTIAL CAUSES OF FIRE:
1. Spark generated from grinding works.
2. Open flame hot works in hazardous area.
3. Spark generated due to static charge generation.
4. Spark from defective electrical fittings.
5. Spark from defective instrument / equipment or equipment not confirming to the
area classification.
6. Lightening
7. Sparks from the exhaust of road tankers/ vehicles.
8. Gas cloud formation due to abrupt stoppage of flaring; followed by explosion due to
delayed ignition.
3.2.2 PREVENTIVE MEASURES ADOPTED BY CAIRN
Cairn has taken pro-active steps for prevention of potential fire disasters. Emergency
management teams are in place at facilities, regional and corporate levels. Various training
activities have already taken place including mock drills for testing preparedness and
response. This fire hazards and prevention plan have been prepared with inputs from
Cairn’s previous studies and assessments as below:
1. Quantitative Risk Assessment for MPT and RGT with Risk Reduction Measures
for Occupational Accidents & Risk Prevention/Reduction Measures for the Loss of
Containment.
2. Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment with risk results (individual and societal
risk) with measures for reducing risks.
3. Environment Impact Assessment The environmental baseline monitoring has
been carried out during pre-monsoon season of year 2007
4. Social Impact Assessment to map the risks on the society due to the project.
5. RNAO Incident Response Plan 2010
6. Rajasthan Incident Response Plan 2008 for managing incidents and emergencies
in Rajasthan (shared with Barmer District collector).
7. Emergency Management Plan 2008 for dealing with incidents escalated to
corporate level for supporting the incident response teams in field. EMT is based in
Gurgaon and follows as weekly rotation system of members and functions from a
well equipped EMT Room and ready to deploy at short notice. The EMT members
meet every Monday to take stock of emergencies and also to hand over to the next
team.
[56]

8. Mangala Development – Pipeline Project (MPP) Team Incident response Plan
9. RGT Incident Response Plan 2010
10. RNAO Fire Contingency Plan 2010
11. RGT Fire Contingency Plan 2010
12. RNAO Oil Spill Contingency Plan 2010
13. Bridging Document of IRPs for the 90 km cross-country pipeline between MPT
and RGT
14. Bridging Document of IRPs for the crude oil export line between MPT, RGT and
Midstream Operations
The fire prevention mechanisms in Rajasthan upstream operations in place are as follows:
• The fire fighting philosophy is aimed to protect the life of personnel and on loss
prevention.
• The fire fighting media in CIL usage shall always be optimized to reduce the effect
on the environment.
• The fire protection systems are kept in a state of readiness which will act as the key
components of fire protection at the facility. These systems will come into operation
immediately during any emergency and will actuate before the response of the fire
crew.
• Containment of any spill and fire fighting facilities around the tank are in place to
extinguish any fire as early as possible
• The fire team is trained about the layout and hazards associated with the facility.
They will be stationed along with the Foam Tenders at MPT Fire station and at RGT
and shall approach only in upwind direction.
• In RGT, the slug catcher with significant inventory and condensate transfer pumps
(on account of large number of valves, flanges and piping) has the potential for leaks
as well as seal failures associated with the pumps. The ability to stop the pump from
a remote location isolates the inventory in case of such leakages. It is therefore
recommended that provision is made to stop each of the pumps from a remote
location in case of any exigency
• Shutting down crude pumping operation and isolation of affected section of Pipeline
(Shut upstream & downstream valves) minimizes potential for fire scenarios
• Fire team shall extend its efforts to mitigate the fire within the given possibilities
and available resources. In case of additional support, mutual help between MPT
and RGT fire teams will be sought by the respective Installation Managers. External
help from nearby agencies / District administration will be sought as required and
all out efforts will be made to control and extinguish the fire.
• The response time should be less than 4 minutes for MPT facilities and for the well
pad 1-18, it will be less than 12 minutes within RNAO.
[57]

• If the fire is beyond control, then the fire will be allowed to burn in a controlled
manner. However the affected facility will be isolated from producing / supplying
oil.
• Emergency Response plans are in place to control any fire incident within the
facility
• Adequate fire protection systems are installed at various stages of process
management to control minor fires. Enhanced fire protection systems are located at
oil separators, well heads, flare area and knock out area, diesel and condensate
settling tanks, electrical sub stations, buildings and chemical laboratory area. The
fire protection includes portable fire extinguishers, Inergen system, fire hydrant
systems, fire tenders at strategic locations within the facility
• Release of VOCs may result from evaporative losses during storage (typically
referred to as “breathing, storage, or flash losses” resulting from operational
activities such as filling, withdrawal and loading / unloading of transport links
(referred to as “working losses”), and due to leaks from seals, flanges, and other
types of equipment connections (known as “fugitive losses”). Additional emissions
may occur from vapour combustion units and vapour recovery units. Systems are in
place at most bulk fuel storage tanks, as well as aboveground piping and pump
systems to monitor emissions and to prevent and control the emission of VOCs from
storage and working losses.
• Where vapour emissions contribute or result in ambient air quality levels in excess
of health-based standards, installation of secondary emissions controls such as
vapour condensing and recovery units, catalytic oxidizers, vapour combustion units,
or gas adsorption media is recommended
• Periodic monitoring of fugitive emissions are to be carried out from pipes, valves,
seals, tanks and other infrastructure components with vapour detection equipment,
and with subsequent maintenance or replacement of components are in place.
• Training of all field personnel/contractor to detect leaks and identify potential
hazard at an early stage will serve as an important preventive measure in the long
run
3.2.3 PREVENTION OF OTHER MAN-MADE RISKS
War: The project area is about 150 km away from Munabo on the Indo –Pak border and
hence the chances of collateral damage during war are high. Cairn India has plans in place
for rapid evacuation of all project areas in case of early indications of war are received
Terrorism / Sabotage: Cairn India has undertaken security hardening measures in place
to deal with these incidents at all its assets in Rajasthan
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Risk of third party activities: With the rapid pace of urbanization and population
explosion, we expect a moderate increase in construction and infrastructure works along
our pipeline route. Hence one cannot rule out unauthorized excavation or construction
works by third parties close to our pipeline. To guard against such activities like
construction or digging up of ground close to our pipeline area which in any manner
damages or affect normal functioning of pipeline, pipeline markers have been placed all
along the length of pipeline and at important crossings indicating presence of pipeline.
Risk Management plans are in place for all risks listed above. Cairn will ensure a Permit to
Work and NOC regime is followed for any excavation works along the pipeline. Cairn
security and safety personnel will keep constantly monitoring for any illegal or
unauthorized activities along the pipe line route and take suitable actions to protect the
assets.
Pilferage: The risk of anti-social elements, including organised gangs, puncturing the
pipelines to pilfer oil and gas is also high. People with the mistaken belief that crude oil can
be used directly for domestic purposes can attempt to puncture the pipeline. Normal crude
oil is often pilfered for use in furnace oil for which it is a good substitute. However people
will not be aware of the properties of Cairn crude and attempt to tap into oil pipeline. There
have been instances of pilferage from other oil and gas pipelines in India and is a risk for
Cairn too. As the Cairn crude solidifies under ambient weather conditions, it may not pose
any serious threat either to the surrounding environment or the community. The Union
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gases is working on a legislation that would entail
prison term up to10 years to anyone found guilty of tampering with the pipeline.
Road Tanker related Emergencies: Prior to operational readiness of 24” heated pipeline
for exporting crude oil from MPT to various buyers in Gujarat, crude oil was transported
through road tankers from August 2009 to May 2010. Since June 2010, crude oil is being
transported via 24” heated export pipeline. Therefore, there are no road tanker related
emergencies pertaining to Cairn operations.
Domestic Fire: Barmer district has high frequency of fire accidents at homes. Hence
following precautions may be useful from community perspective or even for schools.
In the event of a fire:
• Sound alarm
• Call Fire, Police, and Medical services
• In case of minor fire, use the extinguisher or water spray
[59]

• If the fire goes out of control, then implement evacuation procedures to outside
Assembly Area
• Intimate immediately to District administration to coordinate with other line
departments.
• Implement plan for people needing special assistance
• Follow standard head counting procedures
• Arrange for first-aid and ambulance services as per need
• Do not re-enter building until the “all clear” signal is given
• Determine if arrangements need to be made for transportation to alternate location.
3.3 NATURAL DISASTERS
3.3.1 PREVENTIVE AND MITIGATION MEASURES FOR FLOODS
Barmer District has witnessed the flood situation during August - 2006 in Kawas and
surrounding areas. The Kawas town is situated approximately 7 KM away from Yennai’s
Loading Bay.
Actions for Flood Preparedness Following precautions have to be taken:-
• Mangala Processing Terminal ground level is approximately 1.0 meter higher than
Kawas area.
• The terminal is connected with a 60ft bitumen road which joins the NH-112 at a
distance of 2.5 KM.
• Around 1.2 meter height concreted Dyke wall/ Bund wall has been provided around
the storage tanks which will protect the tanks in case of flood as well as to contain
any spillage from flanges/ pipelines installed within the dyked area.
• The entire plant shall be shut down safely in case of any forecast of flood situation.
• Linkages with local government in Barmer and NGOs for disaster relief being
established to ensure pooling of resources and efforts for flood relief and mitigation
measures.
• Cairn will extend all possible help to the district administration in providing
temporary relief to the surrounding local villagers in case their dwellings are
marooned in the floods.
General tips for flood management
Flooding is usually caused by excessive rain with lack of proper drainage system; it could
be slow accumulation or rapid flash flooding.
• Ensure proper drainage and sewage system in and around the Cairn facilities and
for community habitation areas too.
[60]

• Cairn in coordination with District Administration shall monitor the flood situation
with updates from IMD and CWC
• Related timely alarm/early warning siren could be activated
• Ensure that power systems are shut down to avoid electrical accidents
• Monitor the flood situation and provide proper updation and counselling so as to
avoid panic and rumours
• Have inventory of rescue materials like spade, crowbar, ladder, rope, sand bags, etc
to handle floods
• Intimate Fire and rescue, police and medical departments as per need and ensure
safe assembly in elevated floors/ platforms
• Arrange proper evacuation and have safety verification and structural stability
before re-entry into buildings.
General Precautions for Flood
1) Follow the emergency plan for your staff and neighbourhood.
2) Activate first aid team including cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) trained
personnel.
3) Evacuate to safe zones during floods
4) Use the emergency kit with essential materials like water, dry food, first aid
material, etc.
Emergency Supply Kit:
It shall consist of:
• Purified water for drinking
• Food
• First aid kit
• Simple clothing set/ per person
• Simple bedding with warm blankets for winter
• Tarpaulin tent sheets
• Soap, towel and sanitary napkins
• Chlorine powder
Other Essential items
• Battery-powered AM/FM radio and spare batteries at workplace.
• Flashlight and spare batteries conforming to electrical area classification
• Hammer and nails, crowbar, pry bar, axe
• Mosquito repellent
• Plastic sheeting/tarpaulin
• Cutting pliers
[61]

• Rope, duct tape
• Small shovel
• Pen, marker, note pad
• Pocket knife
• Whistle
Family records and documents
• Cash/ Bank passbook
• Ration card
• Voting card
• Certificates-Birth, school, community
• Insurance policies
• Driving licence/ passports
3.3.2 EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS AND MITIGATION
After an earthquake a large number of people will be rendered homeless and will require
to be assembled at suitable places to administer the immediate basic needs of food, water,
clothing and medical care. It is expected that in an earthquake, injuries will exceed the
number of deaths. Also, if the earthquake occurs at night the numbers affected in both the
categories will be substantially more. Accordingly in earthquake planning this has been
taken into consideration for working out the expected casualties to provide adequate
medical cover. There would be high number of surgical cases in an earthquake and
therefore establishment of mobile hospitals/operation theatres have to be planned by the
district administration. Rescue and rehabilitation operations may be required which may
call for huge requirement of JCB excavators, earth movers and professional rescue teams.
According to NDMA Earthquake Guidelines, six pillars of earthquake management are
highlighted as follows:
• Ensure the incorporation of earthquake resistant design features for the
construction of new structures.
• Facilitate selective strengthening and seismic retrofitting of existing priority and
lifeline structures in earthquake-prone areas.
• Improve the compliance regime through appropriate regulation and enforcement.
• Improve the awareness and preparedness of all stakeholders.
• Introduce appropriate capacity development interventions for effective earthquake
management (including education, training, R&D, and documentation).
• Strengthen the emergency response capability in earthquake-prone areas.
[62]

Here CIL in coordination with district and state administration could take up the above
mentioned points for coordination and implementation follow-ups.
Further community awareness is imperative to tackle earthquakes and children in
particular need practical trainings because they may spend lot of their time in schools.
Earthquakes can strike without warning; the immediate need is to protect lives by taking
the best available cover. All other actions must wait until the tremor subsides. If persons
are protected from falling objects, they could be eventually evacuated to safe areas.
The following safety procedures are to be followed
If inside a building:
• Initiate Drop, Cover and Hold procedures
• If no cover is available, get against inside doorway or crouch against inside wall and
cover head; stay away from outside walls, windows or other expanses of glass,
potential falling objects
• Leave doors open to minimize jamming if the building shifts
• Do not attempt to run through building or outside due to risk of falling objects
• If in a room with no desks or furniture, get against inside wall or inside doorway and
crouch
• After initial shock, initiate evacuation and standard accounting procedures
If outside in open areas:
• Move quickly away from building and overhead electrical wires
• Lie flat, face down, and wait for shocks to subside
• Do not attempt to enter building until authorized to do so
• Do not light fires or touch fallen wires
Identification of safe assembly Areas:
• Earthquake safe areas will be away from the building and overhead power lines
• Keep everyone away from underground gas and sewer lines
• Call Fire, Police, and Medical services
• In the event of aftershocks, staff or community shall be encouraged to remain
calm and stay sitting close to the ground
• Administer emergency first aid as needed
• Do not re-enter building until given “all clear” from person in charge
General Precautions to be taken:
1. Follow the emergency plan for your staff and neighbourhood.
2. Conduct search and rescue
[63]

3. Provide first aid for the injured
4. Assemble at safe places place during an earthquake
5. Take cover in safe places; like under heavy tables or desks; inside hallways; corners
of rooms or strong archways.
6. Avoid dangerous places like; near windows or mirrors; under any heavy objects
that can fall; the kitchen where the stove, refrigerator or contents of cupboards may
fall on you; doorways where the shaking may slam the door on you.
Measures to be taken:
(a) Cairn Team
• Follow the “Drop-Cover-Hold” procedure and follow safe evacuation
• Turn off the water and electricity.
• Evacuate to safe ground
• Conduct head count to ascertain safety of all personnel
• Use the emergency supply kit which contains the following
• Water Bottles
• Food
• First aid kit
• Simple clothing set/ per person
• Simple bedding with warm blankets for winter
• Tarpaulin tent sheets
• Soap, towel and sanitary napkins
• Chlorine powder
Other Essential items
• Class ABC fire extinguisher (make sure everybody knows how to use it)
• Keep a battery-powered AM/FM radio and spare batteries at workplace and at
home
• Flashlight and spare batteries conforming to electrical area classification. Have
spare batteries in each location
• Hammer and nails, crowbar, pry bar, axe (spare pry bar should also be stored
outside in tool-shed or garage)
• Mosquito repellent
• Plastic sheeting/tarpaulin
• Cutting pliers
• Rope, duct tape
• Small shovel
• Pen, marker, note pad
• Pocket knife
[64]

• Whistle
(b) Neighbourhood Community - Assess the level of hazard and accordingly take the
evacuation steps in coordination with district administration
• Follow the “Drop-Cover-Hold” procedure and follow safe evacuation
• Conduct head count to ascertain safety
• The following family records and documents should be carried out.
• Cash/ Bank passbook
• Ration card
• Voting card
• Certificates-Birth, school, community
• Insurance policies
• Driving licence/ passports
3.3.3 OTHER PREPAREDNESS MEASURES
Wind and Sand storm
Sand storm is recurrent throughout the year in the operational region and it may impact
the business continuity also. So some safety measures like reduction in transport, personal
protection like wearing goggles and face masks could be promoted.
Drought and Famine
Drought is perennial in this region. Effective water management and counter strategies are
already adopted by community based organisations.
Biological Hazards
Epidemic diseases are likely to create havoc. Hence preparedness is required. The major
factor in controlling the spread of diseases is information and awareness of the community
about disease. The community should be made aware of the following
• Types of diseases prevalent in the region and their symptoms
• Contact numbers and addresses of nearby community/primary health care centre
• Basic hygiene training (like washing hands, boiling water, etc.) to prevent diseases
such as dysentery and cholera
General Precautions during Epidemic
1. Follow basic hygiene procedures like regularly washing hands with soap
2. Avoid or minimize contact with infected persons
3. Always wash hands after handling any of the patient’s belongings
[65]

4. Cover your mouth and nose when coughing or sneezing.
5. Only give food and medicines to the patients as prescribed by the doctor/nurse
6. Drink only purified (boiled and filtered) water
3.4 TRAINING NEEDS ANALYSIS
The advanced fire fighting and SCBA training shall be imparted to identified group of
personnel who will act as a fire response team to fight the fires. A basic fire fighting
training is compulsory to all employees, consultants, contract personnel and catering staff
in order to have a fundamental knowledge of first aid fire fighting and to respond to the
fires in the incipient stage. There shall be regular mock drills once a month. IM shall be
responsible for conducting the drills on regular basis. Field HSE team shall be responsible
for maintaining records of the drills. Besides this, CIL could also consider participatory
training for neighbourhood community.
[66]

CHAPTER
4
4 MAINSTREAMING DM CONCERNS INTO
DEVELOPMENTAL PLANS/PROGRAMMES
4.1 DISASTER DEVELOPMENT CONTINUUM
Natural disasters occur when societies or communities are exposed to potentially
hazardous events, emanating from both natural hazards such as extremes of rainfall,
temperature, sandstorm, tectonic movements, and human/ industry induced hazards like
gas/oil pipeline leakage or tank fire or well blowout or any other chemical leakages.
Reducing the number and effects of nature induced or industry triggered disasters means
consolidating development gains which in turn promotes sustainability. With increasing
frequency of disasters, countries face situations in which scarce resources that were
earmarked to development projects have to be diverted for relief and reconstruction.
Disaster is defined as a cause and product of failed development, outlining the relationship
between the two concepts i.e. ‘disaster’ and ‘development’. Sustainable Development is
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the
concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding
priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and
social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs
(Brundtland Commission report, 1987). Disasters and development are inversely related as
evident in the following facts:
4.1.1 DISASTERS AFFECT DEVELOPMENT
Disasters resulting from natural hazards killed on an average more than 60,000 people
each year between 1992 and 2001. They affected on an average 211 million people per
year (1991-2000) through damage to homes, property, crops, livestock and local
infrastructure. Associated economic losses from major disasters currently exceed US $90
billion a year; this excludes losses from to small and medium scale disasters. Some single
[67]

disaster impacts result in economic losses in excess of national Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), generating negative growth as witnessed in the case of Indian Ocean Tsunami of
2004.
The number of people affected indirectly by disasters, for example by rising prices or losses
to livelihoods caused by adverse economic consequences is incalculable. Additionally,
disasters (small, medium and large) erode the gains of social welfare. Lack of disaster risk
considerations in the recovery following major disasters leads to investing in “construction
and reconstruction of risk” thereby perpetuating unsustainable human development.
Poverty alleviation, good governance and other sustainable development activities in line
with the Millennium Development Goals (placed by United Nations in 2000) are challenged
owing to compounding disaster losses and risks.
4.1.2 DEVELOPMENT AFFECTS DISASTERS
Developing countries are hit hardest by disasters. Between 1992 and 2001, 96 per cent
deaths from natural disasters were reported in countries classified by the UNDP as medium
and low on human development. Over the same period, 98 per cent of those directly
affected lived in these countries. While only 11 per cent of the people exposed to natural
hazards live in countries with low levels of human development, they account for more
than 53 per cent of total recorded deaths.
Levels of development and disaster risks of a country are clearly, closely linked.
Appropriate development policies, by factoring disaster risk concerns, can help reduce
disaster losses, protect existing development gains and avoid new risks. Disaster- sensitive
development policies can thus, help in the achievement of the Millennium Development
Goals. For example a study conducted on the impacts of disaster portrays nearly: 12 % of
national revenue is lost in disaster response, 2 % of Gross Domestic Product is eroded due
to disasters and 6 % of population are affected by Disasters either directly or indirectly.
The growing body of knowledge on the relationships between disasters and development
indicates four basic themes. These themes are captured in the Figure given below.
[68]

(- +)
Development can increase
vulnerability
Development Realm
Development can decrease
vulnerability
(- +)
Negative
Realm
Disaster can set back
development.
Disasters can provide development
opportunities.
Positive
Realm
(- -)
Disaster Realm
(+ -)
FIGURE 16: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISASTERS AND DEVELOPMENT
Source: UNDP, India
4.2 NEGATIVE REALM
Disasters set back development programme destroying years of development
initiatives.
The examples in this realm include infrastructure destroyed by flood or drought which
predominantly affect rural economy and similarly, earthquake or Industrial Disaster may
affect urban economy. We can take the example of Bhopal Gas tragedy which has affected
millions of people and the people are still battling over litigation and compensation issues.
The Mexican Gulf oil spill recently involving British Petroleum has a huge impact on
environment and the full scale of impact is yet to be ascertained. BP is overall spending
nearly US $30 billion for overall Disaster response consisting of compensation and
environmental cleanup.
Artificial embankments along rivers restrict the natural movement of rivers and prevent
spill -over onto the floodplains during monsoons. Human settlements come up on these
low-lying floodplains. Often during the monsoon season, very heavy rainfall along with
release of water from reservoirs upstream lead to rivers breaching their embankments and
flooding human settlements.
[69]

4.3 POSITIVE REALM
Rebuilding after a disaster provides significant opportunities to initiate
development programmes
The ownership-driven housing reconstruction programmes initiated by the Government of
Gujarat after the 2001 Gujarat earthquake helped build local community’s skills in safer
reconstruction and strengthened community leadership. After the 2004 tsunami, several
state governments in India expressed that the disaster presented them with an opportunity
to apply the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) notification. This would help them regulate
development activities and land-use along India’s coasts in the area falling within 500
meters of the high tide line and in the inter-tidal zone, by rebuilding coastal villages out of
the immediate CRZ. It is said that every disaster is an opportunity to improve the resilience
and safety of communities. It provides opportunities to overall revamp the mitigation
efforts to prevent future disasters from happening.
4.4 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES ADDRESSING DRR
There are a number of ongoing development initiatives of the Government of India that
have included components to help reduce disaster vulnerability. Some of these are:
• Integrated Wasteland Development Programme (IWDP)
• Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP)
• Desert Development Programme (DDP)
• Flood Control Programmes
• National A forestation and Eco development Programme (NA&ED)
• National Rural Health Mission (NHRM)
• Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM)
• National Cyclone Mitigation Project
• National Programme for Capacity Building of Engineers in Earthquake Risk
Management (NPCBEERM)
[70]

• National Programme for Capacity Building of Architects in Earthquake Risk
Management (NPCBAERM)
• Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP)
• Crop Insurance
• Indira Awaz Yojana (IAY)
• Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rojgar Yojana (SJSRY)
• Sampoorna Grameen Rojgar Yojana (SGRY)
• Food for Work
4.5 ROLE OF CIL
Now taking cue from the disaster-development linkage, it is pertinent to address the
mainstreaming disaster management in to all facets of development. It is not enough to
merely address the short term disaster management with stand alone programmes. Both
government agencies and CIL may be required to work together on long term
developmental issues in Barmer region which is backward, socially and economically. It is
an opportunity to mainstream sustainable development and disaster management
concerns into development. This could cover building disaster resilient schools, better
water management, improving green cover, improvising livelihood programmes for youth
and poor, promoting gender equity, etc. Finally what is most important is to inculcate the
‘culture of safety’ among people.
4.5.1 CIL DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES
CIL has already initiated number of development programmes through its CSR wing in
Barmer district. According to the Human Development Report of 2009, it is recorded and
appreciated that CIL is able to make meaningful developmental impacts. The extract is
stated below:
“Cairns when set its foot on the soil of Barmer to explore oil, it took projects under
Corporate Social Responsibility and its dairy project is one the major programme. The
breed improvement programme, which is a part of the Dairy initiative, was also launched
with the presentation of a good breed bull to one of the Self Help Groups. The project aims
to increase the income of rural milk producers by facilitating the establishment of a
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collection network of milk in the villages and bulk milk sales to the end user and thus
providing the farmers an assured and remunerative outlet for their milk production.
“For us it is like fortune has knocked upon our door,” said Mukna Ram a resident of village
Raawli Naadi where the dairy collection centre had started making it the fifth village
connected to the project. As part of IFC- Cairn India Linkage Programme, activities have
been started to support the dairy development initiative in a number of villages in the
Barmer district. The NGO– Society to Uplift Rural Economy (SURE), Barmer- is responsible
for implementing the programme.
4.5.2 CIVIL SOCIETY PARTNERSHIP
CIL has been proactively engaging civil society partners for various developmental
programmes and now it is initiating vulnerability reduction and risk management as part
of disaster management.
Due to the high incidence of fires in the settlements, emphasis is being laid by local NGOs in
partnership with CIL on the protection of life and property from fire. SURE has initiated a
programme to build fire-proof huts using local materials and incorporating indigenous
knowledge and traditional practices. This fire proofing scheme have been initiated in two
villages as a pilot project. SURE and Dhara Sansthan are also working on raising awareness
among community about fire safety and fire prevention measures.
During the flood of 2006, the local NGOs and Cairn jointly contributed to rescue, relief and
rehabilitation. Cairn provided boats and helicopters to rescue stranded people. They also
initiated relief measures like providing food, water, sanitation and temporary shelter.
Dhara Sansthan prepared a damage assessment report on the impact of disaster on
community.
[72]

CHAPTER
5
5 PREPAREDNESS MEASURES
Disaster preparedness is the key to prevent and mitigate major disasters. As the saying
goes every hazard does not have to turn in to a disaster what divides them is the level of
preparedness. Here, the community participation and involvement in all phases of disaster
management is essential.
5.1 RESOURCES AVAILABILITY
Resource Inventory (personnel and equipments) and contingency plan are pertinent part
of preparedness. For example in India Disaster Resource Network (IDRN) various Disaster
Management related resource information is collated and shared at national and state
levels. IDRN is an online inventory designed as a decision making tool for the government
administrators and crisis managers to coordinate effective emergency response operations
in the shortest possible time (http://www.idrn.gov.in).
An inventory of resources available at Cairn and district level was carried out and is
provided in Appendix E. This DMP plan suggests that inventory of resources shall be
periodically updated and uploaded in both Cairn and Barmer District administration
websites respectively.
5.2 COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN DISASTER PREPAREDNESS
It is imperative to have community involvement in the Disaster Management Plan with
focus on all phases of disaster management: Pre-disaster, during disaster and post disaster
phases. CIL already has strong community linkages through its Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) programmes as stated in the previous chapter. This community base
could be used with participatory approaches to address the hazards and risk factors as part
of disaster management plan. Here the community-based disaster management (CBDM)
model could be used extensively as a part of comprehensive Disaster Management vis-a-vis
CIL operations.
[73]

5.2.1 NEED FOR COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
Community participation in disaster risk reduction is one of the key factors in reducing
vulnerability and increasing resilience of people. Analyses of response to past disasters
could be useful for review and preventive action. This has resulted in developing
mechanisms to mitigate disasters at the grassroots level through participation of
communities. Communities being the first responder and having more contextual
familiarity with hazards and available resources are in better position in planning and
executing immediate rescue and relief actions. In areas that have experienced repeated
disasters, the communities are realizing that they need to work out a plan to prevent losses
and at the same time enable faster recovery in the event of an emergency situation. To
convert this realization into an effective plan, they need guidelines which will help them to
prepare their own Community Based Disaster Management plans to safeguard lives,
livelihood and property.
PHOTOGRAPH 7: COMMUNITY CONSULTATION
AT JOGASAR KUAN
PHOTOGRAPH 6: CONSULTATION WITH
VILLAGE HEAD AND MEMBERS
5.2.2 SALIENT FEATURES OF CBDM
The primary goal of CBDM is to reduce vulnerability of the concerned community and
strengthen its existing capacity to cope with disasters. The approach of preparing the
CBDM plans should be facilitated by government and civil society organisations with
people’s participation as a necessary pre-requisite for disaster management. By involving
the community in the preparedness phase, it not only increases the likelihood of
coordinated-action by the communities to help in mitigating disasters but also brings the
community together to address the issue collectively. There are evidences of collective and
coordinated action yielding good results and to a great extent it has been effective in
lessening the impact of disaster.
[74]

5.2.3 COMPONENTS FOR CBDM
a. Formation of Village Disaster Management Committee (VDMC)
VDMC can be ideally formed in each village which is prone to multihazards for initiating
disaster preparedness activities. It consists of local elected representatives, grass root level
government functionaries, local Non-Government Organisations (NGOs)/Community Based
Organizations (CBOs), members of youth groups such as the National Service Scheme (NSS)
and Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangatan (NYKS), women groups, youth club members, grass root
level government functionaries, etc. The size of VDMC is based on the population and need
of the villagers. The head of the VDMC takes a lead in mobilizing the community for the
preparation of the CBDP plans.
b. Review & Analysis of Past Disasters:
It refers to prioritizing disasters based on its frequency and analysis of past Disasters and
the estimated losses. This can be carried out by taking the help of elderly people of the
village. The villagers analyze the losses that they had incurred during various disasters and
learn the best practices carried out. This is an important activity as it forms the basis for
preparedness and mitigation plans.
c. Seasonality Calendar of Disasters
While analyzing the past experiences pertaining to various natural disasters, communities
develop the seasonality calendar based on the occurrence of disaster events.
d. Mapping Exercises
One of the most important activities of the CBDP is the mapping of risk, vulnerabilities and
capacities of the village by the community itself. This is done through Participatory Rural
Appraisal (PRA) exercise. It aims to provide a pictorial base to the planning process
especially for the semi – literate populace and ensures maximum community involvement
across gender, caste, class and other divides. The mapping excercise includes: a) Social
Mapping, b) Resource Mapping, c) Risk and Vulnerability Mapping d) Opportunity Mapping
and e) Evacuation Routes Mapping
5.2.4 CULTURE OF PREVENTION
With the ever increase in the number of disasters causing huge loss to life and property,
the urgency of developing a culture of prevention is of prime importance. The culture of
prevention harnesses human potential with adequate skill, knowledge and confidence to
cope with the severe impacts of various hazards. Experiences have shown that some of the
[75]

most successful risk reduction initiatives have involved communities in understanding the
risk of that locality and designing appropriate preparedness and response plan. The
Community Based Disaster Management Plan (CBDM) transforms vulnerable groups into
disaster resilient communities. NGOs play a key role in facilitating and supporting the
community in the development of Community Based Disaster Management Plans to built
disaster resilient communities.
5.3 CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF COMMUNITY BASED DISASTER
MANAGEMENT
Normally CBDM programme needs to include the following elements in its design,
adaptation and implementation:
Participation: It is necessary to involve community members in the entire cycle of disaster
management: risk assessment, preparedness and mitigation, and response. Community
participation in decision-making and implementation increases the programme ownership
and benefits and brings accountability.
Inclusiveness: The programme needs to target the most vulnerable sectors and groups,
along with other communities. Including social groups with least access to resources has an
empowering impact. The vulnerable groups include women, children, elderly, people with
disabilities, chronically ill, etc.
Responsiveness: The programme needs to be based on the community’s felt and urgent
needs. It should consider the community’s perception and prioritisation of disaster risks,
and risk reduction measures so that the community can be fully prepared for response
coordination during emergencies.
Integrated: It needs to have an integrated approach under which pre-, during and postdisaster
measures are planned and implemented as necessary by the community. It also
requires an inter-sectoral and multi-disciplinary (water conservation, livelihood
enhancement, safe shelters, etc.) approach for sustainable solutions.
Proactive: The programme needs to follow a proactive approach emphasizing pre-disaster
measures of prevention, mitigation and preparedness. It should encompass structural and
non-structural measures, with emphasis on regulation, education, training, and capacitybuilding.
Cairn is making significant contribution to various community based programmes. One of
the significant problems faced in Barmer district is perennial drought situation. To address
the water shortage problem rain water harvesting model is initiated with community
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participation. Here either ‘tanka’ or ‘nadi’ (artificial storage pond) is created to store water
during rainy season. CIL is supporting such programmes wherever possible in villages
adjoining Barmer district.
Similarly biological hazards like H1N1 Pandemic Influenza, malaria, etc are handled with
community awareness through circulation of IEC material in vernacular languages, regular
medical camps are organised, and preventive steps are taken by district administration and
CAIRN- CSR team. During the brief meeting with office of Chief Medical and Health
department, it is learnt that many awareness programmes are conducted for community
health preparedness. The district health department is conducting regular Integrated
Disease Surveillance Programmes (IDSP) to combat any epidemic outbreak. There nearly
14 Community Health Centres and 60 Primary Health Centres in Barmer district. Some of
the specific recommendations provided by the district medical and health services are to
increase the ambulances, X-ray machines, trained staff in orthopaedic and gynaecology.
Road safety is another concern, since transport vehicles have increased manifold in the
Barmer district. It has been reported that many accidents do take place involving
significant number of persons. Hence a need is felt to improve road safety awareness of the
vehicle drivers as well as the community members in Barmer district.
Community level fire accidents are recurrent phenomena in and around Barmer district,
for this strong community preparedness is the key. Community awareness on preventing
house fire is important; besides this, fire resilient shelter construction practices could be
promoted among the community members.
5.4 CONDITIONS FOR CBDM
Social Consciousness: It is necessary that local people see themselves and their communities
as central to effective disaster management and expect to have a say in the development of
local policies and programmes. Social consciousness regarding hazards, risks and disasters
in a more inclusive context of community living and sharing natural resources is an
essential pre-condition for a successful intervention.
Social Organisation: A shared perception of risk and vulnerability brings people together,
leading to formation of non-governmental or community-based organisations. NGOs or
community organisations develop and implement preparedness and mitigation
programmes and promote self-reliance, mutual aid, community obligations through these
programmes.
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Access to Resources: One of the most important conditions is access to resources for
households and communities. It is necessary that adequate financial support is made
available through NGOs, government or financial institutions for implementing a
programme and making it sustainable. It is also important to recognise that other
programmes too have resources, methods, skills and knowledge that complement disaster
management.
Adaptive to Innovations: Local people have knowledge, skills and capacities which they can
use for making necessary changes and adjustments in their living conditions and
environment. These community capabilities need to be harnessed for improving their
preparedness and mitigation measures.
Institutional Framework and Accountability: Such a framework lays down regulations for
sharing and use of natural resources and living spaces, and how transparency could be
brought in the entire process of implementation. Accountability is necessary to ensure that
even at local level there is a culture of compliance with norms, statutes, and codes.
Setting up a Community-Disaster Management Plan: Through an incremental approach,
communities need to be guided through small and definite steps towards disaster risk
reduction. It may not be a grand plan. The programme needs to build upon community’s
experiences, and the available internal support and resources.
Community-specific risk reduction measures: Focus on risk and vulnerability to which the
community is particularly exposed. The community needs to establish its own structures
and processes to reduce their risks.
Reliance on Community’s Resilience and Capacity: Recognise community’s resilience and
capacity in terms of resources, skills, networks and social organisations which a
community can use in responding to a disaster.
5.5 RISK KNOWLEDGE
Risk knowledge is foundational cornerstone for community resilience. The awareness
about risk, vulnerability and capacity in the form of existing resources are essential for
community resilience. As the saying goes ‘to know risk = no risk’, therefore the community
members require full orientation on the potential risks and hazards they may be exposed,
so that accordingly the community can be encouraged to be prepared for multihazards.
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5.6 DISASTER RISK REDUCTION STRATEGIES
5.6.1 FINANCIAL AND LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES
Community needs to avail financial services to their households—savings, credit, and
insurance to cope up with the impact of any major Disaster. Many households borrow,
more do save, and all seek informal, if not formal, insurance. The choice of these services
depends upon the household situation. Credit is obtained more for economic activities, and
helps to reduce risk (income smoothing). Savings can provide more efficient self-insurance
to help mitigate and cope with risk (consumption smoothing). Formal insurance may not
be affordable for the lower income households, but they seek insurance through their
savings and other physical assets as part of risk transfer. People have been provided
financial resources for income-generation activities largely in the context of either post
disaster situation or even in the predisaster context. Such an access to financial services
often helps people to diversify their income-earning opportunities.
5.6.2 MICROFINANCE
Microfinance services are targeted at poor households, who are excluded from the formal
banking sector. The timing of introducing microfinance for the affected communities is
critical. Though microfinance is strongly linked to poverty alleviation efforts for more than
a decade, its potential for helping households in crisis or disaster situations has been
recognized.
Multiple income-earning opportunities and asset-building through microfinance help poor
households in dealing with disasters better. Besides, MFIs provide temporary loans,
postpone debt repayment and allow clients to withdraw their savings to cope with
disasters and sustain their consumption.
5.6.3 INSURANCE
The insurance coverage of vulnerable and low income populace is usually very thin. The
small number of policyholders and the limited geographical area in which insurance
companies operate make it very difficult for them to spread their risks. If the insurance is
provided on a group basis, it can enlarge the risk pool and provide insurance at affordable
price. As some of the recent disasters have shown (Orissa Super cyclone, Gujarat earth
quake, Indian Ocean tsunamis, Kashmir earthquake or recurrent floods) the catastrophic
risk insurance is still far beyond the reach of economically vulnerable population. Hence a
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proactive risk transfer mechanism in the form group insurance scheme can be promoted for
the risk prone communities in and around CIL operations.
5.6.4 SOCIAL FUNDS
Social funds have established themselves as important instruments for social protection in
disaster management context. Generally, social funds are not coping instruments. Instead,
they are most widely known for their investments in social infrastructure, particularly
health, education, water supply, and sanitation. Social funds at present are not sufficiently
broad-based to cover a large number of risk reduction measures. However, as social funds
increase their scope of functioning, they could be used for supporting community-based
disaster preparedness and mitigation. Already CIL through its CSR initiatives is able to
provide social infrastructure / development programmes. Now it can be fine tuned towards
Disaster Risk Reduction.
For engaging the community the following steps are to be taken:
Step 1: Initial awareness building to the community
Step 2: Formation of Task force
Step 3: Participatory learning and action
Step 4: Task force Training
Step 5: Developing Disaster Preparedness Plan
Step 6: Assign responsibilities for the task force and its sub teams
Step 7: Conduct Mock Drills & Simulation Exercise
Step 8: Provide necessary equipments and Links with the Local Body
Step 9: Ensure sustainability on long term mitigation programmes
Step 10: Revision of CBDP plan every year as a need based
5.7 SUPPORT BY EXTERNAL ACTORS
Besides CAIRN’s CSR programmes the community needs to seek the support of district
administration, NGOs and experts. Though the community remains the principal actor, it
always requires the support of external agencies for resources, knowledge, and expertise to
tackle natural and as well as human/ industrial induced hazards.
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Local Stakeholders: As part of community based approach CAIRN could synergise with
other local stakeholders as follows:
5.7.1 NEHRU YUVA KENDRA:
The Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangatan is an autonomous body affiliated with Ministry of Youth
Affairs and Sports. In Barmer district it is reasonably active and it has nearly 325 village
level NYK clubs with 20 to 30 members each. The age criterion for membership in NYK is
between 18 to 35 years, which is potentially useful for disaster management volunteers.
Already NYK is conducting few blood donation camps and community programmes. CAIRN
in collaboration with district administration could promote disaster management training
and awareness programmes.
5.7.2 NSS, NCC, RANGERS/ROVERS AND SCOUTS/ GUIDES:
The Education department promotes community services and volunteerism among
students through National Service Scheme (NSS), National Cadet Corps (NCC) and Bharat
Scouts and Guides. CAIRN and district administration could use this youth organisations for
disaster management. As of now disaster management trainings are yet to be initiated for
them. Many teachers are part of Civil Defence, which is useful resource. Meeting the NSS
Coordinators at MBC Government Girls College, it is learnt that two NSS units with 200 NSS
Volunteers are trained in each college. They have taken part in Barmer flood relief work in
2006. Apart from relief and food aid they have addressed post flood malaria and
chikungunya outbreak. In addition they have worked in drought and famine as well. The
PG Government College has 3 units of NSS Volunteers and two more government colleges
have 2 units each. So overall six units of NSS volunteers are available which is potentially
useful to promote disaster management awareness and preparedness among the
community members.
5.7.3 CIVIL DEFENCE:
The Barmer district Civil Defence is coordinated with Border Home Guards. There are
nearly 836 volunteers trained in fire fighting, search and rescue and other community
activities. The civil defence volunteers are pooled from Doctors, Nurses, Teachers and
Police. This could be used by CIL for any fire emergency and community coordination. The
Civil Defence has one fire tender has 3600 litre capacity of water and 1800 litres of foam. It
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has six member team consisting of one lead fireman, four fire fighters and one driver. Any
emergency communication has to be routed through police control room or district
administration.
5.7.4 HOME GUARDS:
The Barmer district Urban Home Guards is manned by one deputy Commander, two
Platoon Commanders, one Head Constable and two constables. It has nearly 360
volunteers. As of now only basic training is given on search and rescue. It requires more
detailed training on disaster management and mitigation.
5.7.5 BARMER MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION
PHOTOGRAPH 8: DURING THE DMP
PRESENTATION MEETING AT BARMER
COLLECTORATE
PHOTOGRAPH 9: DMP PRESENTATION BEING
MADE BY EGSS AT BARMER COLLECTORATE
9 th September 2010
9 th September 2010
It has done minimum disaster preparedness and mitigation activities to tackle hazards.
Nevertheless the municipal administration has fire response mechanism consist of two fire
vans manned by six firemen and three drivers. The recommendation given by them is
primarily to upgrade the Fire and Rescue services. Additional feature is that Emergency
ambulance ‘108’ system is working well with 4 such ambulance plying regularly.
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5.7.6 DISTRICT ZILLA PARISHAD
The Chairperson recommended that disaster management has to be holistic and integrated
in which livelihood, water and developmental issues has to be connected with it. She
opined the need for disaster management trainings and awareness programmes at village
level, especially for women.
5.7.7 JESAI ARMY COMMAND, RAJASTHAN
It is one of the front line army posts bordering Pakistan. Because of sensitivity this army
command centre has good fire safety standby systems. They have 8 fire tenders each with a
capacity of 3200 litres water, 425 litres foam, 2 cylinders each of 22.5 kg of CO2, 75 kg of
DCP. These are available with multiple fire dousing facilities as part of preparedness
measures undertaken at his command base, especially the fire safety measures and fire
tender vehicles with multiple capacities. Each truck is manned by 6 people of which 1 is the
driver, 1 is the head fireman and 4 fire men. Most of the trucks are conventional two wheel
drive vehicles. The following suggestions can be adopted for better coordination: (i) to
have a civilian phone connection for coordination with district administration for any
emergency situation and (ii) to simplify the coordination procedure between CIL and Army
unit for emergency coordination. In this regard the Rajasthan State government can
facilitate a direct communication facility by simplifying the procedures for coordination
and emergency management between CAIRN and Army command.
5.8 OPERATIONAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
CIL shall have the means to independently deal with all on-site emergencies. These are
identified as potential occurrences in the designated areas within the State of Rajasthan
that are legally placed under the sole jurisdiction and control of CIL.
CIL has developed and implemented a site specific Incident Response Plan (IRP) for its
various facilities in the State of Rajasthan. The purpose of the IRP is to provide guidance to
personnel based at the site who are appointed to the Incident Response Team (IRT) on the
actions to be taken in the event of an incident or emergency. It details the procedures to be
followed by members of the IRT to ensure a prompt and efficient response, should an
incident or emergency situation occur. IRT organisations are staffed by site personnel who
are assigned and trained in their respective emergency roles and responsibilities.
The IRP is complemented by the Rajasthan Operations Fire Contingency Plan the intent of
which is to provide the Forward Control Team or Incident Response Team (IRT) with all
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necessary details, data and tactical procedures to enable facility based personnel to
expeditiously deal with fire related emergencies in their early stages.
The Incident Response Team will be composed of Field Managers, Supervisors and
personnel based at the site who will be on call at all times while on location for their tour of
duty. Personnel who form an IRT will be informed of their responsibilities and trained in
their role.
If an incident or emergency situation develops, the site IRT will be mobilised, and
depending on circumstances at the time, resources from adjacent facilities will be called
upon to provide assistance.
This IRP contains Incident Management Guides (IMG’s) based on the most likely incidents
that may occur; these IMG’s are provided as an aid for those involved with managing
incidents or emergency situations.
5.8.1 MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF EMERGENCIES
The Site / Installation Manager (or authorised deputy) shall assume command and control
of any emergency occurring within the respective facility in southern/ northern area of
operations. Details of the IRT member’s roles and responsibilities are covered in the
respective IRP. All personnel based in or visiting the site are to be briefed on the
emergency procedures and advised of their responsibilities.
Mitigation measures have been deployed at sites to protect personnel, equipment and
property from the effects of fire and explosion. The site Safety Induction covers the rules to
be followed by employees, contractors and visitors in case of an emergency at any one of
the locations within Cairn operational facility.
Control measures employed to limit or prevent the escalation of accidents, incidents and
hazards include, but are not limited to:
• Remotely operated equipment such as ESD and blow-down systems, specific to
the area.
• Deployment of the Forward Response Team, if it is safe to do so, to proceed to
the incident and manually operate equipment, e.g. isolation valves.
• Remote operation of equipment and co-ordination of the Forward Response
Team is carried out by personnel located in the Incident Control Centre.
In all foreseeable circumstances, the prior preparedness arrangements are made for
incident response and the management of emergencies. These arrangements will ensure, as
far as is reasonably practicable, the safety of all persons involved or connected with them
and prevent damage to equipment and the environment.
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These arrangements include:
• Planning for emergencies.
• Incident prevention, detection, control and mitigation measures.
• Manual intervention.
• Informing relevant personnel of what their emergency response roles are.
• Informing all personnel of hazardous conditions; their response and accounting
for all personnel following an incident.
• Partial or full terminal evacuation.
• Fire fighting and rescue.
• Co-ordination of the response and the co-operation of all those involved.
• External Support and response.
FIGURE 17: ORGANISATION LINKS FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN CIL
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These arrangements extend to the Cairn Gurgaon Emergency Management Team (EMT) so
that they will respond promptly if additional logistical, medical, environmental, media or
business continuity assistance is required.
The formation of Incident Response Organisations for Rajasthan is fundamentally the same
for all sites and facilities. The site Incident Control and Forward Response organisations
and numbers are determined by the size of the facility and the location of the site and
organisation in relationship to the Rajasthan Emergency Response Team and Supporting
groups. Figure 14 presents the Organisational links for Emergency Management.
5.8.2 PREPARATION AND PLANNING
Cairn Management is cognisant of its obligations under the various statutory regulations to
identify, and manage all hazards and their risks associated with Rajasthan upstream
operations and put in place control measures to reduce these risks to 'As Low as
Reasonably Practicable' (ALARP) levels.
The overriding strategy in this regard is to accord paramount importance to the
preservation of life and the prevention of injury. Accordingly, the safety of personnel,
including those directly responding to the incident, will take priority over environmental,
property and business considerations.
5.8.3 SUFFICIENT COMPETENT PERSONNEL
Cairn Senior Management and their site managers have an obligation to ensure sufficient
competent personnel are available to cover the roles identified in the site Incident
Response organisation. All personnel on the upstream operations’ site will be competent to
respond, as appropriate, to emergencies. This can vary from responding to alarms and
simple instructions and going to a muster station, to assessing complex situations, taking
correct decisions and allocating tasks.
Selection, Training and Competency Assessment
A formal process exists for the selection of personnel for critical emergency roles. This
selection process includes a formal assessment of competency. Details of the training,
competency and assessment are contained in the Rajasthan Incident Response Plan.
All personnel working at the Rajasthan upstream operations facilities shall receive
appropriate instruction on how they will respond to emergencies. This is briefly covered in
the site Safety Induction process as well.
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5.8.4 DETECTION OF INCIDENTS
Incidents and potential incidents are detected primarily by either:
• Fire and Gas Detection System
• Automatic detection of process deviations or leaks
• Personnel at site
The site’s Automatic detection systems are described in the site safety induction booklet.
Instruction on the correct procedure for raising alarms is provided through site Safety
Induction training and contained in Permit-to-Work and other related procedures.
Personnel are trained on manually raising alarms - e.g. manual alarm call points, by
telephoning or calling by radio to the site control centres.
5.8.5 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS
Reliable communications equipment and support are available for use during an
emergency situation and enable communications to be made throughout the Rajasthan
Field with neighbouring sites, the regional emergency centre and Gurgaon. The radio
centre will be located in a dedicated facility within the operating site.
Communication facilities are available at the radio centre include the following:
• UHF radios
• HF Single Side band (SSB) facility in MPT and RGT control room for interfacing
with Midstream operations.
• Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) phones in all well pads, Sub-stations and
other office buildings.
• Analog phones at all well pads and production facilities
• Mobile phones (outside the rig / operations sites)
• Public Address and General Alarm (PAGA) System at well pads.
• General Alarm System (as part of PAGA) with 3 different tones signifying
emergency categories.
• Emergency siren.
Details of emergency numbers and contacts are found in Appendix A of this document.
During any incident, it is essential that the MPT communications centre be manned by a
competent radio operator, who is responsible for maintaining communications with all
sections of the IRT and the ERT and for passing on information as required to the Incident
Controller.
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All personnel who are issued with communications equipment such as UHF Radios must be
competent in its use and familiar with emergency communications procedures such as
usable channels, telephone and alternative systems and procedures if primary system fails
to raise help.
5.8.6 MEDICAL FACILITIES AND SUPPORT
To ensure prompt response and minimise delays in the treatment and transportation of
patients needing hospital care, medical facilities such as clinics or first response units such
as mobile clinics or ambulances are available in O.B.Camp / MPT medical centre and in
RGT. Rajasthan operations being round the clock operations, the Installation Manager
should ensure that sufficient medical support is available to cover the period of the
operation.
5.8.7 SECURITY INCIDENTS
How to manage security incidents, (e.g. unauthorised entry to the terminal or site,
extortion, kidnapping, etc.) are covered by the Cairn India Emergency Management Manual
and site related security procedures.
5.8.8 EXTERNAL SUPPORT
Cairn’s corporate Crisis Management Plan provides details of the Cairn India Crisis
Management Team’s activities in Support of the field response teams in such aspects as the
involvement of external emergency services i.e. Police, public and media enquires etc.
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CHAPTER
6
6 RESPONSE
A response plan constitutes a part of disaster management cycle which takes place
immediately after an incident/disaster which could emanate from either human industry
induced or nature induced. It has components like (a) Alarm/ Early Warning System; (b)
Shutting down plant operations; (c) Communication with authorities (if required); (d)
Setting up coordination mechanism; (e) Search and rescue; (f) First aid and medical
response; (g) Relief and (h) Rehabilitation. The response includes design of plans
developed for immediate response which would be initiated on a trigger mechanism based
upon the occurrence of an event of extreme nature. It also covers the emergency command
structure and operational readiness of Emergency Response Centre (ERC).
6.1 INCIDENT CLASSIFICATION
CIL defines emergency situations in three tiers of severity, related to the scale of the
incident and the capability to respond effectively. The tier levels are based on the Cairn
Risk Evaluation guidelines and their details are given below.
Tier 1 Emergency
• Emergency or incident can be effectively and safely managed, and contained within
the site, location or facilities by operations staff
• Emergency or incident has no impact outside the site, location or facility
• There is unlikely to be danger to life, the environment or to company assets or
reputation.
Tier 2 Emergency
• The incident cannot be effectively and safely managed or contained at the site,
location or facility by operational staff and additional support is required
• The incident is having, or has the potential to have an effect beyond the site, location
or facility and external support may be involved
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• There is likely to be danger to life, to the environment, to company assets or
reputation
Tier 3 Emergency
• The incident has escalated to a level where it has, or has the potential to, adversely
affect the public, the Company’s operations or reputation
• The incident will have technical, media, public affairs and personnel implications,
which require immediate action
• There will be one or a combination of the following:
o Death and / or serious injury to employees, contractors or the public
o Pollution or the potential to cause environment damage
o Damage to Company or Public property
FIGURE 18: TIER CLASSIFICATION IN CIL
6.2 INCIDENT RESPONSE STRUCTURE
The Company’s emergency management procedure for Rajasthan uses four primary
organisations for response and management of incidents and emergencies. These are:
1. Incident Response Team (IRT) based at the various field operating facilities.
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2. Emergency Response Team (ERT) based in the town of Barmer in Rajasthan
3. Emergency Management Team (EMT) based in the Company head office in
Gurgaon.
4. Crisis Management Team (CMT) based in the Company head office in Gurgaon.
Clearly defined and understood roles and responsibilities minimise confusion and ensure
all the onsite emergencies are effectively handled. This in turn will assist operations to
resume to pre-emergency status as quickly as possible after mitigation of the emergency.
Cairn has established an Incident Response Team to respond to any potential emergency
scenario including oil spill incidents.
CIL defines emergency situations in three tiers of severity, related to the scale of the
incident and the capability of the organisation to respond effectively.
FIGURE 19: TIERS AND RESPONSE TEAMS
Details of the linkages between the organisations and how assistance is provided to the IRT
by the ERT and EMT is given below.
6.2.1 INCIDENT RESPONSE TEAMS (IRT)
The Incident Response Team will comprise the following two main organisations:
• Incident Response Team, (IRT) responsible for management and control of the
incident
• Forward Response Team (FRT) responsible for controlling the emergency at the
affected area.
Note: On all occasions that an Incident Response Team is mobilised, the Emergency
Response Team (ERT) Leader and the Emergency Management Team (EMT) Leader shall
be notified.
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The IRTs have the responsibility for dealing with all incidents and emergency situations
which may occur at or within their respective area of operation. Where additional support
in the way of resources and advice is required by the IRT, the same will be requested
through and provided by the adjacent sites or in the first instance by ERT.
The leader of the Incident Response Team is the Installation Manager or their nominated
deputy and the Forward Response Team will be led by the designated site Senior
Supervisor who will be trained and assessed prior to being authorised for the role. The HSE
Coordinator will provide Support to the Incident Controller and the Installation Manager
will appoint a scribe to maintain a record of events.
Members of the Forward Response team (Fire Fighting and Rescue) are trained in the use
of all available equipment and operate under the instructions of the Incident Controller and
“guidance and control” of the Forward Controller. All CIL personnel assigned to the IRT,
dependent on their roles during an incident, are trained in Incident Response which
enables them to fulfil their respective roles in a competent manner and trained in the use of
Tier-1 response equipment.
6.2.2 EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (ERT)
The Barmer based Emergency Response Team (ERT) will provide support to the site teams
in the event of an incident or emergency, particularly for any Tier 1 & 2 events. The ERT at
Barmer and EMT at Gurgaon are composed of trained Cairn personnel on a single duty
shift. Sufficient personnel are trained to ensure that emergency positions are filled at all
times. The active duty roster is maintained by the respective Radio Officers and is also
accessible on Cairn’s Intranet.
6.2.3 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT TEAM (EMT)
Based in the CIL Gurgaon Office, the Emergency Management Team (EMT) is responsible
for providing tactical response, support, assistance and advice to all Tier 2 & 3 incidents
and emergency situations occurring in upstream facilities.
When the Emergency Management Team (EMT) is activated, the Crisis Management Team
Leader will be informed immediately and will be updated on a timely basis on all matters
relating to the incident including any investigative findings and decisions regarding the
status of the operation.
The Emergency Management Team Leader will normally be located in Gurgaon and based
on information received from the Incident Response Team (IRT), will assess the situation
and activate the full EMT, if appropriate. As part of the transition to the EMT, the IRT
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Incident Controller will provide a situation status report for the Emergency Management
Team Leader.
Personnel in the Emergency Management Team (EMT) are responsible for: responding to
emergencies; participating within an assigned section/role; contributing to the
development of specific response procedures; and for completing any training required to
carry out their role effectively.
The activation level of the EMT will be determined by the Emergency Management Team
Leader, according to the size and severity of the incident. Normally, all the positions within
the Emergency Management Team will be filled if the EMT is activated. The various roles
within each team will be carried out by the relevant authority unless the scale of the
incident requires additional personnel to fulfil these roles. The exception to this is the role
of Environment Manager, which will be taken up as soon as the EMT is activated. For
environmental events the core ERT and EMT teams will be supplemented by the
Environmental and CSR Coordinators.
6.2.4 CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM (CMT) – STRATEGIC RESPONSE
The Crisis Management Team is the CIL corporate body located in the Corporate Office in
Gurgaon with the responsibility for defining response strategy for major Tier 3 incidents.
Cairn’s Rajasthan operations are supported by the Gurgaon based EMT and CMT and a
regional Emergency Response Organisation based in Barmer. Mutual assistance is provided
to upstream facilities by the adjacent drilling and construction groups.
6.2.5 OIL SPILL SUPPORT AGENCIES
Tier 2 & 3 Contractor
Cairn has an associate membership with an organisation namely “Oil Spill Response (OSR)”
at Singapore which is the world’s largest international oil spill preparedness and response
organisation. Upon activation/ request from CIL, they provide technical response and
resources to mitigate Tier 2 and 3 oil spills. In addition to the supply of equipment, they
also provide experienced personnel to assist in the response. The Incident Controller can
notify ERT / EMT to activate OSR’s services from Singapore, during major oil spill related
incident and place them on alert. It is the Emergency Management Team Leader’s
responsibility to initiate the mobilisation of the contractor.
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6.2.6 HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY
In order to minimise the potential hazards of the spilled oil and the environment in which
the incident response team may be operating in, a number of steps must be taken. In order
to protect the response team, it is essential that a safe working environment be established
before commencing spill control, cleanup and / or repair operations.
Each spill response shall follow standard health and safety procedures in order to protect
the health and safety of those responding and the non-response personnel who may be in
the vicinity and if applicable, the general public.
6.2.6.1 HEALTH AND SAFETY PLANS
Risk Evaluation
A risk evaluation is required as part of the Health and Safety Planning process. It must be
carried out prior to undertaking any response task (irrespective of Tier size) and shall
define the possible hazards likely to be encountered. All personnel involved must be fully
aware of the hazards and the procedures for reducing or eliminating, where possible, the
impact of the hazard before performing any task. This assessment includes characterisation
of both on-site and potentially, impacted off-site areas. Information collected will be used
to determine the following:
• Need for evacuation of threatened areas;
• Establishment of clearly marked safety zones and restricted areas;
• Procedures to be followed by response personnel in the different zones; and
• Decontamination procedures.
6.2.6.2 SAFETY PLAN (TIER 2 & 3 INCIDENTS)
A Safety Plan shall be developed for each Tier 2 / 3 incident scenario. The Environment
Manager is responsible for preparation of a Safety Plan, the basis of the plan will come from
a Site Safety Assessment.
6.2.6.3 SITE SAFETY ASSESSMENT
The Site Safety Assessment is intended to prevent uncontrolled incidents occurring which
may cause further damage to the environment or loss due to damage, injury or illness. The
Site Safety Assessment should comprise the following sections:
A. Site Survey – including a site survey form addressing the safety of those personnel
taking part in the clean-up as well as those members of the public who may also be
involved
B. Operations Analysis – involving assessment of the way in which any containment/
clean-up operation is to be conducted
[94]

C. Site Control – including arrangements for closing area using barriers, policing,
briefing and vetting of personnel, restriction of access.
D. Logistics and Supplies – including appropriate equipment, protective clothing,
temporary shelter, accommodation, food / refreshment, sanitation and first aid
Each section should be addressed and the appropriate steps taken to ensure that
requirements of the Safety Assessment are adequately met.
6.2.6.4 SAFETY BRIEFINGS
Prior to initiating work on assigned tasks, personnel will attend a ‘toolbox’ safety briefing
to receive information and objectives of their assignments, locations where assignments
are to be carried out, hazards present in the work areas, measures to be instituted to
protect against the hazards and First aid and Medical Evacuation procedures.
6.2.7 OIL SPILL RESPONSE MANAGEMENT
This part consists of guidance on preparation for action. It includes assessment of risk to
those responding, the response objectives and strategy, the organisations involved and
details of response equipment. This section is designed to help those responding to spills to
understand in advance the expected oil spill scenarios, the ways and means to respond
effectively and minimise pollution of the environment.
6.2.7.1 INCIDENT RESPONSE ACTIVATION
Activation of the Rajasthan Incident Response Team is coordinated via the site Radio Room,
the radio operator will establish contact with the EMT Duty Manager who will, depending
on the level of spill, mobilise the EMT. Contact details of the EMT and support organisations
are maintained in the Incident Response Plan- Appendix A – Contact Directory.
Depending on the size and complexity of the incident, a coordinated response to an
emergency situation may be activated at a variety of levels.
The Safety of responding personnel will be a primary consideration in all response
activities.
6.2.7.2 OIL SPILL RESPONSE DECISION TREE
Figure 17 ‘Oil Spill Response Decision Tree’ provides a guide to the Installation / Site
Management team in formulating their response to an oil spill.
[95]

FIGURE 20: OIL SPILL RESPONSE DECISION TREE
6.2.7.3 RESPONSE STAGING AND MOBILISATION
Effective response to an oil spill requires rapid mobilisation of resources depending on a
number of factors, one of the most critical of which is the time taken to activate this plan
and mobilise equipment and resources to the scene of the spill.
To ensure efficiency of response, a Tiered approach is employed by CIL in line with national
guidelines. This OSRP takes into account the response time needed to mobilise, transport
and deploy increasing amounts of resources to the scene of a spill for spills of different
sizes and locations.
[96]

6.2.7.4 REMOTE LOCATION
Remote location events i.e. at well pad-18 or some point along the inter-field pipeline
require coordinated control between all elements of the Incident Response Team
particularly when the Forward Response Team is mobilised to the scene. Upstream
facilities specific plans describe the provisions for initial emergency response and the
contingencies which are under the control of the Incident Response Team (IRT) and how
they interact with the ERT / EMT. Checklists/prompt cards to assist the IRT in the
management of oil spills have been provided.
6.2.7.5 OIL SPILL RESPONSE EQUIPMENT
CIL has prepared an oil spill response plan and maintaining minimum required spill
response/ clean-up equipment. Some of the oil spill equipment will be stored at the site
with the bulk material stored at the nearby warehouse.
6.2.7.5.1 Off-Site Spill
The objective of surface containment is to prevent the spread of oil on the soil or substrata
surface and to prepare it for recovery or treatment. This usually can be achieved using
easily available materials (i.e., shovels, earth-moving machinery, trucks, damming
materials, sorbents etc.) to construct berms, dams, barriers, and trenches to divert and
contain the flow.
Containment and damming to pool the oil are important if the oil is to be pumped and/or
sucked up. Several techniques are also discussed to contain and divert subsurface flow.
6.2.7.5.2 Methods
Terrestrial containment techniques are summarised in Table 8.1, with some of the more
common methods for containment being:
• Earth containment or diversion berm
• Containment or diversion trench
• Sorbent barrier
• Culvert and drain blocking
• Soil interceptor trench
TABLE 13: SUMMARY OF TERRESTRIAL CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL TECHNIQUES
No Technique Description Limitation
Potential
Environmental
Effects
1
Earth
Containment
Berm
Low barriers constructed with locally
available materials (e.g., earth, gravel,
sandbags, etc.) are used to contain
• Steep terrain
• Accessibility
• Implementation time
• Highly permeable soils
Environmental
damage
inflicted by
excavation of
[97]

surface oil flow. and low-viscosity oils berm
materials.
2
Earth
Diversion
Berms
Low barriers are constructed of
available materials (earth, gravel,
sandbags, etc.) to direct oil flows to a
recovery point or around a sensitive’s
area.
• Steep or rugged terrain
• Accessibility
• Implementation time
• Highly permeable soils
Environmental
damage
inflicted by
excavation of
berm materials.
3 Trenches
Dug by machinery to contain and
collect oil for recovery or to intercept
surface oil flows.
Used on most terrain types and redirect
them to recovery points or around
sensitive areas.
Likely would have to be likely would
have to be lined to prevent penetration.
• Limited accessibility
• Implementation time
• Low-viscosity oils on
highly permeable soils
• High water table
Environmental
damage
inflicted by
trench
excavation and
if not lined
greater oil
penetration.
4
Sorbent
Barrier
Low elevation sorbent barriers are used
on relatively flat or low-slope terrain to
contain or immobilize minor oil flows
and recover a portion of the used to
block culverts as a means of containing
courses that feed into culverts;
• Implementation time
• Steep slopes
• Storage area behind
culvert size
Winds may
blow sorbents
into the
surrounding
environmental
5
6
Culvert
Blocking
Drain
Blocking
Board, sandbags, inflatable plug or
earthen materials are used to block
culverts as a means of containing oil
flow into drainage courses that feed
into culverts;
Sandbags, boards, mats or other
materials are used to prevent oil spilled
on roadways and paved areas from
entering storm drains or pipes.
For kerb inlets, potion a board over the
kerb inlet and it in place with a
sandbag.
• Limited accessibility
• Storage area behind
culvert
• Culvert size
• Implementation time
Street inlets can be similarly blocked
with a board or plastic sheeting.
7
Soil
interceptor
trench
Trenches are contracted across the
migration path to intercept the
horizontal movement of spilled oil
within the subsoil, i.e., floating above
the water table and moving with the
groundwater.
• Rocky ground
• Water tables >3m below
the surface
• Implementation time
Environmental
damage
inflicted by
trench
excavation
[98]

6.2.8 LOGISTICS
In addition to the initial spill response, on-going response operations must be supported
with personnel, equipment and materials. These additional resources may be stored at the
existing response bases or at pre-determined forward holding points. As each incident will
have unique requirements, incident-specific logistics planning will be required and this
function will be undertaken by the Logistics Coordinator.
6.2.9 COMMUNICATIONS
Reliable communications equipment and support are available for use during an
emergency situation and enable communications to be made throughout the Rajasthan
Field with neighbouring sites, the Regional Emergency Centre at Barmer and Emergency
and Crisis Management Centre at Gurgaon. Each response/ emergency centre is provided
with a radio room and manned by radio officers round the clock. Communication facilities
that are available in the Rajasthan field include the following:
The operations, drilling, seismic and construction sites in Rajasthan are provided with:-
• UHF radios
• HF Single Side band (SSB) facility in MPT and RGT control room for interfacing with
Midstream operations
• Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) phones in all well pads, Sub-stations and other
office buildings.
• Analog phones at all well pads as well as in the plants
• Mobile phones (outside the rig / operations sites)
• Public Address and General Alarm (PAGA) System in the plants and well pads.
• General Alarm System (as part of PAGA) with 3 different tones for emergency
alerting / evacuation of plant personnel.
• Emergency siren.
• Details of emergency numbers and contacts are found in Rajasthan IRP.
During any incident, the communications centre is manned by a competent radio operator,
who is responsible for maintaining communications with all sections of the IRT and the
ERT and for passing on information as required to the Incident Controller. All personnel
who are issued with communications equipment such as UHF Radios, mobile telephones
are competent in its use and familiar with emergency communications procedures such as
[99]

usable channels, telephone and alternative systems and procedures if primary system fails
to raise help.
UHF Channel 16 is for making initial contact in an emergency, once contact has been
established the caller must change to one of the agreed communications channels for
passing messages and information. It should be remembered that UHF radio is open to
anyone to listen and hence it must not be used to pass sensitive and confidential
information.
6.2.10 OIL SPILL SCENARIOS
Oil is produced at a number of remote well sites and transported from the sites via a
network of interfiled pipelines to the Mangala Processing Terminal (MPT) where the
product is processed and oil separated. The oil is then sent to either the off-spec tanks,
settling tanks or bulk storage tanks. From the bulk storage the oil is currently pumped into
the 24” crude oil export pipeline to Radhanpur / Viramgam / Salaiya in Gujarat and later to
Bhogat Terminal.
6.2.11 CAUSES AND SOURCES OF SPILL
A Tier 1 scenario for oil spill will typically originate from a pipeline leak or a leak from
valve at the well pad or along the section of interfiled pipe work. Other Tier 1 spills will
most probably be from leakages during transfers to road vehicles. Spill size should not be
more than a few tons for these scenarios. Tier 2 & 3 spills are more likely to be the result of
a major failure of equipment or rupture in the interfiled pipeline network
An analysis of the probabilities of various potential sources of oil and fuel spills to the
environment from CIL’s operations in the RJ-ON-90/1 block are listed below
TABLE 14: PROBABILITIES OF POTENTIAL SOURCES OF OIL SPILLS
Oil spill from drilling operations caused by:
o Well blow-out
o Operator error
o Collision incident and loss of
containment
o Failure in storage facilities; and
o Fuelling operations
Oil spill from storage facilities:
o Operator error
o Loss of structural integrity; and
o Structural failure due to corrosion,
manufacturing fault or induced
o Physical stress; and
o Natural disaster.
[100]

Oil spill from pipeline failure caused by:
o
o
Direct impact (collision, sabotage)
Resulting in loss of structural integrity;
and
o Structural failure due to corrosion,
manufacturing fault due to corrosion,
manufacturing fault or induced
o
o
Physical stress; and
Natural disaster.
Oil spilling from transport trucks caused by:
o Driver’s negligence / fatigue /
misjudgement / error;
o Collision incident and loss of
containment ;
o Structural failure due to corrosion
Cairn has developed an Oil Spill Response Plan to address/ handle Tier-I oil spill
emergency.
Tier II / Tier III incidents would result from an uncontrolled well blowouts and pipeline
rupture causing a spill of national significance, leading to significant soil and / or
groundwater contamination followed by a clean-up operation. The likely occurrence of Tier
II and Tier III oil spill incidents is considered remote.
6.3 ESCAPE & EVACUATION ASSESSMENT (EEA)
The Escape and Evacuation Assessment (EEA) has been conducted in conjunction with the
results of the Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) and Quantitative Risk
Assessment (QRA). The word escape can be defined as the process of getting personnel to
the Assembly Points and evacuate can be defined as the process of getting personnel
outside the facility fence line and to a safe location.
The purpose of the EEA is to identify safe muster areas, propose primary as well as
alternative escape routes, and estimate the time needed for personnel to escape to the
muster areas in case of an emergency. The Escape and Evacuation Analysis has included
the following tasks:
Identify safe muster areas: In order to assess escape routes, safe locations for mustering
must first be identified. Risk contours and hazard zones from the Risk Assessment are used
to help identify potential locations for muster areas.
Evaluate and propose primary and alternative escape routes: The escape routes have
been identified based on the risk contours and the consequence calculations from risk
assessment (specifically the FERA and QRA studies), high risk areas and hazard zones are
identified. Both routes lying within the hazardous zone and leading away from the zones
are evaluated in order to identify primary and alternative escape routes.
Estimate escape and evacuation time to safe areas: The methodology used for
estimating escape and evacuation time is based on the Emergency Preparedness Guidelines
from Det Norske Veritas – Safety Analysis Handbook. The methodology splits the escape
[101]

and evacuation analysis into several sub-activities in order to get a more detailed and
accurate estimation of the time needed to evacuate from a hazardous area. All activities
from the occurrence of the incident until the personnel have reached a muster station must
be identified. Along with the measured length of the escape routes, the time needed for
each activity and thereby the total escape and evacuation time is estimated.
6.3.1 ESCAPE AND EVACUATION PROCEDURES
The escape and evacuation procedures are limited to on-site emergencies, which are
caused by accidents taking place within the plant boundaries.
Steps in an Immediate Response Plan
• Personnel safety and accounting of all employees at the site (roll call). This is of
paramount importance.
• Provide medical (or First Aid) assistance to the injured.
• Call for Emergency Response Team (ERT) and secure the site.
• If rescue is required (e.g., confined space), rescue shall be attempted only by trained
persons. Rescue shall not be attempted if it endangers lives of the rescuers.
Securing the site means cessation of all operations related activities including electrically
powered tools, all gas, diesel, propane powered equipment or equipment with open flames,
or any motorized equipment. Vehicles shall be parked-off the site roads and shall clear the
area for mobile fire fighting appliances. An incident commander/Emergency Response
Team will evaluate the incident, organize the team, and give strategic direction to the team.
6.3.2 IMPAIRMENT OF ESCAPE AND EVACUATION MEANS
Escape Routes may be impaired by;
• Thermal radiation exceeding the criteria for personnel (12.5kW/m 2 , threshold value
to be used for escape routes as personnel are expected to escape from the situation
within the time of giving extreme pain, 20 sec.).
• Temperature above the human tolerance level if escape route is unprotected.
• Smoke/toxicity above the human tolerance level.
• Debris blocking the escape route.
[102]

Muster Points may be impaired by the same criteria as those for escape routes, but as this
is a location where personnel will stay for a longer time, the threshold values need to be
stricter; therefore, the criteria for thermal radiation should be set to 5.0 kW/m 2 only.
6.3.3 SAFE MUSTER AREAS
Figure 18 shows the suggested Mustering points at MPT along with the Individual Risk
Contours from the QRA. These suggested muster points are evaluated here in order to
determine whether they are in located in safe areas.
As can be seen in Figure 20, all suggested muster points as shown in Orange Squares are
outside the 10 -8 Individual Risk contours, although one of the muster points is very close.
This means that all the suggested muster points are in areas with an individual risk lower
than 10 -8 per year, meaning the likelihood of having fatalities is very low.
The hazards included in these Individual Risk contours are fire and explosions from
hydrocarbons in the process, steam explosions and steam and hot water leaks. The risk to
personnel in these contours is due to the initial hazard event, and thus the risk from
escalated events is not included.
FIGURE 21: RISK CONTOURS AT MPT SHOWN ALONG WITH MUSTER POINTS
The suggested locations for muster points at MPT can also be assessed against
Recommended Design Total Radiation exposure for locations “where personnel with
appropriate clothing may be continuously exposed” as per API 521. This API standard
[103]

ecommends a value of 500 Btu/hr/ft 2 or 1.58 kW/m 2 (including solar radiation – about
300 Btu/hr/ft 2 ) as the threshold value for continuous exposure to radiation without
shielding. Although some high consequence but very low frequency flammable events may
potentially produce radiation levels exceeding the API recommended value, the IR contours
show that these would impact the muster points at a frequency of less than 10 -8 per year,
which is acceptable to CIL.
Furthermore, not all muster points would be impacted by such an event and enough safe
locations have been identified to provide alternative muster points should one of these
become impaired due to radiation. Therefore, DNV believe that these suggested muster
points are acceptable in regards to API 521.
Raageshwari gas and condensate pipeline events also contribute a risk to personnel at
MPT. These pipelines from Raageshwari arrive at the southern end of the plant and so the
risk from pipelines may affect the mustering points in this area.
6.3.4 COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
It is CIL’s intent to provide a communication system that will operate as follows:
“The PA/GA system shall be suitable to annunciate both audible and visual addresses and
alarm when required to do so. Distinct tones and alarms for muster, GA and toxic gas shall
be developed in detailed design. These tones and alarms shall be addressed simultaneously
throughout MPT, including the Central Control Room (CCR), Operation Base (OP) and MPT
buildings including fire station.”
“In areas of high noise amber/orange flashing beacons shall compliment the speaker
system.”
“The design of the Public Address and General Alarm (PA/GA) system shall ensure any
abnormal event is automatically activated from input actions from any of the safety
shutdown systems, or where activated manually by the CCR from a process upset or other
abnormal event. During any call to muster or abnormal event the PA/GA system design
shall permit operator over-ride for the annunciation of information relating to muster or
abnormal event throughout the facilities”.
The operating facilities will have a recognisable and identifiable emergency signal and/or
alarm to notify all personnel on the site, plant that an incident or emergency situation has
occurred. The alarm tones and their duration comply with the requirements of applicable
OISD guidelines.
[104]

6.3.5 ESTIMATED ESCAPE TIME TO SAFE AREA
The total escape and evacuation process with respect to time are assessed for the following
sub activities.
A: Emergency Situation (hazard evaluation, initiation of alarm)
This is the time from initiation of the incident to the time when personnel have been
warned, which means the incident has been announced on the PA/GA. Some initial
incidents, i.e. an explosion, can be detected all over the plant area and personnel will start
the escape immediately before initiation of the alarm has occurred. Other incidents, like
hydrocarbon leaks, need to be detected by gas/fire detectors or visually by personnel. For
this analysis, it is assumed 2 minutes from when an incident occurs until warning to
personnel has been initiated. This time has also been used in many other DNV assessments.
B: General Alarm on the PA/GA-system (Human reaction, secure site, select escape
route)
Delays in the mustering can also be caused by the time needed to make decisions, i.e. the
time people use to detect the alarm, decide whether to take action, wait, or otherwise.
Experiments and studies of real scenarios have shown that the decision making times can
be much longer than the time needed to move out of the area. This is an important point as
the most preferable escape route given weather conditions and hazard type may not be
intuitive - proper training and drills must be performed to ensure emergency
preparedness. Also, as much information as possible should be communicated via the
PA/GA system to help maintain order and give guidance to the escape and evacuation
procedures.
It should be noted that personnel in the middle of performing an activity or job will
normally be slower to react. Furthermore, the incident itself may cause significant noise or
confusion, thus slowing the warning time as well as reaction time of personnel on the
facility. These factors, together with the possibility of stress, fatalities/injuries, and
management delays, can be used a basis for assuming a certain delay in the response time
from workers. Therefore, 4 minutes has been used as an estimate of the time from
initiation of alarm until the escape activities actually begin.
C: Escape to Mustering Area
DNV has made use of specifications provided by CIL on where personnel are to be located
in the terminal, together with the proposed escape routes, estimated distances to each
preferred mustering point(s), and typical walking speeds to estimate the time needed to
reach mustering points.
Typical walking speeds are:
[105]

• 1 m/s on walk ways on same level, corridors, roads, etc.
• 0.8 m/s in stairs
• 0.3 m/s in ladders (includes the time to go on and off the ladder.)
Actual data on speed of going down a ladder demonstrates that necessary variations based
on personnel behaviour are more meaningful than any variations due to clothing or
differences between day and night. Nevertheless the illumination level will affect the speed
of walking. Presence of smoke or lack of emergency lighting will also affect the speed in
addition to causing confusion. The time to reach the mustering points will be estimated by
using distances estimated from the GA plan, combined with the speeds given above.
D: Time to go to alternative Muster point if main escape route is blocked
This time is estimated based on measured distance of the secondary escape route.
E: Assemble at Muster Area and count personnel
This time will include the time needed to perform a count of all personnel at the Mustering
Point. This will vary depending on how many workers from a given area all muster at a
same location and how structured this process is in practice. Training and dedicated roles
will make this process more effective. As an estimate of this, time to assemble and count
personnel at mustering points has been set to 3 minutes.
F: Emergency Preparedness organization
The time needed for organizing emergency preparedness measures can be estimated as the
time needed for the emergency teams to reach their mustering stations. This time estimate
must also take into account the time needed for emergency teams to prepare emergency
response equipment and to put on appropriate PPE. Therefore, estimating the time needed
for organizing and deploying emergency response teams will be the same as for time to go
to alternative muster point, with a few additional minutes added to account for preparing
emergency response equipment and to put on appropriate PPE.
G: Search and rescue time
The time available for the emergency preparedness crew to carry out their tasks is
estimated here. One of the main duties of any emergency response is to search for and
transport casualties/injured personnel. The time needed to perform these activities
inevitably depends on the situation at hand and will only be allowed if conditions are
considered safe.
In some situations the time available for doing emergency preparedness tasks could be
limited if the potential for escalation of the initial event exists. It is most likely that search
and rescue should be done after the situation is under control and there is no potential for
escalation.
[106]

In order to account for heavy clothes/equipment and the need to find, treat and transport
injured personnel, it is therefore assumed that the search and rescue teams will take three
times as long to return to the muster points as normal escape personnel would take.
H: Transfer to muster area.
It is assumed that search and rescue teams will use three times as long time to transfer
than for normal escape. It might be the case that the emergency preparedness teams return
directly to the mustering points and this time will then be included in point G. Time
estimate is not included for this sub-activity.
I: Evacuation (out of the MPT area).
This is the time needed to transfer to a mustering point outside of the MPT area. This will
be done if decided by the incident commander. If the primary mustering point is outside
the MPT, no further time is needed.
The Primary escape routes are marked as green on the drawings. The alternative escape
routes are marked with yellow and the one included in the time estimate is the shortest of
the different alternative routes leading out of the MPT. The distances have been measured
from the furthest part of the selected areas to the mustering points.
TABLE 15: TOTAL TIME FOR ESCAPE AND EVACUATION IN MPT
Area
Escape and Evaluation Time for Personnel With no Emergency
Preparedness Duties (minutes)
North Route (Back
Gate)
Route (East)
Route (South West) –
Nearby Main Gate
Diesel Tank Area 20 36 23
Oil Prod. Area 21 29 26
Power Gen. Area 32 42 20
Setting Tanks 25 37 29
Stream Area 31 - 21
Export Oil Tank
Storage
29 43 20
Water Treatment Area 34 42 26
[107]

The longest time for the escape and evacuation when the primary route has been chosen is
from the water treatment area and is estimated to be 26 minutes. If an alternative route
needs to be chosen the longest time from the water treatment area and is estimated to be
34 minutes.
6.3.6 MAPPING OF EVACUATION ROUTES FOR SETTLEMENTS
Evacuation routes are mapped for all villages within the maximum hazard zone of the well
fields. The evacuation routes are mapped from the village near the hazard to the nearest
village outside the hazard zone. In case the main evacuation route is blocked, alternate
evacuation routes are to be provided. Model Evacuation routes are provided in Figures 3, 4,
6 and 9 in Appendix B.
The evacuation route to be followed will be decided by Cairn Emergency Response Team
and communicated to the villagers by phone or loud speakers. Mock drills should be
conducted to ensure that the villagers are familiar with the route to be taken in case of
disaster.
6.3.7 EARLY WARNING AND EVACUATION (EWS) FOR COMMUNITY
Warning and evacuation consist of three essential parts: an early warning system in place,
evacuation plans, and a well informed community. Communities need to possess early
warning systems that provide the best available information on potential hazards in a
timely manner, implement effective evacuation plans, and have the training and capacity to
respond appropriately to the information- planned by them in a well consulted and
coordinated manner.
An effective early warning system consistently detects potential hazards and
communicates the threat in a manner that ensures that ample warning is received by the
community. Warning messages inform individuals on what is happening, what this means
to an individual, and how the individual should take action. Warning messages are
delivered in clear, simple language, with enough lead time for recipients to respond.
Resilient communities have local early warning systems that are operational at all times
and are linked to national and state hazard detection and warning systems. These linkages
and other components of the warning system also require backup mechanisms that ensure
fail-safe operation during hazard events. This redundancy ensures that if one component of
the system is not functioning, then the warning message is still delivered.
[108]

Resilient communities also have well publicised evacuation plans in place well in advance
of receiving any hazard warning. The development of effective evacuation plans requires
expert and local knowledge of the hazard risk, including information on the location of
hazard areas and vulnerable populations such as women, children, physically challenged
and elderly.
Effective evacuation plans also require a high degree of coordination and planning for the
development of proper evacuation routes and signs. Regular evacuation drills are needed
to ensure that all sectors of society are knowledgeable of the warning and evacuation
procedures.
Resilient communities also conduct assessments of evacuation drills and post-event
warning and evacuation procedures.
These assessments provide information to disaster managers and community leaders on
how to improve and adapt systems and plans to further reduce or avoid risks from coastal
hazards. A warning system cannot be effective without education and community
orientation.
No matter how expensive or sophisticated the system, if individuals are not able to
understand the warning information or do not know how to respond, there is increased
risk that lives may be lost. Comprehensive public awareness campaigns should provide
constant reminders about hazard risks, warning procedures, and evacuation plans within
coastal communities.
Some of steps to strengthen EWS are:
• Clearly defined roles and responsibilities for CAIRN staff and district administration
for disseminating warning information
• Clear and well publicised standard operating procedures for warning at-risk
populations
• Appropriate technology combined with appropriate human coordination to
facilitate rapid communication of warning information
• Periodic testing and evaluation of all aspects of warning systems and evacuation
procedures
• Use of clear, simple language in warning messages
• Identification, preparation and periodic updation of data of at-risk segments of the
population who are in the vicinity of MPT and RGT.
[109]

CIL has installed flood warning equipment at the following villages –
1. Hathi Singh ka Gaon
2. Dangari
3. Nagarda
The system will be integrated to the existing control system at MPT Control Room to
provide the information across all the sections of the existing plant. The main objective of
this system is to provide sufficient notice to the company and community to evacuate to
higher grounds.
6.3.8 MEDICAL EVACUATION
In the event of a medical evacuation being required, the site medical team shall
immediately notify the Incident Controller of the need to evacuate a patient (s). The
Incident Controller or their nominated deputy shall immediately inform the ERT Leader
who will mobilise the ERT and ensure that the medical and logistical support organisations
are prepared and pressed into service.
The MPT doctor in consultation with the Incident Controller will determine the method of
evacuation and location for treatment. For medical evacuation by road ambulance, it is the
Doctor’s responsibility to ensure sufficient medication is available in the ambulance to
cover the whole period of the journey.
6.4 REPORTING AND NOTIFICATION REPORTING
6.4.1 INCIDENT REPORTING
All incidents and emergencies are reported and investigated in order to establish what
happened and the causes of the incident or emergency in order to introduce measures to
prevent such incidents recurring.
The incident reporting procedure is contained in the Cairn HSE procedures. An initial
Incident Notification Report shall be compiled and submitted by the concerned Line
Manager to the relevant management levels, through Cairn Incident management System
(CIMS) within 12 hours of the incident occurring.
[110]

6.4.2 NOTIFICATION
The primary responsibility for notifying the relevant organisations is the site Incident
Controller who notifies the Emergency Response Team Leader, who in turn notifies the
Emergency Management Team Leader.
A list of categories and notification times is covered in Section 2 of the Rajasthan Incident
Response Plan document. If any incident or emergency situation occurs which is not
specifically listed, the site Incident Controller must use his discretion with a view to
notifying the Emergency Response Team Leader and Emergency Management Team Leader
as soon as reasonably practicable.
6.5 MEDIA COMMUNICATION
In the event of an incident or emergency, there will inevitably be some media interest.
Media at times, attempts to exaggerate or sensationalise the event. Therefore, CIL needs to
systematically feed in the right information to media through a media bureau as per the 3-
tier structure.
6.6 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES (ERP)
The Emergency Response Procedures (ERP) serves as a guide to the team managing the
incident or emergency situation. The most effective method for ensuring a successful
outcome is by training and practice by those charged with the responsibility of responding
to and controlling incidents and emergencies. The Company requires that all Incident
Controllers and staff at their sites, plants and field locations to become familiar with the
content of these procedures and guides through frequent and regular exercises and drills.
Appendix C of this document contains a set of Incident Action Plans; these have been
prepared as an aid to the Incident Controller and his team.
6.7 SPHERE STANDARDS
In any post disaster context, it is pertinent to address the community needs through a
systematic and prompt response. For effective post-disaster response a brief note on
universally accepted minimum standards drawn from “Sphere Standards” are provided
here for reference.
[111]

The Sphere Standards consists of Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in
disaster response which is the product of the collective experience of many people and
agencies. The project was launched in 1997 to develop a set of universal minimum
standards in core areas of humanitarian assistance. The aim of the project is to improve the
quality of assistance provided to people affected by disasters, and to enhance the
accountability of the humanitarian system in disaster response.
The Minimum Standards covers the following sectors (Ref: “The Sphere Project –
Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response”, 2000)
• Minimum Standards in Water Supply and Sanitation,
• Minimum Standards in Nutrition
• Minimum Standards in Food Aid
• Minimum Standards in Shelter and Site Planning,
• Minimum Standards in Health Services
The purpose of the Humanitarian Charter and the Minimum Standards is to increase the
effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, and to make humanitarian agencies more
accountable. It is based on two core beliefs: first, that all possible steps should be taken to
alleviate human suffering that arises out of conflict and calamity, and second, that those
affected by a disaster have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to assistance.
Agencies’ ability to achieve the Minimum Standards will depend on a range of factors, some
of which are within their control, while others such as political and security factors, lie
outside their control. Of particular importance will be the extent to which agencies have
access to the affected population, whether they have the consent and cooperation of the
authorities in charge, and whether they can operate in conditions of reasonable security.
Availability of sufficient financial, human and material resources is also essential.
[112]

CHAPTER
7
7 PARTNERSHIP WITH OTHER
STAKEHOLDERS
Partnership and synergy of efforts with other stakeholders is essential to ensure
effectiveness of disaster management plans. This would result in better command and
control, coordination, economy of effort and better preparedness and response.
7.1 STAKE HOLDER ANALYSIS
As a part of project studies (Social Impact Analysis) Cairn India has carried out a detailed
stakeholder analysis. The stakeholders having an interest in disaster management are:
• Settlements around Cairn facility
• Villages where Cairn, invests in development
• Gram Panchayat
• Tehsildars
• Block Development Office
• District administration –Collector , police , medical officer, revenue department
• Directorate General of Mines Safety
• Chief Controller of Explosives
• Local contractors
• Joint venture partners ONGC
• Media
• NGOs working on Barmer
• NGOs outside Rajasthan but has interests in the state
• Elected representatives
• Other opinion leaders
• Other relief agencies
• Rajasthan state Government
• Rajasthan state disaster management authorities
• Rajasthan Pollution Control Board
[113]

• The Centre for Disaster Management in the Rajasthan State Institute of Public
Administration
The stakeholder details and their various activities are elaborated in Part 1, Chapter 5,
and Section 5.7 of this document.
7.2 DISTRICT AUTHORITIES IN BARMER
Effective coordination with district authorities is required to ensure coordination of efforts
for disaster management. The District Medical officer and revenue authorities will be
actively involved. Cairn India ERT (Emergency Response Team) will ensure effective liaison
with the District Authorities. Coordination with the following will have to be ensured:
• District Disaster Management Authority
• Fire brigade
• Police
• District Medical Officer
• Civil defence
• Army and Air Force Bases (through district administration)
7.3 COMMUNITY BASED DISASTER ORGANIZATIONS
There are 14 prominent NGOs working in Barmer district. In the aftermath of the floods,
the NGOs were engaged in rescue, relief and rehabilitation in Barmer district. Already few
of them are working in partnership with Cairn’s CSR wing. Some of the NGOs include (i)
Help Age India, (ii) Society for Upliftment of Rural Economy (SURE), and (iii) Dhara
Sansthan
7.3.1 SELECT NGOS
Mittal Foundation engaged with the local authorities and village communities to take up
the work of restoring twenty of the worst affected schools through repairs/retrofitting,
additions and reconstruction interventions, depending on the specific needs of each school.
Sustainable Environment & Ecological Development Society (SEEDS) a Delhi based
NGO was actively involved in reconstruction in villages, built over 300 houses, basic
Community Facilities for 5,000 people and Shelter Construction Training: 100 workers
[114]

Children’s Investment Fund Foundation CIFF joined with the Mittal Foundation to help
build and restore 21 schools that were damaged or destroyed in the flooding. More than
2,900 students benefit from this programme. CIL will carry out further analysis and work
with suitable organisations for building community based disaster capabilities.
7.4 ROLE OF MEDIA
Media throughout the world plays a vital role in educating the public about disasters;
warning of hazards; gathering and transmitting information about affected areas; alerting
government officials, relief organizations, and the public to specific needs; and facilitating
discussions about disaster preparedness and response. Communications can educate,
warn, inform, and empower people to take practical steps to protect themselves from
natural hazards. For the media to fill these roles most effectively, the organizations need to
establish and strengthen working relationships with the media as partners for disaster
management.
Corporate Communication Department of Cairn India will be dealing with all media
related issues during disasters.
7.4.1 BEFORE A DISASTER
• Analysis of risk sources and patterns , factors increasing vulnerability of
communities
• Public Information on potential dangers and risks
• Early Warning providing proper information on Early Warning Systems
• Preparedness Information
• Advocate for risk reduction
• Encourage people’s participation in disaster management
7.4.2 DURING A DISASTER
• Inform the public with timely and factual information
• Advice the public about actions to be taken (e.g. Evacuation, Escape useful
techniques)
• Inform on actions being taken by authorities and aid groups
• Provide messages concerning the welfare of marginalized or trapped groups
[115]

• Facilitate communication among affected people and their relatives, friends, families
in other parts of the country
• Highlight the needs of survivors
• Communicate potential secondary risks to minimize further disasters or damages
• Prevent panic
• Avoid sensationalism
7.4.3 AFTER A DISASTER
• Highlight learning's
• Project gaps in relief efforts
• Highlight success stories
• Responsible reporting to prevent reliving trauma
7.4.4 NGOs ROLE IN MEDIA
NGOs working in disaster management should seek to provide reliable information to the
media, as early as possible, in a concise and readily understandable form, and linked, where
possible, to newsworthy events.
• Never misrepresent facts
• Identify and communicate specific themes and messages, both through the mass
media and in other alternative forms of communication
• Issue holding statements where appropriate
• Provide relevant training for reporters and field personnel to enhance disaster
preparedness, mitigation and relief efforts and the timeliness, quality, and accuracy
of reporting about disasters.
• Cairn India has a media communication plan for disasters and has effective
relationships in place with media.
Corporate Communication Department of Cairn India has suitably trained staff for
coordination with media during disasters and will lead communication during any disaster.
[116]

CHAPTER
8
8 FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
As per the emerging disaster management structure formally at the state and district levels,
SDMA and DDMA respectively, there is likelihood for clear cut fund allocation for both
disaster preparedness and response.
CIL through its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is already having annual budget
allocation earmarked for various developmental activities. It also includes funds to create a
reserve for emergencies and natural disasters. Henceforth, CIL could earmark a separate
fund allocation for the promotion of community based disaster management. The financial
powers are vested with various operating levels as per Company delegation of authority
(DOA). Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is the custodian of the DOA.
8.1 FUNDS
Funds will cater for
• Integrating disaster management concerns into operations and construction stages
for design and operations
• Purchase & maintenance of equipment for disaster management
• Setting up and construction of response centres
• Training of personnel –Cairn staff, communities in disaster preparation and
response
• Joint exercises
• Disaster Education and awareness campaigns among people
• Production of leaflets, posters and other educational material
• Capacity building and training of local communities
• Response actions during disasters like food packets, medical facilities etc
• Recovery actions for repair and rebuilding facilities
• Funding of NGOs for disaster management partnerships
o For promoting disaster awareness
o Actual relief and recovery
o Rebuilding
[117]

8.2 ANNUAL BUDGETS
Annual budgets will have the following provisions:-
• Adequate funds will be catered for in the annual budgets for disasters and
emergencies · Funds earmarked for projects and expansions by Cairn India also will
have specific funds for ensuring mitigation of disasters.
• All heads of departments are aware of the requirement for earmarking funds for
disaster management.
• The executive committee (ExCo) form the approving hierarchy for budget approvals
8.3 FUND ALLOCATION FOR HAZARD PREPAREDNESS
In addition to allocation of funds for prevention of hazards and improve the preparedness
of emergency team, it is also suggested that CIL can earmark a fund to mitigate and control
any major emergency.
[118]

PART 2: DISASTER SPECIFIC ACTION
PLAN
[119]

CHAPTER
9
9 PREFACE FOR SOPs
A. ON-SITE FIRE RELATED EMERGENCIES
Fires at an industrial installation can severely interrupt production, disrupt the lives of
those who depend upon the plant for livelihood and weaken the economy of the
community. Although the primary purpose of any fire prevention strategy is to protect lives
and losses of company but it is important (and often a legal responsibility) for every
employee working within the installation area to be fully aware of fire hazards, fire
prevention rules, fire fighting techniques and emergency action plan.
CIL has compiled all relevant information pertaining to the recognition of fire hazards,
potential scenarios, strategies and tactics, fire protection systems and emergency response
resources into the upstream Fire Contingency Plan, for its operations in the State of
Rajasthan.
B. FIRE SCENARIOS & EMERGENCY RESPONSE
The following Emergency scenarios are anticipated /visualized in the operations phase.
Incident Action Plans to deal with these scenarios are shown in Appendix C.
1. Fire in the well head / well pads
2. Oil fire at Inlet Separator
3. Fire at the flare area & knockout drum
4. Fire in the Diesel Storage, Export Oil, Condensate, Off spec and Settling tanks
5. Fire in Electrical sub stations.
6. Buildings (Central Control Building)
7. Fire in Chemical Laboratory Building
8. Oil & Gas Leakage in Pig Launcher Area followed by fire.
9. Fire in cross country pipe line (90 Kms.) between Raageshwari Gas Terminal (RGT)
and MPT
10. Fire in Mangala Train-1 (MT-1) facilities
11. Enhanced Oil Recovery (EoR) near Train-1 (Phase I expected project completion by
Q3-’10 and Phase II by Q1-‘11).
[120]

12. Barmer Hill Project (EWT) (expected project completion by 2011).
13. Major Construction Activities within MPT /RGT/ Well pads
14. Operation Base (O.B.) Camps / Offices
C. OIL SPILL RELATED EMERGENCIES
Prevention of accidental spillage is Cairn India Limited’s (CIL’s) first priority. To support
this strategy, all land based production and drilling facilities are designed, installed and
operated to minimise possibility of oil spills. Facilities and resources supplied by third
parties are also required to meet national pollution prevention guidelines and operation
standards.
Cairn shares the community’s concern for the protection of the natural environment from
oil spills. Cairn will work and consult with appropriate government bodies and the local
community to address any issues relating to oils spills. Where third party interests are
involved such as products or transport vehicles or drill rigs, the company will assess the
situation and take timely and appropriate action.
The company is committed to integrating into its plans and operations a process to identify
oil spill risks and to implement appropriate spill response and clean-up strategies. This Oil
Spill Response Plan details Cairn’s organisational framework for preparedness and
response to oil spill incident that may arise from its operations in Rajasthan. The principal
strategy is for rapid Response, Containment and Clean–up.
The following chapters comprise SOPs for six credible disaster scenarios.
9.1 SOP for Crude pipeline leak
9.2 SOP for Well/rig blowout
9.3 SOP for gas well blowout
9.4 SOP for earthquake
9.5 SOP for flood
9.6 SOP for biological hazard
[121]

9.1 SOP: CRUDE OIL PIPELINE LEAK
Equipment/Facility
Material
Physical
State
Crude Oil
Liquid (High Viscosity)
Atmospheri
c condition
Prevailing
Wind
direction
Pressure
From 5 (at the receival facility)
to 70 (at the inlet point of the
export pipeline) kg/cm 2
NNE, SSW
Operating
Condition
Pipe diameter
Ambient Temperature
(℃)
24 inches
43 – 48 (Summer), 6 – 20
(Winter)
Prevailing
Wind speed
(m/s)
Flow Rate 125,000 BOPD 1.5
[122]

Liquid release rate: 5mm
Liquid release rate: 25mm
Liquid release rate: Full
bore
50 LPM
500LPM
5000 LPM
Potential Scenario - Crude release with ignition
Initial Crude Release (No ignition)
Crude release with ignition
Special Hazard(s) / Precautions
1. Evacuate the people and livestock from the hazard zone (1 km radius) in
coordination with district administration
2. Communicate with District Administration and alert Electrical, Water Resources,
Agricultural, Roads and Railway departments about the incident, if required.
3. Monitor for respiratory hazards e.g. products of combustion, VOC, etc.
4. Identify surface water bodies, agricultural/pasture land and settlements. Take
containment measures to prevent crude from reaching/ contaminating.
[123]

Hazard Zone (for cross-country crude pipeline) of 1 km radius for
evacuation purposes
For resources please refer Appendix D
Resources Requirement
Fire Fighting Operational Requirements (Minimum)
Foam Tenders (complete with crew:
Water Supply
4 Nos
5000 LPM
Manpower
Additional Firefighters
Support Personnel
48 Nos
100 Nos
Medical Support
Ambulances (complete with emergency medication) 4
[124]

Doctors 2
Nurses 12
Medical Attendants ( stretcher bearers, medical support) 24
District administration- Line Departments, Revenue Department ( Village Administrative
Officers, Village Assistants), Police, Fire and Rescue, Medical and Health dept, Rescue
volunteers from Home guards, Civil Defence, etc.
Incident Action Plan (IAP)
Cross-Country Crude Pipeline Failure - Crude release with ignition
Task
Action
Party
1. Raise Alarm
• Trigger fire alarm CIL
• Call Hotline Numbers – Refer Emergency Contacts in Appendix A CIL
• Cairn MPT Emergency Alarm/Notification CIL
2. Notify Authorities & external agencies ( Fire and rescue – 101, Police
-100, District Administration – 1077)
CIL/DC
3. Shut down crude pumping operation CIL
4. Isolate affected section of Pipeline (Shut upstream & downstream
valves)
CIL
5. Cordon off the area DC/CIL
6. Initiate mobilization of Fire Fighting operational resources (Refer
Resources section)
7. Establish Unified Command (for liaison with responding agencies)
CIL (smallscale
fires)
DC (largescale
fires)
8. Initiate community evacuation (Refer Fire Incident Evacuation Plan
given below)
[125]
DC.
CIL
to

assist DC
9. Assess hazards – potential for explosion CIL
• Evaluate escalation potential – explosion probability CIL
• Fire Exposure CIL
10. Assess if crude can be removed safely and initiate safe disposal of
collected crude
CIL
Fire Evacuation Plan for Community
1. Initiate alarm/ early warning system and evacuate community within 1 km radius.
2. Conduct search and rescue operations.
3. Trained community volunteers shall provide first aid to the injured and transport
them to hospitals
4. Prepare the people by sharing the real impact of incident and seek their
cooperation
5. Coordinate and organize evacuation of community members as per priority.
6. Provide temporary shelter with water, food and sanitation facilities
7. Conduct damage assessment if any, with community participation.
8. Only after thorough check up and formal clearance community shall return to their
habitation
9. Help them to restore normal life with necessary repair works.
[126]

9.2 SOP: OIL WELL BLOWOUT
Equipment/Facility – Oil Well
Material
Crude Oil
Atmospheric
condition
Physical
State
Liquid (High Viscosity)
Prevailing
direction
Wind
Pressure 30-35 kg/cm2 NNE, SSW
Well Bore Diameter
(production casing)
8.5 inch or 12.25 inch
Prevailing Wind
speed(m/s)
Operating
Condition
Ambient Temperature (℃)
43 – 48 (Summer), 6 –
20 (Winter)
Low Producer: 200 –
2500 BOPD
1.5
Well Flow Rate (flow from a
single well varies from well
pad to well pad)
High Producer: 1500 –
7000 BOPD
Horizontal Well –
Maximum 15,000
BOPD
[127]

Potential Scenario - Crude release with ignition
1. Well Blowout w/o
ignition
2. Well Blowout with ignition
Special Hazard(s) / Precautions
1. Evacuate the people and livestock from the hazard zone (1 km radius) in coordination
with district administration
2. Communicate with District Administration and alert Electrical, Water Resources,
Agricultural, Roads and Railway departments about the incident, if required.
3. Monitor for respiratory hazards e.g. products of combustion, VOC, etc
4. Identify exposed water bodies, agricultural/pasture land and settlements. If required,
take containment measures to prevent crude from reaching/contaminating.
5. Blast resulting from ignition of accumulated well gas and vaporization of crude oil pool
as a result of delayed ignition.
6. Extremely high radiant heat, requiring high fire fighting water demand.
7. Specialised well-fire extinguishment services and specialized equipment required to
extinguish fire and/or cap the well.
[128]

Hazard Zone (for oil well) of 1 km radius for evacuation purposes
For resources please refer Appendix D
Fire Protection Requirements
Fixed Fire Protection System
• Water Spray System
Mobile Fire Fighting Units
• Fire Tenders (complete with crew) (For peripheral defensive protection)
Water Supply Requirements
• Application Rate: 100 bbls/min (20,000 LPM)
• Temporary Water supply (24 hour supply): 25,000 bbls
Specialist Resources (Pre-Contracted)
• Well Blowout Control Specialists
• Specialized equipment
[129]

Manpower
• Additional Firefighters
• Support Personnel
Medical Support
• Ambulances (complete with emergency medication)
• Doctors
• Nurses
• Stretcher Bearers
Law & Order Agencies
• Police
Incident Action Plan (IAP)
Crude Oil Well Blowout with Ignition
Task
Action Party
1. Raise Alarm
a. Trigger fire alarm
b. Call Hotline Numbers – Refer Emergency Contacts in
Appendix A
c. Cairn MPT Emergency Alarm/Notification
d. Notify Authorities & external agencies ( Fire and rescue –
101, Police -100, District Administration – 1077)
2. Shut down well pad operation
CIL
CIL
CIL
CIL/DC
CIL
3. Turnout Fire fighting appliances (For peripheral defensive
protection)
4. Cordon off the area – Establish “hazard zone” and secure area from
unauthorized entry.
5. Initiate mobilization of Fire Fighting operational resources (Refer
Resources section)
DC/CIL
CIL (smallscale
fires)
[130]

6. Establish Unified Command (for liaison with responding agencies)
DC (largescale
fires)
7. Activate Specialist Resources (Pre-Contracted)
• Well Blowout Control Specialists
CIL
• Specialized equipment
8. Initiate community evacuation (Refer Fire Incident Evacuation
Plan)
DC.
CIL to assist
DC
9. Assess Hazards – potential for explosion
a. Evaluate escalation Potential – Explosion probability
b. Fire Exposure
10. Assess if crude can be removed safely and initiate safe disposal of
collected crude
11. Mobilise capping machinery
CIL
CIL
CIL
CIL
Fire Evacuation Plan for Community
1. Initiate alarm/ early warning system and evacuate community within 1 km radius.
2. Conduct search and rescue operations.
3. Trained community volunteers shall provide first aid to the injured and transport
them to hospitals
4. Prepare the people by sharing the real impact of incident and seek their cooperation
5. Coordinate and organize evacuation of community members as per priority.
6. Provide temporary shelter with water, food and sanitation facilities
7. Conduct damage assessment if any, with community participation.
8. Only after through check up and formal clearance community shall return to their
habitation
9. Help them to restore normal life with necessary repair works.
[131]

9.3 SOP: GAS WELL BLOWOUT
Equipment/Facility – Gas Well
Material Natural Gas (>95% Methane) Atmospheric condition
Physical State Gas Prevailing Wind direction
Pressure Around 250 kg/cm 2 NNE, SSW
Operating
Condition
Well Bore Diameter
(production casing)
3.5 inch
Prevailing Wind
speed(m/s)
Ambient
Temperature (℃)
43 – 48 (Summer), 6 –
20 (Winter)
1.5 (present rate)
[132]

Well Flow Rate
20 – 35 MMSCFD
Potential Scenario - Crude release with ignition
1. Well Blowout without ignition 2. Well Blowout with ignition
Special Hazard(s) / Precautions
1. Initial efforts should be concentrated on all possible sources of ignition.
2. Restrict access to and activities in the well head area
3. Blast resulting from ignition of accumulated well gas as a result of delayed ignition
4. Extremely high radiant heat, requiring high fire fighting water demand.
5. Specialist well-fire extinguishment services and specialized equipment required to
extinguish fire and/or cap the well.
Hazard Zone (for gas pipeline) of 1 km radius for evacuation purposes
[133]

For resources please refer Appendix E
Fire Protection Requirements
Fixed Fire Protection System
• Water Spray System
Mobile Fire Fighting Units
• Fire Tenders (complete with crew) (For peripheral defensive protection)
Water Supply Requirements
• Application Rate: 100 bbls/min (20,000 LPM)
• Temporary Water Reservoir Capacity (24 hour supply): 25,000 bbls
Specialist Resources (Pre-Contracted)
• Well Blowout Control Specialists
• Specialized equipment
Manpower
• Additional Firefighters
• Support Personnel
Medical Support
• Ambulances (complete with emergency medication)
[134]

• Doctors
• Nurses
• Stretcher Bearers
Law & Order Agencies
• Police
Incident Action Plan (IAP)
Gas Well Blowout with Ignition
Task
Action Party
1. Raise Alarm
a. Trigger fire alarm
b. Call Hotline Numbers – Refer Emergency Contacts in
Appendix A
c. Cairn MPT Emergency Alarm/Notification
d. Notify Authorities & external agencies ( Fire and rescue –
101, Police -100, District Administration – 1077)
2. Shut down well pad operation
3. Turnout Fire fighting appliances (For peripheral defensive
protection)
4. Cordon off the area – Establish “hazard zone” and secure area from
unauthorized entry.
5. Initiate mobilization of Fire Fighting operational resources (For
resources refer Appendix D)
6. Establish Unified Command (for liaison with responding agencies)
CIL
CIL
CIL
CIL/DC
CIL
CIL
DC/CIL
CIL (smallscale
fires)
DC (largescale
fires)
7. Activate Specialist Resources (Pre-Contracted)
• Well Blowout Control Specialists
CIL
• Specialized equipment
[135]

8. Initiate community evacuation (Refer Fire Incident Evacuation
Plan)
DC.
CIL to assist
DC
9. Assess Hazards – potential for explosion
• Evaluate escalation Potential – Explosion probability
• Fire Exposure
10. Initiate inventory building of extinguishing media and equipment :
CIL
CIL
DC/ CIL
• Water supply – sources, holding pit(s) and associated
pumping equipment
• Capping machinery
Fire Evacuation Plan for Community
1. Initiate alarm/ early warning system and evacuate community within 1 km radius.
2. Conduct search and rescue operations.
3. Trained community volunteers shall provide first aid to the injured and transport
them to hospitals
4. Prepare the people by sharing the real impact of incident and seek their
cooperation
5. Coordinate and organize evacuation of community members as per priority.
6. Provide temporary shelter with water, food and sanitation facilities
7. Conduct damage assessment if any, with community participation.
8. Only after through check up and formal clearance community shall return to their
habitation
9. Help them to restore normal life with necessary repair works.
[136]

Natural Hazard-Earthquake
9.4 SOP: EARTHQUAKE
Hazard
Impact
Earthquake
Cairn installations/ neighbourhood
community
4-5 Magnitude Very low risk
Earthquake Zone- III:
moderate risk zone
Not much impact on
buildings and
installations
5-6 Magnitude Moderate impact Evacuation, if required
6-8 Magnitude High Risk Immediate evacuation
[137]

Potential Scenario – Earthquake
Preparing for an earthquake
It has to be noted that earthquakes can neither be predicted nor prevented. When an
earthquake strikes, the district and Cairn team must be ready to respond. To survive,
the Cairn team and neighbourhood community members should be prepared with
‘survival plans’. Preparing for an earthquake takes time and effort. The basic approach
should be: (a) Avoid injury to self and help others; (b) minimize damage to Cairn
installations and property, (c) Be prepared to survive at least 72 hours after an
earthquake without help from emergency response officials.
Special Hazard(s) / Precautions
1. Earthquake impact can cause damage to gas or oil pipelines resulting in pipe
rupture or blast from ignition of accumulated associated well gas and vaporization
of crude oil pool.
2. Immediately shut down all operations and supply in pipeline
3. Depending upon the intensity,

escue operations
5. Emergency coordination team to monitor the situation
6. Only after proper safety inspection, work can be resumed at Cairn facilities.
For resources please refer Appendix D
Emergency Response Resources Requirement
Fixed Fire Protection System
• Water Spray System
Mobile Fire Fighting Units
• Fire Tenders (complete with crew) (For peripheral defensive protection)
Water Supply Requirements
• Application Rate: 100 bbls/min (20,000 LPM)
• Temporary Water Reservoir capacity (24 hour supply): 25,000 bbls
Specialist Resources (Pre-Contracted)
• Search and rescue
• Specialized equipment
Manpower
• Additional Firefighters
• Support Personnel
Medical Support
• Ambulances (complete with emergency medication)
• Doctors
• Nurses
• Stretcher Bearers
Law & Order Agencies
• Police
Incident Action Plan (IAP)
Earthquake
1. Raise alarm
Task
Action
Party
• The staff to follow ‘drop-cover-hold’ procedures and
assemble at pre-designated safe muster points
CIL
[139]

• Cairn MPT Emergency Alarm/Notification CIL
• Notify Authorities & external agencies (Refer Emergency
Contact in Appendix A)
CIL
2. Shut down all operations immediately CIL
3. Initiate evacuation of staff CIL
4. Coordinate with district administration for community evacuation
from settlements
DC
CIL to
assist
5. Activate Specialist Resources (Pre-Contracted)
• Search and rescue DC
• Specialized equipment (JCBs, Earth-movers, Gas detectors,
Steel cutters)
6. Establish Unified Command ( for liaison with responding agencies)
7. Coordinate and mobilize specialized medical teams with mobile
operation theatres
8. Coordinate and mobilize transport and logistics
9. Assess Hazards – potential for leakage and consequent explosion.
10. Cordon off the area – Establish “hazard zone” and secure area from
unauthorized entry.
DC
DC
DC
DC/CIL
CIL/DC
DC
Earthquake Evacuation Plan for Community –
1. Trigger alarm/ early warning siren and evacuate community to pre-designated
open ground.
2. Ensure speedy coordination for evacuation
3. Attend the injured with first aid and transport them to hospital
4. Assure the people by sharing the real impact of incident and seek their
cooperation
5. Provide temporary shelter with water, food and sanitation facilities
[140]

6. Conduct damage assessment if any, with community participation
7. Only after through check up and formal clearance community can be permitted
to return to their habitation
8. Help district administration in restoring normalcy with possible assistance.
[141]

9.5 SOP: FLOODS
Natural Hazard-Flood
Hazard
Flood
Low frequency – High
intensity event
Impact
Depending on
quantum of flood
On Cairn installations/ neighbourhood
community
Very low risk
Moderate impact
High Risk
Not much impact on
installations
Evacuation as per
requirement
Immediate evacuation
[142]

Potential Scenario – Flood/ Flash Flood
Preparing for flood scenario
Flood in Barmer district is a rare occurrence but as in the case of the 2006 flood, it can cause huge
devastation and affect normal life of community in general and CIL operations in particular
Special Hazard(s) / Precautions
1. Flooding can lead to disruption of Cairn operations in Well pads, Rigs, even pipeline
could be damaged.
2. Flooding can lead to disruption in electrical supply and communication and cause
damage to roads, bridges and other infrastructure.
3. Immediate shut down of all operations and supply in pipeline as required
4. Depending upon the level and quantum of water inundation evacuation required for
both within Cairn facility as well as for neighbouring community to move to safe zones.
5. Search and rescue teams to be kept in standby for any emergency rescue operations
6. Emergency coordination team to monitor the situation
7. Ensure the drainage channels are de-silted and bunds are periodically maintained.
8. Only after proper safety inspection, work can be resumed at Cairn facilities.
For resources please refer Appendix E
[143]

Emergency Response Resources
Specialist Resources (Pre-Contracted)
• Search and rescue teams (divers/swimmers, Emergency Medical Technician)
• Specialized equipments- like boats, life jackets, search helicopters, hovercraft, etc.
Manpower
• Support Personnel
Medical Support
• Ambulances (complete with emergency medication)
• Doctors
• Nurses
• Stretcher Bearers
• Oral Rehydration Satchets (ORS)
Law & Order Agencies
• Police
Other Essentials
• Water storage tanks
• Chlorine tablets
• Temporary shelters with sanitation facilities
• Temporary common kitchen or food packets
Incident Action Plan (IAP)
Flood
Task
1. Cairn staff and community members to be alerted with inputs
available from Cairn’s flood warning system
2. During Flood situation look out for regular updates from Indian
Meteorological Department (IMD) and Central water
Commission (CWC) for forecast and follow up action.
Action Party
CIL
CIL
3. Shut down all operations as precaution based on forecast CIL
4. Raise alarm if water level is reaching critical level of
jeopardizing safety of infrastructure
CIL, Community,
DC
a. Cairn MPT Emergency Alarm/Notification CIL
[144]

. Notify Authorities & external agencies CIL
5. The CIL staff and community should move to safe zones (high
elevations)
CIL, Community,
DC
6. Activate Specialist Resources (Pre-Contracted)
a. Search and rescue (divers/swimmers, boats, life jackets,
searchlights, nylon ropes)
b. Specialized equipment (helicopters, sandbags, crowbars,
spades, portable motor pumps)
7. Establish Unified Command (for liaison with responding
agencies)
DC/CIL
DC/CIL
DC
8. Establish “hazard zone” and secure area from unauthorized entry DC
[145]

9.6 SOP: BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS
Biological Hazard-Epidemic
Hazard
Impact
Epidemic
Cairn operations/ neighbourhood
community
Examples H1N1 Witnessed 9 deaths in 2009
Potential Scenario – Epidemic
Malaria
Endemic to the region
Chikungunya Reported in 2009, 2010
Epidemics are categorised based on disease outbreak, transmission, and mortality and
morbidity rates. They are monitored by Indian Disease Surveillance Programme (IDSP)
through weekly community visits by Primary Healthcare Centre (PHC) staff.
Barmer shows limited spread of diseases in this region due to its sparse population
(Barmer population density = 69 per sq km). Epidemics can disrupt normal life and
economy of the region impacting business continuity.
Special Hazard(s) / Precautions
1. Gather periodic updates from Chief Medical and Health Officer (CMHO), especially
during monsoons and during outbreaks.
2. Activate a medical coordination team in CIL to monitor and coordinate to minimise
impact of the epidemic among its staff.
3. The CIL medical team should liaise with the CMHO for follow-up actions.
4. Clean and disinfect reusable equipment appropriately.
5. If epidemic spreads, quarantine can be enforced by district authorities.
6. Arrange for immediate removal/disposal of the dead to prevent further spread of the
disease.
[146]

Resources
The district healthcare system comprises district hospitals, CHC and PHC as shown below:
S.
No
Type
Total
Available
Within 20 km radius of CIL facilities
1 Hospitals 9
2 Community Health
Centre
3 Primary Healthcare
Centre
14 In Kawas, it is being developed as a
Highway Trauma Centre with 3 doctors, 1
LHV and 4 Compounders
66
CIL has 6 doctors on-call/standby. Please refer Appendix E for additional resources.
Emergency Response Resources Requirement
Medical Support
• Ambulances (complete with emergency medication)
• Doctors
• Nurses
• Stretcher Bearers
• Medicine stocks
• Mobile medical surgeries/vans
• Gloves, masks, disinfectants
Law & Order Agencies
• Police
• Civil Defence
Incident Action Plan (IAP)
Epidemic
Task
1. Inform Public Health Department (02982 230462) of
possible epidemic
Action Party
IDSP Survey personnel
2. CIL should activate medical coordination team CIL
[147]

3. Announcement of epidemic Ministry of Health/
CMHO
4. Information to PHCs/CHCs within 5 km radius CMHO
5. Public health warning to nearby communities CMHO, PHCs, CHCs
6. CIL medical team should liaise and coordinate with CMHO CIL
7. Mobilise medical resources at village/block level CMHO
8. Alert hospitals and mobile medical teams at district level CMHO
9. Initiate vaccination programme CMHO
10. Assess requirement for Quarantine
Ministry of health/
CMHO
• Public health warning about quarantine to district DC
• Mobilise resources (food, medicines, water) for
quarantine
• Mobilise police/civil defence to enforce
quarantine. Cordon off the area
DC
DC, CMHO to assist
[148]

PART 3: CROSS- CUTTING ISSUES
[149]

CHAPTER
10
10 REVIEW AND UPDATION OF PLANS
This disaster management plan needs constant review and updation based on the
following requirements.
1. Major change in the operational activities and location
2. Valuable inputs from actual disasters
3. Lessons learnt from training
4. Inputs from mock drills/ simulation exercises
5. Lessons learnt from near-miss incidents
6. Changes in disaster profile
7. Technological developments/ innovations in identifying potential hazards
8. Changes in regulatory requirements
9. Updation of databases using GIS
10. Change in demography of surrounding population
11. Changes in geo-political environment
The review will be undertaken in coordination with the district administration and other
relevant key stakeholders like civil society agencies, community based organisations,
youth organisations, etc. Besides this, other national and state level agencies like NDMA
and SDMA will be apprised of the reviews and updates.
CIL will periodically update the DMP components based on the national and state disaster
management guidelines.
[150]

CHAPTER
11
11 COORDINATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
CIL will liaise and coordinate with key stakeholders involved in the comprehensive
disaster management for ensuring the implementation of the components involved in the
DMP. The plan will address the cross-cutting nature of the activities and issues that
emanate from onsite and offsite areas with vertical and horizontal linkages between and
within CIL and district administration. The coordination will also address linkages with
NGOs, CBOs and local bodies for ensuring the implementation of the plan.
The most important component of testing this DMP is to conduct mock drill or simulation
exercise in order to identify the positive elements as well as gaps.
11.1 NEED FOR MOCK DRILL
Mock drill exercise is pertinent to verify the level of preparedness and improve the
coordination during emergencies. This has to be based on past experiences and lessons
learnt. Mock-drills help in evaluating response and improving coordination within CIL,
with various government departments, non-government agencies and communities. They
help in identifying the extent to which the Plans are effective and also aid in revising these
if required. These drills enhance the ability to respond faster, better and in an organized
manner during the response and recovery phase.
The approach for conducting a mock-drill varies as per the complexity of scenario
depending upon the potential hazards, response system of the institution and the target
community. Therefore, to ensure proper implementation of a drill programme, roles and
responsibilities (SOPs) of the concerned personnel, departments, corporate bodies,
stakeholders, and mechanisms for conducting the drill should be delineated clearly.
11.1.1 FOR EFFECTIVE MOCK DRILL
Regardless of the size, complexity and risk involved in the implementation of the drill, an
effective drill/exercise programme should have the following essential elements as prerequisites:
[151]

• Emergency Response Plan explaining institutional response structure, emergency
response functions and standard operating procedures for various departments
• Team personnel at headquarters and field level trained on their standard operating
procedures
• Updated database of resources, equipment and manpower available
• Updated Emergency Directory with important contact details of members of
various Departments of the Government
• Mock-drill Scenario and detailed action plan for Mock-drill
• Evaluation formats for concerned departments and definite criteria for evaluation
• Observers and Qualified evaluators
Lessons learnt from the actual drills and exercises would be useful to revise operational
plans and serve as a basis for the training of various stakeholders across different sectors.
The drills and exercises will help to -
• Identify planning gaps
• Revise Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to enhance coordinated emergency
response
• Increase public awareness and community readiness
• Enhance capacities of professionals, departments and trained volunteers
• Test plans and systems in simulation exercises
11.1.2 TYPES OF DRILLS AND EXERCISES
There are several different types of drills and exercises.
11.1.2.1 DRILL
A drill is a supervised activity with a limited focus to test a procedure that is a component
of the overall emergency management plan. That is, drills usually highlight and closely
examine a limited portion of the overall emergency management plan. For example, a
disaster management unit might conduct a drill for the use of a radio system with those
responsible for communicating on it. Drills are designed to impart specific skills to
[152]

technical personnel (e.g., search and rescue, ambulance, fire fighting). A perfect drill is one
that leads to a flawless repetition of the intended task under any circumstance.
11.1.2.2 FUNCTIONAL EXERCISE
A functional exercise simulates a disaster in the most realistic manner without moving
real people or equipment to a real site. A functional exercise utilizes a carefully designed
and scripted scenario, with timed messages and communications between players and
simulators. The emergency operations centre (EOC)—the facility or area from which
disaster response is coordinated—is usually activated during a functional exercise and
actual communications equipment may be used.
11.1.2.3 FULL-SCALE EXERCISE OR FIELD EXERCISE
It tests the participation of as many members as possible for effectively responding to a
disaster. This is an exercise which takes place in “real time,” employs real equipment, and
tests several emergency functions. Full-scale exercises are generally intended to evaluate
the operations capability of emergency management systems in a community and to
evaluate interagency coordination. While these exercises cannot realistically reproduce
the dynamic and chaos of real life disasters, they are useful when intended to detect the
inevitable errors, lack of coordination, or deficiencies of the simulated response. A critical
evaluation is the essential conclusion of these exercises.
11.1.3 COMPOSITION OF PARTICIPANTS
The participants should be from community volunteers, Disaster Management Team
(DMT) members and decision makers from various departments (Emergency Support
Functions). The DMTs should consist of the following groups:
• Early Warning/Communication
• Evacuation and Temporary Shelter Management
• Search & Rescue
• Damage Assessment
• First-Aid/Medical Health/ Trauma Counselling
• Water & Sanitation
• Relief (Food & Shelter) Coordination
Note: The number of teams may vary as per the multi-hazard scenario in the area or for
specific scenario like gas leakage.
[153]

11.1.4 OBSERVERS/EVALUATORS
Their role is to observe the actions and decisions of the players, in order to later report
what went well and what did not. The main focus is on the performance of functions and
or/agencies, institutions and facilities being tested, keeping in mind the objectives of the
exercise.
11.1.5 COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
The community themselves are the first responders for carrying out rescue and
emergency services. Community taskforces initiate responses at field level where
specialized quick response teams join them for faster recovery. The field level team
leaders of ESFs and local incident commander coordinate with community taskforces and
quick response teams to understand the requirements of the situation and provide
essential assistance to perform operations.
11.2 PREPARATORY PROCEDURE
Familiarize the participants (multi-stakeholders) about the mock drill exercise in prior
and explain how they are an extremely important part of preparedness and response plan.
Equip the CIL Staff, Community, District administration, Line Department officials, Police,
Teshildar, Village Administrative Officer and other stakeholders on how to respond to an
actual disaster. It is an opportunity to test and evaluate how well all sections of the
emergency plan work together and how the community and stakeholders are trained to
respond to actual emergency situation.
The CIL staff, District administration and Community representatives should study the
emergency plan carefully in prior and make sure they understand all aspects of the plan.
The early warning team must decide on the mode and type of alarm for that particular
hazard (for example gas leakage from RGT). It could be alarm bell or siren. The evacuation
team must designate the safe assembly areas and evacuation routes with proper sign
boards.
All the CIL staff and community members must know how to respond with appropriate
procedures related to the notified hazard once they hear the alarm. First priority in
evacuation process should be of vulnerable persons, elderly persons, children, People with
disability (PWD-visually challenged, physically challenged/ differently-abled, etc.),
Paralysed, chronically ill, etc., as they are the most vulnerable during emergency. Search
and evacuation team members must help in evacuation as per the procedures appropriate
[154]

to the notified hazard. After the safe assembly a proper head count can be carried out to
ascertain the safety of all persons.
The external agencies such as District Administration, Teshildar, Police, Fire and Rescue
services, Medical team etc. must be informed of the mock drill and requested to be present
during the drill. Take feedback from all participants for improvisation to handle the real
time emergency situations. Record (documentation and video shoot) the entire mock drill
process for future improvements.
11.2.1 TIPS FOR CONDUCTING SAFE MOCK DRILL
• Organise the mock drill which is representative of a real situation.
• Create a list of all participants before starting the drill.
• Explain the objectives, duration, “do’s and don’ts” clearly to all participants
• Ensure the participation of vulnerable groups that need assistance, such as women,
children, elderly persons, people with disabilities (PWD), paralyzed, etc.
• Inculcate the practice of escorting the vulnerable to safe assembly areas
• Finally there shall be a head count to ascertain everybody has safely reached the
safe spot.
• The participants should be advised not to panic during the mock drill. At the same
time, they should be advised to be alert and participate seriously.
• Prior to conducting the drill, the drill team members should be trained in the
duties, responsibilities and activities related to their respective positions in the
conduct of the drill.
CAUTION: Mock drills are known to cause casualties if NOT CONDUCTED SYSTEMATICALLY
or not taken seriously by the participants.
11.3 GUIDELINES FOR MOCK DRILL DESIGN
All drills should be conducted in accordance with the drill scenario as prepared by CIL and
with prior permission from district administration. The participation of the district
administration, Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) of all line departments, tehsildars,
police, VAOs, voluntary agencies such as Civil Defence, NSS, NYKS, Bharat Scouts and
Guides, Rangers and Rovers, Red Cross, Industrial Safety Managers/Technical Experts and
groups or individuals specifically identified to conduct the drills is to be ensured. The
[155]

number of controllers, simulators and evaluators are decided based on the type of drill to
be conducted, the scenario and the resources available to conduct the exercise (personnel,
equipment, funding etc).
11.3.1 SCOPE
The scope defines the boundaries of the drill. While conducting the mock drill, the scope
could also include the possible collateral hazards associated with the main hazard that
triggers other events. The following five aspects should be considered while defining the
scope -
1. Hazards – Identify one specific hazard/collateral hazards for the exercise
2. Geographic area – Identify a defined location for the event and identify a hazard
impact scenario
3. Agencies and personnel – Identify which agencies will participate and the
personnel required
4. Exercise type – Identify the type of exercise to be conducted based on realistically
achievable results within the drill scenario
5. Operating Procedures – Identify SOPs as per the scenario to test emergency
response functions and coordination
11.3.2 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
It is a statement to communicate the scope of the exercise to the entities participating in
the mock drill.
11.3.3 OBJECTIVES
Objectives should be clear, concise, specific, performance based and attainable. The
number of objectives needed for an exercise may vary according to the scale and expected
output of the exercise. Objectives can be classified into “general/functional/specific”.
General objectives will provide the overall scope of the exercise with reference to the
community, agency, institution, industry or organization.
Functional or specific objectives form the core of the mock drill. These further define the
statement of purpose for the exercise by clearly describing the expected outcomes
(performance) of the disaster management functions being tested.
[156]

11.3.4 SCENARIO NARRATIVE
The scenario narrative describes the events leading up to the time the exercise begins. It
sets the scene for later events and also captures the attention of the participants. It could
include answers to questions such as:
• What event
• How was the information relayed
• What damages have been reported
• What was the sequence of events
• Was there any advance warning issued and how long before the event
• What factors influence emergency procedures
11.3.5 DRILL ACTIVITY
Activities should be planned in such a way that it provides sufficient scope to test the preidentified
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), drill scenario and the needs of the
identified participants (e.g. members of ESF teams, schools, industries, public/commercial
settings).
11.3.6 EXPECTED ACTIONS/ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
This describes the expected response to actions undertaken. Each ESF and its respective
team members should be listed by name so that there is no confusion as to who is
responsible for each function.
11.3.7 EXPECTED RESPONSE/EVALUATION CRITERIA
The expected response is already pre-identified and defined in a procedure. Specific areas
need to be identified for evaluation in the design stage of the mock drill. Details of the
procedure must be included so that evaluation is properly carried out. The criteria for
evaluation should focus on response recovery based on the hazard scenario stimulated
and emergency functions conducted.
[157]

11.4 GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCTING MOCK DRILL
When conducting drills, a set process should be followed in order to minimize risks of
injury to personnel, damage to equipment or the environment.
11.4.1 PRE-DRILL BRIEFING
The drill coordinator should hold a pre-drill briefing with the participating agencies,
observers/evaluators to explain the scene and the ground rules for executing the drill.
Operational procedures should be reviewed and safety precautions should be considered
and reviewed with the participants. In a scenario which has a potential to cause damage to
the habitat, it is important to involve the community and discuss the possible chain of
events with them.
11.4.2 DRILL INITIATION
The drill should be initiated by the mock drill coordinator in accordance with the planned
drill scenario. The exact actions (such as alarm or announcement) for the initiation should
be identified.
11.4.3 DRILL ACTIVITY
After the drill is initiated, every activity and response should be carried out according to
the scenario and respective SOPs. Methods for receiving and delivery of messages can be
verbal or written; on paper, by telephone, radio or fax. The drill scenario should be
allowed to continue till completion of the stated objectives or as stated by the mock drill
coordinator.
CAUTION: An abnormal termination is possible when actions taken by operating
personnel would adversely affect the safety of the participants or cause damage to the
facility, equipment or environment.
[158]

11.5 GUIDELINES FOR DRILL EVALUATION
Evaluation process is an important component of the drill. It is the act of observing and
recording mock drill activity, by comparing the performed actions against the drill
objectives.
Evaluation serves three functions:
• To evaluate personnel actions
• To evaluate the ability of the responding agencies to implement a plan
• To check the effectiveness of the standard operating procedures
During the pre-drill briefing, the drill planner, mock drill coordinator and evaluation team
will review the drill activity and SOPs. An evaluation worksheet outlining the action
processes to be observed as per the set timeline decided in the scenario exercise should be
circulated. After the drill, an evaluation report will be prepared and the comments can be
incorporated into the SOPs.
11.5.1 EVALUATION TEAM
The team members may be identified from within or outside the participating agencies.
The mock drill coordinator may also serve as an evaluator. The size of the evaluation team
will depend on the complexity and scale of the drill. Evaluators should be familiar with the
local emergency management system, have expertise and knowledge of the plan and have
analytical skills in keeping with the exercise design.
11.5.2 ELEMENTS FOR EVALUATION
The evaluators should consider the following elements in their evaluation
• Notification, alerting and mobilization of disaster response personnel
• Adequacy of alerting procedures
• Timely activation and staffing of response facilities
• Accurate and timely assessment of emergency situation
• Emergency response facilities
[159]

• Timely activation
• Adequate personnel as per the Response Plan
• Adequate response equipment
• Disaster preparedness plans and procedures
• Assigned task forces, personnel’s demonstrated familiarity with the plans and
standard operating procedures
• Following the set process of the procedures and plans
• Communications capabilities between response facilities
• Adequate timely communication with field teams
• Use of primary and back-up communication systems
• Satisfactory handling of messages and communication from CIL’s control room to
the field site and vice-versa
• Adequate communications between emergency support functions
• Situation assessment
• To be able to demonstrate timely and coordinated information exchange between
response facilities
• To be able to assess the emergency situation, classify the situation and develop
initial mitigation/restoration activities in a timely and accurate manner
• Overall adequacy of the drill scenario to assess the response plan, facilities,
resources, personnel/task forces according to functional areas and standard
operating procedures
11.6 FEEDBACK & IMPROVEMENTS
Following the drill, the mock drill coordinator will hold a session to critique the drill along
with the evaluators and drill team. The critical analysis highlights the successes,
shortcomings of the drill scenario, personnel’s actions, equipment accessibility etc. The
feedbacks and improvements include an analysis of the expected versus the actual
[160]

operating actions including a critical evaluation of the response mechanisms and response
time. The process should first involve –
• Self-evaluation by the participants
• Discussion of the evaluation notes, checklists and actions taken
• Overall drill performance.
Lessons learnt should be generated and shared with all the participating agencies to
ensure improvements and effectiveness for live scenarios. The mock drill coordinator
shall make the final determination of whether the drill objective was met or not.
11.6.1 MOCK DRILL EVALUATION REPORT
The evaluation report summarizes the development, conduct and results of the
drill/exercise. The report should present an overall evaluation of the exercise, state
whether the exercise objectives were achieved, and cite any areas of noteworthy
performance, discoveries, determinations, problems, and solutions identified as a result of
the exercise.
[161]

CHAPTER
12 3
12 RECOMMENDATIONS
1. CIL shall enhance the Coordination Mechanism with Barmer District Administration and
respective line Departments for effective Disaster Management
2. CIL’s Preparedness shall include systems and mechanisms including Community
Participation for ensuring integrated and comprehensive Disaster Management.
3. CIL and District administration shall lay down the sequence of actions to be taken by all the
relevant agencies in the emergency/crisis situations as per the formulated Cairn’s
Emergency Command Structure.
4. The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) evolved as part of this DMP shall be used as
joint operating procedures for both Cairn and District Administration during emergencies
5. Periodical updation of Disaster Management Inventory consisting of critical resources
and storage locations.
6. CIL shall ensure periodic execution of mock drills as prescribed in the DMP.
7. CIL shall undertake Capacity Building in the field of Community based Disaster
Management to improve Community Resilience.
8. State Administration shall be requested by CIL to ensure a 1 km radius of Buffer Zone
around MPT and RGT facility to prevent any new commercial establishments or
settlements.
9. CIL shall periodically maintain Emergency Management Kits
[162]

10. The Inventory of Resources shall be periodically updated and uploaded in both Cairn and
Barmer District administration websites respectively
11. CIL shall improve the Community based Early Warning Systems for multihazards
12. CIL shall liase and network with neighbouring corporate houses and other agencies on
Sharing of Resources during emergencies
13. This DMP (English Version) shall be translated into Hindi and disseminated to appropriate
district/state departments and CIL management.
14. GIS based pipeline survey and periodical monitoring shall be conducted.
[163]

APPENDIX A – EMERGENCY CONTACT NUMBERS
1 HOTLINE NUMBERS
Department Hotline Number Telephone number
Police 100 02982 221 822
Ambulance 108
District Collectorate 02982 220 003
Municipality/ Fire 02982 225 781, 220 098
Home guard 02982 220 075
2 WIRELESS CALL SIGNS
S. no Name of station Call sign Mobile call sign
1 Police Firing Range Romeio.18
2 Police Control Room Control Mobile control
3 Collector, DM Echo
4 S.P.Chamber Tiger Tiger
5 Repeater Station Chohtan Gita.25
6 Police City Kotwali Gita. 1 Mike.1
7 Police Station, Sadar Gita.2 Mike.2
8 Police Station, Baytu Gita.3 Mike.3
9 Police Station, Gida GitaA Mike.4
10 Police Station, Sheo Gita.5 Mike.5
11 Police Station, Girab Gita.6 Mike.6
12 Police Station, Dhorimana Gita.7 Mike.7
13 Police Station, Gudamalani Gita.8 Mike.8
14 Police Station, Balotra Gita.l1 Mike.ll
15 Police Station, Kalyanpur Gita.12 Mike.12
16 Police Station, Mandalee Gita.13 Mike.13
17 Police Station, Samdari Gita.14 Mike.14
18 Police Station, Siwana Gita.15 'Mike.15
19 Police Station, Sindhari Gita.16 Mike.16
20 Police Station, Chohtan Gita.19 Mike.19
21 Police Station, Ramsar Gita.20 Mike.20
22 pblice Station, GadaraRoad Gita.21 Mike.21
23 Police Station, Binjrad Gita.22 Mike.22
24 Police Station, Sedawa Gita.23 Mike.23
[164]

25 Police Station, Bakhasar Gita.24 Mike.24
26 Police Station, GRP BMR Gita.26 Mike.26
3 CONTACT NUMBERS OF DISTRICT DISASTER MANAGEMENT
CELL
Telephone numbers
S. No Name of post
STD Code Work Home
1 District collector Chairman 02982 220003 220004
2 District Police
Superintendent
3 Chief works Officer, District
Administration
4 Additional district collector
(Administration)
Member 02982 220005 220006
Member 02982 220292 220296
Member 02982 220007 220008
5
Special Additional Works
Officer,
District
Administration
Member 02982 220053 220063
6 Chief Medical and Health
Officer
7 Sub-Director, Pushpalen,
Barmer
8 Special director, Technical
Mission, PHED
9 Assistant engineer, Water
resources division
Member 02982 220562 220204
Member 02982 230284
Member 02982 220253 220243
Member 02982
10
Superintendent engineer,
Jodhpur Electricity
Distribution Board
Member 02982 223788 221390
11 Sub controller, Civil
Defence
Member 02982 220075
12 District Education Officer,
Secondary
Member 02982 230228 227711
13 Superintendent, railway Member 02982 220146 227575
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station, Barmer
14 District information officer Member 02982 220973 221295
15 District Statistics officer Member 02982 220682
16 District transportation
officer
Member 02982 220615 222377
17 District information and
public relations officer
Member 02982 220485 220168
18 District supply officer Member 02982 220164 223277
19 Commandant, Homeguard Member 02982 220075
20 District manager, BSNL Member 02982 221100 221200
21 Station commander, Jalipa
Army
22 Deputy inspector general,
BSF
Member 02982 221582
Member 02982 220837 220838
4 TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF THE IMPORTANT OFFICIALS IN THE
DISTRICT
S. No
Name of the
official
1 Ravi Jain
2 H. S. Meena
3 Mitusingh
4
Rajesh
Chauhan
5 B. L. Naga
6 C. L. Devasi
Post
District Collector and
Magistrate
Assistant District
Collector
Subdivision Officer,
Barmer
Subdivision Officer,
Baalothara
Subdivision Officer,
Shiv
Subdivision Officer,
Gudaamalani
Barmer Headquarters
STD
Code
02982
02982
02982
Telephone
Work Home Mobile
220003 220004 9414 649900
220007 220008 9828 153204
220009 220009 9413 001325
02988 220005 220005 9413 305432
02987 253301 253301 9414 689965
02982 221837 221837 9414 404982
[166]

7 Neeraj Mishra
8 Lalith Jain
9
Choonaram
Poonad
Financial Officer,
Barmer
District supply official,
Barmer
Additional Charge
Officer, Disaster
Mitigation and
Management
10 C. S. Bhati Tahsildar, Barmer
11
12
13
14
Bhanwar
Singh
Dhanraj
Choudary
Dheerendrasin
gh Soni
Manmohan
Vaas
15 Rajesh Mevda
16
Ramchandr
Panchar
Tahlsildar, Baayuthi
Tahlsildar, Sivana
Tahlsildar,
Gudaamalani
Assistant Tahlsildar,
Shiv
Tahlsildar,
Pachpadara
Tahlsildar, Chauhatan
17 Naresh Joshi Tahlsildar, Ramsar
18
Kailash
Choudary
19 Harphoolsingh
20 Tanuram
21 Mehtabsingh
22 Ayidansingh
23 L. R. Vishnoi
24 Bhagaram
25
Donngarsingh
Choudary
Development Officer,
Barmer
Development Officer,
Baayuthi
Development Officer,
Sivana
Development Officer,
Dhoreenmna
Development Officer,
Shiv
Development Officer,
Baalothara
Development Officer,
Chauhatan
Development Officer,
Sindheri
02982 220404 230309 9829 795150
02982 220164 9414 307813
02982 222226 225283 9414 308166
02982 220224 220224 9414 493101
02982 241183 241183 9414 678411
02901 230613 230613 9414 544638
02983 280031 280031 9828 930418
02987 253095 253095 8003 332335
02988 281241 281241 9414 526707
02989 286130 286130 9414 430682
02985 270078 270078 9829 588882
02982 220062 222990 9414 452089
02982 241128 241128 9414 664013
02901 230603 230625 9001 091051
02986 264224 264291 9413 527300
02987 253036 253036 9414 627699
02988 220007 220007 9414 425388
02989 286126 286126 9950 111783
02984 284444 284555 9413 163662
[167]

5 POLICE OFFICIALS
S. No
Name of the
official
1 Navjyothi Gogai
2 Sriraam Meena
3 Jasaram Bans
4 Kajod Mal Peena
5 Banjiram Meena
6
7
Budharam
Vishnoi
Ramesh
Sharma
8 Manoj Mood
Kumar
9 Jagdish Vishnoi
10 Manoj Sharma
11
12
13
14
Lakshminarayan
an
Jayram
Choudary
Dinesh
Meena
Bhanwarlal
Devasi
15 Udaysingh
Kumar
Post
District Police
Superintendent
Additional District
Police superintendent
Assistant
Superintendent,
Barmer
Assistant
Superintendent,
Chauhatan
Assistant
Superintendent,
Baalothara
Inspector of Police,
main Police Station,
Barmer
Police chief inspector,
Barmer
Sub-inspector,
Baayuthi Police
station
Sub-inspector, Gida
Police station
Inspector, Girab
Police station
Inspector, Shiv Police
station
Sub-inspector,
Dhorimana Police
station
Inspector,
Gudaamalani Police
station
Inspector, Baalothara
Police station
Sub-inspector,
Kalyanpura Police
[168]
STD
Code
02982
02982
Telephone
02982 223900
02989
02988
02982 220100
02982 200774
02982 241125
02982 210115
02981 276310
02987 253032
02986 264226
02983 280025
02988 220010
02980 255010
Work Home Mobile
220005 220006
220930 220078
220079
286139 224964
221007 224964
9799
397243
9928
431600
9414
754280
9414
712666
9414
006081
9414
430238
9414
980142
9414
525090
9828
798031
9982
366262
9413
363434
9414
373723
9414
306790
9414
101010
9414
842698

station
16 Mishrilal
Sub-inspector,
Samdhadi Police 02990 276226
station
17 Narpathdan
Sub-inspector, Sivana
02901
Police station
230610
18 Khiyaram
Sub-inspector,
Mandali Police station
02980 244240
19 Moolaram
Sub-inspector,
Sindhari Police station
02984 284240
Sub-inspector,
20 Kaliashdaan Chauhatan Police 02989 286123
station
21 Hanjaariram
Sub-inspector,
Beejrad Police station
02989 233010
22 Surajmal Meena
Inspector, Ramsar
Police station
02985 270124
23 Surendra Kumar
Inspector, Sedva
Police station
02903 214333
24 Dhanaram
Inspector, Gadraroad
Police station
02981 270124
25 Mohansingh
Inspector, Bakhasar
Police station
02903 269310
Sub-inspector,
26 Jagdish Prasad Pachpadara Police 02988 281807
station
27 Babulal Vishnoi NPRIPL, Barmer 02982 220010
9982
494390
9680320
656
9413092
511
9784
417157
9414301
026
9799
518080
9414
722983
9414
273413
9414
915802
9829
367944
9928
370591
9460
431894
6 MUNICIPALITY
S. No
Name of the
official
1 Usha Jain
2 Srimathi
3 Choonaram
Post
Chairman N. P,
Barmer
Chairman N. P,
Baalothara
Commissioner N. P,
Barmer
STD
Code
[169]
Telephone
02982 220048
02988 220024
Work Home Mobile
02982 220048 222754

4 Mangatram Officer, Baalothara 02988 220024 221156
9929
105943
7 HEALTH DEPARTMENT
S. No Name of the
official
Post
1
Chief physician and health
Ganpathsingh
officer
2 Jeetendrasing Additional chief physician and
h
health officer (P.K.)
3 Govardhan Additional chief physician and
singh
health officer (health)
4
M. L. Bohra RCMO, Barmer
5 R K
Maheshwari
6
G C Vadera
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
P R Rati
D K Charan
Shamburam
N K Kotiwala
S S Shomani
Vishnuram
Jagdish lal
Government hospital, Barmer
Government
Baalothara
Block CMO, Barmer
Block CMO, Baalothara
Block CMO, Chauhatan
Block CMO, Shiv
Block CMO, Sivana
Block CMO, Dhorimanna
Block CMO, Baayuthi
S. Lal Block CMO, Sindhari
Shamburam
16 Phusaram
Vishnoi
17 Virendra
Gandhi
MOSHC, Chauhatan
MOSHC, Gudaamalani
MOSHC, Pachpadara
hospital,
Telephone
STD
Code
Work Mobile
02982 230462 9414633819
02982 230307 9460088345
02982 230276 9001892727
02982 231155 9001892666
02982 230369 9414106651
02988 220910 9414384393
02982 231062 9413527068
02988 224011 9414531056
02989 286117 9414531575
02987 253364 9414493491
02901 223245 9460087626
02986 264279 9414106662
02982 241400 9460310636
02984 284300 9413527825
02989 286117 9414531575
02983 280808 9414530058
02988 281296 9414282386
[170]

18
19
20
21
22
23
F R Rati
J S Rathod
N K Kotiwala
G S Rathod
B S Doodi
R R Suthar
24 Sanjeev
Mithal
25
Tarachand
26 Harish
Chauhan
MOSHC, Ramsar
MOSHC, Samdhadi
MOSHC, Shiv
MOSHC, Sivana
MOSHC, Kavas
MOSHC, Kalyanpur
MOSHC, Gadra Road
MOSHC, Bishaala
MOSHC, Sindhari
02985 270156 9414527068
02900 275210 9828658765
02987 253364 9414493491
02901 230677 -
02982 248506 9414756114
02980 255210 9414133179
02981 278100 9784312011
- - 9413307987
02984 284300 9461217477
8 HEALTHCARE CENTRES IN BARMER
S. No
1
2
3
4
5
Name of
the
Hospital
Governmen
t Hospital
Governmen
t hospital,
Nahata
District
decay
prevention
centre
Community
health
center
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Place
Barmer
Balothara
Barmer
Shiv
Goonga
Post
SS,JS,SMO,
MO&
Nursing
Staff
SS,JS,SMO,
MO&
Nursing
Staff
MO
SMO,MO&
Nursing
Staff
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Name of
official
incharge
R K
Maheshwari
G C Vadera
Govardhansi
ngh Charan
Anuj Sharma
telephone
Work
02982
220204
(home)
230369
(work)
02988-
220910
02982
230276
02987
253354
02987
252361
Other
9414106651
9414984393
9001892777
9828159506
Arjanram MN
II
9414493329
[171]

[172]
6
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Bhiyond
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Khushwant
Khatri
02987-
202102
9001892700
7
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Girab
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Gotham MN
II
9772387811
8
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Harsaani
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Hari
Singh
MN II
02901-
111505
9828969435
9
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Jaisindhar
Village
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Tulcharam
Megval
921483688
9
9214836889
10
Community
health
center
Gadraroad
JS,SMO,MO
&
Nursing
Staff
Prakash
Bhansali
02981
278489
9414531796
11
Village
Family
welfare
unit
Detani MO Prahaladram
12
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Jaisindhar
Station
MO&
Nursing
Staff
02981-
279429
13 Community Ramsar
JS,SMO,MO
&
Nursing
Staff
Pharasram
Rati
02985
270156
9001892602
14 Community Vishala
SMO.MO&
Nursing
Staff
Tarachand
Bhagora
029852040
89
9001892597
15
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Khadeen
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Peerusingh
Bhati
02985-
205015
9001892588
16
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Ranigaon
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Matilal
Khatri
02982
263165
9001892592
17
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Taratara
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Rajiv Jain 9001892595
18
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Gaagariya
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Mohammad
Akram
02985-
217200
9001892604
19
Primary
Healthcare
Sanavada
MO&
Nursing
Mahipal
Chaudry
02986-
9001892590

[173]
Centre Staff 263254
20
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Bhinde
ka
paar
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Mohammad
Akram
02985-
217240
9001892604
21
Village
Family
welfare
unit
Rathasar
MO
Mohammad
Akram
9001892604
22
Community
health
center
Chauhatan
JS,SMO,MO
&
Nursing
Staff
Shamburam
Gadveer
02989-
286117
9414531575
23
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Bakhasar
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Shankaram
Gahloth
029032144
45
9950349196
24
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Sedva
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Dinashadath
Sharma
029032141
65
9001892701
25
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Mitdaoo
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Rakesh Azad 8107115814
26
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Kailnor
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Gopesh
Panwar
9414562201
27
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Sata
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Shiraj
Vishnoi
02903-
268330
9799701219
28
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Dhanaoo
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Ajay Kumar
Sharma
02989-
288013
9414314845
29
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Saarla
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Birbalram
Khileri
9460613435
30
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Bhawanr
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Bashidar
Balai
9001892650
31
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Bhurhan ka
tala
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Ajkumar
Khandelwal
9928724369
32
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Bavdi Kala
MO&
Nursing
Staff
9414271027

[174]
33
Community
health
center
Baytu
JS,SMO,MO
&
Nursing
Staff
S K Singh
Bist
02982
241400
9001892780
34
Community
health
center
Kavas
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Jagdish
Lal
Mali
9001892834
35
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Bhadka
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Jasraj Bohra 9001892840
36
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Savaupdam
singh
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Prakash
Kumar
Chaudry
02902
256888
37
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Batadu
MO&
Nursing
Staff
S K Singh
Bist
02902-
221210
9001892780
38
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Bhimda
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Shivram
Prajaapath
0-
212100290
2
9829570544
39
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Gida
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Prakashmal
Vishnoi
9001892795
40
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Kanod
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Deepak
Kumar
941363337
5
9001892776
41
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Jhank
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Kamalkant
Sharma
9413507539
42
Village
Family
welfare
unit
Pareyu
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Bannaram
02983
280880
9414530058
43
Community
health
center
Gudamaalan
i
JS,SMO,MO
&
Nursing
Staff
Tusaram
Vishnoi
02986
264900
9414106662
44
Community
health
center
Dhorimana
JS,SMO,MO
&
Nursing
Staff
Vishnuram
Vishnoi
9001892729
45
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Gandhavkur
da
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Ajay Yadav 9461070471
46
Primary Bakharpura MO& Ashok
9784422477

[175]
Healthcare
Centre
Nursing
Staff
Vishnoi
47
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Peeparali
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Kimraj Patel 9950452003
48
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Sonadi
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Dharmapal
02933-
214427
9509290441
49
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Ogala
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Jainarayan
Bhairava
029332144
39
9587775911
50
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Bhuniya
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Shaitansingh
Vishnoi
029892891
26
9001892714
51
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Gangasara
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Mangalchan
drayadaav
8784814406
52
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Araniyali
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Omprakash
Vishnoi
9001892644
53
Village
Family
welfare
unit
Begana
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Hemantkum
ar (Ayush)
9610508694
54
Community
health
center
Sindheri
JS,SMO,MO
&
Nursing
Staff
Sanjeev
Mittal
02984
284300
9001892838
55
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Payala kala
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Navaneet
Dadhish
56
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Dhanka
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Praful
Kumar
9001892368
57
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Chava
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Bajranglal
Kataria
02982-
245101
9511129876
58
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Sarunu
MO&
Nursing
Staff
02982-
243145
Mr.
Lalkha
Ram MN II
9001892425
59
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Nokada
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Sudhirkuma
r Darjee
02986-
267337
9001892410

[176]
60
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Hodu
MO&
Nursing
Staff
A K Purohit
02984-
289105
9001892419
61
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Shivkaar
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Nanda
Tai
(Ayush)
02982-
232038
9460465074
62
Village
Family
welfare
unit
Nosar
MO
Ketaram
Soni
9001892430
63
Community
health
center
Sivana
JS,SMO,MO
&
Nursing
Staff
Ghuamnsing
h Rathod
029012306
77
9413032956
64
Community
health
center
Samdhadi
JS,SMO,MO
&
Nursing
Staff
Ghisalal
Rathod
02900
276210
9002189250
65
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Padaru
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Natwarsingh
02901-
234716
9001892460
66
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Rakhi
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Lakshminar
ayan
9001892476
67
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Ajit
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Suresh
Kumar
Raina
9001892502
68
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Ramaniya
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Hukmichand
Rathod
9001892469
69
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Mokalsar
MO&
Nursing
Staff
S D Bhoda
029012327
80
9001892746
70
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Khandap
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Omprakash
9001892481
71
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Indrana
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Santosh
Kuma Soni
9001892452
72
Village
Family
welfare
unit
Majal
MO
Malik
Esar
Ahmed
9413254491

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
Community
health
center
Community
health
center
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Pachpatra
Kalyankuma
r
Mandali
Patodi
Parloo
Jasol
Araba
Asada
Thob
JS,SMO,MO
& Nursing
Staff
JS,SMO,MO
& Nursing
Staff
MO&
Nursing
Staff
MO&
Nursing
Staff
MO&
Nursing
Staff
MO&
Nursing
Staff
MO&
Nursing
Staff
MO&
Nursing
Staff
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Virendra
Gandhi
R R Sudhar
Kuldeep
Solanki
Dharmendra
Soni
Prem
prakash
Vishnuprasa
d
02988
281517
9001892302
255210 9001892301
02980-
210201
02980-
254720
02988-
243015
02988
240306
9001892306
9001892303
9001892305
9001892304
Karthi Bhati 9413252900
Rameshwar
(Ayush)
9468553419
Mr. Dinesh
Ranga MN II
9983370902
82
83
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Primary
Healthcare
Centre
Navatala
Kitnod
MO&
Nursing
Staff
MO&
Nursing
Staff
Rajendra
Kiradia
Rajesh
Jhanku
212323 9001892851
9829090060
9 HOSPITALS
S. No Name of the hospital STD Code Phone Managing doctor
1 Manak hospital, Barmer 2982 222964 50 Chaganlal Bohra
2
Eye hospital, Rain
Basera, Barmer
2982 220791 60 Omprakash Mehra
3 Sagar hospital, Barmer 55 Bhanuparatap
[177]

4
Jeevanjoyth hospital,
Barmer
2982 223170 40 Sayaman Megwan
5 Khati hospital, Barmer
6 Daga hospital, Balothara 2988 222717 35 Ashokji
7
Sant Haridas hospital,
Balothara
2988 222164 24 Satish Agarwal
8 B H T Hospital, Barmer 2982 223811 50 Hariprakash
10 VETERINARY HOSPITALS/PHARMACIES IN THE DISTRICT
S. No Name of the official Post Place Telephone
number
1 B R Jetiya Assistant Workplace, 9829183935
director Barmer
2 Ajash Sharma VO Veterinary 9414532931
hospital
3 Narayan Singh VO Animal
9928383230
husbandry
development
4 Hemant Kumar VO Workplace, 9414417856
Barmer
5 Pushpendar Singh VO Bakhasar 9928245409
6 Ajaynath Goswami VO Kavas 9680788611
7 Ghenaram VA Dhorimanna 9414529372
8 Banwarlal VO Mitda
9 Adharam VO Niyad 9468550023
10 Vishnuvrithisurvase VO Mool ki Daani 9829782494
11 Milind Sadarve VO Ramsar 9413005835
12 Ravendra Kumar VO Beejrad 9413635856
13 Ganesh Somaji VO Bhaidana 9414719745
14 Rajesh M Nimbarte VO Navatala 9970059343
15 Harisingh SVO Sivana 02901230260
16 Deshpal Singh SVO Chauhatan 9414294657
17 Parmeshwarlal SVO Balothara 9414721143
18 Shravankumar Vaishna VO Tapra 02988-240007
19 Madangiri Swami VO Kitnod 9414294860
20 Vijay Kaidar VO Gadraroad 9460491269
21 Ajaykumar Teesal VO Baythu 9413030458
22 Kunamaram Venival VO Dhorimanna 9414107475
23 Dhanshyam Marodia VO Bakhasar 9414171819
[178]

24 Avinash Kumar VO Kanana 9460887035
25 Sanjay Sharma VO Pachpatra 9414275244
26 Jeetendra Singh VO Naithrad 9414529937
27 Kamendra Kumar VO Samdhadi 9414755044
28 Ratanlal Jhinkar VO Mokalsar 9414900579
29 Jaydeep Bathoria VO Sedva 9415160671
30 Ajaypalsingh VO Patodi 9829029855
31 Kamlesh Kumar VO Kalyanpur 9460769423
32 Jagdish Kumar VO Gudamalaani 9799045501
33 Punamachand Vishnoi VO Sonadi 9784814644
34 Banwarsingh Deniwal VO Chava 9484376257
35 Hemant Kumar VO Savaoo
9414417856
Padamsingh
36 Vijay Chandan VO Araniyali 9414529222
11 PUBLIC HEALTH ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT
S. No Name of the Post
Telephone
official
STD Work Home Mobile
Code
1 D C Vishnoi Special Director 02982 220253 220243 9772205701
2 D D Jhangad Special Officer and 02982 220253 9460008323
T. S. First
3 B L Jatol Special Officer, 02982 220610 220613 9783802666
Barmer city
4 Hanjariram Technical officer 02982 9982866677
Balwa
5 Sonaram Assistant Special 02982 223270 9413904543
Chaudry Officer,
Production
Subdivision,
Barmer city
6 S P Avasthi Assistant Special 02982 220073 9414013801
Officer,
Production and
Finance
Subdivision,
Barmer city
7 Khetaram Assistant Special 02981 278330 278345 9783031150
Choudry Officer,
[179]

Gadararoad and
Finance
subdivision,
Barmer
8 Mahesh
Assistant Special
Sharma
Officer, Shiv
subdivision
9 Aarti Parihar Officer, Revenue
section
10 Tilokchand Officer,
Geharvar distribution
section
11 Jayram Das Officer, Bhadka
section (1st and
2nd)
12 Mahesh
Officer, Vishala,
Sharma
Shiv, Nimbala
section
13 Kaalooram
Meena
Officer, Gadraroad
section (1st and
2nd)
14 Ramdeen Jyani Special Officer,
North district
division
15 Sonaram Assistant Special
Beneval Officer, 2nd
district
subdivision,
Barmer
16 Meharam Assistant Special
Choudry Officer, Baayuthi
subdivision
17 Sanjay Jain Assistant Special
Officer, Undoo
Subdivision
18 Sanjay Jain Assistant Special
Officer, Bhiyad
subdivision
19 Gopaldas Officer, Barmer
Bhoda
section
20 Bhanwarlal Officer, Nagaana
Ghoyal
Section
02987 253050 9413992066
02982 220073 9413904399
9214584958
9413163788
9413992066
9950374636
02982 220612 220254 9461146048
02982 222610 9413904543
02982 241162 9414530212
02987 251822 9413308568
9413308568
9928496310
9413503403
[180]

21 Jeetendra
Kumar
Officer, Pooniyon
ki Daani section
22 Kamlesh Officer, Bayuthi
Mathur
section
23 Jaychand Officer, Kavas and
Kheechad Bhimda section
24 Lakshmikanth Officer, Bhiyad
Damor
and Kanasar
section
25 Kailash Purohit Officer, Khokhsar
section
26 Bhanwarlal Charge officer,
Ghoyal
Undoo 2nd section
27 Bhanwarlal Charge officer, S P
Ghoyal
Singh section
28 Bhanwarlal Charge officer,
Ghoyal
Heera ki Daani
section
29 R R Sharma Special Officer,
South district
division
9982320540
9414918904
9694540192
9602200493
9928774756
9413503403
9413503403
9413503403
02982 220482 220480 9413957525
30 Jogeshwar
Prasad
Technical officer 9829213626
31 Mangilal Jain Assistant Special
Officer, Chauhatan
section
32 B L Malav Assistant Special
Officer, Ghanau
section
02989 286153 9414302074
02989 286153 9928089028
33 Shivjiram
Chaudry
Assistant Special
Officer,
Dhorimanna
section
02986 264221 264254 9414302111
34 Radheshyam
Meena
Officer,
section
SKT
9783814368
35 Radheshyam
Meena
Officer, Chauhatan
1st section
9783814368
[181]

36 Radheshyam
Meena
Officer, Chauhatan
2nd section
9783814368
37 Radheshyam
Meena
Officer,
section
Sanvlaur
9783814368
38 B L Malav Officer, Sevada
section
39 V V Vashisht Officer, Buran ka
Tala section
40 B L Malav Charge officer and
Officer, Sihania
section
41 B L Malav Charge officer and
Officer, Ghanau
section
9928089028
9602440516
9928089028
9928089028
42 Kailash Meena Officer,
Dhorimanna
section
1st
9799144687
43 Shivjiram
Chaudry
Officer,
Dhorimanna 1st
and 2nd section
9414302111
44 Kailash Meena Charge officer and
Officer, Ramji ka
Gol section
45 S K Gupta Officer, Raijep
division, Barmer
46 Sukhram Soni Officer,Raijep
subdivision,
Barmer
47 Sukhram Soni Charge officer and
Officer, Ramsar
subdivision
48 Babulal Meena Assistant Special
Officer,
Gudaamalani
9799144687
02982 222228 9414182973
02982 222695 9414529940
02985 270131 9414529940
02983 280239 9928015609
[182]

subdivision
49 Radhakishan
Meena
Officer,
section
Ranigaon
9413054391
50 Pramod Mathur Officer, Mahabar
section
51 D N Ladhad Officer, Barmer
section
9414383765
9414529941
52 Radhakishan
Meena
53 Radhakishan
Meena
Officer, Ramsar
1st section
Officer, Ramsar
2nd section
9413054391
9413054391
54 Gangaram
Girab
Officer,
section
Girab
9783453091
55 Bhairulal
Meena
Officer,
Gudaamalani
section
9413101490
56 Bhairulal
Meena
Officer,
section
Bhatala
9413101490
57 Bhairulal
Meena
58 Dharmendrasin
gh Parihar
Officer, Poliniyon
ki Daani section
Special Officer,
Baalothara
division
9413101490
02988 220706 220736 9414531514
59 Sanjay Mathur Assistant Special
Officer, Baalothara
subdivision
02988 220873 9414882490
60 Shankarram
Chaudry
Assistant Special
Officer,
Pachpadara
subdivision
02988 281270 9414550113
61 J P Mathur Assistant Special
Officer, Sivana
subdivision
02981 230690 9414689307
[183]

62 Bharatsingh
Chaudry
Assistant Special
Officer, Sindhari
subdivision
02984 284432 9414282434
63 Sanjay Mathur Officer, Baalothara
1st sub division
64 Ramlala Meena Officer, Revenue
section
9414882490
9983471323
65 Pavan Kumar
Bagga
Officer,
Production
section
66 Sanjay Mathur Officer, Asada
section
9414282490
67 Maangilal
Khitliya
Officer,
Pachpadara
section
1st
9414561398
68 Tulsidas Dabhi Officer,
Pachpadara
section
2nd
02988 240548
69 Harjisingh Officer, Mandali
section
70 Jagdishsingh Officer, Sivana
section
71 Jagdishsingh Officer, Samdhadi
section
72 Jagdishsingh Officer, Bamseen
section
9414761206
9414476546
9414476546
9414476546
73 Ramnath
Meena
74 Roshanlal
Mathur
Officer, Sindhari
1st section
Officer, Sindhari
2nd section
9460045170
9460045170
75 Ravindrasingh Officer, Padroo
section
9828582972
[184]

12 PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
S. No
Name of the
official
1 T C Chajed
2 K D Charan
3 R K Jhinjha
4 Mukesh Bhati
5 M R Chaudry
6 D D Bhati
7 R S Purohit
8 R K Mangal
9 S S Moyal
10
Mohanam
Chaudy
11 C L Khatri
12 P C Chajed
13 Vineeth Gupta
14 Sura Ram Jaani
Post
Superintending
Officer, SNV, Barmer
Superintending
Officer, SNV,
Balothara
Superintending
Officer, SNV,
Balothara
Superintending
Officer, SNV, Barmer
Superintending
Officer, SNV, Barmer
Superintending
Officer, SNV,
Gudamalani
Superintending
Officer, SNV,
Barmer
Superintending
Officer, SNV,
Chauhatan
Superintending
Officer, SNV, Shiv
Superintending
Officer, SNV, NH,
BMR
Assistant Officer
Subdivision I,
Barmer
Assistant Officer
Subdivision II,
Barmer
Assistant Officer
Subdivision III,
Barmer
Assistant Officer
Subdivision, Nagar,
Telephone
STD
Code
Work Home Mobile
02982 226295 226425 9414291073
02988 227023 - 9413329818
02988 220453 - 9414106607
02982 220064 220607 9414135836
02982 222380
- - - 9414129034
- - - 9414206173
02989 220672 - 9414196757
- - - 9414528996
02982 220595 - 9799496410
02982 9414493084
9414529931
9413308861
9414384202
[185]

15 Hari Babu
16 P D Khatri
17 Veerchand Soni
18 Surenda Basani
19 Mangaldas
20 P C Sharma
21 Pamendra Singh
22 Chunnilal Sharma
23
Champalal
Sharma
24 Ananth Prajapath
25 Mahaveer Bohra
26 Sujaram Vishnoi
27 Babulal Setiya
28 M L Parihaar
29
30
Mohanlal Naik
Babulal Vishnoi
Barmer
Assistant Officer
Subdivision,
Ranigaon
Assistant Officer
Subdivision, Vishala
Assistant Officer
Subdivision,
Bachdau
Assistant Officer
Subdivision IV,
Barmer
Assistant Officer
Subdivision, I
Gadraroad
Assistant Officer
Subdivision II
Gadraroad
Assistant Officer
Subdivision, Bhiyad
Assistant Officer
Subdivision, Harsani
Assistant Officer
Subdivision II, Guda
Assistant Officer
Subdivision V, Guda
Assistant Officer
Subdivision I, Guda
Assistant Officer
Subdivision II
Dhorimanna
Assistant Officer
Subdivision,
Chauhatan
Assistant Officer
Subdivision, II
Balothara
Assistant Officer
Subdivision II,
Balothara
Assistant Officer
Subdivision
[186]
9414084627
9414384210
9460538448
9828421329
9414130768
9413132712
9414195105
9414633424
9414988024
9414306882
9414307155
9414105947
9414123685
9460008073
9414152589

31
32
P M Singhodia
Champalal
33 Jodharam
Chaudry
34
35
36
Sohanlal
Sukhram Machra
Girdhariram
37 Sohansingh
Rathod
38
Anil Gupta
39 Deeparam
Chaudry
40
K K Sindhal
41 Jeetendra
Sharma
42
43
44
45
Tejaram Chaudry
Suresh Vyas
Surendra Mohan
Narsingharaam
Samdhadi
Assistant Officer
Subdivision,
Kalyanpur
Assistant Officer
Subdivision, Sivana
Assistant Officer
Subdivision I, Gida
Assistant Officer
Subdivision I, Kanod
Assistant Officer
Subdivision II, Gida
Assistant Officer
SubdivisionVI,
Kanod
Assistant Officer
Subdivision, V,
Balothara
Assistant Officer
Subdivision, Kavas
Assistant Officer
Subdivision II,
Kanod
Assistant Officer
Subdivision IV
Sindheri
Assistant Officer
Subdivision I,
Sindheri
Assistant Officer
Subdivision II,
Sindheri
Assistant Officer
Subdivision QC-1,
BMR
Assistant Officer
Subdivision QC,
Balothara
Assistant Officer
Subdivision, QC-III
BMR
9413302950
9414391038
9414107128
9414130412
9414267847
9413507685
9251302365
9414128918
9414560792
9414301052
9460957650
9414531618
9001507955
9414141780
9414492949
[187]

46
Pukhraj Meg
Assistant
Subdivision,
BMR
Officer
QC-II
9414634348
13 OTHER OFFICIALS
S. No
Name of the
official
Post
[188]
STD
Code
Telephone
Work Home Mobile
1
Ramavatar
Meena
CEO, GP, Barmer 02982 220292 220296 9414431433
2
Deepprakash
Mathur
ATI CEO, GP, Barmer 02982 220053 220063 9414260968
3
Pemsingh Assistant Collector,
Chaan
Bayuthi
02982 241212 241211 9928031634
4 M L Nehra LAO, ONGC, Barmer 02982 225317 222612 9828844459
5 G S Raanavath LAO. RSMM. Barmer 02982 227035 - 9413024579
6 Deepal Jain DID, NIC, Banner 02982 220973 221295 9928018289
7 Harindra Singh
District excise officer,
Barmer
02982 220427 221836 9413340074
8 P R Kadela
Superintendent of
Post Office, Barmer
02982 220443 220394 9413228199
Superintendent,
9 Bhimsingh Railway station, 02982 220146 227575 9413639576
Barmer
10 Priyah Nandan
Sub Forest officer,
Barmer
02982 220442 220616 9413311079
11
Dhoodmal Main depot manager,
Yadav
Barmer
02982 224698 220538 9413327899
12
Subash
TDM (telephone),
Agarwal Barmer
02982 221100 221200 9414001447
13 Bhagwandaan SDOT 02982 225600 225601 9414401987
14 L R Meena SDOT 02982 220233 223426 9414001696
15 R K Mishra
Special Engineer,
Joodbaludi, Barmer
02982 220408 220329 9829047260
16 N R Gulzar
District
transportation 02982 220615 222377 9413313399
Officer, Barmer
17
Hariram Commercial tax
Chaudry officer, Barmer
02982 220512 220972 9414490879

18
Shravan District Public
Chaudry Relations executive
02982 220485 220140 9414106698
19 H S Kaviya
Assistant Director of
Public Welfare
02982 230009 - 9414391308
20 R K Satiya
Sub-director of
Industry department
02982 220320 - 9414509906
21
Valalram Sub-director,
Sonlakhi Agriculture
02982 220672 220673 9414383493
22 Hariram Weather department 02982 220631 - -
14 VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS AND NGOs IN THE REGION
S. No Name and address of the organisation STD code Phone/mobile
1 Action end (Indian), Barmer
2 Shyor station, Barmer 02982 222614
3 Mahila mandal, Barmer Aaghor 02982 225575
4 Seema Jan Kalyan Samithi, Barmer
5 Indian Redcross Society, Barmer
6 Dhara Sansthan, Barmer 02982 221556
7 Reds, Barmer
8 Jan Vikas Sansthan, Barmer
9 Nakoda, Trust, Mevanagar 240005
10 Distirct addiction prevention committee, Barmer
11
Nehru youth development and welfare Organisation,
Chithat ka paar
12 Maru Mandhan organisation, Barmer
13 Prani Mitr organisation, Barmer
14 District Bharat Sevak Samaj, Barmer
15 Mahaveer, International Sivana
16 Narayan Seva Sansthan, Samdhadi 36270
17 SBBJ, Barmer
18 Prayag Sansthan, Sindheri
19 Vasundhara Seva Samithi, Pachpatra 02980 55226
20 Grameen Pragati Sansthan, Gida
21 Sandesh Sansthan, Shiv
22 Idea Sansthan, Balothara
23 Grameen Vikas and Seva Samithi, Khara 9413292491
24 Grameen Vikas Gau Seva Samithi 9413292491
25 Krishna Sanstha Barmer, Nehru Nagar, Barmer 9413307897
[189]

26 Marudhara Sansthan Barmer 9413163736
27
Reds Sansthan Barmer, Ramnagar Chauki, Sindheri
Road, Barmer
9414384269
28 Seva Sansthan, Kolu 9414531700
29
Tar.C.D. Samaj Seva Sansthan, St. Paul School. Barmer 9214801758
Richa Sansthan Barmer, Gaudara Villa, Patrkar
30
Colony, GM, 2 Patrkar Colony, Mahaveer Nagar,
Barmer
31 Parivarthan Sansthan, Barmer, in front of Raj Hotel,
Baldev Nagar, Barmer
32 Ankur Vikas Sansthan, Halepotharon ki Basti, near
Jaydu Marwad Tent House, Malgodam road, Barmer
33
Nehru Yuva mandal Karchi village, Babuguleria
9414106366
9413459505
9414753637
34 District village All caste development Society, Nehru
Nagar, Barmer
9784571671
35 Arunima Sansthan, Gokul Krishna Nagar, Roycolony,
Barmer
9414302064
36 Loktarag Granvin Sansthan, near Panchayat Samithi,
Shiv
02987 253337
37 Gangotri Sansthan, Barmer, NH 40, Mahveer Nagar,
Barmer
9983304701
38 Prerna Sansthan, New Vegetable Market, Rico Road,
Barmer
9414107423
39 Khetheshwar Vikas Sansthan, Kanod House,
Mahaveer Nagar, Barmer
2902 257113
40
Khemababa Prani Seva Sansthan, Bayuthi 9414532827
41 Silpi Sansthan, near Sonnadi, Khagale Mauhalla,
Barmer
42 Matheshwari Shodh Sansthan, behind the high
school, Sundar Nagar, Chauhatan
43 Khetheshwar Sansthan, Balera, Matheshwari Steel
Station Road, Barmer
44
Tadarsh Vikas Sansthan, Girab
45
46
47
9414106887
9414529600
9829464887
Samrathal Sansthan, Mitda Khurd 2nd 9414655774
Shade Sansthan, CL 10, Mahaveer Nagar, Barmer 9929066617
Malini Grameen Vikas Sansthan, Bhojariya 9460287?~
[190]

48
49
Upkar Sansthan, Barmer 9413818203
Bandua Makthi Morcha, Sindheri, Chauraha , Barmer 9214715168
50 Chaman Seva and Jan Kalyan Samithi, Barmer, G C 15,
9414271044
Mahaveer Nagar, Barmer
51
Nehru Yuva Mandal New Bhurtiya 9460885200
52 Samagra Vikas Sansthan, Jatiyon ka Naya Mohalla,
Barmer
53 Thar Yuva Vikas and Shod Sansthan, Aachal Cinema
Complex, Barmer
54 Balaji Vikas Sansthan, Ramnagar Rico Puvi Shetr,
Shivkar Road, Barmer
Shri Doongarpuri Jan Kalyan Seva Samithi, Soda
55
Bhavan, in front of Mayur Noble Academy, Gandhi
Nagar, Barmer
56
Gau Seva Samithi, Nimbaniyon ki Daani
9414391464
9829462485
9414529524
9414302064
57 Sant Sri Garvaji Maharaj Seva Trust, Kumavat Nagar,
9414106534
Barmer
58
Sangharsh Sansthan, Barmer 9414612913
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
Sri Malani Sansthan, Barmer 9413183249
Taman Sansthan, Chauhatan 9413459085
Balaji Vikas Sansthan, Balaoo 9414529524
Sri Jasnath Jan Vikas Sansthan, Barmer 9413308582
Marwad Seva ad Jan Kalyan Seva Samithi, Balothara 9414531708
Seema Jan Kalyan Samithi, Chauhatan 02989 286463
Mahaveer International, Chauhatan 02989 286151
Jeevdaya Samithi, Chauhatan 9414108625
Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Chauhatan 9414106363
Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh, Chauhatan 9414201915
Nehru Yuvak Mandal, Chauhatan 9983759846
[191]

15 LIST OF DIVERS/SWIMMERS IN THE DISTRICT
S. No Name Address
Mobile
number
1 Yusaf Khan S/o Masare Khan Mussalman Asothara 9828924575
2 Doodharam S/o Devaram Bhiel Asothara
3 Ashokdas S/o Pokerdas Sant Asothara
4 Jaganlal S/o Shamburam Sant Asothara
5 Yusaf Khan S/o Kani khan Mussalman Asothara 9983974921
6 Mohandas S/o Shamburam Sant Asothara
7 Vasudev S/o Purushotam Sant Asothara 9413291002
8 Kojaram S/o SHobaram Harijan Asothara 9460014274
9 Mangilal S/o SHobaram Harijan Asothara
10 Javeridas S/o Shambudas Sant Asothara
11 Alabaks S/o Sultan Khan Moyala Asothara
02988-
272440
12 Kalu Khan S/o Dhinekhan Moyala Asothara
02988-
272456
13 Ghanikhan S/o Sultankhan Moyala Asothara 9414688908
14 Misarkhan S/o Mishrekhan Moyala Asothara 9413767685
15 Ghanikhan S/o Kareemkhan Moyala Asothara
16 Anwarkhan S/o Bharkatkhan Moyala Asothara
17 Dayaram S/o Tulacharam Chaudry Kitnod 9413031687
18 Karnaram S/o Prabhuram Kumar Kitnod 9413209336
19 Padmanram S/o Vijamanaram Kumar Kitnod
9413492793
PP
20 Devaram S/o Padmaram Kumar Kitnod
9413492793
PP
21 Parsamal S/o Ratiram Paliwal Jasol 9414755264
22 Parsamal S/o Sonaji Nai Jasol
23 Bhanvarlal S/o Sonaji Nai Jasol
24 Rupa S/o Harkaram Kanchi Jasol
25 Mangilal S/o Amararam Mali Jasol
26 Gobarram S/o Bagadaram Megval Bituja 9413506863
27 Mangilal S/o Sonaji Megval Bituja
28 Babulal S/o Bayaji Megval Bituja
29
Shankarlal S/o Savaram Mali
Balothara
30
31
Deramaram Mali Balothara 9414855657
Devarchand S/o Deramaram Mali Balothara 9414855657
[192]

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
Deeparam S/o Champalal Malli Balothara 9460889839
Gevarchand S/o Ramaji Mali
Champalal S/o Magajimali
Balothara
Balothara
02988-
240562
Memaram S/o Baubuji Mali Balothara 9414633696
Ashok S/o Bikaji Mali
Goparam S/o Kanji Mali
Balothara
Balothara
Gevarchand S/o Rameshwarji Mali Balothara 9252543494
Vanaram S/o Deramji Mali
Balothara
Mangalaram S/o Deramji mali Balothara 9460889839
Parasmal S/o pukhaji Mali Balothara 9414754837
Rameshwar S/o Keshaji Mali
Balothara
Devarchand S/o Keshaji Mali Balothara 9461155960
Omprakash S/o Samvalji Balothara 9413524441
Sitaram S/o Savaji
Mohanlal S/o Mangilal
Balothara
Balothara
Parasmal S/o Moolji Balothara 9413361915
Gevarchand S/o Roopji Balothara 9414384979
Govarchand S/o Devji
Omprakash S/o Badraji Mali
Balothara
Balothara
Ishwar S/o Bhimji Balothara 9461155960
Pukhraj S/o Jorji
Omprakash S/o Mangilal Palivala
Babulal Meena Batwari from Ramsar
Jalampuri Gosawmi
Balothara
Balothara
Ramsar
Chauhatan
9413307973
9784327277
[193]

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
Kamalsingh S/o Indrasingh Rajput
Harisingh S/o Jalamsingh Rajput
Savisingh S/o Virajsingh R Rajput
Hira S/o Navala
Gopal S/o Narayan Joshi
Gautumchand S/o Namichand Jain
Shaitan Singh S/o Udaysingh Rajput
Ashok Kumar S/o Mevaram Jain
Ranigaon
Rohili
Rohili
Undkha
Vishala
Vishala
Kapoordi
Joona, Keradu Road,
Barmer
9414493290
Nanaji S/o Javan Megval Sindhavasachauhan 9929761243
Baira S/o Veerakalbi
Pukhram S/o Hariram Mali
Dala S/o Kesamegval
Bava S/o Mevaguru
Baira S/o Kevala Megval
Oma S/o Pirakalbi
Bhoompa S/o Prabhu Megval
Pratapa S/o Harji Rabari
Bakarpura
Bakarpura
Sindhavasachauhan
Sindhavasachauhan
Barkhadpura
Sindhavasaharniyan
Sindhavasachauhan
Gandhav Kala
9610634784
9929877669
9929761245
9829473457
9960899781
02983-
284845
73
Peelaram S/o Borkharam Kumar
Gandhav Kala
02983-
284845
74
Narana S/o Savai Lauhar
Gandhav Kala
02983-
284845
75
Sukhdev S/o Amadas Sant
Gandhav Kala
02983-
284845
76
77
Bhoompa S/o Kevarabari
Dagaria
9928289526
Raimal S/o Kehra Rabari Dagaria 9928289526
[194]

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
Joga S/o Lichmana Rabari Gandhav Kurda 9799180758
Banwarpuri S/o Kisthurpuri Gandhav Kurda 9799180758
Thidsingh S/o Pratap Singh Rajput Gaadevi 9461005656
Silekhan S/o Gulaal Khan Mussalman Banta 9950588678
Sidhik S/o Ahmed Mussalman Banta 995058867/8
Sikander S/o Ahmed Mussalman Banta 995058867/8
Ada S/o Bhima Purohit Ratnapura 9929468317
Nethi S/o Jeta Kalbi Megani Meg Daani 9950058731
Choga S/o Chamela Kumhar Ratnapura 9929031764
Manga S/o Bharta Purohit Soda Ki Daani 9928995107
Moga S/o Choga Megwal Ratnapura 9799836403
Mubarak S/o Sajankhan Moyla Kumhar Khudala 9929917418
Gaphur S/o Sajankhan Moyla Kumhar Khudala 9929917418
DenaS/o Sajankhan Moyla Kumhar Khudala 9929917418
Babu S/o Sajankhan Moyla Kumhar Khudala 9829435479
Karna S/o Motiram Jat
Khudala
Shankaram S/o Hariram Kalbi Alpura 9928587968
Madararam S/o Kesararam Bheel Alpura 9928587968
Kherajram S/o Chelaram Bheel Alpura 9928587968
Rameshkumar S/o Poonmaji R Rajput Alpura 9799372327
Rajusingh S/o Kishoresingh Rajput Alpura 9928587968
Himtharam S/o jasrooparam Megval Alpura 9928587968
Shyamaram S/o Bhairaram Rabari Alpura 9929761394
Okhaaram S/o Prabhuram Rabari Alpura 9929761394
Moda S/o Gaji Kumhar Lolava 9829471994
[195]

103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
Magookhan S/o Laadukhan Lolava 9829471994
Rehman S/o Usman Khan Goliya Jeevraj 9829471994
Kaloonkha S/o Usman Khan Goliya Jeevraj 9829471994
Babukhan S/o Sajankhan Tikiya 9950306802
Abdul S/o Hakim Moyala Kumhar Sada 9829402399
Satar S/o Moyala Kumhar Sada 9784192507
Usa S/o HakimMoyala Kumhar
[196]
Sada
02984-
280390
Mohammed S/o Rahim Moyala Kumhar Sada 9799372470
111 Mustaq Khan S/o Hakim Khan Moyala
Sada 9680348790
Kumhar
112
Chaina S/o Ramji Megval Sada 9602392633
113
114
115
116
Naan Giri S/o Choon Giri Swami Sada 9928304391
Deepa S/o Sava Rabari Sada 9928979714
Latif S/o Alam Kumhar
Batada
02984-
288257
Naseer S/o Lakhe Khan Kumhar Batada 9829755281
117 Sameer Khan S/o Khudabaksh Mussalman
Kumhar
118 Jamal Khan S/o Khudabaksh Mussalman
Kumhar
119 Vali Mohammad S/o Raydhan Mussalman
Kumhar
120 Sadik Khan S/o Lakhe Khan Mussalman
Kumhar
121 Mohammed S/o Gul Mohammed Mussalman
Kumhar
122 Tajmohammed S/o Gul Mohammad
Mussalman Kumhar
123 Valimohammad S/o Ramjan Khan
Mussalman Kumhar
124 Mehboob Khan S/o Ramjan Khan
Mussalman Kumhar
125
Sultan Khan S/o Bage Khan Mussalman
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira

Kumhar
126 Sumar Khan S/o Sultan Khan Mussalman
Kumhar
Sindhari Chausira
127 Mohammad S/o Deen Mohammad
Mussalman Kumhar
Sindhari Chausira 9799372097
128 Ganimohammad S/o Ramjan Khan
Mussalman Kumhar
Sindhari Chausira
129 Noormohammad S/o Ramjan Khan
Mussalman Kumhar
Sindhari Chausira
130 Lateef Khan S/o Ramjan Khan Mussalman
Kumhar
Sindhari Chausira
131 Taj Mohammad S/o Sultan Khan Mussalman
Kumhar
Sindhari Chausira 9413028865
132 Sultan Khan S/o Basera Khan Mussalman
Kumhar
Sindhari Chausira
133 Jamalkahn S/o Imankhan Mussalman
Kumhar
Sindhari Chausira
134 Safimohammad S/o Imankhan Mussalman
Kumhar
Sindhari Chausira
135
Ibrahim S/o Imankhan Mussalman Kumhar Sindhari Chausira 9413292213
136 Safimohammad S/o Akoolkhan Mussalman
Kumhar
137 Musekhan S/o Badarkhan Mussalman
Kumhar
138 Najirmohammad S/o Isakhan Mussalman
Kumhar
139 Valimohammad S/o Isakhan Mussalman
Kumhar
140
Iqbal S/o Nijamkhan Mussalman Kumhar
141 Mubarak S/o Phatekhan Mussalman
Kumhar
142 Valimohammad S/o Mubarak Khan
Mussalman Kumhar
143 Jamalkhan S/o Badarkhan Mussalman
Kumhar
144 Satarkhan S/o Gufirkhan Mussalman
Kumhar
145
Ilias S/o Gufirkkhan Mussalman Kumhar
146
Ahmed S/o Isakhan Mussalman Kumhar
[197]
Sindhari Chausira 9828125321
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira 9660361583
Sindhari Chausira 9950270640
Sindhari Chausira 9828125354
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira

147 Rehmad S/o Ahmed Khan Mussalman
Kumhar
148 Mittonkha S/o Hammed Khan Mussalman
Kumhar
149 Umardeen S/o Fakir Mohammed Mussalman
Kumhar
150 Poopookhan S/o Umardeen Mussalman
Kumhar
151 Suamrkhan S/o Umardeen Mussalman
Kumhar
152 Ajeem Khan S/o Askar Khan Mussalman
Kumhar
153 Babu Khan S/o Urskhan Mussalman
Kumhar
154 Gangaraam S/o Mavaram Mussalman
Kumhar
155 Joonjharam S/o Daluram Mussalman
Kumhar
156 Gul Mohammad S/o Khameesha Khan
Mussalman Kumhar
157 Valimohammad S/o Khamisha Khan
Mussalman Kumhar
158 Radhurakhan S/o Sumarakhann Mussalman
Kumhar
159 Malakhan S/o Sumra Khan Mussalman
Kumhar
160 Sadak Khan S/o Achar Khan Mussalman
Kumhar
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira 9413033512
Sindhari Chausira
Sindhari Chausira 9413032199
Sindhari Chausira 9413028461
Sindhari Chausira 9461033364
Gudamalani
Gudamalani
Gudamalani
Gudamalani
Gudamalani
16 LIST OF OFFICIALS TRAINED IN FIRE FIGHTING AND CONTROL
S. No Name of official Address
1 Hemsingh, Fireman Barmer Agor
2 Vainsingh Beriyon ka Baas, Barmer
3 Dhanraj Soni
Near the old powerhouse,
Barmer
STD
Code
Phone/Mobile
02982 225756
02982 222339
02982 223594 PP
[198]

4 Tejaram Chaudry Gandhi Nagar, Barmer
5 Hebsingh Rathod Gram kudla
6 Bhanaram Chaudry
Jaislamer Chunji, near the
Nake, Barmer
7 Nenumal Beriyon ka Baas, Barmer
8
Suresh Thanvi, Assistant
fire officer
Balothara Municipality
9 Om Prakash, Firemen Balothara Municipality
10 Kailash Narayan Balothara Municipality
11 Danaram Balothara Municipality
12 Gyan singh City safety office, Barmer
13 P N Sharma City safety office, Barmer
14 S K Sharma City safety office, Barmer
15 Ram Karan City safety office, Barmer
16 Mohanlal City safety office, Barmer
17 Gopalsingh City safety office, Barmer
18 Kabulakhan City safety office, Barmer
02982 224842 PP
02982 246353
02982 226288
02982 226276
02988 220024
02988 220024
02988 220024
02988 220024
02988 220024
02982 220075
02982 220075
02982 220075
02982 220075
02982 220075
02982 220075
[199]

APPENDIX B – MAPS
Figure 1 - Hazard Analysis Map for MPT
Figure 2 - Hazard Analysis Map showing area with maximum hazard in Mangala and
Aishwariya
Figure 3 - Evacuation Routes from villages in Maximum Hazard Zone in Mangala Well
Field
Figure 4 - Evacuation Routes from villages in Maximum Hazard Zone in Aishwariya Well
Field
Figure 5 - Hazard Analysis Map showing area with maximum hazard at Bhagyam
Figure 6 - Evacuation Routes from villages in Maximum Hazard Zone in Bhagyam Well
Field
Figure 7 - Hazard Analysis Map for Raageshwari Gas field
Figure 8 - Hazard Analysis Map showing area with maximum hazard in RGT and Well
pads
Figure 9 - Evacuation Routes from villages in Maximum Hazard Zone in Raageshwari Gas
field and Well Pads
Figure 10 - Hazard Analysis Map for inter-field pipeline
[200]

APPENDIX C – INCIDENT ACTION PLANS (IAPS)
IAPs FOR FIRE RESPONSE ON-SITE
ACTION IN THE EVENT OF A FIRE
(i)
SITE PERSONNEL
• Actuate the Fire Alarm Manual Alarm Call Point (FAMCP) installed in plant area.
Inform the CCR by Radio or VOIP phone to raise an Emergency Alarm.
• Shout “Fire, Fire, Fire” to raise the alarm and alert nearby personnel.
• Initiate activities pertaining to process isolations, if any.
• Check the wind sock for prevailing wind direction and confirm for personnel escape
direction (upwind of emergency) if possible
• Incident Response team members shall muster in the Control Room
• Non-essential personnel / contract worker, drivers etc shall evacuate through the
nearest escape gate and report to muster checker at the assembly point.
(ii)
FIRE RESPONSE TEAM
• Fire team members shall report at the Fire Station Room.
• Fire team members shall immediately don the turn out gear and turn out to the
location of emergency.
• Fire team Leader / Forward Controller shall be in contact with the Incident
Controller and shall act in consultation with Incident Controller.
• Fight the fire from upwind.
• Cut off the source of fuel by isolating approachable upstream isolation valve.
• Always fight fire under protection where there is potential hazard of Boil over /
explosion.
• Operate the fixed water spray and fixed foam system where ever provided.
• In case of gas fires, do not attempt to control or extinguish the fire before plant is
shut down and blown down.
[211]

1. PROPANE POOL FIRE FROM PROPANE STORAGE, REFRIGERATION PACKAGE
(RGT FACILITY)
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:
Propane Liquid and gas
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:
• Fire & Explosion due to release of high pressure gas
• Pool fire due to propane liquid release
• BLEVE of propane vessel due to flame impingement
• Personnel Injuries
SAFETY SYSTEM:
Fire & Gas detection system
FIRE PROTECTION:
• Fixed and portable water monitors
• Propane vessel water spray system
• Fire hydrant network
• Fire tender
IN CASE OF FIRE:
• Report incident to the Control room.
• Sound the emergency siren/ PAGA alarm to evacuate the area
• Alert the fire fighting team
• Isolate propane source
• Turn-on vessel’s water spray system
• Use water monitor streams to dissipate propane vapours safely
• Keep Emergency Response personnel upwind; never enter gas cloud
• Mobilise the fire fighter with fire tender from upwind direction
• Turn on water spray system of neighbouring storage tanks
• If the fire is major, request for additional expert help from ERT, Barmer / EMT,
Gurgaon.
[212]

2 FIRE IN THE WELL HEAD IN WELL PAD
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:
Crude Oil & Natural Gas
POTENTIAL FIRE HAZARDS:
• Release of high pressure gas / associated gas with crude oil
• Pool fire escalating to explosion on well head
• Blow out
SAFETY SYSTEM:
Fire & Gas Detection System and plant safe shut down/ blow down systems
FIRE PROTECTION:
• Fire Extinguishers
• Fire tenders from MPT/ RGT depending on the location of the well.
IN CASE OF FIRE:
• Barricade the affected Well heads.
• STOP the road side traffic
• Communicate to Central Control Room as per Communication chart.
• Mobilize the Fire Tender(s)
• Evacuate the Nearby villagers & alert the public
• If the fire is major, request for additional expert help from ERT, Barmer / EMT,
Gurgaon.
3. CRUDE OIL FIRE AT PRODUCTION SEPARATOR (MPT)
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:
Crude Oil & Associated Natural Gas
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:
• Fire & Explosion due to release of associated gas with crude oil
• Pool fire due to Crude Oil leakage
• Escalation of pool fire to other nearby equipments.
• Serious Environment effects ( Soil & Air Contamination)
[213]

• Personnel Injuries
SAFETY SYSTEM:
Fire & Gas detection system and plant safe shut down systems
FIRE PROTECTION:
• Fire Extinguishers
• Fire hydrant network
• Fire tenders
IN CASE OF FIRE:
• Communicate to the Control room.
• Use the fire extinguishers / foam system available nearby
• Blow the manually operated electrical siren/ PAGA alarm to evacuate the area
• Alert the fire fighting team
• Mobilise the fire fighter with fire tender from upwind direction
• Start cooling nearby facility / equipment.
• If the fire is major, request for additional expert help from ERT, Barmer / EMT,
Gurgaon.
4. FIRE AT THE FLARE AREA & KNOCK OUT DRUM
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:
Condensate & Natural Gas
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:
• Pool fire due to natural gas / Condensate release
• Pool fire escalating to other nearby equipment
• Serious Environment effects ( Soil & Air Contamination)
• Personnel Injuries
SAFETY SYSTEM:
Fire & Gas detection system and plant safe shut down system
[214]

FIRE PROTECTION:
• Fire Extinguishers
• Fire hydrant network
• Fire Tenders
IN CASE OF FIRE & EXPLOSION
• Communicate to the Control room.
• Use the fire extinguishers / foam system available nearby
• Blow the siren to evacuate the area
• Alert the fire fighting team
• Mobilise the fire fighter with fire tender from upwind direction
• Start cooling nearby facility / equipments
• If the fire is major, request for additional expert help from ERT, Barmer / EMT,
Gurgaon.
5. FIRE IN THE DIESEL STORAGE, EXPORT OIL, CONDENSATE, OFF SPEC AND
SETTLING TANKS
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:
Crude Oil, Condensate, Diesel
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:
• Pool fire due to Crude Oil or Diesel leakage.
• Pool fire escalating to explosion of the storage tank.
• Serious Environment effects (Soil & Air Contamination)
• Personnel Injuries
SAFETY SYSTEM:
• Fire & Gas detection system
• Foam application (top application) system
• Plant safe shut down system
FIRE PROTECTION:
• Fire water spray system
• Foam system
[215]

• Fire tenders
IN CASE OF FIRE & EXPLOSION
• Communicate to the Control room.
• Use the fire extinguishers / foam system available nearby.
• Activate the water spray system, if available.
• Start the foam system and area water monitor
• Blow the siren to evacuate the area
• Alert the fire fighting team
• Mobilise the fire fighter with fire tender from upwind direction
• Start cooling nearby facility / equipments
• If the fire is major, request for additional expert help from ERT, Barmer / EMT,
Gurgaon.
6. ELECTRICAL SUB STATIONS
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:
Electrical Switchgear & Combustible Associated Spares
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:
• Electrical panel fire
• Heavy smoke in the substation
• Serious Environment effects (Air Pollution)
• Personnel Injuries
SAFETY SYSTEM:
F & G System
FIRE PROTECTION:
• Fire Extinguishers
• Fire water Network
• Fire tenders
IN CASE OF FIRE:
• Inform Central Control Room.
[216]

• Shutdown the substation or concerned breaker
• Use CO2 or DCP fire extinguisher in case of small fire
• Evacuate the area and substation
• Use fire hydrant water after ensuring the power has been shutdown / isolated.
• If the fire is major, request for additional expert help from ERT, Barmer / EMT,
Gurgaon.
7. BUILDINGS (CENTRAL CONTROL BUILDING & FIRE STATION)
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:
Paper, wood, plastic & other combustible material
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:
• Smoke
• Fire escalating to the nearby offices
• Inhalation hazard
SAFETY SYSTEM:
• Fire & Gas Detection System
• The building is manned round the clock
FIRE PROTECTION:
• Fire Extinguishers
• Inergen system (only at central control room)
• Fire Hydrant Network
• Fire Tender
IN CASE OF FIRE:
• Raise the emergency siren
• Evacuate the building & muster
• Use the fire extinguisher if the fire is small and under control
• Activate the Inergen system in case fire is big & uncontrollable
• Use fire hydrant / tender depending on requirements
• If the fire is major, request for additional expert help from ERT, Barmer / EMT,
Gurgaon.
[217]

8. FIRE IN CHEMICAL LABORATORY BUILDING
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:
Chemical, paper, wood, plastic & other combustible material
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:
• Smoke
• Fire escalating to the nearby offices
• Inhalation hazard
SAFETY SYSTEM:
• Fire & Gas Detection System
• The building is manned round the clock
FIRE PROTECTION:
• Fire Extinguishers
• Inergen system
• Fire Hydrant network
• Fire Tender
IN CASE OF FIRE:
• Raise the emergency siren
• Evacuate the Chemical Laboratory / building & muster at the assembly point
• Use the fire extinguisher if the fire is small and under control
• Use the fire water after ensuring water compatibility with the chemical
• If the fire is major, then evacuate the area and request for additional help from ERT,
Barmer / EMT, Gurgaon.
9. OIL & GAS LEAKAGE IN PIG LAUNCHER AREA (AT MPT/ RGT) FOLLOWED BY
FIRE
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:
Crude Oil & Natural Gas
[218]

POTENTIAL HAZARDS:
• Pool fire & explosion due to Crude Oil & Natural Gas leakage
• Serious Environment effects ( Soil & Air Contamination)
• Personnel injuries
SAFETY SYSTEM:
• Manned operation
• Fire & Gas Detection System
• Kerbed facility
FIRE PROTECTION:
• Fire Extinguishers
• Fire water network
• Fire tenders from the nearby fire Station.
IN CASE OF FIRE:
• STOP Pigging operation
• Inform Central Control Room
• Use fire extinguisher if in case of fire is small
• Mobilise the fire team & use fire hydrant water / foam if the fire is big and
uncontrollable
• If the fire is major, then evacuate the area and request for additional help from ERT,
Barmer / EMT, Gurgaon.
10. FIRE/ GAS LEAK IN CROSS COUNTRY PIPE LINE.
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:
Crude oil, Condensate & Natural Gas
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:
• Pool fire due to crude oil Leakage
• Explosion from release of natural gas.
• Explosion from release of Condensate followed by delayed ignition
• Dense heavy smoke from burning crude
• Serious Environment effects (Soil & Air Contamination)
[219]

• Injury to public
SAFETY SYSTEM:
• Security Patrolling
• Thermal Sensor across the pipeline
• Information by public
FIRE PROTECTION:
Fire tenders from the nearby fire Station (MPT/ RGT)
IN CASE OF FIRE:
• Barricade the affected section of pipeline
• Isolate at appropriate AGI (Above Ground Installation)/ sectional valve
• STOP Traffic on the road or nearby pipeline area
• Communicate the Central Control Room at MPT/ RGT
• Communicate to nearest Police station & Fire Brigade.
• Alert Public for preparing to evacuate from the area.
• If the fire is major, then evacuate the area and request for additional help from ERT,
Barmer / EMT, Gurgaon.
11. FIRE IN MANGALA TRAIN 1 FACILITIES
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:
Crude Oil & Natural Gas
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:
• Pool fire & explosion due to Crude Oil & Natural Gas leakage
• Serious Environment effects ( Soil & Air Contamination)
• Personnel injuries
SAFETY SYSTEM:
• Manned Operation
• Fire & Gas Detection System
FIRE PROTECTION:
• Fire Extinguishers
[220]

• Fire water network
• Fire tenders from the nearby fire Station.
IN CASE OF FIRE:
• Stop all the related operations
• Inform Central Control Room
• Use fire extinguisher if in case of fire is small
• Mobilise the fire team & use fire hydrant water / foam if the fire is big and
uncontrollable
• If the fire is major, then evacuate the area and request for additional help from ERT,
Barmer / EMT, Gurgaon
12. FIRE IN ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY (EOR)
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:
Crude Oil, Natural Gas & Chemical
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:
• Smoke
• Fire escalating to the nearby facilities
• Inhalation hazard
SAFETY SYSTEM:
Manned 24 hrs
FIRE PROTECTION:
• Fire Extinguishers
• Fire water system
• Fire Tender
IN CASE OF FIRE:
• Stop all the related operations
• Inform Central Control Room at MPT or Mangala Train 1 control room
• Use fire extinguisher in case fire is small
• Mobilise the fire team & use fire water / foam if the fire is of large magnitude
[221]

• If the fire is major, then evacuate the area and request for additional help from ERT,
Barmer / EMT, Gurgaon.
13. FIRE SITUATIONS IN BARMER HILL PROJECT (EWT)
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:
Crude Oil & Natural Gas
POTENTIAL FIRE HAZARDS:
• Release of high pressure associated gas with crude oil
• Pool fire escalating to explosion on well head
• Blow out
SAFETY SYSTEM:
Fire & Gas Detection System
FIRE PROTECTION:
• Fire Extinguishers
• Fire tenders from MPT
IN CASE OF FIRE:
• Barricade the affected Well heads.
• Stop the road side traffic
• Communicate to MPT – Central Control Room as per Communication chart.
• Mobilize the Fire Tender
• Evacuate the Nearby villagers & alert the public
• If the fire is major, request for additional expert help from ERT, Barmer / EMT,
Gurgaon.
16. FIRE SITUATION “MAJOR CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES WITHIN MPT / RGT/
MT-1 / WELL PADS”
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:
Chemical, paper, wood, plastic & other combustible material
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:
[222]

• Smoke
• Fire escalating to the nearby facilities, Hydrocarbon live equipment & offices,
• Inhalation hazard
• Personnel Injuries
SAFETY SYSTEM:
Manned 24 hrs
FIRE PROTECTION:
• Fire Extinguishers
• Fire Hydrant water system
• Fire Tender
IN CASE OF FIRE:
• Raise the emergency siren
• Evacuate the construction area
• Inform Central Control Room.
• Use the fire extinguisher if the fire is small and under control
• Use the fire hydrant water after ensuring water compatibility with the chemical &
electrical system is switched off
• If the fire is major, then evacuate the area and request for additional help from ERT,
Barmer / EMT, Gurgaon.
17. FIRE IN “OB CAMPS & OFFICE BUILDING”
FLAMMABLE MATERIAL:
Chemical, paper, wood, plastic & other combustible material
POTENTIAL HAZARDS:
• Smoke
• Fire escalating to the nearby offices
• Inhalation hazard
SAFETY SYSTEM:
• Fire & Gas Detection System
• Manned 24 hrs
[223]

FIRE PROTECTION:
• Fire Extinguishers
• Fire Hydrant water system
• Fire Tender
IN CASE OF FIRE:
• Raise the emergency siren
• Evacuate the building & muster
• Use the fire extinguisher if the fire is small and under control
• Inform Central Control Room
• Mobilise the Fire Tender
• If the fire is major, then evacuate the area and request for additional expert help
from ERT, Barmer / EMT, Gurgaon.
[224]

APPENDIX D – FIRE PROTECTION
ARRANGEMENTS
1 MANGALA PROCESSING TERMINAL
Mangala Processing Terminal Fire Protection system has been installed as per OISD 116.
The fire water system is designed to combat two major fires simultaneously with a
minimum of four hour’s water supply.
Fire Water Storage
Two dedicated above ground fire water storages tanks of 5000 KL capacity each, total
10000 KL of water is available for fire fighting purpose.
Fire Water Pumps
Four Diesel driven pumps are provided each with a capacity of 908 M3 per hour at 102
meters head and two electrical driven pumps Jockey pumps each with a capacity of 110 M3
per hour at 88 meters head. The jockey pump will maintain a pressure of 8.5 bars pressure
in the fire main header. When the fire water mains pressure is reduced to 7.5 bars, the
jockey pump will start. If the pressure in the fire water main falls to 6.5 bars the first main
fire water pump will start and if the pressure remains in 6.5 bar or below for more than 30
seconds the second pump will start, in the same way third and fourth pump
Distribution Network
Fire water ring main is installed throughout the plant area to ensure availability of water as
and when required for fire fighting purpose and the line working pressure is 10.5 bars. The
fire water network is laid in closed loops to ensure multi-directional flow. Isolation valves
are provided in the network to enable isolation of any section of the network without
affecting the flow in the rest. The isolation valves are normally located near the loop
junctions. Additional valves are provided in the segments where the length of the segment
exceeds 300 M. Fire water distribution ring main is sized for 120% of the design water rate.
Piping
Piping network is laid underground. The fire water main has at least one meter earth
cushion in open ground and 1.5 metre earth cushion under the roads and is provided with
protection against soil corrosion by suitable coating/wrapping.
[225]

Hydrant Monitors
Hydrants and monitor are installed along the water ring main to cover entire hazardous
area. Distance between the two hydrants or two monitors are maintained at 30 metres in
the hazardous area as per OISD 116. Monitors are installed in such a manner so as to cover
all the tanks as well as group unit area. Height of the hydrant valve from the ground level is
not more than 1.2 metres where as in the non hazardous area it is maintained at a distance
of 45 meters. High Volume Long Range Monitor photo can be seen below:
Hose Boxes
Provision of hose boxes are installed at critical locations for housing hoses and nozzles.
Storage Tank Protection
Fixed foam systems are installed for all the tankages (Export oil tanks D250 A/B/C/D,
Diesel tank D857, Off-spec tanks D255A/B and Settling tanks D214/D224) The systems
includes conveying system comprising of fixed piping for water supply at adequate
pressure, foam concentrate tank, eductor, suitable proportioning equipment for drawing
foam concentrate and making foam solution, fixed piping system for onward conveying to
foam makers for making foam, vapour seal box, and foam pourer. For the Diesel tank in
addition to foam system automatic Medium Velocity water spray deluge system operated
by Quartzoid bulb is provided with.
Protection for Other Units
Automatic Medium Velocity water spray system is provided for the following process
equipment:
1. Off spec oil pumps (P 255 A/B)
2. Stabilised oil pumps (P225 A/B/C)
3. Export oil pumps (P252 A/B/C/D)
4. Vapour Recovery Unit Compressor Package (Z-300, Z310, Z320)
5. Dehydrator (V217, V227).
6. RGT pig receivers (condensate and natural gas)
Total Flooding System - Inergen system
Inergen system has been installed in the following areas:-
1. Well pad switch gear rooms.
2. Sub Station (SS) #s 1A, 1B and 4A.
3. Chemical lab building.
[226]

4. Central Control Room – DCS console area and panel.
Total Flooding – CO2 system
CO2 system has been installed for the following equipment:-
1. Emergency Diesel Generator (EMDG) - A.
2. Emergency Diesel Generator (EMDG) - B.
3. Emergency Diesel Generator (EMDG) - C.
DETAILS OF FIRE VEHICLES
1 Multi Task Fire Vehicle of Rosenbauer having 6000 litres water capacity, 4000 litres
foam concentrate, Pump of 5000 LPM at 10 bar and 400LPM at 40 bar, Roof turret
output of 3800 LPM at 7 bars and throw of 80metres, 1000 kg DCP, DCP Turret 15-40
kg/sec and a throw of 10m-40m , DCP hose reel Discharge output of 5 kg/sec and throw
of approx.12 m and powered rescue tools
2 Multi Task Fire Vehicle of Rosenbauer having 3000 litres water capacity,2000 litres foam
concentrate, Pump of 4000 LPM at 7 bar and 300 LPM at 35 bar, Roof turret output of
4000 LPM at 7 bars and throw of 80 metres, 500 kg DCP, DCP Turret 15-40 kg/sec and a
throw of 10m-40m , DCP hose reel Discharge output of 5 kg/sec and throw of approx. 12
m
3 Foam Nurser having 10000 litres foam capacity; pump 4000 LPM at 8 bars and 1800
LPM at 15 bars. Roof turret output of 4000 LPM at 7 bars and throw of 80 metres
1 No.
2 Nos.
1 No.
Portable Fire Fighting Equipments
Adequate numbers of DCP/CO2 extinguishers are provided at strategic locations and all
extinguishers are clearly visible and easily accessible. The extinguishers are installed in
such a way that the top of the extinguisher does not exceed 1.5 mts from the ground level.
The travel distance to any extinguisher in process area does not exceed 15 mts where as in
the offsite area it does not exceed 30 mts as per OISD.
INVENTORY OF FIRE EQUIPMENTS IN MANGALA PROCESSING TERMINAL (MPT)
Ser. No Equipments Quantity
1. Fire water Monitors 86
2. Fire hydrants with Double Landing valves 287
3
DCP ( ABC Type) Fire Extinguisher 10 Kg Stored pressure type
as per IS 13849
249
4 UL listed Foam Trailer with Monitor capacity of 2250 LPM 1
5
Trolley Type DCP fire Extinguisher 50 KG Capacity as per IS
10658
15
[227]

6
CO2 Type Fire extinguisher 4.5 Kg Capacity CCOE approved
and as per ISI.
119
7
CO2 Type Fire extinguisher 6.5 Kg Capacity CCOE approved
and as per ISI 2878
27
8
Permaline Delivery Hose 63 mm Type B as per IS 636 and UL
listed
284
9 Jet Nozzles 63mm ISI marked 142
10 Fire Sand Buckets with Stand ( each with four buckets) sets 16
11 Self Contained Breathing Apparatus sets 12
12 Fire proximity suit 8
13 Fire Entry Suit 2
2 MANGALA TRAIN - 1 (START UP PRODUCTION
PACKAGE)
Mangala Train-1 (Start Up Production Package / SUPP) has been installed as per Early
Production Set-Up (EPS) concept as per OISD 189. The fire water system is designed in
such a manner that at least one monitor of capacity approx.1600 LPM or two (2) hydrants
can be operated in full pressure (7.0 kg/cm2) in case of any emergency.
FIRE WATER STORAGE
Two Open Fire water ponds of 500 KL capacity each with a total of 1000m3 of water are
available for fire fighting purpose.
One additional Trailer Pump Connection (TPC) is also provided in the Fire water storage
tank for connection to external fire tender in case of an emergency. Regular filling
arrangement for the fire water reservoir is also provided.
FIRE WATER PUMP
Two electrical driver pumps have been provided for MANGALA TRAIN - 1 facility. Each
pump has a capacity of 100 M3 per hour.
A diesel driven trailer mounted fire pump of 1800 LPM capacity is available as a back up to
the electrical driven fire water (submersible) pumps.
FOAM TENDER
Presently a Foam Tender with foam tank capacity of 800 Litres capacity and water tank
capacity of 2250 Litres is available on standby to meet plant emergencies. The Foam
[228]

Tender is manned round the clock by a trained Fire Crew of 5 personnel in Day and Night
shifts.
FIRE WATER DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
A fire water ring main of 8” size is installed around the facility along the road side to ensure
availability of water as and when required for fire fighting purpose. This line is hooked up
with the delivery of the electrical driven fire pumps drawing water from the 600m3
storage.
A TPC is also available to feed water supply directly from the trailer pump to the fire water
main by taking direct suction from the Fire water reservoirs. The fire water ring main is
laid above the ground with supports provided at every 6.0 metres distance.
HYDRANT/MONITORS
Hydrants and monitors are installed on the Fire water main to cover entire hazardous area.
Distance between the two hydrants or two monitors are maintained at 30 metres in the
hazardous area. Monitors are strategically installed to cover all the tanks as well as group
unit area. Height of the hydrant valve from the ground level is not more than 1.2 mtrs. In
the non hazardous area, the distance between each hydrant is maintained at 45 metres.
PORTABLE FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENTS
Sufficient numbers of DCP / CO2 extinguishers are provided at strategic locations and all
the extinguishers are clearly visible and easily accessible. The extinguishers are installed in
such a way that they can be easily lifted and operated. The travel distance to any
extinguisher in process are does not exceed 15 mts where as in the offsite area it does not
exceed 30 mts as per OISD requirements.
INVENTORY OF FIRE EQUIPMENT IN MANGALA TRAIN 1 (START UP PRODUCTION
PACKAGE)
Sr.
No
Equipment
Quantity
1. Foam Tender with water and foam tanks (800 Lts. Foam) 1 No.
2. Fire water Pumps of 100 M3 capacity at Train-1 and Loading Bay 4 Nos.
3. Fire water Monitors 8 Nos.
4. Fire hydrants with Double Landing valves 13 Nos.
5. Trailer pump of 1800 LPM capacity 1 no.
6. DCP ( ABC Type) Fire Extinguisher 10 Kg Stored pressure type as per IS 13849 30 Nos.
7. DCP ( ABC Type) Fire Extinguisher 10 Kg Stored pressure type as per IS 13849 10 Nos.
8. Foam Trailer with UL listed Monitor 2250 LPM 1 Nos.
[229]

9. Trolley Type DCP fire Extinguisher 50 KG Capacity as per IS10658 4 Nos
10. CO2 Type Fire extinguisher 6.5 Kg Capacity PESO approved and as per ISI 2878 4 Nos.
11. Permaline Delivery Hose 63 mm Type B as per IS 636 and UL listed 20 Nos.
12. Multi-purpose Nozzles 63mm ISI marked 5 Nos.
13. Fire Sand Buckets with Stand (each with four buckets) 4 sets.
14. Self Contained Breathing Apparatus 2 Nos.
15. Fire proximity suit 2 Nos.
16. CO2 Type Fire extinguisher 22.5 Kg Capacity PESO approved and as per BIS. 2 Nos.
[230]

APPENDIX E – EMERGENCY RESOURCES
CAIRN RESOURCES
Subject
Mangala
Processing
Terminal
Mangala Train 1
Raageshwari Gas
Terminal
Fire
Fire tenders Quantity 1 Multi Purpose
Rescue Tender & 1
Foam Tender
1 Foam Tender 1 Foam Tender
Capacity
Vehicle No. 1 (Multi
Purpose Rescue
Tender) – 6000 L
water/4000 L foam
/ DCP 1000 Kgs.
Pump capacity –
5000 LPM at 10 bar
Vehicle No. 3 (Foam
Tender) – 3000 L
water/2000 L foam
/ DCP 500 Kgs.
pump capacity –
4000 LPM at 7 bar
3500 L water/500 L
foam / DCP 2000
Kgs. pump capacity
– 2250 LPM at 7 bar.
Additional Jerry
cans - 300 Liters
Vehicle No. 2 (Foam
Tender) – 3000 L
water/2000 L foam
/ DCP 500 Kgs.
pump capacity –
4000 LPM at 7 bar
Foam Nurser Quantity 1
Capacity
10,000 L of foam
with pump capacity
of 4000 LPM at 8
bar
Fire Water
Storage
Quantity 2 tanks 2 open ponds 2 tanks
Capacity 5000 KL each 500 KL each 1000 KL each
Fire Water
Pumps (Diesel
Driven)
Quantity 4 pumps 2 electrical
submersible pump
& 1 trailer mounted
diesel driven pump
Capacity 908 m 3 /hr at 10.2 108 m 3 /hr each &
trailer pump 1800
[231]
1 diesel driven
pump at Saraswati
filed and 2 diesel
driven fire pump at
RGT
40 M3/hr at
Saraswati & 908

kg/cm 2 LPM m 3 /hr each at RGT
Fire Water
Pumps
(Electrical
driven)
Quantity
2 electrical driven
Jockey Pumps
Capacity 110 m 3 /hr at 8.6
kg/cm 2
Nil
NA
2 Nos. electrical
driven jockey pump
55 M3/hr at 10 bar
Firewater
monitor (fixed)
86 nos. 8 nos. 1 nos. at Saraswati -
1
17 Nos. at RGT
Fire Hydrants
(with double
landing valves,
fixed)
264 nos. 13 nos. 2 nos. in Saraswati
and
18 Nos. at RGT
Portable fire
extinguisher
249 DCP type, 146
CO 2 type,
40 DCP type, 6 CO 2
type
11 DCP type, 1 CO 2
type at Saraswati 1
15 DCP type, 4 CO 2
type at EGF
Trolley type
fire
extinguisher
(50 kg)
Trailer
mounted foam
monitor
15 nos. 4 nos. 6 at Saraswati 1
1 at EGF
4 nos. 1 nos. 1 nos.
Sand buckets 16 sets 4 sets 1 set
Self contained
breathing
apparatus
Fire proximity
suit
Fire entry suit
12 nos. 2 nos. 2 nos.
8 nos. 2 nos.
2 nos.
Diesel driven
trailer mounted
fire pump
4 pumps of 1800
LPM capacity each
1 pump of 1800
LPM capacity
[232]

DISTRICT/GOVERNMENT RESOURCES
Subject
Barmer
District
Jesai Army
Base
Army Base,
Jodhpur
Public fire
brigade
Fire
Fire tenders Number, 1 each with
Mining
Department
and Civil
Defence, 3 nos.
With Barmer
Municipality, 1
with Balotra
Municipality
8 nos. 03 crash +
domestic
02 / one
working and
another
under
breakdown
from 2 yrs
Capacity
3028 l water
(Civil Defence)
3200 l water/
425 l foam
9000 ltrs /
3000 foam
8000 litres
Portable mobile
monitors
Personnel
available
Earthquake
5 firemen (Civil
Defence), 6
firemen
(Barmer
Municipality),
4 firemen
(Balotra
Municipality)
90 Not disclosed
42 firemen 24 personnel 7 personnel
in each shift
total 21 + one
supervisor in
each shift
JCBs 63 nos. 2 JCBs
Excavators
Evacuation
related
Logistics
Temporary
accommodation
(tents etc)
Buses/mini
coaches, LMVs/
Air evacuation
11 tent houses, Tents /
Permanent
shelter
Food supplies 6 godowns Canteen /
Meshes
[233]

Flood
Boats
Life jackets
2 with Water
Resources
Department
20 with Water
Resources
Department, 8
with Civil
Defence, 4 with
Home Guard,
16 with Police
Helicopters –
search and
rescue
Sandbags
Divers/swimm
ers/rescue
personnel
Many
160 nos. Enough nos
Medical
List of hospitals 8 hospitals, 60
Primary
healthcare
centres
5 beds medical
centres
Govt.
Hospital
Doctors, nurses
939 nurses/
paramedics
3 doctors +
males nurses
27
18 doctors /
50 nurses
Mobile
operation
theatres
One stabilising
equipment
Nil
Ambulances 2 nos. 03 03 - 108 &
03 of hospital
Rapid response
team
1 team at
district HQ
[234]

OTHER CORPORATE RESOURCES
Subject
Fire
Barmer JSW -Dilip
Narwani
Giral Lignite Power Limited
Fire tenders Number 02 03
Capacity 5 m 3 / 200 liters 5 m 3 / 200 liters
Portable mobile
monitors
70, capacity 5 – 10 kgs 500, Capacity 5-10 kgs
Personnel available 32 fire man, 7 DCO, 4
supervisor out sourced
12 per shift, 2 supervisors, 2
driver, 8 fireman
AGM – safety, 1 sr,
Manager, 2 Dy. Manager, 5
Engineers
Earthquake
JCBs 2 nos/ 18 tonnes 1Hydra, 1 JCB /20 Tonnes
Excavators Nil Dozzer -08
Evacuation related Logistics
Transport to
temporary
accommodation
(tents etc)
Food supplies
Flood
16 trucks that can be used
in case of evacuation &
personnel cars which can
be hired
Canteen facility serving
500 people
Company buses in general
shift, individual car
Boats --
Life jackets --
Helicopters – search
and rescue
Proposed --
Sandbags 50 Nos --
Divers/swimmers/r
escue personnel
--
[235]

Medical
List of hospitals
Occupational health
center
--
Doctors, nurses 2 beds/ one doctor / 4
male nurse / 1 female
nurse
--
Mobile operation
theatres
No arrangement --
Ambulances Number 2 1 Ambulance + 3 jeeps
Telephone
number
9783802704
9982249075
02982229321
No dedicated number
[236]

APPENDIX F – BARMER DISTRICT PROFILE
Barmer is located at 25.75° N 71.38° E. It has an average elevation of 227 metres (744 feet).
The total area of Barmer district is 28,114 km².
TOTAL AREA
Villages
Towns/cities
Total
28114.03 sq km
59.29 sq km
281703.32 sq km
The whole district lies between 24°58′ - 26°32′ N and 70°5′ – 72°52′. On its north is
Jaisalmer, to the south is Jalore, and Pali and Jodhpur are to the east. Barmer district is
3,727 ft (1,136 m) above sea level and 22 km in length. The longest river in the district is
the Luni. It is 480 km in length and drain into the Gulf of Kutch passing through Jalore. The
variation in temperature in various seasons is quite high.
ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS IN BARMER
Barmer district consists of Barmer, Baytu, Shiv, Chauhatan, Gudamalani and Balotara
Tehsils. The distribution of villages in these tehsils is given below.
Village Distribution in Barmer District
Collectorat
e
District
collectorate
Taluk
Panchayat
Samithi
Villages in Panchayat Samithi in
2001 based on status of
habitation
Habitabl
e
Nonhabitable
Total
Barmer Barmer Barmer Barmer 269 0 269
Ramsar Barmer 142 2 144
Baytu Baytu Baytu 321 0 321
Shiv Shiv Shiv 284 1 285
Chauhatan Chauhatan Chauhatan 367 2 369
[237]

Chauhatan Dhorimana 0 0 0
Gudamalani Gudamalani Dhorimana 401 0 401
Gudamalani Sindhri 0 0 0
Balotara Pachpadara Balotara 259 2 261
Sivana Sivana 128 1 129
Total 2171 8 2179
POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHICS
Barmer had population of 1964835 in 2001 of which males were 1038247 (52.84%) and females
were 926588 (47.16%), table 2.1. The district has 3.48 percent of state’s population and 8.29
percent area. The population growth during 1991-2001 was 36.83 percent compared to 28.27
percent during 1981-1991. The rural population stood at 1819431 (92.6%), while the urban
population was 145404 (7.4%). The 5-14 years population was 545120, 15-59 years old were
978039 and 60 plus population was 139461. 15 percent of the population is under 6 years of age.
The district has an area of 28387 sq.km and density of population of 69 in 2001. The population
statistics are given below:
POPULATION IN BARMER
S. no Year Males Females Total Increase/decrease
1 1981 587648 531244 1118892 (+)344087
2 1991 759077 676145 1435222 (+)316330
3 2001 1038247 926588 1964835 (+)529613
POPULATION DENSITY
S. no Year
Village
Density
City/town
Total
% Increase/
decrease
1 1981 36 1401 39
2 1991 46 2432 51 +12
3 2001 65 2452 69 +18
[238]

POPULATION TEHSIL WISE
S.
No
Block
Village
1991 2001
City/
town
Total
Village
City/
town
Total
1 Barmer 201455 68625 270080 203331 83591 286922
2 Ramsar 0 0 0 79764 0 79764
3 Baytu 140601 0 140601 192746 0 192746
4 Shiv 121551 0 121551 178539 0 178539
5 Chauhatan 256570 0 256570 344330 0 344330
6 Gudamalani 244259 0 244259 341477 0 341477
7 Pachpadara 192132 46858 238990 265596 61813 327409
8 Sivana 134488 28683 163171 213648 0 213648
Total 1291056 144166 1435222 1819431 145404 1964835
POPULATION IN 2001
District No. of Households Persons Males Females
Total 309739 1964835 1038247 926588
Rural 284796 1819431 959844 859587
Urban 24943 145404 78403 67001
Source: Statistical Abstract of Rajasthan, 2005
The district has 309739 households of which 91.95 percent are rural areas and only 8.1
percent in urban areas (table 2.1). Of the rural population, 52.78 percent are males while
this proportion is 53.92 percent in urban areas. Given the number of households in the
district at 309739, the average household size comes to 6.34. The average household size in
rural areas is 6.39 compared to urban household size of 5.83. The family size in urban
Barmer is thus lower than the rural family size. 28.3 percent houses are permanent type
followed by 14 percent that are semi-permanent and 57.8 percent are temporary type.
[239]

DEMOGRAPHICS
S. No Base Total Number
1 Males 1038247
2 Females 926588
3 Total 1964835
4 Villagers 1819431
5 Cities/towns 145404
6 Population density 69
7 Total literacy rate 59.00
8 7a. Males 72.80
9 7b. Females 43.04
10 Population in cities/towns 145404
11 Sex ratio per 1000 males 892
12 Increase in population in 10 years (1991-2001) (+)36.90
LAND UTILISATION
The district has a geographical area of 2.82 million hectares. In 2004-05, about 1.12
percent of the area had forest cover, 7.2 percent constituted pasture land, 25.13 percent
was fallow land and 51.63 percent was cultivated crop land. The remainder was either not
available for cultivation or culturable wasteland. Gross cropped area in 2004-05 was 1.55
million hectares (1.79 million hectares in 2006-07) and area sown more than once stood at
90762. In 2006-07, some changes took place with net sown area being 60 percent of total
area. The cropping intensity for the year stood at 106.24. It is the condition of the district
that allows it to have only 6.24 percent area under double cropping.
LAND UTILISATION IN BARMER
Items Area in hectares %
Reporting Area 2817332 100
Forest 31677 1.12
[240]

Area under Non-agricultural Uses 72926 2.59
Barren & Uncultivable Land 126147 4.48
Permanent Pasture & other Grazing Land 202739 7.20
Land under Misc. Tree Crops & Groves 301 0.01
Culturable Waste Land 220963 7.84
Fallow Lands other Than Current Fallow 355854 12.63
Current Fallows 352234 12.50
Net Area Sown 1454491 51.63
Gross Cropped Area 1545253
Area Sown More Than Once 90762
Source: Statistical Abstract of Rajasthan 2005.
FOREST COVER
The forest cover marginally increased to 1.13 percent and permanent pastures and other
grazing lands constituting 15.38 percent and barren and cultivable land another 18
percent.
AREA OF FOREST – 2009 – 2010
S. no Name of forest
Not under
protection
Protected Unclassified Total
1 Barmer 0 54199.24 2156.33 56355.57
Total 0 54199.24 2156.33 56355.57
LAND HOLDINGS
Barmer district in 2003 had 27048 holdings of which majority were 4 hectares and above
(70.24%). Across tehsils, such holdings were 72.75 percent in Barmer, 73.48 percent in
Baytu, 83.57 percent in Chohtan, 57.61 percent in Gudamalani, 59.51 percent in Pachpatra,
89.43 percent in Ramsar, 80.90 percent in Sheo, 50.42 percent in Siwana as against the
district average of 70.24 percent. Large holding does not mean much in rainfed areas.
However, this pattern of holdings would reflect on agricultural practices. Large land
[241]

holdings are a reflection of the harsh environmental conditions, and hence low population
density (69 people/ km²).
CLIMATE
The characteristic features of the climate of the district are its (dryness, extremes of
temperature and the fitful and erratic nature of the rainfall. The year may, be divided into
four seasons, winter from November to March, summer season from April to June,
monsoon from July to mid-September, and the post-monsoon season up to the end of
October.
In summers the temperature soars to 46 °C to 48 °C. In winters it drops to 5 °C (41 °F).
Primarily Barmer district is a desert where average rainfall in a year is 277 mm. However,
extreme rainfall of 549 mm rain between August 16 and August 25, 2006 left many dead
and huge losses. As many as 20 new lakes formed, and 6 covered an area of over 10 km².
RAINFALL
The normal annual rainfall at the district headquarters is 27.75 cm. while the actual rainfall
in 1989 was only 26.62 cm. During the period the humidity percentage at Barmer Centre
was 56.84. The rainfall decreases towards the west. The average number of rainy days
(days with rainfall of 2.5 mm. or more) in a year is only taking the district as a whole. The
winter season sets in by November, when both day and night temperatures begin to drop,
reaching the lowest point in January. The minimum temperature often records below
freezing point in January and trees and vegetation get injured by frost. Temperatures rise
rapidly after March and attain the peak in May or June. Day temperatures have been known
to reach as high as 49°C in May. Throughout summer, the heat is intense and scorching
winds prevail. Even during monsoon, the air is dry in between the fitful spells of rain. The
district is prone to droughts.
Barmer has an average rainfall of 26.04 cm. Table 3.4 (also fig. 3.2) shows wide annual
variations since 1991. This period had a lowest rainfall of 5 cm in 1991 and the highest
rainfall of 61 cm in 1994. The average rainfall during this period is 29.5 cm. The normal
rainfall of the district is 27.75 cm. Most the rainfall is received between June and
September and the number of rainy days has gone down in the recent times. In these 14
years, the negative deviations lead to drought situation. Of the years since 1991, only 7
years there was excess rainfall; higher than the normal rainfall and the highest deviation
was recorded in 1994. Since 1991, initially there were three years when it rained more
[242]

than normal (1992-1994), then it was two years (1997-1998) and then one year (2001 and
2003). This means that during last 15 years the cycle of such events has reduced. However,
one can question the concept of drought in desertic condition. 1991 and 2002 appears to be
serious dry years. The rainfall pattern among the regions is very much uncertain.
Therefore, kharif cropping is too much uncertain in all the regions.
RAINFALL (IN MM)
S.
No
Taluk
name
Averag
e
rainfall
200
1
2002 2003
200
4
200
5
200
6
200
7
2008
200
9
1 Barmer 286.8 264 126 475 220 140 759 243 186 166
2 Ramsar 269.1 238 56 702 234 66 666 198 306 142
3 Baytu 360.3 480 56 207 118 180 779 306 192 224
4 Shiv 280 325 81 267 181 176 478 270 171 145
5
6
7
Chauhat
an
Gudamal
ani
Pachpad
ara
348 482 72 474 182 200 875 173 274 196
275.5 272 36 556 156 207 578 361 353 161
337.9 270 107 609 262 223 500 287 418 186
8 Sivana 292.4 236 166 506 291 266 543 289 420 154
320.
8
320.87 470.07 205 182 647 266 290 178
SOILS
The soils of the district are broadly desertic type. Qualitatively the soils are very poor and
devoid of humus content. These soils are very deep and sandy, associated with dunes, inter
dunes and sandy plain covering about 31 percent of the area. Dunes are the spectacular
feature of the district and these occur scattered all over the area. In some parts of Barmer,
red desert soils are also found. Soil texture varies from sandy loam to sandy clay loam,
becoming slightly heavier with depth. Calcium carbonate is at varying depths and is
frequently cemented. Solanchak (saline soils) are also found in the district. Kolu, Chirai,
Shergarh, Pal and Bap soil series have been identified in the district. The most common
characteristics of the soil are as follows:
[243]

• Poor fertility with a zone of lime strata in the sub-soil.
• The soils are characterised by incomplete leaching of soluble salts, ill defined profile
development and accumulation of lime at some point in the profile; and
• The soils are deep, structure less and porous on account of which water and other
liquids such as liquid hydrocarbons percolate easily and rapidly.
WATER RESOURCES
Potable water in the district comes mainly from rain water harvested in large tanks. Wells,
tube wells and hand pumps are also in use. The seasonal rivers, Luni and Jojree and the
Narmada canal also flow through this district. However the water from the rivers is not
potable.
In 2004, of the 8 blocks, 12.5 percent were safe, 25.0 percent were critical and 62.5 percent
were over-exploited (dark). As per the ground water quality status in Barmer, 97.6 percent
habitations are chemically affected (PHED, GOR). So the ground water situation is quite bad
in Barmer. During the summer months, acute water scarcity occurs in many parts of the
district like Barmer and Balotra.
AVAILABLE POTABLE WATER SOURCES
Taluk
Total
villages
Wells/tube wells
Hand pumps
Working Discarded Total Working Discarded Total
Shiv 267 206 6 212 178 9 187
Barmer 227 193 4 197 876 57 933
Chauhatan 339 344 14 358 221 54 275
Gudamalani 369 338 7 345 388 57 445
Baytu 321 45 2 47 95 3 98
Sivana 126 119 5 124 82 33 115
Ramsar 132 48 2 50 121 3 124
Pachpadara 249 128 3 131 321 20 341
Total 2030 1421 43 1464 2282 236 2518
Cities
[244]

Barmer 1 24 0 0 69 2 71
Balotara 1 26 0 0 0 0 0
Sivana 1 8 0 8 0 0 0
Samdadi 1 7 0 7 0 0 0
Total 4 65 0 15 69 2 71
NATURAL WATER SOURCES
S. No Taluk Name of river
1 Baytu
2 Chauhatan
3 Ramsar
4 Barmer
5 Gudamalani Luni, Narmada Canal
6 Sivana Luni, Jojree
7 Shiv
8 Pachpadara Luni
Rivers that flow during the monsoon only do not contain potable water
DAMS IN BARMER
Name Length in metres Capacity in MCFT Affected population
Melee dam 529 164.00 1000
Nanereenbagunda dam 1008 25.40 2000
Peeploon 1243 17.78 2000
Telwadaa dam 525 14.20 800
Mavadi dam 530 11.55 1500
Gudaanaal dam 1026 5.96 500
Chandr dam 300 37.00 600
[245]

Kitnod dam 255 10.69 400
Mandalee dam 980 7.17 300
DROUGHT
The district is heavily affected by drought mainly due to the low amount of rainfall and
sandy soils. Some statistics regarding drought are given below.
DROUGHT IN BARMER
S. No Year of drought Affected/year
No of drought affected
villages
1 1992 2048 1636
2 1993 2049 0
3 1994 2050 1639
4 1995 2051 0
5 1996 2052 1650
6 1997 2053 1430
7 1998 2054 192
8 1999 2055 1850
9 2000 2056 1889
10 2001 2057 1771
11 2002 2058 1311
12 2003 2059 1975
13 2004 2060 0
14 2005 2061 1916
15 2006 2062 1811
16 2007 2063 1231
17 2008 2064 1714
[246]

18 2009 2065 1761
19 2010 2066 2179
DROUGHT AFFECTED VILLAGES
S. No Taluk name 50-74% >75%
Total no of
affected villages
1 Barmer 0 269 269
2 Ramsar 0 144 144
3 Baytu 1 320 321
4 Shiv 5 280 285
5 Chauhatan 0 369 369
6 Gudamalani 2 399 401
7 Pachpadara 25 104 129
8 Sivana 0 261 261
Total 33 2146 2179
FIRE
Fire is one of the biggest hazards in Barmer. The high temperatures and the preponderance
of thatched houses in the area result in a large number of fires every summer.
VILLAGES PRONE TO FIRE
Taluk Year Village
Barmer 2006 Golaberi, Doodhabera, Maadpurasaani, Sondi, Bhurtiya, Visaala
Aaghor, Maarudi, Bandra, Bholra, Bhadkha, Undhkha, Jhakdon ki
Daani, Sanjhta, Radva
2007 Doodiyon ka Tala, Shivbaakhri, Barmer Magra, Barmer Gaadaan,
Baankasar, Dhanoda, Aati, Raavthasar, Berivalatala, Sondi, Malva,
Visala, Teersinghdi
2008 Mahabar, Maaylon ka Der, Sanjhta, Teersingda, Nokh, Doogeron ka
Tala, Para, Koodhala, Dholoniyon ka Tala, Mangne ki Daani,
Dableessara, Sarnee Panji, Sura Jagir, Naad, Radva
2009 Aadarsh Basti Vishala, Sanjhta, Danta, Aati, Bhilo ki Basti, Meghvalon
[247]

ka Tala, ishwarpura, Langra, Ravathsar, Sutharon ka Tala, Rohila
Ramser 2006 Chadaar Dhaknaad, Gangaalaa, Hathma, Khara Rataudaan
2007 Laabrau, Ramsar, Ramsar Aaghor, Sethrau, Pabudansingh ki Daani,
Kantal ka paar, Jhankon ka Tala, Babuguleria, Bootiya
2008 Ibre ka Paar, Lakdiyaali, Maanoniyon ki Basti, Konitliya ka Paar, Pire
ka Paar
2009 Siyagon ki Basti, Chadi, Hindiya, Chadaniyon ka Paar, Paandhi ka Paar,
Kelan ka Paar, Gardiya
Baytu 2006 Khokasar, Panavada, Chidiya, Lapoondhada, Savaoo Moolraj, Revali,
Chokla, Daanpura, Malwa, Kolu, Saajan ki Daani
2007 Laapoondhda Malvechan, Saanyiyon ki Daani, Raychanpura,
Singhodiya, Berinadi, Bhanghdavon ki Daani, Kishne ka Tala, Madasar,
Bhimda, Revali, Moodhon ki Daani, Baagthal
2008 Santra, Naathoni Dhaniyon ki Daani, Megvalon ki Daani, Baytu Panji,
Santra, Khavaliya Sara, Mayalon ki Daani, Mahingoni Moodo ki Daani
2009 Keralpura, Khokhasar, Malwa, Jhoraniyon ki Daani, Khard, Charnaan,
Pathali Naandi, Sanpa Manji, Savaoo Moolraj
Gudamaalani 2006 Aalpura, Maangta, Gaadevi, Baand, Nimbalkot, Nokhda, Arniyali, Sada,
Khara Mahechan, Devnagar, Bhedana, Manavas, Dabad Bhatiyan,
Pooniyo ka Tala, Dholanada, Dhanasar Khurd
2007 Dhoodiya Motisingh, Doodhasar, Bhagbhere ki Beri, Naya Kooan,
Sada, Khara Mahechan, Devnagar, Bhedana, Manavaas, Daabad
Bhatiyaan, Pooniye ka Tala, Nimbalkot, Maghta, Dhoodhoo, Bade ka
Tala, Dholanada, Ranaasar Khurd
2008 Loona Kalan, Balkhadi, Motisara, Peeparali, Bhanamagra, Barasan,
Saaniyon ka Tala, Khudala, Silgun, Neharon ki Daani, Koliyana,
Bhoonka Vagarsingh, Darguda, Khoobdi Beri, Dhanka, Dhadhlavaas,
Paanyaalaakalaan
2009 Jaalberi, Takuberi, Chotu, Bhagbere ki Beri, Bhooka THansingh,
Dhobili, Loonva Jhagir, Dhorimanna, Hodu, Amarpura, Tookiya
Chauhatan 2006 Gangaasara, Paneriya, Aalamsar, Jaanpaliya, Baamdala, Saanva, Sarla,
Bhakasar, Bhooniya, Khonra, Taratara, Sondi, Mathe ka Tala, Jhapda,
Aakoda
2007 Raasbani, Khari, Bhakasar, Bhanvaar, Gida, Taratara Mut, Doodhava,
Rataudon ki Daani, Kelnor, Ghumane ka Tala, Uparla, Nimbhsingh ki
Daani
[248]

2008 Aagola, Rabasar, Bhinjasar, Aalamsar, Paancharla, Bhojariya, Molani,
Singhania, Saalariya Taratara, Aakhoda, Konra, Kekad, Bhandniyan
2009 Chauhatan, Dhok, Bhada, Sherpura, Sandaoo, Manasar, Gumane ka
Tala, Poshaal, Bhakhasar, Bavarvala, Aalamsar, Kayam ka Tala,
Sreeramvala, Goda, Mthdavoo, Paancharla
Pachpatra 2006 Aasodhara, Kitnod, Kattu, Kanan, Navatala, Korana, Mool ki Daani,
Gangavaas, Mandli, Kalyanpur, Bhandiyavaas, Chandesara,
Teersinghadi
2007 Ikrani, Khed, Chilanadi, Bankiyavaas Khurd, Panothadi Naadi, Kyar
Chaarnaan, Aaasaada
2008 Naveri Daana, Molraj Kyar, Revada Maiyya, Balothara, Aasothara,
Saaranon ki Beri, Bhimarlayi Stationn, Khardi, Badla, Khed, Surpura,
Jasol, Gol Soda, Tilvada
2009 Kitnod, Boltara, Kalava, Gol Sataion, Saathuni, Ghadoyi Nadi,
Mandapura, Soda ki Daani, Amarlayi Jaagir, Asada, Banav
Sivana 2006 Ramniya, Bhatikeda, Padru, Khanki, Karmavaas, Itvaya, Googarot
2007 Padaroo, Haripura, Beranadi, Arjiyana, Mitoda, Khanki, Rampura,
Naal, Paoo, Bhimpura, Majal, Googarot
2008 Dharana, Thapan, Padhroo, Bhimgoda, Sivana, Guda, Rakhi, Itvaya,
Devaliyali, Pathon ka Baada
2009 Naal, Paapdardi, Phoolan, Paadroo, Khadvi, Thapan, Sinor, Sivana
Shiv 2006 Negarda, Rajdaal, Nagdadha, Motinada, Jhoonejhan ki Basti,
Paaboosar, Nimbla, Mungeria
2007 Balaee, CHonchra, Kane ka Gaon, Raanaasar, Mandaaliya, Mikhdi,
Harsaani, Baleba, Nimbla
2008 Dhamdali, Jhankali, Unroad, Paboosari, Ravat ka Gaon, Undoo, Ganga,
Utal, Kaashmir, Akalee, Bhiyaad, Balasar, Moodhanon ki Daani
2009 Jaansingh Beri, Beesukala, Baaleba, Onara, Solankhiyan, Dheerji ki
Daani, Khejdali
[249]

ACCIDENTS
There are four major roads in the district; NH-15, NH112, SH-16 and SH-28. There are
tarred roads inside the towns. Most villages are approachable only through kutcha roads
and few have internal roadways.
LIST OF ROADWAYS PRONE TO ACCIDENTS
Roadway
Barmer-Jodhpur road
State highway # 28A
National highway # 15
From Shiv to Gaandhav
Accident prone zone
Into Kavas village from Barmer at the 77 km stone
From Doodhva towards Baagundi going downhill at the 47 km stone
On Barmer to Ahmedabad route, at the village Saansiyonka
On the same route, before Khenthsingh’s pyavoo, uphill from
Loratibataen
22 miles from above place going uphill
\
[250]

GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Acceptable Risk: The level of loss a society or community considers acceptable given
existing social, economic, political, cultural, technical and environmental conditions. In
engineering terms, acceptable risk is also used to assess structural and non-structural
measures undertaken to reduce possible damage at a level which does not harm people and
property, according to codes or “accepted practice” based, among other issues, on a known
probability of hazard.
Biological hazard: Processes of organic origin or those conveyed by biological vectors,
including exposure to pathogenic micro-organisms, toxins and bioactive substances, which
may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or
environmental degradation. Examples of biological hazards: outbreaks of epidemic diseases,
plant or animal contagion, insect plagues and extensive infestations.
Building codes: Ordinances and regulations controlling the design, construction, materials,
alteration and occupancy of any structure to insure human safety and welfare. Building
codes include both technical and functional standards.
Capacity building: Efforts aimed to develop human skills or societal infrastructures within
a community or organization needed to reduce the level of risk. In extended understanding,
capacity building also includes development of institutional, financial, political and other
resources, such as technology at different levels and sectors of the society.
Climate change: The climate of a place or region is changed if over an extended period
(typically decades or longer) there is a statistically significant change in measurements of
either the mean state or variability of the climate for that place or region. Changes in
climate may be due to natural processes or to persistent anthropogenic changes in
atmosphere or in land use.
Coping capacity: The means by which people or organizations use available resources and
abilities to face adverse consequences that could lead to a disaster. In general, this involves
managing resources, both in normal times as well as during crises or adverse conditions. The
strengthening of coping capacities usually builds resilience to withstand the effects of natural
and human-induced hazards.
Counter measures: All measures taken to counter and reduce disaster risk. They most
commonly refer to engineering (structural) measures but can also include non-structural
measures and tools designed and employed to avoid or limit the adverse impact of natural
hazards and related environmental and technological disasters.
[251]

Disaster: A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing
widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of
the affected community or society to cope using its own resources. A disaster is a function of
the risk process. It results from the combination of hazards, conditions of vulnerability and
insufficient capacity or measures to reduce the potential negative consequences of risk.
Disaster Risk Management: The systematic process of using administrative decisions,
organization, operational skills and capacities to implement policies, strategies and coping
capacities of the society and communities to lessen the impacts of natural hazards and
related environmental and technological disasters. This comprises all forms of activities,
including structural and non-structural measures to avoid (prevention) or to limit
(mitigation and preparedness) adverse effects of hazards.
Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR): The conceptual framework of elements considered with
the possibilities to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a society, to
avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of
hazards, within the broad context of sustainable development.
Early warning: The provision of timely and effective information, through identified
institutions, that allows individuals exposed to a hazard to take action to avoid or reduce
their risk and prepare for effective response. Early warning systems include a chain of
concerns, namely: understanding and mapping the hazard; monitoring and forecasting
impending events; processing and disseminating understandable warnings to political
authorities and the population, and undertaking appropriate and timely actions in response
to the warnings.
Ecosystem: A complex set of relationships of living organisms functioning as a unit and
interacting with their physical environment.
Emergency management: The organisation and management of resources and
responsibilities for dealing with all aspects of emergencies, in particularly preparedness,
response and rehabilitation. Emergency management involves plans, structures and
arrangements established to engage the normal endeavours of government, voluntary and
private agencies in a comprehensiveand coordinated way to respond to the whole spectrum of
emergency needs. This is also known as disaster management.
Environmental impact assessment (EIA): Studies undertaken in order to assess the
effect on a specified environment of the introduction of any new factor, which may upset
the current ecological balance. EIA is a policy making tool that serves to provide evidence and
analysis of environmental impacts of activities from conception to decision-making. It is
utilised extensively in national programmeming and for international development assistance
[252]

projects. An EIA must include a detailed risk assessment and provide alternatives solutions or
options.
Environmental degradation: The reduction of the capacity of the environment to meet
social and ecological objectives, and needs. Potential effects are varied and may contribute
to an increase in vulnerability and the frequency and intensity of natural hazards. Some
examples: land degradation, deforestation, desertification, wild land fires, loss of biodiversity,
land, water and air pollution, climate change, sea level rise and ozone depletion.
Geological hazard : Natural earth processes or phenomena that may cause the loss of life
or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation.
Geological hazard includes internal earth processes or tectonic origin, such as earthquakes,
geological fault activity, tsunamis, volcanic activity and emissions as well as external
processes such as mass movements: landslides, rockslides, rock falls or avalanches, surfaces
collapses, expansive soils and debris or mud flows. Geological hazards can be single,
sequential or combined in their origin and effects.
Geographic information systems (GIS): Analysis that combine relational databases with
spatial interpretation and outputs often in form of maps. A more elaborate definition is that
of computer programmes for capturing, storing, checking, integrating, analysing and
displaying data about the earth that is spatially referenced. Geographical information
systems are increasingly being utilised for hazard and vulnerability mapping and analysis, as
well as for the application of disaster risk management measures.
Greenhouse gas (GHG): A gas, such as water vapour, carbon dioxide, methane,
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydro chlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), that absorbs and
reemits infrared radiation, warming the earth’s surface and contributing to climate change
(UNEP, 1998).
Hazard: A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may
cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or
environmental degradation. Hazards can include latent conditions that may represent future
threats and can have different origins: natural (geological, hydro meteorological and
biological) or induced by human processes (Environmental degradation and technological
hazards). Hazards can be single, sequential or combined in their origin and effects. Each
hazard is characterised by its location, intensity, frequency and probability.
Hazard analysis: Identification, studies and monitoring of any hazard to determine its
potential, origin, characteristics and behaviour.
Hydro meteorological hazards: Natural processes or phenomena of atmospheric,
hydrological or oceanographic nature, which may cause the loss of life or injury, property
damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation. Hydro
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meteorological hazards include: floods, debris and mud floods; tropical cyclones, storm
surges, thunder/hailstorms, rain and wind storms, blizzards and other severe storms;
drought, desertification, wild land fires, temperature extremes, sand or dust storms;
permafrost and snow or ice avalanches. Hydro-meteorological hazards can be single,
sequential or combined in their origin and effects.
Land-use planning: Branch of physical and socio-economic planning that determines the
means and assesses the values or limitations of various options in which land is to be
utilized, with the corresponding effects on different segments of the population or interests
of a community taken into account in resulting decisions. Land-use planning involves studies
and mapping, analysis of environmental and hazard data, formulation of alternative land-use
decisions and design of a long-range plan for different geographical and administrative
scales. Land-use planning can help to mitigate disasters and reduce risks by discouraging
high-density settlements and construction of key installations in hazard-prone areas, control
of population density and expansion, and in the sitting of service routes for transport, power,
water, sewage and other critical facilities.
Mitigation: Structural and non-structural measures undertaken to limit the adverse impact
of natural hazards, environmental degradation and technological hazards.
Natural hazards: Natural processes or phenomena occurring in the biosphere that may
constitute a damaging event. Natural hazards can be classified by origin namely: geological,
hydro meteorological or biological. Hazardous events can vary in magnitude or intensity,
frequency, duration, area of extent, speed of onset, spatial dispersion and temporal spacing.
Preparedness: Activities and measures taken in advance to ensure effective response to
the impact of hazards, including the issuance of timely and effective early warnings and the
temporary evacuation of people and property from threatened locations.
Prevention: Activities to provide outright avoidance of the adverse impact of hazards and
means to minimize related environmental, technological and biological disasters.
Depending on social and technical feasibility and cost/benefit considerations, investing in
preventive measures is justified in areas frequently affected by disasters. In the context of
public awareness and education, related to disaster risk reduction changing attitudes and
behaviour contribute to promoting a “culture of prevention”.
Public awareness: The processes of informing the general population, increasing levels of
consciousness about risks and how people can act to reduce their exposure to hazards. This
is particularly important for public officials in fulfilling their responsibilities to save lives
and property in the event of a disaster. Public awareness activities foster changes in
behaviour leading towards a culture of risk reduction. This involves public information,
[254]

dissemination, education, radio or television broadcasts, use of printed media, as well as, the
establishment of information centres and networks and community and participation actions.
Public information: Information, facts and knowledge provided or learned as a result of
research or study, available to be disseminated to the public.
Recovery: Decisions and actions taken after a disaster with a view to restoring or
improving the pre-disaster living conditions of the stricken community, while encouraging
and facilitating necessary adjustments to reduce disaster risk. Recovery (rehabilitation and
reconstruction) affords an opportunity to develop and apply disaster risk reduction measures.
Relief / response: The provision of assistance or intervention during or immediately after
a disaster to meet the life preservation and basic subsistence needs of those people
affected. It can be of an immediate, short-term, or protracted duration.
Resilience / resilient: The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed
to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable
level of functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social
system is capable of organizing itself to increase its capacity for learning from past
disasters for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures.
Retrofitting (or upgrading): Reinforcement of structures to become more resistant and
resilient to the forces of natural hazards. Retrofitting involves consideration of changes in
the mass, stiffness, damping, load path and ductility of materials, as well as radical changes
such as the introduction of energy absorbing dampers and base isolation systems. Examples of
retrofitting include the consideration of wind loading to strengthen and minimize the wind
force, or in earthquake prone areas, the strengthening of structures.
Risk: The probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (deaths, injuries,
property, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from
interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions.
Conventionally risk is expressed by the notation Risk = Hazards x Vulnerability. Some
disciplines also include the concept of exposure to refer particularly to the physical aspects of
vulnerability. Beyond expressing a possibility of physical harm, it is crucial to recognize that
risks are inherent or can be created or exist within social systems. It is important to consider
the social contexts in which risks occur and that people therefore do not necessarily share the
same perceptions of risk and their underlying causes.
Risk assessment/analysis: A methodology to determine the nature and extent of risk by
analysing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of vulnerability that could
pose a potential threat or harm to people, property, livelihoods and the environment on
which they depend. The process of conducting a risk assessment is based on a review of both
the technical features of hazards such as their location, intensity, frequency and probability;
[255]

and also the analysis of the physical, social, economic and environmental dimensions of
vulnerability and exposure, while taking particular account of the coping capabilities
pertinent to the risk scenarios.
Structural/ non-structural measures : Structural measures refer to any physical
construction to reduce or avoid possible impacts of hazards, which include engineering
measures and construction of hazard-resistant and protective structures and
infrastructure. Non-structural measures refer to policies, awareness, knowledge development,
public commitment, and methods and operating practices, including participatory
mechanisms and the provision of information, which can reduce risk and related impacts.
Sustainable development : Development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within
it two key concepts: the concept of “needs”, in particular the essential needs of the world’s
poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by
the state of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present
and the future needs. Sustainable development is based on socio-cultural development,
political stability and decorum, economic growth and ecosystem protection, which all relate
to disaster risk reduction.
Technological hazards: Danger originating from technological or industrial accidents,
dangerous procedures, infrastructure failures or certain human activities, which may cause
the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or
environmental degradation. Some examples: industrial pollution, nuclear activities and
radioactivity, toxic wastes, dam failures; transport, industrial or technological accidents
(explosions, fires, spills).
Vulnerability: The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental
factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of
hazards. For positive factors, which increase the ability of people to cope with hazards, see
definition of capacity.
Wild land fire : Any fire occurring in vegetation areas regardless of ignition sources,
damages or benefits.
[256]