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Review of<br />
Conflict<br />
Related<br />
International<br />
Policing<br />
Better world,<br />
better Britain<br />
1 April 2008 - 31 March 2009<br />
www.fco.gov.uk
PHOTO CREDITS:<br />
UN Photo (left on cover) / Martine Perret<br />
UNPOL Search Vehicles at Checkpoints in Dili<br />
United Nations Police (UNPOL) search vehicles at a check<br />
point, after the shooting incident in which President Jose<br />
Ramos- Horta was wounded and a number of others were<br />
killed or injured.<br />
Location: Dili, Timor-Leste<br />
Date: 12 February 2008<br />
UN Photo (right on cover) / Martine Perret<br />
Malaysian FPU Deploy at Dili Airpot<br />
Members of the Malaysian contingent of the Formed Police<br />
Unit (FPU) of the United Nations Mission in Timor- Leste<br />
(UNMIT) familiarise the platoons with the use of an aircraft<br />
in a mission during a rapid deployment exercise.<br />
Location: Dili, Timor-Lest<br />
Date:12 December 2008
Contents<br />
Page<br />
Executive Summary<br />
I. Introduction 6<br />
II.Gaps in quality and quantity 9<br />
Skills and experience 9<br />
Pre-deployment training and skilling 10<br />
Human resource management 10<br />
National policing models and cultures 10<br />
Development of doctrine and common standards 11<br />
Planning and leadership of missions 11<br />
National police leadership 12<br />
National political will and funding 13<br />
Domestic policing priorities 14<br />
Security and duty of care issues 15<br />
III. Demand – Assessing the Scale and Type of Policing Elements Required 16<br />
IV. Other Models 18<br />
Australia 18<br />
Canada 21<br />
Other Countries 24<br />
V. UK Capacity and Future Options 25<br />
UK capacity 25<br />
Future options 26<br />
Operational delivery 26<br />
Funding 27<br />
Staff generation 28<br />
Enhanced capabilities 28<br />
Duty of care 29<br />
Standby capacity 30<br />
Standing capacity 30<br />
Scale of UK capacity 31<br />
International capacities 31<br />
Other initiatives 32<br />
Concluding Matters and Recommendation 32<br />
Annexes<br />
A List of Contributors<br />
B Select Bibliography<br />
C Conflict Related Policing Models in Other Countries<br />
D 2005 Strategic Task Force Outcomes<br />
4
Executive Summary<br />
Policing is a critical element in international efforts to maintain law and<br />
order and restore the rule of law in states transitioning from conflict to<br />
peace and stability.<br />
Increased recognition of this over the last decade<br />
has led to a steadily rising demand for international<br />
police officers, capable of carrying out more<br />
complex roles in more varied environments.<br />
Straightforward monitoring and reporting roles,<br />
have been replaced by a requirement for executive<br />
operational policing and longer term rebuilding,<br />
reform and development of national police<br />
capacities. Policing components of missions may<br />
need to provide expertise in para-military policing,<br />
community policing, investigative and intelligence<br />
policing, and the development of leadership,<br />
command and control, professional standards<br />
and organisational and administrative capacities.<br />
Individual police officers need delivery skills which<br />
include executive policing, training, coaching,<br />
advising, mentoring, consultancy and donor<br />
coordination.<br />
Conflict related policing missions and operations<br />
are now carried out by international and regional<br />
organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the<br />
European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and<br />
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in<br />
Europe (OSCE), and by multilateral coalitions - some<br />
in challenging environments where significant<br />
insurgency and terrorist campaigns are ongoing.<br />
The increased demand is such that various EU and<br />
UN missions are now operating significantly below<br />
their mandated strength of international police<br />
officers.<br />
Within the con<strong>text</strong> of increasing demand and<br />
complexity, the United Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary<br />
David Miliband has commissioned this review of<br />
conflict related international policing.<br />
The core focus of the review is on the key capacity<br />
gaps facing the policing elements of international<br />
missions and the options available for more effective<br />
UK support.<br />
The review finds that the quality of officers<br />
deployed – their ability to effectively carry out<br />
their roles – is a key capacity gap. Increasing<br />
that quality requires, amongst other things;<br />
professional human resource management to<br />
identify and match relevant skills and experience;<br />
more effective pre-deployment training to provide<br />
officers with the additional skills they will need<br />
in missions, and; the development of doctrine,<br />
common standards and more effective mission<br />
leadership to ensure that officers from differing<br />
policing models and cultures can work effectively<br />
together.<br />
The quantity of officers available for deployment<br />
is mostly dependent upon the need to balance<br />
national policing priorities against international<br />
contributions. Better understanding of linkages<br />
between conflict related missions and national<br />
policing priorities, <strong>full</strong>y integrating mission work<br />
into officers’ career development, and effective<br />
security and duty of care management may all<br />
have some positive effect on numbers available<br />
for deployment. However, real improvement is<br />
only likely to be achieved by matching resources<br />
and funding to the political will for international<br />
police deployments. Chiefs of Police will always<br />
be limited in the support they can give, if they are<br />
not given resources to back-fill posts vacated by<br />
officers deployed overseas.<br />
The review also examines how the demand for<br />
the policing elements of conflict related missions<br />
is assessed. A key finding is that there is a clear<br />
need for more resources and expertise to develop<br />
doctrine and use it to underpin integrated,<br />
strategic assessment and planning - police officers<br />
who are trained in these roles at both national and<br />
international levels.<br />
4
Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
As part of the assessment of the UK’s model of<br />
support to conflict related policing, the review has<br />
studied the models of other countries, including<br />
Australia and Canada. Models of support vary but<br />
all are a product of both national policy priorities<br />
and national policing structures. The current UK<br />
model is unusual in the lack of police ownership and<br />
leadership over operational delivery, and compared<br />
to some models has relatively few resources<br />
committed to the management of deployments.<br />
In order to develop more effective UK support<br />
to conflict related policing various options are<br />
considered in the review. These include; increasing<br />
police ownership and building new capacities in<br />
deployment planning and management; changing<br />
our funding models to provide discreet budgets for<br />
delivery structures allocated to, and paid from, the<br />
overall budgets of the police bodies responsible;<br />
improving staff generation by offering police leaders<br />
additional incentives to release staff; better human<br />
resource management of the officers we deploy,<br />
and; the development of national standing and<br />
standby cadres.<br />
The review recognises that there are currently<br />
severe constraints on conflict related funding,<br />
and that many of the options identified have<br />
financial, and broader resource implications.<br />
As such implementation of options may not be<br />
feasible in the immediate term. However, once all<br />
options are <strong>full</strong>y developed Ministers will be able<br />
to direct implementation of measures to improve<br />
the effectiveness of UK support once resources are<br />
available, or alternatively to direct that resources<br />
should be made available more immediately to<br />
implement those measures.<br />
Some of these options are obviously alternatives,<br />
e.g. standing and standby cadres, however the<br />
majority represent a range of measures which<br />
would need to be implemented comprehensively<br />
if the UK is to develop a more effective model of<br />
support.<br />
The review concludes with a single recommendation<br />
– that the UK International Police Assistance<br />
Board is requested to commission further<br />
work on the options in the review, in order<br />
to provide Ministers with <strong>full</strong>y developed<br />
and costed proposals for improving UK<br />
effectiveness.<br />
5
I. Introduction<br />
.<br />
1.1 This report sets out the findings of a review of<br />
conflict related international policing, commissioned<br />
by the Foreign Secretary. In the past this was a<br />
relatively homogeneous field, with police officers<br />
deployed to peacekeeping missions simply to<br />
monitor and report on local policing conditions and<br />
capacity. But over the last decade the mandates,<br />
roles and environments to which police officers<br />
deploy have become more varied.<br />
1.2 Policing missions and operations are carried<br />
out by international and regional organisations<br />
(the United Nations (UN), the European Union<br />
(EU), the African Union (AU), and the Organisation<br />
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)),<br />
by multilateral coalitions and bilaterally. Mandates<br />
range from executive operational policing to reform<br />
and development through training, equipping,<br />
mentoring and advising. Mission environments<br />
range from the relatively benign, where<br />
peacekeeping has produced at least a semblance<br />
of stability and lasting peace, to more challenging<br />
post-conflict environments where significant<br />
insurgency and terrorist campaigns are ongoing.<br />
1.3 For the purposes of this review “conflict<br />
related” international policing is a generic term<br />
intended to cover all of the above.<br />
1.4 The framework for the review was established<br />
by the following questions;<br />
a) What is the nature of the gaps in the<br />
quality and quantity of international policing<br />
teams?<br />
b) To what extent is the UK’s international<br />
police capacity fit for purpose in filling these<br />
gaps?<br />
c) What scale and type of policing elements<br />
are required for international conflict related<br />
operations, and how is the demand for these<br />
activities currently assessed?<br />
d) What models of international police<br />
support work elsewhere, in particular the<br />
Australian and Canadian models?<br />
e) What are the options for more effective<br />
UK support for international policing,<br />
including the option of a UK contribution to<br />
a standing EU or UN force?<br />
1.5 The review was carried out by Conflict Group<br />
during the second half of 2008. The views of<br />
senior and experienced UK practitioners and policy<br />
makers were obtained through questionnaires and<br />
interviews, and UN, EU and other international<br />
policing experts were also interviewed. In addition<br />
senior police officers from the UK International<br />
Policing Assessment and Planning Group (APG) 1<br />
carried out fact finding visits to Australia and<br />
Canada, to study those countries’ models of<br />
international policing support.<br />
1.6 Annex A lists all those who have contributed<br />
to the review. A review of relevant academic<br />
literature and research was also conducted and a<br />
select bibliography is contained at Annex B.<br />
1.7 In order to remain relatively concise this<br />
report mostly synthesises the evidence and views<br />
gathered without citing individual contributions, but<br />
individual contributors views have been retained for<br />
future reference.<br />
1.8 The review builds on, rather than revisits,<br />
national work already undertaken in this area -<br />
commencing in 2005 with the UK International<br />
6
Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
Policing Strategic Task Force, which produced<br />
Ministerial recommendations for improving UK<br />
effectiveness 2 . The review has also been carried<br />
out concurrently with other major national<br />
developments in the field. In particular 2008<br />
has seen a Cabinet Office review of Stabilisation<br />
and Civil Effect, and the formation of a new<br />
International Police Assistance Board (IPAB). The<br />
recommendations of the Cabinet Office review<br />
include the possibility of changes to the operational<br />
management of UK conflict related policing<br />
activities. The IPAB, which brings together senior<br />
officials from the UK police service and all interested<br />
departments, has been established to bring more<br />
coordination and oversight to a wide range of UK<br />
international policing assistance, including conflict<br />
related policing, and to develop a national strategy<br />
which underpins this approach.<br />
1.9 The findings of this review are set out broadly<br />
in line with the framework questions above, albeit<br />
with some reordering. Firstly the report examines<br />
qualitative and quantitative capacity gaps in<br />
international policing and then looks briefly at<br />
demand and assessment of policing elements.<br />
Next the report provides details of other countries’<br />
models of international police support, before<br />
examining current UK policing capacities and finally<br />
options for more effective UK support.<br />
1.10 The options considered include:<br />
> Moving to police owned and led operational<br />
delivery for all aspects of deployment planning,<br />
management and support.<br />
1 Established in 2007 the APG is a reserve capacity of 30 senior<br />
UK police officers trained to carry out assessment, evalution and<br />
planning of peace support and related operations.<br />
2 The outcomes of the STF are detailed at Annex D<br />
At the same time enhancing and developing<br />
new capabilities, including a permanent capacity<br />
with dedicated staff for police led doctrine<br />
development, planning and research.<br />
> Changes to our current funding models to<br />
increase police ownership and leadership,<br />
including: the development of discreet budgets<br />
for police led delivery structures (which are<br />
assured over a number of years), with separate<br />
assessment and funding of mission costs, and;<br />
funding for operational delivery allocated to,<br />
and paid from, the overall budgets of the police<br />
bodies responsible.<br />
> Improving staff generation; by offering police<br />
leaders additional incentives to release staff by<br />
funding <strong>full</strong>, or partial, back-filling and allowing<br />
corresponding increases in their establishments,<br />
and; by better communicating the professional<br />
benefits of conflict related policing to the police<br />
service.<br />
> Better preparation, support and human resource<br />
management of the officers we deploy,<br />
including by; enhancing training to provide<br />
officers with additional skills and knowledge,<br />
enabling them to achieve more impact in their<br />
roles; strengthening our systems of health and<br />
welfare support, to also cover psychological,<br />
counselling and peer support services; police<br />
led HR management in order to seamlessly<br />
combine periodic deployments to international<br />
missions with officers’ regular national policing<br />
roles, and; the confirmation of general principles<br />
regarding duty of care.<br />
> The development of different models of<br />
deployable capacities, including; a standby<br />
cadre of pre-trained and equipped officers; a<br />
standing capacity, or a standing element, of<br />
our overall capacity; deploying more officers to<br />
more missions; the development of international<br />
7
standby and standing capacities and seconding<br />
officers to the headquarters of the UN and EU,<br />
and; partnership capacity building with other<br />
police contributing countries.<br />
1.11 Whilst some of these options provide<br />
alternative choices (e.g. standby or standing<br />
cadres), the majority represent a range of<br />
developments which will need to be implemented<br />
comprehensively – selective implementation of<br />
individual options will not address the gaps which<br />
currently limit the effectiveness of the UK model.<br />
1.12 Current constraints on conflict related funding<br />
are such that implementation of any options which<br />
require additional resources may not be feasible in<br />
the immediate term. However, in the IPAB the UK<br />
has, for the first time, a body which brings together<br />
all police and government partners involved in<br />
conflict related policing, and which can commission<br />
work to <strong>full</strong>y develop the options considered here.<br />
This would allow Ministers to direct implementation<br />
of measures to improve the effectiveness of UK<br />
support, once resources are available, or to direct<br />
that resources should be made available more<br />
immediately to implement those measures.<br />
8
Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
II. Gaps in quality and quantity<br />
2.1 Contributors to the review identified a number<br />
of core issues which result in capacity gaps in both<br />
the quality and quantity of police officers deployed<br />
to missions.<br />
Quality<br />
2.2 Failing to deploy officers with the right skills<br />
and experience to specific roles in missions<br />
is seen as a key problem, manifesting itself in<br />
various ways. A lack of appropriate policing<br />
experience and skill sets, resulting for example in<br />
traffic police training CID officers or officers with<br />
sound operational experience being out of their<br />
depth in roles which require strategic abilities and<br />
perspective. In addition there is often significant<br />
variance in the levels of policing experience and<br />
expertise of officers drawn from different countries,<br />
compounded by a lack of common standards and<br />
practise (see doctrine below).<br />
2.3 Most contributors however identified the<br />
lack of additional expertise as the most important<br />
capacity gap – skills and experience in mentoring,<br />
advising, consulting and analysis, including the<br />
ability to apply these skills as part of wider rule of<br />
law reform and within the specific national and<br />
cultural environment of the mission.<br />
2.4 Officers with insufficient rank and experience<br />
are tasked to mentor senior national officials and<br />
whereas training is a specific acquired skill, where<br />
one rank can train another, this does not work in<br />
mentoring, advising etc. National officers rapidly<br />
realise that the international mentor/advisor has<br />
insufficient experience or rank to give sound advice.<br />
One contributor stated that it is misplaced and<br />
arrogant to send e.g. a Police Sergeant to advise<br />
a Police District Commander. Another stated that<br />
mentors should be of at least Inspector (in UK<br />
police terms) rank and preferably higher, or have<br />
staff officer experience.<br />
2.5 Also crucial is the lack of experience and skills<br />
needed to analyse how policing reforms are to be<br />
sequenced and prioritised within wider rule of law,<br />
security and justice sector and political reforms. 3<br />
2.6 Contributors identified the broad range of skills<br />
and expertise required. These include: the ability<br />
to undertake joint analysis with all key policing<br />
stakeholders (Ministry of Interior, police authorities,<br />
police forces and agencies) and other institutional<br />
actors (Ministry of Justice, courts, prosecutions,<br />
prisons, civil society, other donors etc.), in order to<br />
develop a shared understanding of security needs<br />
(including human security) and effect reform of the<br />
rule of law system as a whole; the ability to analyse<br />
the constraints to effective policing, the legislative<br />
framework within which the police operate and the<br />
political con<strong>text</strong> and political will for change.<br />
2.7 Implementation requires skills for the design<br />
and delivery of a comprehensive programme<br />
to provide more effective policing, security and<br />
justice, which may include reform of: human and<br />
financial resource management; command and<br />
control; planning and administration; integrity and<br />
discipline; training and skills; equipment and asset<br />
management; accountability and oversight etc.<br />
2.8 Also critical is the ability to influence, or<br />
engage the influencing capacity of others, to<br />
generate sufficient political will for change and<br />
reform.<br />
3 “All too often, those involved in programming in one organisation<br />
are unaware of what couterparts in other organisations are<br />
doing. Donors are often very focused on their won programs and<br />
methodologies, which can complicate or even aggravate the already<br />
insecure environment in which the engagement is taking place.<br />
This absence of co-ordinated planning results in poorly designed<br />
programming, programming that does not fit with other initiatives<br />
or risks replicating what has been treid already.” Groenewald,<br />
Hesta and Peake, Gordon Plice Reform through Community-Based<br />
Policing-Philosophy and Guidelines for Implementation, Report of a<br />
Conference hosted by International Peace Academy and Saferworld<br />
New York, September 2004, p.4<br />
9
2.9 Much of the above points to a need for more<br />
comprehensive and sophisticated pre-deployment<br />
training and skilling. Hostile environment and<br />
“duty of care” training is well provided for; in fact<br />
contributors pointed to unnecessary duplication in<br />
this area, for example UK officers deploying to the<br />
EU policing mission in Afghanistan found much of<br />
the Hostile Environment training they received in<br />
the UK being repeated on arrival. What is required<br />
is more “mission specific” training, together with<br />
the development of training programmes which can<br />
provide additional skills and expertise in mentoring,<br />
consulting and advising and improve the<br />
understanding of developmental policing reform.<br />
2.10 Human Resource (HR) management<br />
- recruitment and selection - also has a major<br />
influence on quality gaps. There are no<br />
internationally agreed and standardised competency<br />
measurements. Role profiles or job descriptions<br />
and selection criteria, albeit now improving within<br />
the EU and UN, have not previously been designed<br />
to professional HR standards and have hampered<br />
effective selection of officers for posts in mission.<br />
2.11 Contributors also highlighted post selection<br />
by flag criteria, rather than by an individual’s<br />
competence, as a major issue in some missions. In<br />
at least one UN mission countries providing large<br />
numbers of officers have demanded key posts<br />
and sought to keep those posts limited to their<br />
own nationals, rather than filling them through a<br />
universal selection process.<br />
2.12 This potential conflict - between individual<br />
competence and international organisations’ desire<br />
for broad-based representation in missions - is<br />
reflected on a macro scale in the issue of differing<br />
national policing models and cultures.<br />
Contributors recognise that different policing<br />
models are often necessary and beneficial for<br />
missions, for instance to develop para-military or<br />
community based policing, and some countries will<br />
be better equipped than others to provide particular<br />
policing models and specific areas of policing<br />
expertise. The UK police service, for example,<br />
has widely recognised expertise in developing<br />
community based policing, whilst the French<br />
Gendarmerie and Italian Carabinieri have long<br />
experience and expertise in para-military policing.<br />
2.13 But it is critically important to resist importing<br />
policing models which are culturally out of place<br />
or which do not accord with host nation legal/<br />
rule of law frameworks. Missions should be using<br />
the core policing skills and principles of officers<br />
and contingents to develop local forces which suit<br />
local circumstances - not exporting the UK, French,<br />
Nigerian etc., police services.<br />
2.14 Different policing models cease to be<br />
complimentary where there is insufficient mission<br />
leadership and planning. For example, in UN<br />
missions in Kosovo and Liberia the diversity of<br />
policing approaches brought by officers from<br />
many different backgrounds, coupled with a failure<br />
by senior management to define and impose<br />
coherent policing development strategies, plans<br />
and procedures has led to contradictory approaches<br />
causing confusion and even resentment amongst<br />
the local police. 4<br />
4 “By importing police officers who have no experience in<br />
enforcing laws in democratic societies and operating in<br />
a courteous and helpful manner, UNMIK has been making<br />
matters worse. With such a profile of “international police” officers,<br />
it was clear they could not contribute tothe developtment of local<br />
policing and antagonised relations with the local population.“<br />
Muharrmei, Robert et al, Administration and Governance in Kosovo -<br />
Lesson learned and lessons to be learned Kosovar Institute for Policy<br />
Research and Development, Prishtina/Geneva, June 2005, p.17.<br />
10
Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
2.15 Key to the ability of mission planners<br />
and leaders to design and implement coherent<br />
strategies, plans and procedures, and to resolving<br />
the conflict between broad based representation<br />
and competence, will be the development of<br />
doctrine and common standards.<br />
2.16 Harmonisation and accommodation of<br />
different policing models and cultures already<br />
exists in many areas of international policing (e.g.<br />
extradition procedures and operational cooperation)<br />
but to date there has been little development of<br />
similar common standards and doctrine for conflict<br />
related international policing. This is now changing<br />
as both the EU and UN recognise the urgent need<br />
to improve standards and harmonise practises in<br />
mission.<br />
2.17 The UN in particular has begun doctrine<br />
development workshops for Formed Police Units<br />
(public order policing) and intends to take forward<br />
wider policing doctrine development in 2009.<br />
Amongst the key areas of doctrine that will need to<br />
developed are defining how policing components<br />
of mission should work alongside the military<br />
and other civilian components, and establishing<br />
structured lessons learned capacities, capable of<br />
capturing and sharing best (and worst) practice<br />
from existing and previous missions, for the benefit<br />
of the planners, leaders and managers of future<br />
missions.<br />
2.18 The UK has already undertaken work on<br />
doctrine, with the FCO producing a manual in 2007<br />
entitled “Peace Support Operations - Information<br />
and guidance for UK police personnel”, 5<br />
designed<br />
to provide UK officers with guidance on policies,<br />
procedures and practice. Further national doctrine<br />
development is now required to encompass the<br />
type of stabilisation operations on which the<br />
UK is engaged in Afghanistan, and there is an<br />
opportunity to apply UK policing expertise to the<br />
doctrine development which the UN and EU intend<br />
to undertake.<br />
2.19 The development of doctrine and common<br />
standards will address some of the issues affecting<br />
the planning and leadership of missions, but<br />
contributors identified other critical gaps in this<br />
area.<br />
2.20 Planning for the policing components<br />
of missions has been a weakness both at the<br />
national and international levels. 6 Insufficient<br />
strategic policing expertise has been called upon<br />
in drawing up objectives, priorities and end states<br />
(mandates) for missions and insufficient assessment<br />
of local policing realities has been carried out by<br />
international police experts. At both national and<br />
international levels there has been a lack of officers<br />
trained and available (either in dedicated units or<br />
on a standby basis) to plan for and manage the<br />
implementation of the policing components of<br />
missions, and planning for the policing components<br />
has often not commenced early enough, or with<br />
sufficient coordination with military and other<br />
civilian planning.<br />
5 Available at: http://www.ukinternationalpolicing.com/edocs/<br />
ipo_guidelines.pdf<br />
6 “.... institutional mechanisims for planning must be improved.<br />
Unlike the combat phase of most interventions, the postconflict<br />
phase, including policing, usually receives little attention.<br />
This is in part a result of the weakness of the institutions in the<br />
United States and other governments charged with policing reform:<br />
they simply do not have the corporate capacity to undertake<br />
detailed pre-intervention planning. It is also a failure of political<br />
will at the national and international levels, since it is the task of<br />
the polictical leadership to make the public case for the lengthy<br />
preparation, extensive resourcing, and long-term commitment<br />
that is required for post-conflict policing missions.”Jones, Seth G.,<br />
Wilson, Jeremy M., Rathmell, Andrew and Riley, K. Jack, Establishing<br />
Law and Order After Conflict, Rand Infrastructrue, Safety, and<br />
Environment (Organisation), Virginia, 2005, p.224<br />
11
Established missions and operations also need<br />
internal planning capacity and expertise - strategic<br />
and operational planning is a requirement<br />
throughout the life of a mission.<br />
2.21 However, progress is being made. The UN<br />
formed a small Standing Police Capacity (UN SPC)<br />
in 2007, with a mandate to plan for and provide<br />
initial headquarters functions for missions. Similarly<br />
the EU established Civilian Response Teams in 2006<br />
( a reserve capacity to assess and plan for civilian<br />
missions including police components) and more<br />
recently in 2007 the Civilian Planning and Conduct<br />
Capability (EU CPCC) with a mandate to plan,<br />
conduct and support civilian European Security and<br />
Defence Policy (ESDP) operations. At a national<br />
level, and in response to capacity gaps identified<br />
early during our engagement in Iraq, the UK has<br />
established an International Policing Assessment<br />
and Planning Group (APG), providing 30 officers on<br />
a reserve basis, trained to carry out assessment and<br />
planning for conflict related missions.<br />
2.22 Developments in this area continue. The UN<br />
is currently reviewing both the Standing Police<br />
Capacity and Police Division (which is responsible<br />
for the strategic and operational management and<br />
support of police missions) and has recommended<br />
that both be increased in size. Police Division also<br />
intends to develop courses to train officers in<br />
mission planning. The EU is working to identify<br />
lessons learned from previous mission planning,<br />
in order to develop more rigour and structure,<br />
and to implement new review processes and<br />
tighter oversight to maintain track of delivery<br />
against mission mandates. The UK, as one of the<br />
few countries with a dedicated police mission<br />
assessment and planning capacity, will be well<br />
placed to assist in these developments.<br />
2.23 Mission leadership issues include the<br />
widely held view that there has been too small<br />
a pool of good police mission leaders, and that<br />
programmes to identify, develop, release and<br />
support more officers with strategic expertise<br />
are urgently required. Missions have often been<br />
deployed with critical gaps in senior leadership<br />
due to slow recruitment processes, but conversely<br />
those processes have not always proven reliable<br />
in selecting officers who can perform in mission.<br />
Contributors suggest that more robust recruitment<br />
processes are required, possibly through the use<br />
of training and assessments courses, and that the<br />
development of an international pool of potential<br />
police mission leaders should be pursued.<br />
2.24 It is also widely agreed that mission leaders<br />
should be recruited at the earliest possible stage,<br />
and involved in the planning of the mission, rather<br />
than deploying later to take ownership of plans<br />
developed by others.<br />
2.25 The length of secondments to mission was<br />
also identified as an issue particularly, but not<br />
exclusively, for senior and mission leadership roles.<br />
Whilst recognising why secondments were time<br />
limited (to 12 months in the case of UK officers),<br />
contributors felt this was often an inadequate<br />
length of time for officers to achieve significant<br />
effect, particularly in roles where building<br />
relationships with locals and other international<br />
actors was key to success.<br />
2.26 The attitudes of national police<br />
leadership towards international conflict related<br />
policing can have a material effect on both<br />
quality and quantity gaps. The tension between<br />
domestic policing priorities and the release of<br />
officers for international duties is widely recognised<br />
and common to many, if not most, contributing<br />
countries.<br />
12
Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
2.27 Police leaders are responsible for the provision<br />
of law enforcement to their own communities.<br />
They can be understandably reluctant to release<br />
large numbers and/or high quality officers when a<br />
benefit linkage between international missions and<br />
domestic policing priorities has not been made.<br />
This is particularly the case when they are not given<br />
resources to back-fill posts vacated by the officers<br />
deployed overseas.<br />
2.28 From a UK police service perspective,<br />
contributors were concerned that conflict related<br />
international policing was still seen as a “career<br />
stopper”, potentially detrimental to officers’<br />
careers, and that this inhibited senior, experienced<br />
and quality officers from volunteering. More<br />
incentive was needed to attract such officers by<br />
ensuring that overseas deployments are seen as<br />
career enhancing opportunities, which add value<br />
both to the individual and the police service on<br />
return. To achieve this police leadership need to<br />
<strong>full</strong>y understand the importance of international<br />
policing, the professional development<br />
opportunities which overseas deployments can<br />
provide and support overseas deployments as<br />
natural roles for their officers - part of their ongoing<br />
career path and development.<br />
2.29 Recent developments in the UK have begun<br />
to address some of these issues. The Green Paper<br />
“From the Neighbourhood to the National,<br />
Policing our Communities”, 7<br />
published by the<br />
Home Secretary in July 2008, contains, for the first<br />
time in a national policing document, reference to<br />
the importance of international policing activities<br />
(albeit not specifically to conflict related policing). In<br />
addition, the International Police Assistance Board<br />
is developing a UK International Policing Assistance<br />
Strategy, which will seek to bring more coordination<br />
and integration across a wide range of assistance<br />
activities undertaken by the police service. This can<br />
form the basis of a new communications strategy<br />
to emphasise the importance and professional<br />
benefits of conflict related policing, to the leadership<br />
of the police service.<br />
Quantity<br />
2.30 Contributors agreed that there was a global<br />
shortage of suitably qualified officers to deploy to<br />
conflict related missions. Several EU missions are<br />
running 25-30% below authorised capacity and the<br />
UN currently has a shortfall of 5,500 officers against<br />
a mandated strength of 17,100 across all missions.<br />
2.31 Although there may be legitimate questions<br />
over the way in which the scale and type of policing<br />
element are assessed (discussed in the next section),<br />
there is little doubt that shortfalls have limited the<br />
ability of policing missions to meet their objectives.<br />
One common consequence has been that policing<br />
tasks and missions are often taken over by underqualified<br />
military components – a recent example of<br />
this is police reform in Iraq where the Civilian Police<br />
Assistance Training Team (CPATT) was under military<br />
command with limited policing expertise.<br />
2.32 The reasons why shortfalls exist varies across<br />
contributing countries, but common threads can be<br />
identified. National political will and funding<br />
are key issues. A general commitment to conflict<br />
resolution and peacekeeping can be traced back<br />
to the UN Charter, and clearly involves an effective<br />
policing contribution: policing is an obligation<br />
for an occupying force. An international policing<br />
capability is therefore a requirement based on<br />
international obligations.<br />
7 Available at:<br />
http://fileshomeoffice.gov.uk/police/policing_green_paper.pdf<br />
13
2.33 In many countries political ambition for<br />
conflict resolution and peacekeeping is high,<br />
particularly for increasing the role of policing (and<br />
other civilian) components. But even where cross<br />
departmental political consensus is achieved,<br />
ambitions are not always matched by the<br />
commitment of resources and funding necessary to<br />
achieve them. 8 9<br />
2.34 In addition to providing resource and funding<br />
for actual deployments, there is also the need for<br />
effective operational management of deployments.<br />
The management of overseas deployments is a<br />
normal and established function for most military<br />
services, but not so for most police services -<br />
structures and systems must be developed to take<br />
on these roles. Where there are constraints on<br />
overall funding, the correct balance still needs to<br />
be struck between resources committed to actual<br />
deployments and those devoted to managing the<br />
process. Failure to establish a national structure<br />
to effectively manage deployments, results in ad<br />
hoc systems which are incapable of providing<br />
the quality and quantity desired, and increases<br />
the difficulty international organisations face in<br />
deploying and maintaining operations.<br />
2.35 Whilst countries will quite legitimately decide<br />
which missions they will contribute to on the<br />
basis of national priorities, there are also instances<br />
where, for domestic political imperatives, countries<br />
will favour bilateral activities over contributions to<br />
multinational operations, diverting resources from<br />
the latter and increasing the challenges to effective<br />
coordination.<br />
2.36 Deployed officers are drawn from domestic<br />
duties which must be continued in their absence -<br />
this often leads to a tension between international<br />
policing and domestic policing priorities.<br />
Particularly during a difficult financial climate, police<br />
leaders wish to hold on to their most valuable,<br />
efficient, effective resources - people. For a number<br />
of countries part of the solution to this has been by<br />
providing sufficient resources and funding to allow<br />
“back-filling” of posts.<br />
2.37 In the UK, with increasing budget restrictions,<br />
and greater demands for performance from central<br />
government and police authorities and boards, the<br />
deployment of staff overseas will be considered<br />
a luxury. The level of responses to recruitment<br />
exercises for international policing will also vary<br />
as a natural consequence of the present set-up<br />
of depending on volunteers from 53 separate<br />
UK police forces – who are released only with<br />
the agreement of their Chief Police Officer and<br />
police authority, who naturally give precedence<br />
to the needs of their force. Furthermore, conflict<br />
related missions represent only part of the overall<br />
commitment of UK police officers to international<br />
assistance; numbers are also needed for other<br />
international activities including training, twinning<br />
projects and operational work, and police leaders<br />
need to prioritise these demands.<br />
8 “ There is a profound disconnect between the goals and values<br />
that reformers are trying to promote and the levels of funding<br />
provided to effect this change. Police refrom does not come<br />
cheap and funding is often insufficient to meet the expectations<br />
that accompany it. Donor interest tends to wane before<br />
suffiecient time has passed to produce tangilbe results. Without<br />
a longer-tern commitment, the aims of police reform based on<br />
a community- baed policing approach cannot be acheived, and<br />
international support to unstable areas will remain nothing more<br />
than shrot tern fire fighting”’Groenewald, Hesta and Peake,<br />
Gordon ibid, p.5<br />
9 “ It is also a failure of political will at the national and<br />
international levels, since it is the task of the politcial leadership<br />
to make the public case for the lengthy preparation, extensive<br />
resourcing, and long-term commitment that is required for<br />
post-conflict policing missions.”Jones, Seth G., Wilson, Jeremy M.,<br />
Rathmell, Andres and Riley, K. Jack. Ibid p.224<br />
14
Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
2.38 Despite all these potential inhibitors, the most<br />
recent UK recruitment drive for conflict related<br />
international policing produced record numbers<br />
(approximately 500) of volunteers.<br />
However the majority of these were junior officers,<br />
lacking the seniority, experience or specialised<br />
expertise needed for the majority of the missions in<br />
which the UK is currently engaged - and this reflects<br />
the view of most contributors that whilst quantity<br />
shortfalls are important, quality remains the key<br />
issue.<br />
2.39 Security and duty of care issues also<br />
affect staffing in missions. The statutory and<br />
customary responsibilities of governments for<br />
the duty of care of deployed officers, varies from<br />
country to country. In the UK the bar is relatively<br />
high and much work has been done across<br />
government and the police service to address duty<br />
of care issues - it remains however a complicated<br />
issue.<br />
can be deployed, within an overall funding and<br />
resource envelope.<br />
2.41 Finally it must be recognised that for most<br />
countries and police services conflict related<br />
international policing is a voluntary activity and that<br />
individual officers may decide against volunteering<br />
because of the actual (and perceived) risks<br />
involved. Developing more coherent and effective<br />
approaches to duty of care issues, security and<br />
life support systems is likely to reduce inhibitors<br />
and widen the pool of officers who may consider<br />
deployments.<br />
2.40 The authority to release UK police officers for<br />
deployment to international conflict related policing<br />
missions rests with their respective Chief Constables<br />
and Police Authorities and, ultimately, with the<br />
Home Secretary (and Ministers from the devolved<br />
administrations). The officers are then seconded<br />
through the Foreign Office, either to a mission run<br />
by international organisations such as the EU or<br />
UN, or to a “UK run” mission such as those in Iraq<br />
or Afghanistan. This structure results in a complex<br />
landscape of responsibilities for duty of care and<br />
security provision/risk mitigation. The differing<br />
level of threat and risk across missions adds to this<br />
complexity. There are also funding implications in<br />
the provision of force protection, security and life<br />
support resources, and in hostile or challenging<br />
environments these costs can be substantial. This<br />
may serve to limit the number of officers that<br />
15
III. Demand – Assessing the Scale and Type<br />
of Policing Elements Required<br />
3.1 The lack of doctrine, assessment, planning<br />
and lessons learned capacities, described in the<br />
previous section, has hindered effective and timely<br />
assessments of the scale and type of policing<br />
elements required in missions and operations. 10<br />
3.2 United Nations missions, for example, have<br />
seen an increase in the deployment of Formed<br />
Police Units (UNAMID 11 is mandated for 19<br />
Formed Police Units consisting of up to 2660 police<br />
officers) but without a comprehensive doctrine<br />
which describes what roles these units should<br />
undertake, how they should carry them out and<br />
to what standards. Early UK engagement in Iraq<br />
was marked by a lack of advanced assessment and<br />
planning for the roles which UK police might be<br />
called upon to deliver.<br />
3.3 Frequently missions have been established on<br />
the basis of past experience and using<br />
off-the-shelf methodologies - failing to take<br />
sufficient account of local conditions and culture.<br />
Generic police training curricula and delivery<br />
methods used in Kosovo, were imported to train<br />
Iraqi and Afghan police and required extensive<br />
modification over extended periods before<br />
becoming effective. Some missions (not least<br />
at various stages in Iraq and Afghanistan), have<br />
concentrated to a great degree on training and<br />
equipping - measuring success by numbers - at the<br />
expense of more fundamental reform requirements<br />
such as organisational and leadership development.<br />
3.4 This one-size-fits-all approach has failed<br />
to adequately address the particular policing<br />
needs of the receiving countries, and nebulous<br />
concepts of democratic policing and international<br />
standards, have led to international aspirations for<br />
development and end states which are unrealistic<br />
or even unsuitable in a national and regional<br />
con<strong>text</strong>.<br />
3.5 Insufficient coordination of assessment,<br />
planning and delivery with other mission<br />
components has meant that policing reform and<br />
development is often unsynchronised with other<br />
rule of law and security sector elements - evidenced<br />
particularly in Kosovo and Afghanistan 12 , where<br />
for long periods reform of the police and criminal<br />
justice sectors were out of step with each other.<br />
3.6 Adding to these difficulties is the fact that the<br />
role of policing elements in conflict related missions<br />
has evolved, particularly over the last 10 years, and<br />
continues to do so 13 . From basic monitoring and<br />
reporting (El Salvador, Mozambique, Cambodia<br />
and Namibia), to executive operational policing<br />
(Haiti, East Timor, Kosovo), to longer term reform<br />
and development (Kosovo again, Sierra Leone, Iraq,<br />
Afghanistan). The first of these is now generally<br />
regarded as having been of limited effectiveness<br />
and likely to be confined to history. Future missions<br />
(and the future of ongoing missions) will more likely<br />
deliver one, or a combination of, the latter two<br />
types of role.<br />
3.7 Within these broad categories of policing<br />
roles lie more specific classifiers, for example paramilitary<br />
policing, community policing, investigative<br />
and intelligence policing, and the development of<br />
leadership, command and control, professional<br />
standards, organisational and administrative<br />
capacities. Further categories define methods of<br />
delivery including, executive policing, training,<br />
coaching, advising, mentoring, consultancy, and<br />
donor equipping and coordination.<br />
3.8 It is clear that there is a need for more<br />
resources and expertise to develop doctrine and<br />
use it to underpin integrated, strategic assessment<br />
and planning - police officers who are trained in<br />
these roles and who can work alongside military<br />
and civilian experts and planners, and with host<br />
16
Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
governments, civil society and local communities<br />
to identify and address the unique requirements of<br />
individual missions. Strategic integrated planning,<br />
founded in a comprehensive doctrine and which<br />
identifies programmes of achievable goals, will more<br />
effectively determine the scale and type of policing<br />
required.<br />
3.9 International organisations and individual<br />
contributing countries are increasingly recognising<br />
the gaps in doctrine, assessment and planning, and<br />
the evolving nature of the policing requirement,<br />
and increasing capacity in response – the UN SPC,<br />
the EU CPCC, the UK’s APG. Continuing support to<br />
these areas of development is essential, if the scale<br />
and type of the policing elements are to match the<br />
requirements and demands placed upon future and<br />
ongoing operations and missions. 14<br />
10 “ The UN has often launched missions without benefit of a<br />
systematic analysis of the levels of criminality and capacity for<br />
rule of law in the mission area. In the past, peace operations<br />
have relied on anecdotes to gauge the level of functionality,<br />
efficiency, and poplular support for the police, courts, and prison<br />
system in its area of deployment. DPKO has not had a system<br />
to collect data for police and other elements of the criminal<br />
justice systems in post- conflict settings. Without such data,<br />
assessing the strengths and weaknesses of domestic police and<br />
justice institutions is difficult and reduces support the rule of<br />
law, delaying improvements in accountability and performance.”<br />
Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch. From<br />
TimorLeste to Darur: New Initiatives for Enhancing UK Civilian<br />
Policing Capacity. Henry L. Stimpson Center. Washington DC,<br />
August 2007, p.5.<br />
11 United Nations Assistance Mission in Darfur<br />
12 Wilder, Andrew Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the<br />
Afghan National Police, Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit,<br />
Kabul, July 2007, p.62.<br />
13 Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K, Holt and William J. Durch. Ibid p.1-2<br />
14 Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K, Holt and William J. Durch. Ibid p.1-2<br />
17
IV. Other Models<br />
4.1 As part of this review senior officers from the<br />
UK International Policing Assessment and Planning<br />
Group (APG) travelled to Australia and Canada<br />
in November 2008, to study and report on those<br />
countries’ models of conflict related international<br />
policing.<br />
Australia<br />
4.2 Australia is one of the few, if only, countries<br />
to have established a standing capacity for conflict<br />
related international police deployments - the<br />
International Deployment Group (IDG). The IDG is<br />
a department within the Australian Federal Police<br />
(AFP) - the Australian Government’s primary law<br />
enforcement agency, international law enforcement<br />
representative and the chief source of advice to the<br />
Government on policing issues.<br />
Governance and Policy<br />
4.3 The AFP itself is part of the Attorney-General’s<br />
portfolio, with the AFP Commissioner reporting to<br />
the Minister for Home Affairs. As a departmental<br />
head the AFP Commissioner can also be co-opted<br />
to provide law enforcement advice to the National<br />
Security Committee of Cabinet and makes<br />
recommendations to Government regarding<br />
policy.<br />
4.4 Ministerial priorities for the AFP are;<br />
> Countering the threat of terrorism to the safety<br />
and security of Australians and Australian<br />
interests, inside and outside Australia;<br />
> Contributing effectively to the Government’s<br />
international law enforcement interests<br />
including matters involving cooperation<br />
to combat transnational organised crime,<br />
responses to emergencies, law and order<br />
capacity building missions, and participation<br />
in United Nations, or other internationally<br />
mandated, peace operations;<br />
4.5 Whilst the AFP provides the Commonwealth<br />
(i.e. federal) policing lead, each of the seven States<br />
within Australia also has its own police service,<br />
answerable to the State government.<br />
4.6 Under the AFP’s Strategic Plan for 2007/11<br />
the IDG “…contributes to regional and<br />
international stability and security on behalf of<br />
the Australian Government by implementing<br />
capacity building programs and offshore law<br />
enforcement initiatives.’<br />
4.7 The AFP’s 2007 Business strategy includes<br />
the following outputs for the IDG;<br />
> Bilateral law enforcement capacity building<br />
programs under the auspices of the Law<br />
Enforcement Cooperation Program, and<br />
> International peace operations and missions as<br />
civilian police with the United Nations.<br />
Development of the IDG<br />
4.8 The IDG has been developed primarily<br />
within a regional con<strong>text</strong>. An increasing number<br />
of situations and incidents within its Asia Pacific<br />
sphere of influence (including East Timor, the<br />
Solomon Islands, the Bali Bombings and the<br />
Indonesian Tsunami), led to the identification by<br />
the Australian government of significant gaps in its<br />
ability to respond rapidly to crises and to support<br />
capacity building in fragile and failed states. The<br />
government also recognised a lack of a cohesive<br />
and joined-up response across government<br />
departments.<br />
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Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
4.9 In 2004 the government tasked the AFP<br />
with creating a standing international policing<br />
capacity. The Australian Government already had a<br />
preference for a ‘whole of government approach’ to<br />
security and capacity development activities and the<br />
AFP’s standing capacity was designed to focus on<br />
‘interoperability’, i.e. all agencies and government<br />
departments having a clear understanding of each<br />
others needs, objectives and requirements - and<br />
working together to achieve overall government<br />
objectives.<br />
4.10 This interoperability has now reached a<br />
stage of maturity evidenced in the case of the<br />
Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands<br />
(RAMSI). The RAMSI funding proposals considered<br />
by Government sees the AFP receiving significant<br />
funding to provide support infrastructure to other<br />
contributing agencies. The AFP also manages<br />
programs that would traditionally have been<br />
led by the Australian Agency for International<br />
Development (AusAID).<br />
4.11 The IDG does have small numbers of officers<br />
deployed outside Australia’s immediate sphere of<br />
influence, these include Afghanistan, Cyprus and<br />
Sudan, but the main focus of government policy<br />
priorities, and the bulk of the group’s resources, are<br />
centred on regional security and stability.<br />
Structure<br />
4.12 Authorised by the government in 2006<br />
to increase its establishment to a total of 1200<br />
staff, the IDG currently (November 2008) employs<br />
approximately 750 staff. Of these 250 are Australia<br />
based (A-Base) personnel providing support to<br />
500 IDG members deployed to missions including<br />
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cyprus, Nauru, Papua<br />
New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Timor-Leste,<br />
Tonga, and Vanuatu. Approximately 100 of the<br />
deployed staff are seconded from six State police<br />
services and thirteen Pacific Island Nations (37 from<br />
the state police services).<br />
4.13 The support functions provided by the 250<br />
A-Base personnel include;<br />
Contracts and Logistics<br />
HR and Finance<br />
Foreign Police Liaison<br />
Forensics<br />
Information Technology<br />
Intelligence<br />
Marketing and Public Affairs<br />
Mission Administration<br />
Operational Response<br />
Pacific Islands Police Advisor Training<br />
Protective Services<br />
Strategy Planning<br />
Monitoring and Governance<br />
Wellbeing and Health & Safety Services<br />
4.14 On reaching <strong>full</strong> establishment staffing of the<br />
IDG should be as follows:<br />
> Mission component of 730 staff (including<br />
seconded state and Pacific Island Nations<br />
police).<br />
> A-Base component of 499 staff, comprising:<br />
> National Manager’s office with 28 staff<br />
responsible for international policy, governance,<br />
marketing, communications and projects;<br />
> Missions and Operations support with 33 staff;<br />
> Planning and Development with 98 staff<br />
responsible for intelligence, programme analysis,<br />
planning and doctrine.<br />
> Corporate Services with 94 staff responsible<br />
for contracts & logistics, finance and human<br />
resources.<br />
> Learning & Development with 52 staff<br />
responsible for pre-deployment training,<br />
19
operational safety training, and internal training.<br />
> Operational Response Group with 193 staff.<br />
4.15 The Operational Response Group is a new<br />
capacity, capable of deploying rapidly (up to 40<br />
members within 24 hours, up to a further 40<br />
members within 72 hours and the remainder<br />
within seven days) to any situation - including high<br />
risk environments - to provide stabilisation. The<br />
ORG would deploy to stabilise the environment<br />
giving the IDG time to muster and deploy a main<br />
mission component. The ORG consists of teams<br />
with varying skill sets. Tactical Response Teams<br />
capabilities are intended to be the vanguard in<br />
armed or otherwise high risk civil unrest situations;<br />
Stability Response Teams are trained to a high<br />
level in Public Order Management including long<br />
arms and less lethal options to respond to civil<br />
disorder; crowd control and riot situations, and<br />
operational and specialist units providing support<br />
including negotiators, maritime policing operations,<br />
marksmen, and communications, intelligence, and<br />
logistics experts.<br />
4.16 The IDG has invested significantly in training<br />
with a purpose built (AUD2.8 million/ £1.2million in<br />
2005) international training complex which includes<br />
facilities that recreate the environments police<br />
might experience when deployed overseas. The<br />
training is residential and takes place over 35 days,<br />
delivering two broad themes; safety and security;<br />
and capacity development. A significant amount of<br />
the training is delivered via immersed scenarios in<br />
which cultural awareness, values and human rights<br />
are the focus. An increasing number of non-police<br />
personnel (from AusAID, NGO’s etc.) now also<br />
participate in this training.<br />
Funding<br />
4.17 Discreet and itemised start-up costs for<br />
the IDG are not easily distinguishable because<br />
AFP involvement in international conflict related<br />
policing - in particular large scale deployments to<br />
RAMSI - pre-dates the formal establishment of the<br />
group in 2004. However figures that are available<br />
show that in FY 2003/04 the Government provided<br />
AUD246 million (£103 million) of initial funding<br />
to the AFP for its role in RAMSI from 2003/04<br />
to 2004/05, including the logistics function. In<br />
2005/06 the Government agreed to provide<br />
AUD538 million (£226 million) to the AFP in<br />
additional resourcing from 2005/06 to 2008/09 for<br />
the mission to RAMSI.<br />
4.18 Consolidated financial year budget figures for<br />
the IDG for this and subsequent financial years are<br />
as follows;<br />
FY 2008/09 AUD300 million (£140 million)<br />
FY 2009/10 AUD248 million (£114 million)<br />
FY 2010/11 AUD177 million (£81 million)<br />
State Police Contributions<br />
4.19 The contribution of the seven State police<br />
services to the IDG varies. Economic and resource<br />
issues in some States mean that they are struggling<br />
to recruit officers and therefore unable to second<br />
large numbers of staff to the IDG. Victoria Police<br />
(Vicpol) is currently the largest provider of state<br />
police to the IDG, and has established an internal<br />
support team of 5 staff and a robust re-integration<br />
programme for returning officers.<br />
Key Stakeholders/Partner Agencies<br />
4.20 The two key cross government relationships<br />
for the IDG are with AusAID and the Australian<br />
Defence Force (ADF). The IDG appoints<br />
liaison officers to AusAID’s Fragile States and<br />
Development departments, and to the ADF’s Joint<br />
Operations Planning Group. These partnership<br />
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Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
arrangements are governed by a Strategic<br />
Partnership Agreement between AusAID and<br />
the AFP and a Memorandum of Understanding<br />
between the ADF and AFP.<br />
4.21 All partners identify key benefits to these<br />
relationships which include; speaking a common<br />
language; agreed and detailed understanding of<br />
where responsibilities sit and agreed outcomes;<br />
development of whole of government strategies;<br />
negotiation and development of jointly agreed<br />
business cases, for government consideration, and;<br />
more effective and developed joint operations and<br />
staff relationships on the ground in missions.<br />
Other Observations<br />
4.22 The IDG has invited academia into its<br />
operations, both with academic experts working<br />
alongside group members on planning, policy,<br />
research and programme analysis, and by<br />
commissioning specific pieces of work, for example<br />
the development of a suite of performance<br />
indicators by the University of Queensland. This<br />
academic rigour is supporting the development<br />
of credible business cases and helping to develop<br />
more focus on outcomes rather than inputs.<br />
4.23 Giving ownership and responsibility to the<br />
police has had a significant impact; as the group<br />
matures into the structure and process, it is<br />
becoming more confident in what it can achieve.<br />
The group has a clear sense of purpose, and belief<br />
that it is at the ‘cutting edge’.<br />
4.24 One of the key enablers for the government<br />
in establishing the IDG was the federal and state<br />
governance arrangements, which allowed the<br />
government to deal with the AFP as a single point<br />
of contact to deliver its policy aims on policing.<br />
4.25 An issue in establishing the group (and the<br />
Operational Response Group in particular) was<br />
the fact that it attracted officers with specialist<br />
training and skills (e.g. firearms and public order)<br />
away from other police services. This led to some<br />
relationship issues between the AFP and State<br />
Police. However it should be noted that the ORG<br />
was one of several competing employment market<br />
opportunities for example, security jobs in Iraq and<br />
employment in the mining sector.<br />
4.26 Group members were conscious of the high<br />
cost of maintaining the Operational Response<br />
Group - AUD38 million p.a. (£17.6 million).<br />
However, the unit does have a domestic role in<br />
support of AFP operations and as a redundancy<br />
to State and Territory jurisdictions. In order to<br />
respond to high risk incidents the ORG spends a<br />
high percentage of their time maintaining their<br />
skill level. This group have undertaken rapid<br />
deployments both domestically and internationally<br />
and maintain an ability to deploy at a moments<br />
notice.<br />
Canada<br />
4.27 Canada has a multi-layered police service<br />
with municipal, provincial and regional forces,<br />
and the national Royal Canadian Mounted Police<br />
(RCMP). A total of 64,000 serving police officers<br />
work in approximately 450 separate forces,<br />
varying in size from single figures to the RCMP<br />
which has a strength of 17,000 officers. Although<br />
primarily a national/federal force the RCMP also<br />
provides policing services to territories, provinces,<br />
municipalities and native communities throughout<br />
Canada.<br />
4.28 Canada has contributed to international<br />
conflict related policing for 20 years, but has<br />
recently brought more structure, transparency<br />
and coherence to the governance and control of<br />
their contributions. Canada does not operate a<br />
standing capacity like the Australians, but “recruits<br />
21
to deploy” similar to the UK. Canada does however<br />
train officers in advance in order to develop a pool<br />
of officers ready to deploy.<br />
The Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA)<br />
4.29 In 2006 the RCMP established a centrally<br />
funded five year programme - the International<br />
Police Peacekeeping and Peace Operations<br />
Program (IPP). At the same time a memorandum of<br />
understanding - the CPA - was drawn up between<br />
the Department for Foreign Affairs & International<br />
Trade (DFAIT), the Canadian International<br />
Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of<br />
Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness (PSEP)<br />
and the RCMP. (The RCMP sits within the PSEP<br />
department but is a separate signatory to the<br />
MOU).<br />
4.30 The CPA is designed to enable the RCMP<br />
and its policing partners to plan and manage<br />
international deployments for the long term, rather<br />
than reacting to requests on an ad hoc, mission-tomission<br />
basis. DFAIT, CIDA, PSEP and the RCMP are<br />
jointly responsible for the implementation of the<br />
CPA, working as an inter-departmental association<br />
with governance structures consisting of a Steering<br />
Committee and a Working Group, both of which<br />
are chaired by members from DFAIT. The Steering<br />
Committee is responsible for deciding whether to<br />
contribute Canadian police officers to a particular<br />
international operation and does so against an<br />
established set of key criteria.<br />
4.31 Within the CPA model DFAIT provides foreign<br />
policy expertise and leadership, and identifies<br />
activities where police can contribute to local peace<br />
support and capacity building consistent with<br />
Canadian foreign policy objectives. CIDA provides<br />
knowledge of country and cultural circumstances<br />
and linkages between police interventions and the<br />
wider development of work of the Agency and its<br />
partners.<br />
4.32 The RCMP is responsible for selecting officers<br />
in accordance with operational requirements,<br />
managing their training and logistical support<br />
and providing advice based on Canadian policing<br />
expertise.<br />
4.33 The CPA responds to both the Government of<br />
Canada’s international peace and security objective<br />
of building a more secure world and the objectives<br />
of the Canadian Official Development Assistance<br />
(ODA) policy.<br />
International Peace Operations Branch (IPOB)<br />
4.34 The IPOB sits within the Federal and<br />
International Operations Directorate of RCMP<br />
Headquarters in Ottawa and is responsible for<br />
delivery of the IPP programme and the policing<br />
elements of the CPA. The current structure of the<br />
IPOB was approved by the Canadian Cabinet in<br />
2006 with an initial five year funding allocation.<br />
Originally established with 34 staff, IPOB now has<br />
approval to use existing funding to expand to 54<br />
staff, and following a recent staffing evaluation is<br />
seeking approval and funding for a further increase<br />
to 83 staff.<br />
4.35 IPOB manages and supports all aspects of<br />
police deployments including pre-deployment<br />
recruitment, selection and training activities,<br />
operational support in mission and reintegration on<br />
return from mission. IPOB is mandated by the CPA<br />
to build a rising pool of pre-trained officers, who<br />
will remain with their parent services until called<br />
upon to deploy.<br />
4.36 Training is delivered through a two week<br />
briefing (rather than scenario) course covering<br />
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Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
operational training (executive policing and criminal<br />
intelligence), health, administrative briefings, cultural<br />
awareness and specialised training (mission specific<br />
issues).<br />
4.37 IPOB includes a Health Services Unit (HSU)<br />
which provides physical and psychological health<br />
care advice and support at all stages of operations,<br />
including mission assessments and reconnaissance,<br />
recruitment, selection and training, support in<br />
mission and re-integration on return. Within the<br />
HSU is an employee assistance and family support<br />
coordinator. Available 24/7, the coordinator<br />
provides short-term peer support counselling and<br />
referral services to deployed officers and their<br />
families prior to, during and post deployment. IPOB<br />
also includes a Logistics Unit which manages the<br />
provision of all uniform, equipment and logistical<br />
support.<br />
4.38 Currently IPOB negotiates individually with<br />
other police services for the release of their officers,<br />
there is no single national model. As with the<br />
Australian model, IPOB provides additional funding,<br />
over and above the actual costs of salary and<br />
allowances, allowing police services to back-fill<br />
posts or fund other initiatives.<br />
Funding<br />
4.39 The IPP is funded through two mechanisms.<br />
Firstly a 5 year funding programme is negotiated<br />
and agreed with the Treasury Board (TB) by the<br />
respective CPA Ministers. This funding is paid<br />
quarterly to the IPOB to enable it to deliver the IPP<br />
and build a permanent and sustainable capacity<br />
of deployable police officers for international<br />
peace support operations. Essentially this funds<br />
all Canadian based aspects of the IPP including<br />
hiring recruits to back-fill the shortfall created by<br />
international deployments. Currently this is set at<br />
CAN$37 million (£20 million).<br />
4.40 In addition an Annual Plan is produced<br />
by DFAIT, in consultation with all CPA partners,<br />
which includes approved and anticipated police<br />
participation in operations with an estimate of<br />
incremental costs. The Annual Plan is submitted to<br />
the Steering Committee for approval by 31 March<br />
for the coming fiscal year. This funding derives from<br />
DFAIT’s Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF), and<br />
essentially pays for all mission based costs. Currently<br />
this is set at CAN$11million, (£6.09 million).<br />
Future Plans<br />
4.41 IPOB have developed a draft Strategic Plan<br />
for development over the next five years, the key<br />
outputs of which are;<br />
> The increase the capacity to deploy Canadian<br />
police officers to 500 within the next 5 years.<br />
> To develop a new IPOB business model and<br />
organisational structure.<br />
> To develop a law enforcement capacity building<br />
capability.<br />
> To develop the capacity to contribute to formed<br />
police units.<br />
> To develop a rapid deployment capacity.<br />
4.42 Three strategic priorities are also identified in<br />
the draft Strategic Plan; Building Human Capacity<br />
- providing the necessary quality and quantity<br />
of police officers to peace operations in a timely<br />
manner; Horizontal Relationships - providing<br />
more effective and integrated management and<br />
support to international peace operations, and;<br />
a Responsive and Holistic Approach - ensuring<br />
integrated and coordinated deployments<br />
throughout the spectrum of conflict.<br />
4.43 IPOB is currently mandated under the CPA<br />
to deploy up to 200, drawn from a pool of 600<br />
pre-trained officers. In 2008 Canada deployed a<br />
23
little over 100 officers to missions in Afghanistan,<br />
Bosnia, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Sierra Leone,<br />
Sudan, East Timor and Krygystan. Of these 44%<br />
were RCMP officers with 56% from other police<br />
services.<br />
4.44 Under the draft Strategic Plan numbers will<br />
increase year on year (with retired officers being<br />
brought into the pool from 2010), until 2013 when<br />
a pool of 1500 pre-trained officers will allow the<br />
deployment of 500 officers, 30% from the RCMP,<br />
50% from other police services and 20% retired<br />
officers.<br />
4.45 However the Canadians are not currently<br />
deploying up the CPA mandated numbers and<br />
they recognise that a number of hurdles which<br />
will have to be overcome if their aspirations are<br />
to be met. Better marketing of international<br />
policing is required to gain the buy-in of provincial<br />
governments and increase the number of other<br />
police services which participate. A communications<br />
strategy to achieve this required.<br />
4.46 The diversity of Canada’s police service has<br />
resulted in a lack of commonality in recruitment,<br />
selection and reintegration procedures. Individual<br />
police services have negotiated their own unique<br />
arrangements with the RCMP, and the need to<br />
incorporate trade union protocols has added to the<br />
complexity. Adverse results of this have included<br />
both the quality of officers selected to deploy, and<br />
the ability of police services to make best use of the<br />
officers on their return from deployments.<br />
selection and management tools are required.<br />
4.48 The current infrastructure and some of the<br />
related processes are not sufficient to deal with<br />
such a large scale increase over the next 5 years.<br />
However, these issues have been recognized by<br />
IPOB and its police partners and they are being<br />
addressed in a priority order.<br />
4.49 IPOB cannot currently recruit retired officers<br />
due to national internal bureaucratic issues such<br />
as the provision of life insurance. These issues will<br />
have to be overcome if retired officers are to form<br />
up to 20% of Canadian deployments by 2013.<br />
4.50 All of the above represent major issues which<br />
the IPOB and partners have recognised, and they<br />
are developing programmes and work streams to<br />
address them.<br />
Other Countries<br />
4.51 In addition to Australia and Canada this<br />
review gathered information on a number of other<br />
countries’ models of conflict related international<br />
policing, primarily through interviews of national<br />
policing attaches and advisors attached to national<br />
missions at the UN in New York. The countries<br />
studied were Germany, Norway, Sweden, Italy and<br />
the United States, and details of their models of<br />
international policing are contained at Annex C.<br />
4.47 The drive to increase numbers together with<br />
insufficient professional HR resources has resulted<br />
in the drafting of general job requirements largely<br />
based on UN models. These have failed to ensure<br />
competency requirements are always met during<br />
recruitment and selection. New competency based<br />
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Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
V. UK Capacity and Future Options<br />
UK Capacity<br />
5.1 International capacity for conflict related<br />
policing, is built on national capacities. Contributors<br />
recognise that whilst international organisations are<br />
improving their capacities, equally important is the<br />
development of effective national models.<br />
5.2 Contributors also agree that the UK police<br />
service has the necessary capabilities to address<br />
many of the capacity gaps identified previously. UK<br />
policing is highly regarded and in demand overseas,<br />
particularly in the areas of leadership, community<br />
based policing and training. The service has an<br />
extensive range of professional skills and expertise<br />
capable of carrying out most of the roles now<br />
required in international missions and operations.<br />
5.3 There are two apparent exceptions to<br />
UK capabilities. The police service has no<br />
operational experience of para-military policing,<br />
(a fundamentally different model of policing),<br />
and limited capacities in armed executive policing<br />
(which is either a specialised function for individual<br />
officers - in high demand nationally - or a general<br />
mandate of only a few forces such as the Police<br />
Service of Northern Ireland of the Ministry of<br />
Defence Police(MDP)). Outside of these two areas<br />
the UK should be able to contribute highly skilled<br />
and experienced officers to virtually all other<br />
required roles.<br />
5.4 The UK also has a potential comparative<br />
advantage over many countries, as UK officers<br />
typically retire earlier after 30 years service (rather<br />
than at 60/65) and it should be possible to build a<br />
highly skilled cadre of retired officers.<br />
5.5 Over the last five years we have increased<br />
the resources, and improved the structures<br />
and practises which manage and support our<br />
contributions. Dedicated units in the Foreign and<br />
Commonwealth Office, Home Office, the MDP<br />
and Stabilisation Unit, working together with the<br />
Associations of Chief Police Officers, the wider<br />
police service and the international organisations,<br />
have effectively managed the deployment of officers<br />
to all missions and operations which the UK regards<br />
as strategic priorities. There remain however, factors<br />
which limit the UK’s capacity.<br />
5.6 Conflict related international policing as a<br />
function, is not yet regarded and treated as a core<br />
responsibility of the police service. Outside of the<br />
MDP, it remains a role which individual officers<br />
volunteer to undertake, leaving their forces to do<br />
so. The structures and systems which manage and<br />
deliver our contributions are not police owned and<br />
led (albeit that we employ officers to carry out these<br />
functions alongside civil servants), which reinforces<br />
the perception that this is a niche government<br />
activity rather than a core role of the police service.<br />
Additionally the tension between domestic policing<br />
priorities and international activities has not been<br />
resolved.<br />
5.7 This lack of police service responsibility for the<br />
function, and ownership of the operational delivery,<br />
and the continuing tension between domestic and<br />
international priorities, inhibits individual officers<br />
from volunteering, for fear that participation may<br />
not benefit (may even damage) their ongoing police<br />
career. Whilst overall numbers have been sufficient<br />
to meet government aspirations (and available<br />
funding) for deployments - this does not mean that<br />
we always have officers with the right skills, rank<br />
and experience available for the roles we wish to fill.<br />
5.8 Training has concentrated on duty of care<br />
issues and, to varying degrees, specific mission<br />
“awareness” training. On the assumption that<br />
officers’ core policing skills and specialisations are<br />
25
sufficient, not enough has been done to provide<br />
them with additional skills, e.g. in mentoring,<br />
reform and development, which would allow them<br />
to achieve greater impact in their mission roles.<br />
5.9 As policing missions have become more<br />
complex and multi-faceted, there has been a<br />
requirement for the parallel development of<br />
new doctrine and operational practise. This has<br />
particularly been the case where we have engaged<br />
in coalition or bilateral missions - where officers are<br />
deploying into a UK led operation rather than under<br />
the umbrella of an EU or UN mission, and where<br />
they are working very closely alongside the military,<br />
often in hostile or very challenging environments.<br />
5.10 Whilst we have improved our capacities (e.g.<br />
the 2007 manual of information and guidance, the<br />
establishment of the APG, the development of new<br />
operational practise by MDP in Helmand province),<br />
insufficient resources have been applied to this<br />
area. There is for example no dedicated police<br />
planning, research and programme capability within<br />
our structures. Instead we are reliant upon reserve<br />
capacities such as the APG, or ad hoc tasking<br />
of resources from within our policy, operational<br />
management and support structures.<br />
Future Options<br />
5.11 Options for more effective UK support for<br />
conflict related international policing, can be<br />
developed by assessing the current UK model<br />
against the capacity gaps which have been<br />
identified and the models developed by other<br />
countries.<br />
5.12 Improving our effectiveness will require the<br />
commitment of additional resources. The overall<br />
resource and funding requirements will in large<br />
part be determined by the scale of ambition for<br />
deployments (100, 200, 500 etc.), but many of the<br />
developments required to improve effectiveness will<br />
depend on providing more resources to UK based<br />
operational management and support activities -<br />
which up to now have been sparsely resourced.<br />
5.13 There are approximately 15 staff across<br />
departments and agencies that work solely, or<br />
mostly, on managing and supporting conflict<br />
related policing. Over the last five years this has<br />
resulted in a ratio of “UK based” to deployed staff<br />
varying between 1:10 and 1:20. Compared to<br />
the Canadian and Australian models, where the<br />
ratios (once their models reach <strong>full</strong> strength) will<br />
be approximately 1:6 and 1:3 respectively, the UK<br />
operation has been relatively lean.<br />
5.14 The various options which are set out below,<br />
are not <strong>full</strong>y formed recommendations - more<br />
work will need to be commissioned to consult with<br />
key partners and develop <strong>full</strong>y costed models. The<br />
International Police Assistance Board (IPAB) as a<br />
strategic body representing all interested partners,<br />
is well placed to commission the work necessary to<br />
develop these options into recommendations for<br />
Ministers.<br />
Operational Delivery<br />
5.15 All models essentially consist of two core<br />
elements, which respond to governments’<br />
international policy priorities - the method of<br />
operational delivery and the capacity delivered -<br />
and both of these are shaped by the structures and<br />
roles of their policing services. The existence of a<br />
national or federal policing capacity, with a preexisting<br />
international operational responsibilities,<br />
is undoubtedly advantageous to the development<br />
of conflict related capacity. Centrally funded and<br />
directly responsive to government priorities, rather<br />
than primarily to local policing priorities, a national<br />
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Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
body also provides a more or less “natural home”<br />
for the management of international activities.<br />
5.16 Fundamental to Australia’s ability to develop<br />
a standing capacity was the pre-existence of a<br />
national, operational policing capacity (the AFP)<br />
where the International Deployment Group<br />
could be formed and developed. Countries such<br />
as France and Italy have essentially added new<br />
roles in conflict related policing, to pre-existing<br />
national standing capacities (Gendarmerie,<br />
Carabinieri) which were already responsible for<br />
policing in overseas territories or alongside military<br />
deployments.<br />
5.17 The UK now has national law enforcement<br />
bodies with international responsibilities (such<br />
as the National Police Improvement Agency<br />
(NPIA), and the Serious Organised Crime Agency),<br />
although not a national, operational policing body,<br />
comparable to the AFP or RCMP. With a police<br />
service composed of over 50 separate forces, and<br />
without an obvious “natural home”, the UK has<br />
developed a model where in addition to driving<br />
policy, government departments and agencies<br />
have taken the lead on operational delivery.<br />
5.18 The UK’s current operational delivery<br />
structures have developed considerable expertise<br />
in most aspects of deployment management, as<br />
have various elements of the police service which<br />
undertake other aspects of international policing<br />
activities (for example the NPIA and individual<br />
forces such as the Metropolitan Police Service).<br />
5.19 Nevertheless, this aspect of the UK model<br />
is unusual in comparison to the other countries<br />
studied for this review, where in every case there<br />
is greater police ownership of operational delivery.<br />
This is a major factor in the perception in the UK,<br />
that conflict related policing is not a core role and<br />
responsibility of the police service, which in turn<br />
inhibits the ability to recruit officers with the skills<br />
and expertise required.<br />
5.20 A key step in changing this perception and<br />
its side effects is therefore to achieve police<br />
ownership over operational delivery. The<br />
police service (with clearly defined structures and<br />
command chains culminating in national police<br />
leadership represented on the IPAB) would take on<br />
responsibility for all aspects of deployment<br />
planning, management and support, working<br />
closely with government policy leads and<br />
military and other civilian deployment<br />
structures.<br />
5.21 Options to achieve this increased ownership<br />
and identify which parts of the police service<br />
could take on the roles and responsibilities,<br />
have been under consideration for some time<br />
and are now being taken forward by the IPAB.<br />
The recent Cabinet Office review of stabilisation<br />
and civil effect has also considered and made<br />
recommendations on operational delivery. Current<br />
funding considerations may mean that substantially<br />
increased police ownership is not achievable<br />
in the short term, and that interim measures<br />
involve operational delivery remaining a role for<br />
central government. It should nevertheless remain<br />
the target - only when the police service is<br />
<strong>full</strong>y responsible for delivery is it likely to<br />
recognise this as a core role.<br />
Funding<br />
5.22 Allied to the question of ownership, is that of<br />
funding. The current UK model funds operational<br />
delivery together with actual mission costs from<br />
the various conflict related budgets, with additional<br />
resources provided by departments. A funding<br />
model such as that in Canada, where the delivery<br />
27
structures have a discreet budget assured<br />
over a number of years, and mission costs<br />
are assessed and funded separately, would<br />
allow the development of more durable delivery<br />
structures and of longer term strategic planning to<br />
increase and improve capacities.<br />
5.23 A further step, should police ownership<br />
be achieved, would be to follow the example of<br />
countries such as Australia, Canada and Norway<br />
where funding for the delivery structures<br />
would be allocated to, and paid from, the<br />
overall budget(s) of the police body(ies)<br />
responsible. Budget ownership would be<br />
another step in increasing the police service’s core<br />
responsibility for conflict related policing.<br />
Staff Generation<br />
5.24 Police ownership of operational delivery<br />
and clearer funding mechanisms will not by<br />
themselves resolve the tension that exists between<br />
international and domestic policing priorities.<br />
Budget and establishment limitations will<br />
continue to determine the ability and willingness<br />
of individual Chief Officers to release their staff.<br />
A number of countries address this by offering<br />
police leaders incentives to release staff,<br />
funding <strong>full</strong>, or partial, back-filling and<br />
allowing corresponding increases in their<br />
establishments.<br />
5.25 Adopting this model would obviously increase<br />
the per capita costs of deploying officers, reducing<br />
the overall numbers that could be deployed within<br />
any particular funding envelope. However it would<br />
be a crucial step in increasing our ability to recruit<br />
and deploy officers with specialist skills, expertise<br />
and command experience - in effect increasing the<br />
quality of our deployed officers.<br />
Enhanced Capabilities<br />
5.26 Enhancing our training will provide<br />
officers with additional skills and knowledge<br />
enabling them to achieve more impact in<br />
their roles in missions. Additional investment<br />
will be required to achieve this, both for the<br />
development of new curricula and for training<br />
delivery. We should look to emulate best practise<br />
from other countries (e.g. Australian IDG scenario<br />
based training), and to develop more opportunities<br />
for integrated training, with police officers training<br />
alongside UK and international military and civilian<br />
staff. We should also build robust assessment<br />
and selection elements into our training, to help<br />
ensure that the officers we do deploy have the<br />
right professional and personal qualities to achieve<br />
significant impact and enhance the reputation of<br />
the UK police service.<br />
5.27 More effective UK support also requires the<br />
development of new, and the enhancement of<br />
existing, capabilities. Our capacity for police<br />
led doctrine development (i.e. operational<br />
policy and practise), and strategic and<br />
operational planning and research should be<br />
strengthened. Although the APG provides a pool<br />
of senior officers with increasing expertise in these<br />
areas, we should also invest in a permanent<br />
capability with dedicated staff, whose work<br />
would continue to be supported by the APG on<br />
a reserve basis. This capability would exercise,<br />
train and work closely with military and other<br />
civilian planners, both national and international,<br />
to increase our ability to deliver a comprehensive<br />
approach to security sector and rule of law reform.<br />
5.28 Various aspects of our human resource<br />
management can also be enhanced. Strengthening<br />
our current systems of physical healthcare support,<br />
to also cover psychological, welfare, counselling<br />
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Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
and peer support services for officers and their<br />
families (as in the Canadian model) will help to<br />
ensure that we select officers who are well suited<br />
to work of this nature and capable of dealing<br />
with the challenges they will face throughout the<br />
deployment cycle.<br />
5.29 Professional and career development factors<br />
affecting recruitment and re-integration also need<br />
to be addressed. The IPAB will play a key role in<br />
this, better communicating the professional<br />
benefits of conflict related policing to<br />
the police service. Police service ownership<br />
of operational delivery, together with national<br />
leadership from the IPAB, will also better enable<br />
the professional experience gained on deployments<br />
to be harmonised with the national policing<br />
framework of career and leadership development.<br />
5.30 The long term aim should be the ongoing<br />
professional development of officers, so that they<br />
can seamlessly combine periodic deployments<br />
to international missions with their regular<br />
national policing roles, throughout their<br />
careers. In this way the UK can build a sustainable<br />
cadre of officers with genuine expertise in conflict<br />
related policing and capable of leading missions.<br />
Duty of Care<br />
5.31 Despite the complexity of the issues which<br />
surround duty of care, there are general<br />
principles which should be adhered to.<br />
Contributing countries should be responsible for<br />
ensuring that officers they deploy are aware of<br />
the threats and risks and are appropriately<br />
trained and equipped to live and work in the<br />
environment of the mission. Mission authorities<br />
should be responsible for providing security<br />
and life support resources and systems,<br />
which are sufficient to create an environment<br />
suitable for civilian personnel to live and<br />
work in (accepting that levels of permissiveness<br />
may vary – e.g. para-military police such as<br />
Gendarmerie may be capable of levels of selfprotection<br />
unavailable to civilian police). Mission<br />
authorities should also provide contributing<br />
countries with information or assistance allowing<br />
them to assess security and life support systems<br />
planned or in place.<br />
5.32 Contributing countries should also ensure that<br />
all relevant domestic authorities are satisfied that<br />
the security and life support regimes within which<br />
officers will operate, are such that it is reasonable<br />
to approve deployments. In the case of the UK<br />
this means the Home Departments for England<br />
and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland and the<br />
respective Associations of Chief Police Officers, and<br />
the Ministry of Defence in respect of MDP officers.<br />
5.33 There are of course funding implications in<br />
the provision of force protection, security and life<br />
support resources and in hostile or challenging<br />
environments these costs can be substantial. It is<br />
therefore essential that duty of care, security<br />
and life support issues are factored into<br />
mission planning from the outset, and that<br />
there is political will to ensure that overall<br />
funding is sufficient to account for these<br />
elements, as well as the more direct delivery aspects<br />
of a mission.<br />
Capacity<br />
5.34 Whilst a police led, durable, structured and<br />
sufficiently resourced operational management<br />
capability is a pre-requisite for more effective<br />
delivery of UK capacities to conflict related policing,<br />
the actual capacities which are delivered could take<br />
a number of forms. Policy ambition and funding<br />
29
availability will be key factors in deciding which<br />
capacities the UK should aim to deliver. Whichever<br />
type of capacity is developed, we should consider<br />
making use of our comparative 15 advantage to<br />
ensure that a percentage of the officers we<br />
deploy are retired.<br />
Standby Capacity<br />
5.35 It would be possible to develop a cadre,<br />
similar to the Canadian model, of pre-trained<br />
and equipped officers, who would return<br />
to force duties but remain on standby to<br />
deploy, within agreed time frames. The<br />
advantages of such a standby pool would include<br />
a more assured and timely deployment capacity<br />
and the ability to develop comprehensive and<br />
complimentary skill sets and experience within the<br />
pool.<br />
5.36 Currently we only train and equip officers<br />
when it is known they will deploy, so front loaded<br />
costs would be higher under this model, and there<br />
would be financial risks - training investments<br />
could be lost if officers subsequently declined,<br />
or for operational reasons were not released, to<br />
deploy.<br />
5.37 However these risks would be mitigated if<br />
Chief Officers were provided with the additional<br />
incentives described previously and agreements<br />
reached on deployment timeframes. It would be<br />
important to work towards nationally applicable<br />
terms and conditions for a standby pool, rather<br />
than reach separate agreements with individual<br />
forces - and the IPAB could take the lead in this.<br />
15 See para. Above 5.4 above and Canadian plans for use of retired<br />
officers at para. 4.50<br />
5.38 The additional investment in creating a<br />
standby pool would need to be matched by the<br />
development of more effective and longer term<br />
predictive planning of deployments.<br />
The size of the pool and the time officers would<br />
spend in it, would need to be determined by assured<br />
deployment and funding strategies. Management<br />
of officers’ expectations, and critically the credibility<br />
and reputation of the operation, would be severely<br />
compromised if deployments remained essentially<br />
reactive and ad hoc.<br />
Standing Capacity<br />
5.39 Above a standby pool would be a standing<br />
capacity. It is important when assessing the<br />
Australian model to recognise that fundamental<br />
to the development of the IDG has been the<br />
requirement to provide the bulk, or at least the core,<br />
of operational and developmental policing capacity<br />
to failed or failing states in their neighbourhood.<br />
5.40 With no comparable imperative, it is<br />
questionable whether such a model provides<br />
an efficient and cost effective method for the<br />
UK’s support to conflict related policing. It can<br />
be seen from the Australian model that funding<br />
requirements are substantial (and a UK standing<br />
capacity would have to be developed from scratch,<br />
unlike the IDG which was a development of a<br />
role and capacity which the AFP was already<br />
undertaking), as are the staffing requirements –<br />
approximately 300 Australia based staff supporting<br />
a maximum of 900 deployable staff.<br />
5.41 Beyond issues of funding and political<br />
imperative however, is the question of whether the<br />
UK police service could support a standing capacity<br />
of this nature. Significantly the Associations of Chief<br />
Police Constables, believe that the structures of the<br />
UK police service mean that a standing capacity<br />
would be unworkable and unsustainable.<br />
30
Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
5.42 If a standing capacity is not viable as the The police service are clear that under current<br />
overall model, is there a need for a standing resource and establishment conditions, such<br />
element to the UK’s capacity? Consideration of numbers would be unrealistic for the UK.<br />
this requirement has been ongoing for some time Nevertheless recent recruitment drives have resulted<br />
by the MOD, MDP and partners, particularly in in far more volunteers than policy priorities and<br />
regard to a capacity to work alongside UK military funding limits allow to be deployed (albeit that<br />
components in operations such as the ongoing UK large numbers of officers do not meet the skills<br />
effort in Helmand.<br />
and rank requirements for the many of roles we<br />
currently support).<br />
5.43 The IDG Operational Response Group could<br />
provide a model for such an element, but key to 5.46 In short, although all contributors are agreed<br />
consideration of this would be the required role, that quality is more important than quantity,<br />
capacities and size of the element and the likely the UK could deploy more officers to more<br />
sustained demand for its deployment. Funding, missions, given the demand, political direction and<br />
training and equipping requirements would be funding availability.<br />
substantial, and could be called into question<br />
if sustained demand to deploy the element did<br />
International Capacities<br />
not arise. Equally the costs of establishing and 5.47 Recent research papers from the Institute for<br />
maintaining such a capacity (the current annual Public Policy Research 17 and the Henry L. Stimpson<br />
cost of the Operational Response Group 16 is Centre 18 have proposed the development of new<br />
approximately equivalent to our current total reserve (standby) and standing capacities for the<br />
annual spend on conflict related policing<br />
EU and UN respectively. The first of these proposes<br />
deployments) would have to be balanced within the creation of an EU reserve capacity of 2,000<br />
the resource envelope for the overall conflict trained civilian specialists who would operate much<br />
related policing capacity.<br />
like military reservists. Police expertise is recognised<br />
as a key functional area of such a reserve, but the<br />
Scale of UK Capacity<br />
paper does not indicate what proportion of the<br />
5.44 The number of officers we deploy and the<br />
2,000 would be police. Neither does it indicate<br />
number of missions in which we engage, will<br />
how national police would be recruited and kept<br />
continue to be determined by political priorities,<br />
within the reserve, although it does recognise<br />
overall conflict related funding limits and resource<br />
that different arrangements would be required<br />
availability within the police service.<br />
compared to the private sector experts who might<br />
join.<br />
5.45 Some countries have set a target of 1% of<br />
their police service establishment available for<br />
5.48 The Stimpson Centre paper proposes three<br />
conflict related international policing, which would<br />
new capacities for the UN: A Standing Rule of Law<br />
equate to over 1,400 officers in UK terms.<br />
Capacity (ROLCAP) of 400 experts (275 police) to<br />
plan, deploy and lead new missions, and support<br />
16 other ongoing missions; a UN Police Reserve (UNPR)<br />
See para 4.27 above<br />
of 16,200 officers, allowing for 5,000 deployed<br />
and 11,200 on reserve at any given time, with<br />
31
contributing states given financial incentives for<br />
placing officers on reserve, and; a Senior Reserve<br />
Roster (UN SRR) of variable size providing senior<br />
(retired) police and rule of law experts willing to<br />
deploy at short notice in return for a small annual<br />
stipend.<br />
5.49 The UN is currently considering options to<br />
expand the existing Standing Police Capacity from<br />
it’s current 25 staff, to either 54 or 76, to provide a<br />
more robust mission planning and start up capacity.<br />
Also under consideration are proposals to expand<br />
the UN Police Division to provide more mission<br />
planning, management and support capacity.<br />
5.50 Over the last five years the UK has been<br />
closely involved in the development and<br />
establishment of new EU and UN capacities, (the<br />
EU Civilian Response Teams and Civilian Planning<br />
and Conduct Capacity, the UN Police Division and<br />
Standing Police Capacity) and we have seconded<br />
senior officers to their headquarters to work<br />
within these units. These roles are in effect<br />
force-multipliers and small numbers of high<br />
quality officers can have great impact on<br />
the development and management of more<br />
effective missions and the UK should prioritise<br />
opportunities to second officers to these types of<br />
roles, regardless of the scale of our deployments to<br />
missions.<br />
17 Korski, Daniel. Time for European Civilian Reserve - A submission<br />
to the ippr Commission on National Security for the 21st Century.<br />
Institute for PUblic Policy Research. London, October 2008.<br />
18 Joshua G.Smith, Victoria K. Holt and William J, Durch. Enhancing<br />
United Nations Capacity to support Post- Conflict Policing and<br />
Rule of Law. Henry L. Stimpson Center. Washington, November 2007<br />
5.51 Whether or not the EU and UN move towards<br />
development of international standby or standing<br />
forces, it should be recognised that they will not<br />
automatically address the issues of quality, quantity<br />
and availability identified earlier. International<br />
capacity will remain predicated on national<br />
capacities to release officers with the right skills<br />
within reasonable time frames. For the UK to<br />
contribute effectively to any future international<br />
capacity it must first develop more effective national<br />
systems and structures.<br />
Other Initiatives<br />
5.52 Recent developments in conflict related<br />
international policing have included an increased<br />
effort in partnership capacity building<br />
amongst police contributing countries. The<br />
UK, for example, has provided bilateral assistance<br />
to Bangladesh through training programmes for<br />
Bangladesh National Police deploying to Sudan.<br />
5.53 These bilateral initiatives are also potential<br />
force-multipliers, with the potential to provide<br />
better trained, equipped and regionally based<br />
officers to missions. The UK police service is a world<br />
leader in police training and development and our<br />
UK model of conflict related international policing<br />
should seek further opportunities to deliver this type<br />
of capacity.<br />
Concluding Matters and Recommendation<br />
5.54 Some of the options above are obviously<br />
alternative choices, for example the choice between<br />
developing standby or standing cadres. However,<br />
the majority would need to be implemented<br />
comprehensively to improve the effectiveness of the<br />
UK’s contribution to conflict related international<br />
policing. Selective implementation of individual<br />
measures would be unlikely to address the gaps which<br />
currently limit the effectiveness of the UK model.<br />
32
Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
5.55 Currently there are severe constraints on<br />
conflict related funding, and it is apparent that<br />
many of the options identified above have financial,<br />
and broader resource implications. As such<br />
implementation of options which require additional<br />
funding and resources may not be feasible in the<br />
immediate term. However, that should not prevent<br />
work being initiated to <strong>full</strong>y develop those options.<br />
In the IPAB the UK has, for the first time, a body<br />
which brings together all police and government<br />
partners involved in conflict related policing, and<br />
it is therefore recommended that the IPAB is<br />
requested to commission work to further<br />
develop the options set out above.<br />
5.56 Once all options are <strong>full</strong>y developed Ministers<br />
will be able to direct implementation of measures<br />
to improve the effectiveness of UK support once<br />
resources are available, or alternatively to direct<br />
that resources should be made available more<br />
immediately to implement those measures.<br />
33
ANNEX A<br />
List of Contributors<br />
Tony Anderson, Programme Manager, Peace<br />
Keeping & Operations Group, Canadian Department<br />
of Foreign Affairs & International Trade<br />
Phil Batson, Europe Directorate General, FCO<br />
Chief Superintendent David Beer, Director<br />
General International Policing, Royal Canadian<br />
Mounted Police<br />
Inspector (Ret) Alan Birtwhistle, Former<br />
Secondee UN Police Division and UNAMID<br />
Dr Sylvie Bourgois, Head of Health Services,<br />
International Peace Operations Branch, Royal<br />
Canadian Mounted Police<br />
Assistant Chief Constable Maureen Brown,<br />
Strategic Advisor, EU Civilian Planning and Conduct<br />
Capability<br />
Mr Angus Campbell, Under Secretary of State,<br />
Australian Department of the Prime Minister and<br />
Cabinet.<br />
Andrew Carpenter, Chief of Strategic Policy and<br />
Development Section, Police Division UN DPKO<br />
Assistant Chief Constable Robert Chidley<br />
Ministry of Defence Police<br />
Dr. Michael Clark, Assistant Head of Defence<br />
Security, Physical Security and Policing Policy<br />
Ministry of Defence<br />
Doug Coates, Director, International Peace<br />
Operations Branch, Royal Canadian Mounted Police<br />
Keith Colver, Manager of Secondees, Victoria<br />
State Police.<br />
Assistant Chief Constable Geoffery Cooper<br />
Chief Police Advisor Iraq<br />
Mr. Jason Cresswell, Programme Analyst,<br />
International Deployment Group, Australian Federal<br />
Police<br />
Gillian Dare Conflict Advisor Liberia FCO<br />
Assistant Chief Constable Ken Deane Head of<br />
Operations EU CPCC and former Deputy Head of<br />
Mission EUPOL Afghanistan<br />
Superintendent (Ret) Brian Donley Chief Adviser<br />
to SIPA and UK Contingent Commander<br />
EUPM Bosnia<br />
Birgitta Ekelund Police and Justice Adviser ,<br />
Sweden Mission to the UN<br />
Kurt Eyre Head of International Academy, National<br />
Police Improvement Agency<br />
Superintendent Colin Farquhar, Police Adviser,<br />
Canadian Mission to the UN<br />
Major General Giuliano Ferrari Police Adviser,<br />
Italian Mission to the UN<br />
Inspector Pat Flanagan Operations Support Dept,<br />
International Peace Operations Branch<br />
Sir Ronnie Flanagan Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector<br />
of Constabulary<br />
Roy Fleming Police and Justice Advisor,<br />
Stabilisation Unit<br />
Mr David Freeman, Planning and Development,<br />
International Deployment Group, Australian Federal<br />
Police<br />
34
Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
Superintendent Ian Grant, Her Majesty’s Chief<br />
Inspectorate of Constabulary<br />
Sergeant Geoff Halmarick, Victoria State Police.<br />
Nick Harvey, UK Mission to the UN, FCO<br />
Mr. John Hawkins, IDG Human Resources,<br />
International Deployment Group, Australian Federal<br />
Police<br />
Sue Hay, Head of International Police Assistance,<br />
Home Office<br />
Superintendent Peter Henningsen, Coordinator<br />
Learning and Development, International<br />
Deployment Group Australian Federal Police<br />
Superintendent Michael Jarratt, Australian<br />
Defence College<br />
Chief Inspector Paul Jordan, Ministry of Defence<br />
Police<br />
Commander Jo Kaye, Her Majesty’s Chief<br />
Inspectorate of Constabulary<br />
Mr. Nicholas Kean Police Operations and<br />
Doctrine, International Deployment Group,<br />
Australian Federal Police<br />
Chief Constable Ian Latimer, International Affairs<br />
Portfolio Holder, Association of Chief Police Officers<br />
of Scotland<br />
Deputy Commissioner (Ret) Odd Malme, Police<br />
Adviser, Norwegian Mission to the UN<br />
Richard McCurry, Police Adviser , USA Mission to<br />
the UN<br />
Superintendent Tim Meaklim, International<br />
Academy, National Police Improvement Agency<br />
Chief Superintendent (Ret) Bill Morrell former<br />
Commissioner Solomon Islands Police former Senior<br />
Advisor Republika Srpska EUPM, former Head of<br />
Mentors EUPOL Afghanistan<br />
Mr Allen Mortensen, Manager, International<br />
Deployment Group, Australian Federal Police<br />
Dr Tony Murney, Rule of Law, International<br />
Deployment Group, Australian Federal Police<br />
Ann- Marie Orler, Deputy Police Adviser, Police<br />
Division UN DPKO<br />
Lou Perrotta, Rule of Law Advisor, Stabilisation<br />
Unit<br />
Chief Constable Colin Port, International Affairs<br />
Portfolio Holder Association of Chief Police Officers<br />
and Chair of the International Police Assistance<br />
Board<br />
Assistant Commissioner Frank Prendergast,<br />
National Manager, International Deployment Group<br />
Australian Federal Police<br />
Commander Justine Saunders, Police Attache,<br />
Australian Mission to the UN<br />
Commander Alan Scott, Melbourne Office,<br />
Australian Federal Police<br />
Inspector Chris Sharwood-Smith, UNAMID<br />
Police Training Coordinator, UK Mission to the UN<br />
Lt Colonel Nick Slinger, Assistant Military<br />
Attache, UK Mission to the UN<br />
35
ANNEX B<br />
Select Bibliography<br />
Assistant Chief Constable (Ret) Colin Smith,<br />
Head of EUCOPPS Palestine and Former Chief Police<br />
Advisor Iraq<br />
Lt Colonel Ulrich Spannuth, Deputy Military<br />
Adviser, German Mission to the UN<br />
Keith Staniforth, Coordinator Operational<br />
Response Group, International Deployment Group<br />
Australian Federal Police<br />
Jeanette Stovell, Deputy Director, Peace<br />
Operations Policy Canadian Department of Foreign<br />
Affairs & International Trade<br />
Mr Dave Turner, A/Manager Corporate Services,<br />
International Deployment Group, Australian Federal<br />
Police<br />
Chief Superintendent K.H. Weidner, Police<br />
Adviser, German Mission to the UN<br />
Ata Yenigun, Specialist Assistant, Police Division<br />
UN DPKO<br />
Baker, Bruce. The African post-conflict policing<br />
agenda in Sierra Leone?. Conflict, Security &<br />
Development, 6, 1, 25-50. International Policy<br />
Institute King’s College London. London, 2006.<br />
Baker, Bruce. Conflict and African Police Culture:<br />
The Cases of Uganda, Rwanda, Sierra Leone. Book<br />
chapter, M. O’Neil and M. Marks, (eds.) Police<br />
Occupational Culture: New Debates and Directions,<br />
2007, Oxford: Elsevier Science.<br />
Bayley, David H. Democratizing the Police<br />
Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It. U.S.<br />
Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs,<br />
National Institute of Justice. Washington, DC, 2001.<br />
Collantes, Celador, G. Police Reform:<br />
Peacebuilding through Democratic Policing?.<br />
International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 364-<br />
376, 2005.<br />
Center for Excellence in Stability Police<br />
Units. The Future Roles for Stability Police Units.<br />
Workshop Report. Washington, DC., April 2005.<br />
Challenges Project. Meeting the Challenges of<br />
Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination.<br />
Folke Bernadotte Academy. Stockholm, 2005.<br />
Creating safer communities, Lessons from<br />
South Eastern Europe. Balkan Youth Union,<br />
Centre For Security Studies, Civil, Forum For Civic<br />
Initiatives and Saferworld. London, 2006.<br />
Cutillo, Alberto. International Assistance To<br />
Countries Emerging From Conflict: A Review of<br />
Fifteen Years of Interventions and the Future of<br />
Peacebuilding. International Peace Academy. New<br />
York, 2006.<br />
36
Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
Dahrendorf, Nicola et. al. A Review of<br />
Peace Operations: A Case for Change Overall<br />
Introduction and Synthesis Report. Conflict,<br />
Security and Development Group, King’s College<br />
London. London, March 2003.<br />
Daniel, Donald C. F. Whither Peace Operations?<br />
United States Institute of Peace. Washington, DC,<br />
2008.<br />
Durch, William J. et. al. The Brahimi Report<br />
and the Future of UN Peace Operations. Henry L.<br />
Stimpson Center. Washington, DC, 2003.<br />
Durch, William J and Berkman, Tobias C. Who<br />
Should Keep the Peace? Providing Security for<br />
Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations. Henry L.<br />
Stimpson Center. Washington, DC, 2006.<br />
Earle, Caroline R. European Capacities for Peace<br />
Operations: Taking Stock. Henry L. Stimpson<br />
Center. Washington, DC, 2004.<br />
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Peace<br />
support operations. Information and guidance<br />
for UK police personnel. London, 2007.<br />
Fullilove, Dr. Michael. The Testament of<br />
Solomons: RAMSI and International State-<br />
Building. Lowy Institute for International Policy.<br />
Sydney, NSW, 2006.<br />
Groenewald, Hesta and Peake, Gordon. Police<br />
Reform through Community-Based Policing-<br />
Philosophy and Guidelines for Implementation.<br />
Report of a Conference hosted by International<br />
Peace Academy and Saferworld. New York,<br />
September 2004.<br />
Hansen, Annika S. and Wiharta, Sharon.<br />
The Transition to a Just Order –Establishing<br />
Local Ownership after Conflict. Folke Bernadotte<br />
Academy. Stockholm, 2007.<br />
Hurwitz, Agnes and Studdard, Kaysie. Rule of<br />
Law Programs in Peace Operations. International<br />
Peace Academy. New York, 2005.<br />
International Crisis Group. Reforming<br />
Afghanistan’s Police. Asia Report N°138, 2007.<br />
Jones, Seth G., Wilson, Jeremy M., Rathmell,<br />
Andrew and Riley, K. Jack. Establishing Law and<br />
Order After Conflict. Rand Infrastructure, Safety, and<br />
Environment (Organization). Virginia, 2005.<br />
Khadiagala, Gilbert M. Eastern Africa: Security<br />
and the Legacy of Fragility. International Peace<br />
Institute. New York,<br />
2008<br />
Korski, Daniel. Time for a European Civilian<br />
Reserve - A submission to the ippr Commission on<br />
National Security for the 21st Century. Institute for<br />
Public Policy Research. London, October 2008.<br />
Levine, Daniel H. African Civilian Police Capacity<br />
For International Peacekeeping Operations. Henry<br />
L. Stimpson Center. Washington, February 2008.<br />
Mani, Dr. Rama. Policing in Post-Conflict<br />
Situations. Concept Paper for Whitehall Policy<br />
Seminar. London, 2003.<br />
Marenin, Otwin. Restoring Policing Systems<br />
in Conflict Torn Nations: Process, Problems,<br />
Prospects. Geneva Centre for the Democratic<br />
Control of Armed Forces. Geneva, 2005.<br />
McFate, Sean. Securing the Future. A Primer on<br />
Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries. United<br />
States Institute of Peace. Washington, DC, 2008.<br />
37
Mobekk, Eirin. Identifying Lessons in United<br />
Nations International Policing Missions. Geneva<br />
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.<br />
Geneva, 2005.<br />
Monk, Richard. End-of-Mission Report of the<br />
Seventh Police Commissioner<br />
of the United Nations’ International Police in<br />
Kosovo and the Kosovo Police Service. United<br />
Nations. Pristina, 2008.<br />
Muharremi, Robert et. al. Administration and<br />
Governance in Kosovo - Lesson learned and<br />
lessons to be learned. Kosovar Institute for Policy<br />
Research and Development. Prishtina/Geneva, June<br />
2005.<br />
O’Neill, William G. Police Reform in Post-Conflict<br />
Societies: What We Know and What We Still<br />
Need To Know. International Peace Academy. New<br />
York, 2005.<br />
Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William<br />
J. Durch. From Timor-Leste to Darfur: New<br />
Initiatives for Enhancing UN Civilian Policing<br />
Capacity. Henry L. Stimpson Center. Washington,<br />
DC, August 2007.<br />
Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William<br />
J. Durch.<br />
Henry L. Stimpson Center. Washington, DC,<br />
November 2007.<br />
United Nations. Inventory of United Nations<br />
Capacity in Peacebuilding. United Nations. New<br />
York, 2006.<br />
Wilder, Andrew, Cops or Robbers? The Struggle<br />
to Reform the Afghan National Police, Afghan<br />
Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, July 2007.<br />
Perito, Robert M. The Coalition Provisional<br />
Authority’s Experience with Public Security in Iraq<br />
Lessons Identified. United States Institute of Peace.<br />
Washington, DC, 2005.<br />
Perito, Robert M. U.S. Police in Peace and<br />
Stability Operations. United States Institute of<br />
Peace. Washington, DC, 2007.<br />
Perito, Robert M. Integrated Security<br />
Assistance. United States Institute of Peace.<br />
Washington, DC, 2008.<br />
Samuels, Kirsti. Rule of Law Reform in Post-<br />
Conflict Countries Operational Initiatives<br />
and Lessons Learnt. Conflict Prevention &<br />
Reconstruction, Social Development Department,<br />
The World Bank. Washington, DC, 2006.<br />
38
Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
ANNEX C<br />
Conflict Related Policing Models<br />
in Other Countries<br />
Germany<br />
1. Germany has a tiered policing structure<br />
consisting of Federal and State police services,<br />
with a total policing strength of approximately<br />
270,000 officers. According to the constitution<br />
of the Federal Republic of Germany the states<br />
(Länder) have sovereignty in police matters within<br />
their territory. The constitution also provides central<br />
areas of law enforcement for original Federal<br />
authority. Due to this division of authority, Germany<br />
has 16 State police forces and two Federal law<br />
enforcement agencies, the Federal Criminal<br />
Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt) and the Federal<br />
Police (Bundespolizei). Germany participates in<br />
international police missions with both Federal as<br />
well as State police officers.<br />
2. At the Federal level the Bundeskriminalamt<br />
(approx. 5,000 staff) is Germany´s central agency<br />
for criminal investigation. In close cooperation with<br />
the State Authorities in Criminal Police Matters its<br />
functions are grouped into the areas as a central<br />
agency, investigation, protection and security and<br />
international cooperation. The Bundespolizei, with<br />
40,000 staff, including 32,000 police officers,<br />
carry out a wide range of Federal police tasks, in<br />
particular in the fields of the protection of borders,<br />
aviation security and railway policing.<br />
3. Each of the sixteen German States (Länder)<br />
have their own police service (Landespolizei)<br />
covering areas such as uniform and plainclothes<br />
operations, minor and serious crime investigations,<br />
operational support, special weapons and tactics,<br />
highway patrol and marine policing. Landespolizei<br />
officers are eligible to volunteer for international<br />
missions subject to the approval of their force.<br />
4. According to a decision of the Permanent<br />
Conference of the Ministers and Senators of the<br />
Interior in 1994, an “International Police Missions”<br />
common working group was installed between the<br />
Federal and State Ministries. This working group,<br />
chaired by North Rhine-Westphalia, created an<br />
“Office for Coordination of International Police<br />
Missions” located in the Federal Ministry of the<br />
Interior, and responsible for conceptual and<br />
coordination work. In March 2008 all aspects<br />
of policing deployments at the working level<br />
were rolled out to a new unit, the “Office for<br />
Coordination of International Police Missions”<br />
located at the Bundespolizei Headquarters in<br />
Potsdam. As a whole, thirteen officers work in this<br />
office (five in Federal Ministry of the Interior and<br />
eight at Bundespolizei Headquarters).<br />
5. Due to the constitution in Germany<br />
international relations, including international police<br />
missions, are Federal affairs. Deployments to peace<br />
operations require a formal decision of the Federal<br />
Government. The decision making is incumbent in<br />
the portfolio of Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
(Auswärtiges Amt). The German Parliament has to<br />
be informed about the forthcoming deployment. In<br />
advance of every engagement of Police in a peace<br />
mission the Federal authorities will contact the State<br />
authorities if determine whether they intend to<br />
participate.<br />
6. Both Federal and State officers are deployed on<br />
a volunteer basis. The latter are seconded to the<br />
Federal police for the duration of their deployment<br />
but continue to be paid by their own force. Federal<br />
authorities cover some of the additional costs<br />
Pre-deployment training is delivered at three police<br />
centres across Germany and consists of two weeks<br />
generic training, followed by one week of mission<br />
specific training.<br />
7. Germany does not maintain pool of pretrained<br />
officers, but recruits to deploy according<br />
39
to a general profile. Officers are deployed for a<br />
maximum of one year and must return to force for<br />
at least a year before they may be deployed again.<br />
Germany currently has approximately 280 officers<br />
deployed overseas to thirteen missions including<br />
Afghanistan, Kosovo, Sudan and Liberia.<br />
8. Domestic priorities mean there are difficulties<br />
in recruiting officers and there are no current plans<br />
for an extraordinary increase in numbers deployed.<br />
Instead there is a focus on developing quality over<br />
quantity, particularly in the area of capacity building<br />
and development skills. Two other key themes are<br />
bilateral capacity building with partners (particularly<br />
in Africa) to assist other contributing countries to<br />
deploy more/better, and the building of a more<br />
comprehensive approach on the ground.<br />
Norway<br />
9. Norway has a single police service led by<br />
a National Commissioner and National Police<br />
Directorate (NPD) within the Ministry of Justice and<br />
Police (MJP). The police service consists of 27 Police<br />
Districts, each led by a Chief of Police and several<br />
specialist national units, and has a total of 12,000<br />
employees.<br />
10. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and<br />
MJP, advised by the NPD, have joint policy lead for<br />
international policing contributions, and Deputy<br />
Ministers from these departments meet at least<br />
once a year to set strategic policy and decide on<br />
engagements. Norway’s strategic priorities focus on<br />
countries which may impact on its national interests<br />
- e.g. the Balkans and Afghanistan - and countries<br />
where humanitarian issues dictate engagement -<br />
e.g. Sudan. Norway prioritises engagement with<br />
UN operations over third country engagement in<br />
EU missions, due to its limited ability to influence<br />
EU policy.<br />
11. Operational policy, based on the advice of<br />
the NPD, is to focus resources on priority missions,<br />
rather than spread officers thinly across numerous<br />
missions, in order to have more impact. An earlier<br />
policy decision determined that Norway would<br />
deploy up to a maximum of 1% of its police<br />
establishment (at the time total police strength<br />
was 8,500) meaning that the country will deploy<br />
a maximum of 85 officers. Currently 72 officers<br />
are deployed to missions including Afghanistan,<br />
Kosovo, Sudan, Liberia, East Timor, EU missions,<br />
OSCE and TIPH Hebron.<br />
12. Deployments are managed and supported by<br />
a dedicated “Civpol” unit within the International<br />
Department of the NPD (the International<br />
Department also deals with non-conflict related<br />
capacity building). The unit consists of five officers<br />
and is funded from the regular police budget. The<br />
MFA owns the police deployments budget (currently<br />
set at approximately £10 million) and the “Civpol”<br />
unit is allowed to use up to 1% of this to cover<br />
additional administrative costs.<br />
13. The unit runs once yearly recruitment<br />
campaigns, and interviews and selects volunteers<br />
centrally. Successful volunteers receive a two week<br />
training course, based on UN standard training<br />
modules, and are then placed in a deployment pool<br />
for a maximum of one year before deployment,<br />
remaining in post until called on to deploy.<br />
14. Costs and salaries for deploying officers are<br />
paid from the MFA owned deployments budget.<br />
District Chiefs of Police can use the vacancy<br />
fundings to employ others or use it for other means.<br />
15. Norway experiences some problems recruiting<br />
senior officers for deployment, and recognise that<br />
they need to better communicate the professional<br />
benefits of deployments to Chiefs of Police. They<br />
40
Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
are seeking opportunities to develop international<br />
leadership and crisis management skills in their<br />
police service, including through short term<br />
secondments to international organisations. They<br />
believe that contributing countries should do more<br />
to develop a stronger community of international<br />
policing expertise, for example by posting police<br />
advisors/attaches to their UN permanent missions.<br />
Sweden<br />
16. Sweden also has a single police service<br />
consisting of the National Police Board (NPB)<br />
led by a National Commissioner and 21 County<br />
Police Departments each headed by a County<br />
Police Commissioner. The Swedish Police service is<br />
expanding from approximately 18,500 officers at<br />
present to a target of 20,000 by 2010.<br />
17. The NPB, an agency of the Ministry of Justice<br />
(MOJ), is the central administrative body for the<br />
police service, and also hosts the National Criminal<br />
Investigation Department, the Swedish Security<br />
Service and the National Laboratory of Forensic<br />
Science. County Police Departments have a large<br />
degree of independence, each with a County Police<br />
Authority consisting of the Commissioner and local<br />
policitians appointed by the Swedish Government.<br />
18. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs owns the<br />
budget for the deployment of police officers to<br />
international missions, and works on a continuing<br />
basis to agree policy and priorities with the MOJ,<br />
which has responsibility for administrative and<br />
operational delivery of deployments. Although there<br />
is a policy decision to deploy up to 1% of the police<br />
service on international duties, the average number<br />
of officers deployed over the last 5 years has been<br />
approximately 100.<br />
19. Swedish officers are currently deployed to<br />
18 UN, EU and OSCE missions. The largest single<br />
deployment is to Kosovo, and over a third of all<br />
deployments are to African missions. Officers are<br />
also posted to the permanent missions to the UN<br />
and EU. Swedish officers currently occupy the posts<br />
of Deputy Police Advisor in the UN Police Division<br />
and Police Commissioner in the UN mission in<br />
Liberia.<br />
20. Sweden does not have a standing capacity, but<br />
recruits volunteers from across the police service<br />
on an annual basis. Operational management<br />
and support of all aspects of deployments is<br />
carried out by a unit within the National Criminal<br />
Investigation Department - the Swedish Police<br />
Support Operations (SPSO), with 18 staff, funded<br />
from the regular police budget. Actual deployment<br />
and mission costs are funded from the MFA budget<br />
for deployments.<br />
21. County Police Commissioners, whose authority<br />
is required for the release of officers, are not paid<br />
to backfill posts vacated by deployed officers.<br />
This together with a focus on domestic policing<br />
issues and a view amongst individual officers<br />
that international policing does not advance<br />
careers, leads to recruitment difficulties. Better<br />
communication strategies are being developed to<br />
overcome these difficulties. Others areas under<br />
consideration are the development of mission<br />
assessment and planning capabilities and policy on<br />
duty of care issues.<br />
Italy<br />
22. Policing in Italy is carried out by a number of<br />
separate services, at national, regional, provincial<br />
and municipal levels, with a total of over 320,000<br />
police officers. At the national level the principal<br />
police services are the Carabinieri, the State Police<br />
(Polizia di Stato) and the Financial Guards (Guardia<br />
41
di Finanza). The Carabinieri and State Police each<br />
contain approximately 110,000 officers and the<br />
Financial Guards 68,000.<br />
23. Often referred to as para-military, the<br />
Carabinieri is in fact a <strong>full</strong> military force and one<br />
of the four branches of the Italian Armed Forces,<br />
alongside the Army, Navy and Air Force. In<br />
addition to its military and military policing duties,<br />
the Carabinieri also has a civilian policing role<br />
throughout Italy, with territorial responsibilities at<br />
regional and provincial levels. The force falls under<br />
the Ministry of Defence, although it also reports to<br />
the Ministry of Interior concerning civilian policing<br />
issues.<br />
24. The State Police is a civilian force under the<br />
Ministry of Interior, organised on a regional and<br />
provincial basis. Both the Carabinieri and State<br />
Police undertake a <strong>full</strong> range of policing roles<br />
throughout the country, although approximately<br />
two thirds of all domestic police activities in Italy<br />
are performed by the Carabinieri, thanks to their<br />
territorial organization, based on more than 4,700<br />
Carabinieri stations. The Financial Guards are<br />
responsible for investigating economic crimes, and<br />
for border policing and customs functions. The<br />
Financial Guards are a military force, with a military<br />
organization but except in times of war, they report<br />
directly to the Minister of Economic Affairs rather<br />
than the Defence Ministry.<br />
25. Strategic coordination between the various<br />
police forces is achieved through a national<br />
Committee for Public Order and Security, and this<br />
committee is replicated at provincial level.<br />
Ministries fund the police forces under their<br />
respective command, including for international<br />
duties. Deployment priorities are agreed between<br />
Ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<br />
26. The majority of Italian police deployments to<br />
conflict related missions have been Carabinieri units<br />
operating under military command and control,<br />
with a range of military and policing tasks. Up<br />
to 1,000 Carabinieri have been deployed in the<br />
past, and as of March 2009 approximately more<br />
than 450 Carabinieri are deployed under military<br />
command to NATO or EU missions, with 250<br />
more deployed in civilian policing missions (EU,<br />
UN, multilateral and bilateral missions). In addition<br />
about 100 more police officers from the Financial<br />
Guards and from the State Police are deployed in<br />
these civilian policing missions.<br />
27. Italy does not currently have a central unit<br />
coordinating and managing deployments, each<br />
Ministry and police force manages their own<br />
operations, but the establishment of such a unit is<br />
now under consideration.<br />
USA<br />
28. Policing in the United States is carried out by<br />
forces at federal, state, city/municipal and county<br />
levels and by specialised agencies. According<br />
to figures for 2004, over 17,000 state and<br />
local agencies, and nine major federal agencies<br />
employed over 800,000 sworn law enforcement<br />
officers. No policing agency, federal or otherwise,<br />
has been given responsibility for conflict related<br />
policing, and in fact the country has developed<br />
a unique model of contracting out policing<br />
contributions to the private sector.<br />
29. The US State Department leads on policy<br />
and funding. No overarching deployments or<br />
“peacekeeping” fund exists, instead funding is<br />
allocated on a country by country basis, and is<br />
subject to congressional approval. Once policy for<br />
engagement has been decided, and congressional<br />
funding approval obtained, State Department issues<br />
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Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
contract tenders for the recruitment, deployment<br />
and management of police officers. Typically these<br />
contracts have been taken up by large corporations<br />
such as DynCorp and SAIC.<br />
30. Most recruits are retired officers, or officers on<br />
leave of absence, or who have resigned from their<br />
parent agencies. The State Department exercises<br />
quality control by vetting staff put forward by<br />
the contractors, to ensure for example that they<br />
have been out of active service for no more than<br />
5 years. Candidates’ details are then passed on to<br />
the mission organisation (e.g. UN) for interview<br />
and selection. Successful candidates are given<br />
pre-deployment training, equipment and logistical<br />
support immediately prior to deployment, by the<br />
contracting company.<br />
31. Funding and contracting mechanisms are such<br />
that the US cannot rapidly deploy officers, however<br />
they have deployed large numbers to UN missions<br />
and other operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan<br />
- until the drawdown of the UN mission in Kosovo<br />
the US was amongst the top ten contributors of<br />
police to UN missions.<br />
43
ANNEX D<br />
2005 Strategic Task Force Outcomes<br />
INTERNATIONAL POLICING: ‘GUIDING<br />
PRINCIPLES’<br />
Preventing and resolving conflict and supporting<br />
peace are central to the UK’s ability to guarantee<br />
its security and to help reduce suffering and<br />
bring stability to some of the most volatile places<br />
on earth. The UK works with the international<br />
community to achieve these objectives, most visibly<br />
by contributing to peace support operations in<br />
places like Iraq, Sudan and Kosovo.<br />
The evolution of peace operations over the past<br />
twenty years has seen significantly increased<br />
recognition of the role of law and order in<br />
reducing the chance of conflict in fragile states<br />
and supporting the transition from conflict to<br />
peace elsewhere. The policing, and by extension<br />
rule of law, element of such missions has, as<br />
a consequence, become ever more vital to<br />
the success or otherwise of the international<br />
community’s efforts.<br />
For that reason, the UK has re-examined its<br />
commitment to providing a scarce but highly<br />
regarded resource - British police officers – and<br />
sought to capture some principles that will<br />
guide our policing engagement in international<br />
operations now and over the next five years:<br />
> We will make an enduring commitment to<br />
international policing. It has become an integral<br />
part of conflict management and provides us<br />
with an opportunity to tackle new threats to our<br />
security – from terrorism and organised crime in<br />
particular – where they are created<br />
We will make available up to 475 police personnel<br />
to take part in international missions and to plan<br />
ahead – to create a rolling two-year estimate of the<br />
UK’s likely future commitment<br />
> We will work directly with policing experts<br />
in the UN, EU and other organisations to<br />
build their capacity to respond to the growing<br />
complexity of conflicts around the world, to plan<br />
effectively, and to ensure mission mandates and<br />
structures take <strong>full</strong> account of the importance of<br />
security sector reform<br />
We will create an assessment and planning team,<br />
with expertise in policing and security sector<br />
reform, which will anticipate and prioritise future<br />
needs, undertake joint planning with military<br />
and civilian actors, and support the efforts of<br />
international organisations accordingly<br />
> We will reflect the changing nature of<br />
policing in peace support operations – the<br />
doctrinal shift from observing and reporting to<br />
building institutional police capacity. In effect, a<br />
move to a response based on quality rather than<br />
quantity<br />
We will seek to make available more senior officers<br />
who can provide strategic leadership and influence<br />
the direction of missions in the field. We will source<br />
more expert officers who can mentor, reform and<br />
train indigenous forces in specific skills<br />
> We will maximise the benefits to the UK of<br />
overseas deployments, in terms of enhanced<br />
security, better intelligence, and greater<br />
relevance to domestic policing priorities<br />
We will create an International Police Steering<br />
Committee which will oversee and evaluate the<br />
UK’s contribution to peace support operations. It<br />
will seek the opinions of Chief Constables on the<br />
usefulness in operational terms of information<br />
gathered on missions<br />
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Review of Conflict Related International Policing<br />
> We will seek to maximise the benefit to<br />
individual officers of overseas deployments<br />
thereby ensuring that the additional skills and<br />
command experience gained overseas are<br />
properly recognised and used to <strong>full</strong> advantage<br />
wherever possible on return<br />
We will reflect service overseas in the police<br />
competence framework (critical to promotion and<br />
job moves), and explore the option of a guaranteed<br />
interview for posts for which officers are qualified<br />
on their return. We will also give a standard award<br />
to all officers in recognition of the often difficult<br />
and dangerous conditions in which they work<br />
and the value attributed to participation in peace<br />
support operations<br />
> We will raise the profile of international<br />
policing within the UK to improve<br />
recognition and understanding among key<br />
stakeholders<br />
We will communicate the practical achievements<br />
of UK officers in missions to a wide audience,<br />
including other Government Departments, Chief<br />
Constables, interested politicians, and relevant<br />
media<br />
> We will develop further diversity in the police<br />
personnel we deploy, and quantify the value<br />
to officers of the challenging environments in<br />
which they work overseas<br />
We will build on the existing relationship with<br />
police forces’ human resource departments to<br />
widen further the pool of volunteers. We will also<br />
ensure the lessons learnt from working in majority<br />
Muslim, African or other societies and in a range of<br />
demanding environments and situations are <strong>full</strong>y<br />
applied and shared on return to the UK.<br />
45
Stephen Chambers<br />
Head of International Policing Policy Conflict Group<br />
Foreign and Commonwealth Office © 2009 United Kingdom<br />
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