the world of private banking
the world of private banking
the world of private banking
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GERmAN PRIVAtE BANKS AND GERmAN INDUStRy, 1830–1938 175<br />
saved many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> banks from violent action by <strong>the</strong> radical mob, but <strong>the</strong>y became<br />
less important as a comparative business advantage, because from about 1937<br />
<strong>the</strong> autarkic economic policy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Third Reich made access to foreign capital<br />
markets obsolete. Second, <strong>the</strong> ‘outside’ bankers’ consultative services were equally<br />
no longer required. The Jewish <strong>private</strong> bankers lost many important supervisoryboard<br />
seats, which seriously impaired <strong>the</strong>ir consultative capacity. More generally,<br />
self-financing predominated and <strong>the</strong> capital and credit markets were highly<br />
regulated, so that industrial companies only rarely had to decide between alternatives<br />
in financial matters for which an independent adviser was needed. Third,<br />
many customers had terminated <strong>the</strong>ir business relations with ‘Jewish banks’ as<br />
<strong>the</strong>y feared negative effects, especially if <strong>the</strong>y were dependent on State orders.<br />
By late 1938, when <strong>the</strong> ‘Aryanization’ <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German <strong>private</strong> banks was<br />
completed, <strong>the</strong> result was that those <strong>private</strong> banks which were ‘Aryanized’ but<br />
remained independent, such as M.M. Warburg & Co. (from 1941 Brinckmann,<br />
Wirtz & Co.) and S. Hirschland (from 1938 Burkhardt & Co.), had already become<br />
too weak to recover <strong>the</strong>ir former importance. None <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new proprietors entered<br />
<strong>the</strong> top ranks in <strong>the</strong> bank-industry network <strong>of</strong> interlocking directorships. Only<br />
those ‘gentile’ <strong>private</strong> banks which had ‘Aryanized’ a ‘Jewish’ bank by merger,<br />
such as Hardy & Co. (itself purged <strong>of</strong> its Jewish managing directors) and Merck,<br />
Finck & Co. kept <strong>the</strong>ir position. But with <strong>the</strong> exception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> leading Nazi banker<br />
Kurt von Schröder (I.H. Stein, Cologne), hardly any <strong>private</strong> banker was playing a<br />
leading role in <strong>the</strong> German economy when <strong>the</strong> war began. 49<br />
Conclusion<br />
This chapter has attempted to show that <strong>private</strong> <strong>banking</strong> played an important role<br />
for <strong>the</strong> mobilization <strong>of</strong> funds during <strong>the</strong> crucial period <strong>of</strong> early industrialization in<br />
Germany. Several <strong>private</strong> bankers, particularly those from larger provincial towns<br />
such as Cologne and Elberfeld, did not simply introduce <strong>the</strong> Crédit Mobilier style<br />
<strong>of</strong> banks (and <strong>banking</strong>) into <strong>the</strong> ‘German’ economy, but played a decisive role in<br />
<strong>the</strong> intermediation <strong>of</strong> funds, and at times even provided funds for industry and<br />
transport from <strong>the</strong>ir own limited resources. By <strong>the</strong> mid-1850s, when <strong>the</strong> first jointstock<br />
credit banks were founded, <strong>the</strong> basic railway network connecting almost all<br />
important German Zollverein States was already built. By that time its aggregate<br />
length (5,850 km by 1850) was second only to <strong>the</strong> British network.<br />
49<br />
A. Fischer, ‘Jüdische Privatbanken im “Dritten Reich” ’, in Scripta Mercaturae,<br />
vol. 28, 1994, pp. 1–53, p. 38; C. Kopper, Zwischen Marktwirtschaft und Dirigismus:<br />
Bankenpolitik im ‘Dritten Reich‘ 1933–1939 (Bonn, 1995), pp. 254–91; H. James,<br />
Verbandspolitik im Nationalsozialismus. Von der Interessenvertretung zur Wirtschaftsgruppe:<br />
Der Centralverband des deutschen Bank- und Bankiergewerbes 1932–1945 (Munich, 2001),<br />
pp. 263–8; Ziegler, ‘Spezialisierungen’ pp. 36–45; Köhler, ‘Arisierung’, pp. 173–91.