the world of private banking
the world of private banking
the world of private banking
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174<br />
THE WORLD OF PRIVAtE BANKING<br />
(1919) and C. Schlesinger-Trier & Co. (1929) respectively. By <strong>the</strong> early 1930s<br />
<strong>the</strong>se amalgamated banks had become <strong>the</strong> two leading Frankfurt <strong>private</strong> <strong>banking</strong><br />
houses (as defined by this indicator) and had reached <strong>the</strong> ‘Top Ten’ <strong>of</strong> German<br />
<strong>private</strong> banks. 46<br />
The crisis <strong>of</strong> 1931 had changed <strong>the</strong> situation completely. No doubt <strong>the</strong> fact that<br />
many <strong>private</strong> bankers had speculated in foreign exchange and in stocks backed<br />
mainly by interbank loans was a major reason for <strong>the</strong> breakdown <strong>of</strong> several <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
leading <strong>private</strong> banks after 1931. But this is not <strong>the</strong> whole truth. The reluctance on<br />
<strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Reichsbank to refinance <strong>private</strong> banks during <strong>the</strong> <strong>banking</strong> crisis and<br />
<strong>the</strong> one-sided Government aid for <strong>the</strong> great banks between 1931 and 1933 were at<br />
least as important. The de facto State guarantee for great-bank deposits induced<br />
many customers to turn <strong>the</strong>ir backs on <strong>the</strong>ir former house bank and reduced <strong>the</strong><br />
bankers’ liquidity even fur<strong>the</strong>r. 47<br />
While <strong>the</strong> <strong>banking</strong> crisis ended a period <strong>of</strong> remarkable stability for <strong>the</strong> leading<br />
<strong>private</strong> banks, <strong>the</strong> crisis is not sufficient to explain <strong>the</strong> termination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>private</strong><br />
banks’ importance as a relevant component <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> finance market as such. In<br />
addition to <strong>the</strong> non-economic factor <strong>of</strong> one-sided State aid in favour <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> great<br />
banks, <strong>the</strong> final reason was purely political: anti-Semitism as an accepted factor in<br />
business after <strong>the</strong> seizure <strong>of</strong> power by <strong>the</strong> National Socialists in January 1933.<br />
From <strong>the</strong> early stages <strong>of</strong> industrialization, a majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>private</strong> bankers – not<br />
to speak <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> court bankers – was Jewish or at least <strong>of</strong> Jewish origins. Of <strong>the</strong><br />
leading twenty-five German <strong>private</strong> banks <strong>of</strong> 1933 (as defined by dividend payment<br />
<strong>of</strong>fice namings) twenty-one were described as ‘Jewish’. As <strong>the</strong> period between <strong>the</strong><br />
outbreak <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> crisis (July 1931) and <strong>the</strong> National Socialist seizure <strong>of</strong> power was<br />
very short, it is not always possible to clearly identify <strong>the</strong> final reason for <strong>the</strong><br />
breakdown <strong>of</strong> a given bank. In some cases, such as A. Levy (Cologne), Hagen &<br />
Co. (Berlin), Ephr. Meyer (Hanover) and Lazard, Speyer-Ellissen (Frankfurt), it<br />
is quite probable that <strong>the</strong>se banks would have had to be liquidated even without<br />
<strong>the</strong> political changes. 48 But <strong>the</strong>se cases are exceptions. The rest survived <strong>the</strong><br />
repercussions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> crisis, but were ei<strong>the</strong>r liquidated (4) or ‘Aryanized’ (12)<br />
between 1936 and 1938. The only exception was Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie., which<br />
was labelled ‘Christian’ and survived until <strong>the</strong> final stage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> War on condition<br />
that <strong>the</strong> Jewish partners (as defined by <strong>the</strong> Nuremberg Laws) left <strong>the</strong> bank and that<br />
<strong>the</strong> bank was renamed Pferdmenges & Co.<br />
When <strong>the</strong> forced ‘aryanization’ set in, <strong>the</strong> ‘Jewish’ banks had already lost <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
former importance in many respects. First, <strong>the</strong> bankers’ international connections<br />
46<br />
Wixforth et al., ‘Privatbanken’, table 4, p. 220. See also R. Heilbrunn, Das Bankhaus<br />
J. Dreyfus & Co. 1868–1939 (Frankfurt/Main,1962, Unpublished).<br />
47<br />
W. Winterstein, ‘Privatbanken‘, in H. Pohl (ed.), Das Bankwesen in Deutschland<br />
und Spanien 1860–1960 (Frankfurt, 1997), p. 98.<br />
48<br />
Ziegler, ‘Spezialisierungen‘, p. 35; I. Köhler, Die ‘Arisierung’ der Privatbanken im<br />
Dritten Reich: Verdrängung, Ausschaltung und die Frage der Wiedergutmachung (Munich,<br />
2005), pp. 53ff.