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Review of 

Conflict 

Related 

International 

Policing 

Better world, 

better Britain 

1 April 2008 - 31 March 2009 

www.fco.gov.uk

PHOTO CREDITS: 

UN Photo (left on cover) / Martine Perret 

UNPOL Search Vehicles at Checkpoints in Dili 

United Nations Police (UNPOL) search vehicles at a check 

point, after the shooting incident in which President Jose 

Ramos- Horta was wounded and a number of others were 

killed or injured. 

Location: Dili, Timor-Leste 

Date: 12 February 2008 

UN Photo (right on cover) / Martine Perret 

Malaysian FPU Deploy at Dili Airpot 

Members of the Malaysian contingent of the Formed Police 

Unit (FPU) of the United Nations Mission in Timor- Leste 

(UNMIT) familiarise the platoons with the use of an aircraft 

in a mission during a rapid deployment exercise. 

Location: Dili, Timor-Lest 

Date:12 December 2008

Contents 

Page 

Executive Summary 

I. Introduction 6 

II.Gaps in quality and quantity 9 

Skills and experience 9 

Pre-deployment training and skilling 10 

Human resource management 10 

National policing models and cultures 10 

Development of doctrine and common standards 11 

Planning and leadership of missions 11 

National police leadership 12 

National political will and funding 13 

Domestic policing priorities 14 

Security and duty of care issues 15 

III. Demand – Assessing the Scale and Type of Policing Elements Required 16 

IV. Other Models 18 

Australia 18 

Canada 21 

Other Countries 24 

V. UK Capacity and Future Options 25 

UK capacity 25 

Future options 26 

Operational delivery 26 

Funding 27 

Staff generation 28 

Enhanced capabilities 28 

Duty of care 29 

Standby capacity 30 

Standing capacity 30 

Scale of UK capacity 31 

International capacities 31 

Other initiatives 32 

Concluding Matters and Recommendation 32 

Annexes 

A List of Contributors 

B Select Bibliography 

C Conflict Related Policing Models in Other Countries 

D 2005 Strategic Task Force Outcomes 

4

Executive Summary 

Policing is a critical element in international efforts to maintain law and 

order and restore the rule of law in states transitioning from conflict to 

peace and stability. 

Increased recognition of this over the last decade 

has led to a steadily rising demand for international 

police officers, capable of carrying out more 

complex roles in more varied environments. 

Straightforward monitoring and reporting roles, 

have been replaced by a requirement for executive 

operational policing and longer term rebuilding, 

reform and development of national police 

capacities. Policing components of missions may 

need to provide expertise in para-military policing, 

community policing, investigative and intelligence 

policing, and the development of leadership, 

command and control, professional standards 

and organisational and administrative capacities. 

Individual police officers need delivery skills which 

include executive policing, training, coaching, 

advising, mentoring, consultancy and donor 

coordination. 

Conflict related policing missions and operations 

are now carried out by international and regional 

organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the 

European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and 

the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe (OSCE), and by multilateral coalitions - some 

in challenging environments where significant 

insurgency and terrorist campaigns are ongoing. 

The increased demand is such that various EU and 

UN missions are now operating significantly below 

their mandated strength of international police 

officers. 

Within the context of increasing demand and 

complexity, the United Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary 

David Miliband has commissioned this review of 

conflict related international policing. 

The core focus of the review is on the key capacity 

gaps facing the policing elements of international 

missions and the options available for more effective 

UK support. 

The review finds that the quality of officers 

deployed – their ability to effectively carry out 

their roles – is a key capacity gap. Increasing 

that quality requires, amongst other things; 

professional human resource management to 

identify and match relevant skills and experience; 

more effective pre-deployment training to provide 

officers with the additional skills they will need 

in missions, and; the development of doctrine, 

common standards and more effective mission 

leadership to ensure that officers from differing 

policing models and cultures can work effectively 

together. 

The quantity of officers available for deployment 

is mostly dependent upon the need to balance 

national policing priorities against international 

contributions. Better understanding of linkages 

between conflict related missions and national 

policing priorities, fully integrating mission work 

into officers’ career development, and effective 

security and duty of care management may all 

have some positive effect on numbers available 

for deployment. However, real improvement is 

only likely to be achieved by matching resources 

and funding to the political will for international 

police deployments. Chiefs of Police will always 

be limited in the support they can give, if they are 

not given resources to back-fill posts vacated by 

officers deployed overseas. 

The review also examines how the demand for 

the policing elements of conflict related missions 

is assessed. A key finding is that there is a clear 

need for more resources and expertise to develop 

doctrine and use it to underpin integrated, 

strategic assessment and planning - police officers 

who are trained in these roles at both national and 

international levels. 

4

Review of Conflict Related International Policing 

As part of the assessment of the UK’s model of 

support to conflict related policing, the review has 

studied the models of other countries, including 

Australia and Canada. Models of support vary but 

all are a product of both national policy priorities 

and national policing structures. The current UK 

model is unusual in the lack of police ownership and 

leadership over operational delivery, and compared 

to some models has relatively few resources 

committed to the management of deployments. 

In order to develop more effective UK support 

to conflict related policing various options are 

considered in the review. These include; increasing 

police ownership and building new capacities in 

deployment planning and management; changing 

our funding models to provide discreet budgets for 

delivery structures allocated to, and paid from, the 

overall budgets of the police bodies responsible; 

improving staff generation by offering police leaders 

additional incentives to release staff; better human 

resource management of the officers we deploy, 

and; the development of national standing and 

standby cadres. 

The review recognises that there are currently 

severe constraints on conflict related funding, 

and that many of the options identified have 

financial, and broader resource implications. 

As such implementation of options may not be 

feasible in the immediate term. However, once all 

options are fully developed Ministers will be able 

to direct implementation of measures to improve 

the effectiveness of UK support once resources are 

available, or alternatively to direct that resources 

should be made available more immediately to 

implement those measures. 

Some of these options are obviously alternatives, 

e.g. standing and standby cadres, however the 

majority represent a range of measures which 

would need to be implemented comprehensively 

if the UK is to develop a more effective model of 

support. 

The review concludes with a single recommendation 

– that the UK International Police Assistance 

Board is requested to commission further 

work on the options in the review, in order 

to provide Ministers with fully developed 

and costed proposals for improving UK 

effectiveness. 

5

I. Introduction 

. 

1.1 This report sets out the findings of a review of 

conflict related international policing, commissioned 

by the Foreign Secretary. In the past this was a 

relatively homogeneous field, with police officers 

deployed to peacekeeping missions simply to 

monitor and report on local policing conditions and 

capacity. But over the last decade the mandates, 

roles and environments to which police officers 

deploy have become more varied. 

1.2 Policing missions and operations are carried 

out by international and regional organisations 

(the United Nations (UN), the European Union 

(EU), the African Union (AU), and the Organisation 

for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)), 

by multilateral coalitions and bilaterally. Mandates 

range from executive operational policing to reform 

and development through training, equipping, 

mentoring and advising. Mission environments 

range from the relatively benign, where 

peacekeeping has produced at least a semblance 

of stability and lasting peace, to more challenging 

post-conflict environments where significant 

insurgency and terrorist campaigns are ongoing. 

1.3 For the purposes of this review “conflict 

related” international policing is a generic term 

intended to cover all of the above. 

1.4 The framework for the review was established 

by the following questions; 

a) What is the nature of the gaps in the 

quality and quantity of international policing 

teams? 

b) To what extent is the UK’s international 

police capacity fit for purpose in filling these 

gaps? 

c) What scale and type of policing elements 

are required for international conflict related 

operations, and how is the demand for these 

activities currently assessed? 

d) What models of international police 

support work elsewhere, in particular the 

Australian and Canadian models? 

e) What are the options for more effective 

UK support for international policing, 

including the option of a UK contribution to 

a standing EU or UN force? 

1.5 The review was carried out by Conflict Group 

during the second half of 2008. The views of 

senior and experienced UK practitioners and policy 

makers were obtained through questionnaires and 

interviews, and UN, EU and other international 

policing experts were also interviewed. In addition 

senior police officers from the UK International 

Policing Assessment and Planning Group (APG) 1 

carried out fact finding visits to Australia and 

Canada, to study those countries’ models of 

international policing support. 

1.6 Annex A lists all those who have contributed 

to the review. A review of relevant academic 

literature and research was also conducted and a 

select bibliography is contained at Annex B. 

1.7 In order to remain relatively concise this 

report mostly synthesises the evidence and views 

gathered without citing individual contributions, but 

individual contributors views have been retained for 

future reference. 

1.8 The review builds on, rather than revisits, 

national work already undertaken in this area - 

commencing in 2005 with the UK International 

6


Policing Strategic Task Force, which produced 

Ministerial recommendations for improving UK 

effectiveness 2 . The review has also been carried 

out concurrently with other major national 

developments in the field. In particular 2008 

has seen a Cabinet Office review of Stabilisation 

and Civil Effect, and the formation of a new 

International Police Assistance Board (IPAB). The 

recommendations of the Cabinet Office review 

include the possibility of changes to the operational 

management of UK conflict related policing 

activities. The IPAB, which brings together senior 

officials from the UK police service and all interested 

departments, has been established to bring more 

coordination and oversight to a wide range of UK 

international policing assistance, including conflict 

related policing, and to develop a national strategy 

which underpins this approach. 

1.9 The findings of this review are set out broadly 

in line with the framework questions above, albeit 

with some reordering. Firstly the report examines 

qualitative and quantitative capacity gaps in 

international policing and then looks briefly at 

demand and assessment of policing elements. 

Next the report provides details of other countries’ 

models of international police support, before 

examining current UK policing capacities and finally 

options for more effective UK support. 

1.10 The options considered include: 

> Moving to police owned and led operational 

delivery for all aspects of deployment planning, 

management and support. 

1 Established in 2007 the APG is a reserve capacity of 30 senior 

UK police officers trained to carry out assessment, evalution and 

planning of peace support and related operations. 

2 The outcomes of the STF are detailed at Annex D 

At the same time enhancing and developing 

new capabilities, including a permanent capacity 

with dedicated staff for police led doctrine 

development, planning and research. 

> Changes to our current funding models to 

increase police ownership and leadership, 

including: the development of discreet budgets 

for police led delivery structures (which are 

assured over a number of years), with separate 

assessment and funding of mission costs, and; 

funding for operational delivery allocated to, 

and paid from, the overall budgets of the police 

bodies responsible. 

> Improving staff generation; by offering police 

leaders additional incentives to release staff by 

funding full, or partial, back-filling and allowing 

corresponding increases in their establishments, 

and; by better communicating the professional 

benefits of conflict related policing to the police 

service. 

> Better preparation, support and human resource 

management of the officers we deploy, 

including by; enhancing training to provide 

officers with additional skills and knowledge, 

enabling them to achieve more impact in their 

roles; strengthening our systems of health and 

welfare support, to also cover psychological, 

counselling and peer support services; police 

led HR management in order to seamlessly 

combine periodic deployments to international 

missions with officers’ regular national policing 

roles, and; the confirmation of general principles 

regarding duty of care. 

> The development of different models of 

deployable capacities, including; a standby 

cadre of pre-trained and equipped officers; a 

standing capacity, or a standing element, of 

our overall capacity; deploying more officers to 

more missions; the development of international 

7

standby and standing capacities and seconding 

officers to the headquarters of the UN and EU, 

and; partnership capacity building with other 

police contributing countries. 

1.11 Whilst some of these options provide 

alternative choices (e.g. standby or standing 

cadres), the majority represent a range of 

developments which will need to be implemented 

comprehensively – selective implementation of 

individual options will not address the gaps which 

currently limit the effectiveness of the UK model. 

1.12 Current constraints on conflict related funding 

are such that implementation of any options which 

require additional resources may not be feasible in 

the immediate term. However, in the IPAB the UK 

has, for the first time, a body which brings together 

all police and government partners involved in 

conflict related policing, and which can commission 

work to fully develop the options considered here. 

This would allow Ministers to direct implementation 

of measures to improve the effectiveness of UK 

support, once resources are available, or to direct 

that resources should be made available more 

immediately to implement those measures. 

8


II. Gaps in quality and quantity 

2.1 Contributors to the review identified a number 

of core issues which result in capacity gaps in both 

the quality and quantity of police officers deployed 

to missions. 

Quality 

2.2 Failing to deploy officers with the right skills 

and experience to specific roles in missions 

is seen as a key problem, manifesting itself in 

various ways. A lack of appropriate policing 

experience and skill sets, resulting for example in 

traffic police training CID officers or officers with 

sound operational experience being out of their 

depth in roles which require strategic abilities and 

perspective. In addition there is often significant 

variance in the levels of policing experience and 

expertise of officers drawn from different countries, 

compounded by a lack of common standards and 

practise (see doctrine below). 

2.3 Most contributors however identified the 

lack of additional expertise as the most important 

capacity gap – skills and experience in mentoring, 

advising, consulting and analysis, including the 

ability to apply these skills as part of wider rule of 

law reform and within the specific national and 

cultural environment of the mission. 

2.4 Officers with insufficient rank and experience 

are tasked to mentor senior national officials and 

whereas training is a specific acquired skill, where 

one rank can train another, this does not work in 

mentoring, advising etc. National officers rapidly 

realise that the international mentor/advisor has 

insufficient experience or rank to give sound advice. 

One contributor stated that it is misplaced and 

arrogant to send e.g. a Police Sergeant to advise 

a Police District Commander. Another stated that 

mentors should be of at least Inspector (in UK 

police terms) rank and preferably higher, or have 

staff officer experience. 

2.5 Also crucial is the lack of experience and skills 

needed to analyse how policing reforms are to be 

sequenced and prioritised within wider rule of law, 

security and justice sector and political reforms. 3 

2.6 Contributors identified the broad range of skills 

and expertise required. These include: the ability 

to undertake joint analysis with all key policing 

stakeholders (Ministry of Interior, police authorities, 

police forces and agencies) and other institutional 

actors (Ministry of Justice, courts, prosecutions, 

prisons, civil society, other donors etc.), in order to 

develop a shared understanding of security needs 

(including human security) and effect reform of the 

rule of law system as a whole; the ability to analyse 

the constraints to effective policing, the legislative 

framework within which the police operate and the 

political context and political will for change. 

2.7 Implementation requires skills for the design 

and delivery of a comprehensive programme 

to provide more effective policing, security and 

justice, which may include reform of: human and 

financial resource management; command and 

control; planning and administration; integrity and 

discipline; training and skills; equipment and asset 

management; accountability and oversight etc. 

2.8 Also critical is the ability to influence, or 

engage the influencing capacity of others, to 

generate sufficient political will for change and 

reform. 

3 “All too often, those involved in programming in one organisation 

are unaware of what couterparts in other organisations are 

doing. Donors are often very focused on their won programs and 

methodologies, which can complicate or even aggravate the already 

insecure environment in which the engagement is taking place. 

This absence of co-ordinated planning results in poorly designed 

programming, programming that does not fit with other initiatives 

or risks replicating what has been treid already.” Groenewald, 

Hesta and Peake, Gordon Plice Reform through Community-Based 

Policing-Philosophy and Guidelines for Implementation, Report of a 

Conference hosted by International Peace Academy and Saferworld 

New York, September 2004, p.4 

9

2.9 Much of the above points to a need for more 

comprehensive and sophisticated pre-deployment 

training and skilling. Hostile environment and 

“duty of care” training is well provided for; in fact 

contributors pointed to unnecessary duplication in 

this area, for example UK officers deploying to the 

EU policing mission in Afghanistan found much of 

the Hostile Environment training they received in 

the UK being repeated on arrival. What is required 

is more “mission specific” training, together with 

the development of training programmes which can 

provide additional skills and expertise in mentoring, 

consulting and advising and improve the 

understanding of developmental policing reform. 

2.10 Human Resource (HR) management 

- recruitment and selection - also has a major 

influence on quality gaps. There are no 

internationally agreed and standardised competency 

measurements. Role profiles or job descriptions 

and selection criteria, albeit now improving within 

the EU and UN, have not previously been designed 

to professional HR standards and have hampered 

effective selection of officers for posts in mission. 

2.11 Contributors also highlighted post selection 

by flag criteria, rather than by an individual’s 

competence, as a major issue in some missions. In 

at least one UN mission countries providing large 

numbers of officers have demanded key posts 

and sought to keep those posts limited to their 

own nationals, rather than filling them through a 

universal selection process. 

2.12 This potential conflict - between individual 

competence and international organisations’ desire 

for broad-based representation in missions - is 

reflected on a macro scale in the issue of differing 

national policing models and cultures. 

Contributors recognise that different policing 

models are often necessary and beneficial for 

missions, for instance to develop para-military or 

community based policing, and some countries will 

be better equipped than others to provide particular 

policing models and specific areas of policing 

expertise. The UK police service, for example, 

has widely recognised expertise in developing 

community based policing, whilst the French 

Gendarmerie and Italian Carabinieri have long 

experience and expertise in para-military policing. 

2.13 But it is critically important to resist importing 

policing models which are culturally out of place 

or which do not accord with host nation legal/ 

rule of law frameworks. Missions should be using 

the core policing skills and principles of officers 

and contingents to develop local forces which suit 

local circumstances - not exporting the UK, French, 

Nigerian etc., police services. 

2.14 Different policing models cease to be 

complimentary where there is insufficient mission 

leadership and planning. For example, in UN 

missions in Kosovo and Liberia the diversity of 

policing approaches brought by officers from 

many different backgrounds, coupled with a failure 

by senior management to define and impose 

coherent policing development strategies, plans 

and procedures has led to contradictory approaches 

causing confusion and even resentment amongst 

the local police. 4 

4 “By importing police officers who have no experience in 

enforcing laws in democratic societies and operating in 

a courteous and helpful manner, UNMIK has been making 

matters worse. With such a profile of “international police” officers, 

it was clear they could not contribute tothe developtment of local 

policing and antagonised relations with the local population.“ 

Muharrmei, Robert et al, Administration and Governance in Kosovo - 

Lesson learned and lessons to be learned Kosovar Institute for Policy 

Research and Development, Prishtina/Geneva, June 2005, p.17. 

10


2.15 Key to the ability of mission planners 

and leaders to design and implement coherent 

strategies, plans and procedures, and to resolving 

the conflict between broad based representation 

and competence, will be the development of 

doctrine and common standards. 

2.16 Harmonisation and accommodation of 

different policing models and cultures already 

exists in many areas of international policing (e.g. 

extradition procedures and operational cooperation) 

but to date there has been little development of 

similar common standards and doctrine for conflict 

related international policing. This is now changing 

as both the EU and UN recognise the urgent need 

to improve standards and harmonise practises in 

mission. 

2.17 The UN in particular has begun doctrine 

development workshops for Formed Police Units 

(public order policing) and intends to take forward 

wider policing doctrine development in 2009. 

Amongst the key areas of doctrine that will need to 

developed are defining how policing components 

of mission should work alongside the military 

and other civilian components, and establishing 

structured lessons learned capacities, capable of 

capturing and sharing best (and worst) practice 

from existing and previous missions, for the benefit 

of the planners, leaders and managers of future 

missions. 

2.18 The UK has already undertaken work on 

doctrine, with the FCO producing a manual in 2007 

entitled “Peace Support Operations - Information 

and guidance for UK police personnel”, 5 

designed 

to provide UK officers with guidance on policies, 

procedures and practice. Further national doctrine 

development is now required to encompass the 

type of stabilisation operations on which the 

UK is engaged in Afghanistan, and there is an 

opportunity to apply UK policing expertise to the 

doctrine development which the UN and EU intend 

to undertake. 

2.19 The development of doctrine and common 

standards will address some of the issues affecting 

the planning and leadership of missions, but 

contributors identified other critical gaps in this 

area. 

2.20 Planning for the policing components 

of missions has been a weakness both at the 

national and international levels. 6 Insufficient 

strategic policing expertise has been called upon 

in drawing up objectives, priorities and end states 

(mandates) for missions and insufficient assessment 

of local policing realities has been carried out by 

international police experts. At both national and 

international levels there has been a lack of officers 

trained and available (either in dedicated units or 

on a standby basis) to plan for and manage the 

implementation of the policing components of 

missions, and planning for the policing components 

has often not commenced early enough, or with 

sufficient coordination with military and other 

civilian planning. 

5 Available at: http://www.ukinternationalpolicing.com/edocs/ 

ipo_guidelines.pdf 

6 “.... institutional mechanisims for planning must be improved. 

Unlike the combat phase of most interventions, the postconflict 

phase, including policing, usually receives little attention. 

This is in part a result of the weakness of the institutions in the 

United States and other governments charged with policing reform: 

they simply do not have the corporate capacity to undertake 

detailed pre-intervention planning. It is also a failure of political 

will at the national and international levels, since it is the task of 

the polictical leadership to make the public case for the lengthy 

preparation, extensive resourcing, and long-term commitment 

that is required for post-conflict policing missions.”Jones, Seth G., 

Wilson, Jeremy M., Rathmell, Andrew and Riley, K. Jack, Establishing 

Law and Order After Conflict, Rand Infrastructrue, Safety, and 

Environment (Organisation), Virginia, 2005, p.224 

11

Established missions and operations also need 

internal planning capacity and expertise - strategic 

and operational planning is a requirement 

throughout the life of a mission. 

2.21 However, progress is being made. The UN 

formed a small Standing Police Capacity (UN SPC) 

in 2007, with a mandate to plan for and provide 

initial headquarters functions for missions. Similarly 

the EU established Civilian Response Teams in 2006 

( a reserve capacity to assess and plan for civilian 

missions including police components) and more 

recently in 2007 the Civilian Planning and Conduct 

Capability (EU CPCC) with a mandate to plan, 

conduct and support civilian European Security and 

Defence Policy (ESDP) operations. At a national 

level, and in response to capacity gaps identified 

early during our engagement in Iraq, the UK has 

established an International Policing Assessment 

and Planning Group (APG), providing 30 officers on 

a reserve basis, trained to carry out assessment and 

planning for conflict related missions. 

2.22 Developments in this area continue. The UN 

is currently reviewing both the Standing Police 

Capacity and Police Division (which is responsible 

for the strategic and operational management and 

support of police missions) and has recommended 

that both be increased in size. Police Division also 

intends to develop courses to train officers in 

mission planning. The EU is working to identify 

lessons learned from previous mission planning, 

in order to develop more rigour and structure, 

and to implement new review processes and 

tighter oversight to maintain track of delivery 

against mission mandates. The UK, as one of the 

few countries with a dedicated police mission 

assessment and planning capacity, will be well 

placed to assist in these developments. 

2.23 Mission leadership issues include the 

widely held view that there has been too small 

a pool of good police mission leaders, and that 

programmes to identify, develop, release and 

support more officers with strategic expertise 

are urgently required. Missions have often been 

deployed with critical gaps in senior leadership 

due to slow recruitment processes, but conversely 

those processes have not always proven reliable 

in selecting officers who can perform in mission. 

Contributors suggest that more robust recruitment 

processes are required, possibly through the use 

of training and assessments courses, and that the 

development of an international pool of potential 

police mission leaders should be pursued. 

2.24 It is also widely agreed that mission leaders 

should be recruited at the earliest possible stage, 

and involved in the planning of the mission, rather 

than deploying later to take ownership of plans 

developed by others. 

2.25 The length of secondments to mission was 

also identified as an issue particularly, but not 

exclusively, for senior and mission leadership roles. 

Whilst recognising why secondments were time 

limited (to 12 months in the case of UK officers), 

contributors felt this was often an inadequate 

length of time for officers to achieve significant 

effect, particularly in roles where building 

relationships with locals and other international 

actors was key to success. 

2.26 The attitudes of national police 

leadership towards international conflict related 

policing can have a material effect on both 

quality and quantity gaps. The tension between 

domestic policing priorities and the release of 

officers for international duties is widely recognised 

and common to many, if not most, contributing 

countries. 

12


2.27 Police leaders are responsible for the provision 

of law enforcement to their own communities. 

They can be understandably reluctant to release 

large numbers and/or high quality officers when a 

benefit linkage between international missions and 

domestic policing priorities has not been made. 

This is particularly the case when they are not given 

resources to back-fill posts vacated by the officers 

deployed overseas. 

2.28 From a UK police service perspective, 

contributors were concerned that conflict related 

international policing was still seen as a “career 

stopper”, potentially detrimental to officers’ 

careers, and that this inhibited senior, experienced 

and quality officers from volunteering. More 

incentive was needed to attract such officers by 

ensuring that overseas deployments are seen as 

career enhancing opportunities, which add value 

both to the individual and the police service on 

return. To achieve this police leadership need to 

fully understand the importance of international 

policing, the professional development 

opportunities which overseas deployments can 

provide and support overseas deployments as 

natural roles for their officers - part of their ongoing 

career path and development. 

2.29 Recent developments in the UK have begun 

to address some of these issues. The Green Paper 

“From the Neighbourhood to the National, 

Policing our Communities”, 7 

published by the 

Home Secretary in July 2008, contains, for the first 

time in a national policing document, reference to 

the importance of international policing activities 

(albeit not specifically to conflict related policing). In 

addition, the International Police Assistance Board 

is developing a UK International Policing Assistance 

Strategy, which will seek to bring more coordination 

and integration across a wide range of assistance 

activities undertaken by the police service. This can 

form the basis of a new communications strategy 

to emphasise the importance and professional 

benefits of conflict related policing, to the leadership 

of the police service. 

Quantity 

2.30 Contributors agreed that there was a global 

shortage of suitably qualified officers to deploy to 

conflict related missions. Several EU missions are 

running 25-30% below authorised capacity and the 

UN currently has a shortfall of 5,500 officers against 

a mandated strength of 17,100 across all missions. 

2.31 Although there may be legitimate questions 

over the way in which the scale and type of policing 

element are assessed (discussed in the next section), 

there is little doubt that shortfalls have limited the 

ability of policing missions to meet their objectives. 

One common consequence has been that policing 

tasks and missions are often taken over by underqualified 

military components – a recent example of 

this is police reform in Iraq where the Civilian Police 

Assistance Training Team (CPATT) was under military 

command with limited policing expertise. 

2.32 The reasons why shortfalls exist varies across 

contributing countries, but common threads can be 

identified. National political will and funding 

are key issues. A general commitment to conflict 

resolution and peacekeeping can be traced back 

to the UN Charter, and clearly involves an effective 

policing contribution: policing is an obligation 

for an occupying force. An international policing 

capability is therefore a requirement based on 

international obligations. 

7 Available at: 

http://fileshomeoffice.gov.uk/police/policing_green_paper.pdf 

13

2.33 In many countries political ambition for 

conflict resolution and peacekeeping is high, 

particularly for increasing the role of policing (and 

other civilian) components. But even where cross 

departmental political consensus is achieved, 

ambitions are not always matched by the 

commitment of resources and funding necessary to 

achieve them. 8 9 

2.34 In addition to providing resource and funding 

for actual deployments, there is also the need for 

effective operational management of deployments. 

The management of overseas deployments is a 

normal and established function for most military 

services, but not so for most police services - 

structures and systems must be developed to take 

on these roles. Where there are constraints on 

overall funding, the correct balance still needs to 

be struck between resources committed to actual 

deployments and those devoted to managing the 

process. Failure to establish a national structure 

to effectively manage deployments, results in ad 

hoc systems which are incapable of providing 

the quality and quantity desired, and increases 

the difficulty international organisations face in 

deploying and maintaining operations. 

2.35 Whilst countries will quite legitimately decide 

which missions they will contribute to on the 

basis of national priorities, there are also instances 

where, for domestic political imperatives, countries 

will favour bilateral activities over contributions to 

multinational operations, diverting resources from 

the latter and increasing the challenges to effective 

coordination. 

2.36 Deployed officers are drawn from domestic 

duties which must be continued in their absence - 

this often leads to a tension between international 

policing and domestic policing priorities. 

Particularly during a difficult financial climate, police 

leaders wish to hold on to their most valuable, 

efficient, effective resources - people. For a number 

of countries part of the solution to this has been by 

providing sufficient resources and funding to allow 

“back-filling” of posts. 

2.37 In the UK, with increasing budget restrictions, 

and greater demands for performance from central 

government and police authorities and boards, the 

deployment of staff overseas will be considered 

a luxury. The level of responses to recruitment 

exercises for international policing will also vary 

as a natural consequence of the present set-up 

of depending on volunteers from 53 separate 

UK police forces – who are released only with 

the agreement of their Chief Police Officer and 

police authority, who naturally give precedence 

to the needs of their force. Furthermore, conflict 

related missions represent only part of the overall 

commitment of UK police officers to international 

assistance; numbers are also needed for other 

international activities including training, twinning 

projects and operational work, and police leaders 

need to prioritise these demands. 

8 “ There is a profound disconnect between the goals and values 

that reformers are trying to promote and the levels of funding 

provided to effect this change. Police refrom does not come 

cheap and funding is often insufficient to meet the expectations 

that accompany it. Donor interest tends to wane before 

suffiecient time has passed to produce tangilbe results. Without 

a longer-tern commitment, the aims of police reform based on 

a community- baed policing approach cannot be acheived, and 

international support to unstable areas will remain nothing more 

than shrot tern fire fighting”’Groenewald, Hesta and Peake, 

Gordon ibid, p.5 

9 “ It is also a failure of political will at the national and 

international levels, since it is the task of the politcial leadership 

to make the public case for the lengthy preparation, extensive 

resourcing, and long-term commitment that is required for 

post-conflict policing missions.”Jones, Seth G., Wilson, Jeremy M., 

Rathmell, Andres and Riley, K. Jack. Ibid p.224 

14


2.38 Despite all these potential inhibitors, the most 

recent UK recruitment drive for conflict related 

international policing produced record numbers 

(approximately 500) of volunteers. 

However the majority of these were junior officers, 

lacking the seniority, experience or specialised 

expertise needed for the majority of the missions in 

which the UK is currently engaged - and this reflects 

the view of most contributors that whilst quantity 

shortfalls are important, quality remains the key 

issue. 

2.39 Security and duty of care issues also 

affect staffing in missions. The statutory and 

customary responsibilities of governments for 

the duty of care of deployed officers, varies from 

country to country. In the UK the bar is relatively 

high and much work has been done across 

government and the police service to address duty 

of care issues - it remains however a complicated 

issue. 

can be deployed, within an overall funding and 

resource envelope. 

2.41 Finally it must be recognised that for most 

countries and police services conflict related 

international policing is a voluntary activity and that 

individual officers may decide against volunteering 

because of the actual (and perceived) risks 

involved. Developing more coherent and effective 

approaches to duty of care issues, security and 

life support systems is likely to reduce inhibitors 

and widen the pool of officers who may consider 

deployments. 

2.40 The authority to release UK police officers for 

deployment to international conflict related policing 

missions rests with their respective Chief Constables 

and Police Authorities and, ultimately, with the 

Home Secretary (and Ministers from the devolved 

administrations). The officers are then seconded 

through the Foreign Office, either to a mission run 

by international organisations such as the EU or 

UN, or to a “UK run” mission such as those in Iraq 

or Afghanistan. This structure results in a complex 

landscape of responsibilities for duty of care and 

security provision/risk mitigation. The differing 

level of threat and risk across missions adds to this 

complexity. There are also funding implications in 

the provision of force protection, security and life 

support resources, and in hostile or challenging 

environments these costs can be substantial. This 

may serve to limit the number of officers that 

15

III. Demand – Assessing the Scale and Type 

of Policing Elements Required 

3.1 The lack of doctrine, assessment, planning 

and lessons learned capacities, described in the 

previous section, has hindered effective and timely 

assessments of the scale and type of policing 

elements required in missions and operations. 10 

3.2 United Nations missions, for example, have 

seen an increase in the deployment of Formed 

Police Units (UNAMID 11 is mandated for 19 

Formed Police Units consisting of up to 2660 police 

officers) but without a comprehensive doctrine 

which describes what roles these units should 

undertake, how they should carry them out and 

to what standards. Early UK engagement in Iraq 

was marked by a lack of advanced assessment and 

planning for the roles which UK police might be 

called upon to deliver. 

3.3 Frequently missions have been established on 

the basis of past experience and using 

off-the-shelf methodologies - failing to take 

sufficient account of local conditions and culture. 

Generic police training curricula and delivery 

methods used in Kosovo, were imported to train 

Iraqi and Afghan police and required extensive 

modification over extended periods before 

becoming effective. Some missions (not least 

at various stages in Iraq and Afghanistan), have 

concentrated to a great degree on training and 

equipping - measuring success by numbers - at the 

expense of more fundamental reform requirements 

such as organisational and leadership development. 

3.4 This one-size-fits-all approach has failed 

to adequately address the particular policing 

needs of the receiving countries, and nebulous 

concepts of democratic policing and international 

standards, have led to international aspirations for 

development and end states which are unrealistic 

or even unsuitable in a national and regional 

context. 

3.5 Insufficient coordination of assessment, 

planning and delivery with other mission 

components has meant that policing reform and 

development is often unsynchronised with other 

rule of law and security sector elements - evidenced 

particularly in Kosovo and Afghanistan 12 , where 

for long periods reform of the police and criminal 

justice sectors were out of step with each other. 

3.6 Adding to these difficulties is the fact that the 

role of policing elements in conflict related missions 

has evolved, particularly over the last 10 years, and 

continues to do so 13 . From basic monitoring and 

reporting (El Salvador, Mozambique, Cambodia 

and Namibia), to executive operational policing 

(Haiti, East Timor, Kosovo), to longer term reform 

and development (Kosovo again, Sierra Leone, Iraq, 

Afghanistan). The first of these is now generally 

regarded as having been of limited effectiveness 

and likely to be confined to history. Future missions 

(and the future of ongoing missions) will more likely 

deliver one, or a combination of, the latter two 

types of role. 

3.7 Within these broad categories of policing 

roles lie more specific classifiers, for example paramilitary 

policing, community policing, investigative 

and intelligence policing, and the development of 

leadership, command and control, professional 

standards, organisational and administrative 

capacities. Further categories define methods of 

delivery including, executive policing, training, 

coaching, advising, mentoring, consultancy, and 

donor equipping and coordination. 

3.8 It is clear that there is a need for more 

resources and expertise to develop doctrine and 

use it to underpin integrated, strategic assessment 

and planning - police officers who are trained in 

these roles and who can work alongside military 

and civilian experts and planners, and with host 

16


governments, civil society and local communities 

to identify and address the unique requirements of 

individual missions. Strategic integrated planning, 

founded in a comprehensive doctrine and which 

identifies programmes of achievable goals, will more 

effectively determine the scale and type of policing 

required. 

3.9 International organisations and individual 

contributing countries are increasingly recognising 

the gaps in doctrine, assessment and planning, and 

the evolving nature of the policing requirement, 

and increasing capacity in response – the UN SPC, 

the EU CPCC, the UK’s APG. Continuing support to 

these areas of development is essential, if the scale 

and type of the policing elements are to match the 

requirements and demands placed upon future and 

ongoing operations and missions. 14 

10 “ The UN has often launched missions without benefit of a 

systematic analysis of the levels of criminality and capacity for 

rule of law in the mission area. In the past, peace operations 

have relied on anecdotes to gauge the level of functionality, 

efficiency, and poplular support for the police, courts, and prison 

system in its area of deployment. DPKO has not had a system 

to collect data for police and other elements of the criminal 

justice systems in post- conflict settings. Without such data, 

assessing the strengths and weaknesses of domestic police and 

justice institutions is difficult and reduces support the rule of 

law, delaying improvements in accountability and performance.” 

Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch. From 

TimorLeste to Darur: New Initiatives for Enhancing UK Civilian 

Policing Capacity. Henry L. Stimpson Center. Washington DC, 

August 2007, p.5. 

11 United Nations Assistance Mission in Darfur 

12 Wilder, Andrew Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the 

Afghan National Police, Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, 

Kabul, July 2007, p.62. 

13 Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K, Holt and William J. Durch. Ibid p.1-2 

14 Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K, Holt and William J. Durch. Ibid p.1-2 

17

IV. Other Models 

4.1 As part of this review senior officers from the 

UK International Policing Assessment and Planning 

Group (APG) travelled to Australia and Canada 

in November 2008, to study and report on those 

countries’ models of conflict related international 

policing. 

Australia 

4.2 Australia is one of the few, if only, countries 

to have established a standing capacity for conflict 

related international police deployments - the 

International Deployment Group (IDG). The IDG is 

a department within the Australian Federal Police 

(AFP) - the Australian Government’s primary law 

enforcement agency, international law enforcement 

representative and the chief source of advice to the 

Government on policing issues. 

Governance and Policy 

4.3 The AFP itself is part of the Attorney-General’s 

portfolio, with the AFP Commissioner reporting to 

the Minister for Home Affairs. As a departmental 

head the AFP Commissioner can also be co-opted 

to provide law enforcement advice to the National 

Security Committee of Cabinet and makes 

recommendations to Government regarding 

policy. 

4.4 Ministerial priorities for the AFP are; 

> Countering the threat of terrorism to the safety 

and security of Australians and Australian 

interests, inside and outside Australia; 

> Contributing effectively to the Government’s 

international law enforcement interests 

including matters involving cooperation 

to combat transnational organised crime, 

responses to emergencies, law and order 

capacity building missions, and participation 

in United Nations, or other internationally 

mandated, peace operations; 

4.5 Whilst the AFP provides the Commonwealth 

(i.e. federal) policing lead, each of the seven States 

within Australia also has its own police service, 

answerable to the State government. 

4.6 Under the AFP’s Strategic Plan for 2007/11 

the IDG “…contributes to regional and 

international stability and security on behalf of 

the Australian Government by implementing 

capacity building programs and offshore law 

enforcement initiatives.’ 

4.7 The AFP’s 2007 Business strategy includes 

the following outputs for the IDG; 

> Bilateral law enforcement capacity building 

programs under the auspices of the Law 

Enforcement Cooperation Program, and 

> International peace operations and missions as 

civilian police with the United Nations. 

Development of the IDG 

4.8 The IDG has been developed primarily 

within a regional context. An increasing number 

of situations and incidents within its Asia Pacific 

sphere of influence (including East Timor, the 

Solomon Islands, the Bali Bombings and the 

Indonesian Tsunami), led to the identification by 

the Australian government of significant gaps in its 

ability to respond rapidly to crises and to support 

capacity building in fragile and failed states. The 

government also recognised a lack of a cohesive 

and joined-up response across government 

departments. 

18


4.9 In 2004 the government tasked the AFP 

with creating a standing international policing 

capacity. The Australian Government already had a 

preference for a ‘whole of government approach’ to 

security and capacity development activities and the 

AFP’s standing capacity was designed to focus on 

‘interoperability’, i.e. all agencies and government 

departments having a clear understanding of each 

others needs, objectives and requirements - and 

working together to achieve overall government 

objectives. 

4.10 This interoperability has now reached a 

stage of maturity evidenced in the case of the 

Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands 

(RAMSI). The RAMSI funding proposals considered 

by Government sees the AFP receiving significant 

funding to provide support infrastructure to other 

contributing agencies. The AFP also manages 

programs that would traditionally have been 

led by the Australian Agency for International 

Development (AusAID). 

4.11 The IDG does have small numbers of officers 

deployed outside Australia’s immediate sphere of 

influence, these include Afghanistan, Cyprus and 

Sudan, but the main focus of government policy 

priorities, and the bulk of the group’s resources, are 

centred on regional security and stability. 

Structure 

4.12 Authorised by the government in 2006 

to increase its establishment to a total of 1200 

staff, the IDG currently (November 2008) employs 

approximately 750 staff. Of these 250 are Australia 

based (A-Base) personnel providing support to 

500 IDG members deployed to missions including 

Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cyprus, Nauru, Papua 

New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Timor-Leste, 

Tonga, and Vanuatu. Approximately 100 of the 

deployed staff are seconded from six State police 

services and thirteen Pacific Island Nations (37 from 

the state police services). 

4.13 The support functions provided by the 250 

A-Base personnel include; 

Contracts and Logistics 

HR and Finance 

Foreign Police Liaison 

Forensics 

Information Technology 

Intelligence 

Marketing and Public Affairs 

Mission Administration 

Operational Response 

Pacific Islands Police Advisor Training 

Protective Services 

Strategy Planning 

Monitoring and Governance 

Wellbeing and Health & Safety Services 

4.14 On reaching full establishment staffing of the 

IDG should be as follows: 

> Mission component of 730 staff (including 

seconded state and Pacific Island Nations 

police). 

> A-Base component of 499 staff, comprising: 

> National Manager’s office with 28 staff 

responsible for international policy, governance, 

marketing, communications and projects; 

> Missions and Operations support with 33 staff; 

> Planning and Development with 98 staff 

responsible for intelligence, programme analysis, 

planning and doctrine. 

> Corporate Services with 94 staff responsible 

for contracts & logistics, finance and human 

resources. 

> Learning & Development with 52 staff 

responsible for pre-deployment training, 

19

operational safety training, and internal training. 

> Operational Response Group with 193 staff. 

4.15 The Operational Response Group is a new 

capacity, capable of deploying rapidly (up to 40 

members within 24 hours, up to a further 40 

members within 72 hours and the remainder 

within seven days) to any situation - including high 

risk environments - to provide stabilisation. The 

ORG would deploy to stabilise the environment 

giving the IDG time to muster and deploy a main 

mission component. The ORG consists of teams 

with varying skill sets. Tactical Response Teams 

capabilities are intended to be the vanguard in 

armed or otherwise high risk civil unrest situations; 

Stability Response Teams are trained to a high 

level in Public Order Management including long 

arms and less lethal options to respond to civil 

disorder; crowd control and riot situations, and 

operational and specialist units providing support 

including negotiators, maritime policing operations, 

marksmen, and communications, intelligence, and 

logistics experts. 

4.16 The IDG has invested significantly in training 

with a purpose built (AUD2.8 million/ £1.2million in 

2005) international training complex which includes 

facilities that recreate the environments police 

might experience when deployed overseas. The 

training is residential and takes place over 35 days, 

delivering two broad themes; safety and security; 

and capacity development. A significant amount of 

the training is delivered via immersed scenarios in 

which cultural awareness, values and human rights 

are the focus. An increasing number of non-police 

personnel (from AusAID, NGO’s etc.) now also 

participate in this training. 

Funding 

4.17 Discreet and itemised start-up costs for 

the IDG are not easily distinguishable because 

AFP involvement in international conflict related 

policing - in particular large scale deployments to 

RAMSI - pre-dates the formal establishment of the 

group in 2004. However figures that are available 

show that in FY 2003/04 the Government provided 

AUD246 million (£103 million) of initial funding 

to the AFP for its role in RAMSI from 2003/04 

to 2004/05, including the logistics function. In 

2005/06 the Government agreed to provide 

AUD538 million (£226 million) to the AFP in 

additional resourcing from 2005/06 to 2008/09 for 

the mission to RAMSI. 

4.18 Consolidated financial year budget figures for 

the IDG for this and subsequent financial years are 

as follows; 

FY 2008/09 AUD300 million (£140 million) 



State Police Contributions 

4.19 The contribution of the seven State police 

services to the IDG varies. Economic and resource 

issues in some States mean that they are struggling 

to recruit officers and therefore unable to second 

large numbers of staff to the IDG. Victoria Police 

(Vicpol) is currently the largest provider of state 

police to the IDG, and has established an internal 

support team of 5 staff and a robust re-integration 

programme for returning officers. 

Key Stakeholders/Partner Agencies 

4.20 The two key cross government relationships 

for the IDG are with AusAID and the Australian 

Defence Force (ADF). The IDG appoints 

liaison officers to AusAID’s Fragile States and 

Development departments, and to the ADF’s Joint 

Operations Planning Group. These partnership 

20


arrangements are governed by a Strategic 

Partnership Agreement between AusAID and 

the AFP and a Memorandum of Understanding 

between the ADF and AFP. 

4.21 All partners identify key benefits to these 

relationships which include; speaking a common 

language; agreed and detailed understanding of 

where responsibilities sit and agreed outcomes; 

development of whole of government strategies; 

negotiation and development of jointly agreed 

business cases, for government consideration, and; 

more effective and developed joint operations and 

staff relationships on the ground in missions. 

Other Observations 

4.22 The IDG has invited academia into its 

operations, both with academic experts working 

alongside group members on planning, policy, 

research and programme analysis, and by 

commissioning specific pieces of work, for example 

the development of a suite of performance 

indicators by the University of Queensland. This 

academic rigour is supporting the development 

of credible business cases and helping to develop 

more focus on outcomes rather than inputs. 

4.23 Giving ownership and responsibility to the 

police has had a significant impact; as the group 

matures into the structure and process, it is 

becoming more confident in what it can achieve. 

The group has a clear sense of purpose, and belief 

that it is at the ‘cutting edge’. 

4.24 One of the key enablers for the government 

in establishing the IDG was the federal and state 

governance arrangements, which allowed the 

government to deal with the AFP as a single point 

of contact to deliver its policy aims on policing. 

4.25 An issue in establishing the group (and the 

Operational Response Group in particular) was 

the fact that it attracted officers with specialist 

training and skills (e.g. firearms and public order) 

away from other police services. This led to some 

relationship issues between the AFP and State 

Police. However it should be noted that the ORG 

was one of several competing employment market 

opportunities for example, security jobs in Iraq and 

employment in the mining sector. 

4.26 Group members were conscious of the high 

cost of maintaining the Operational Response 

Group - AUD38 million p.a. (£17.6 million). 

However, the unit does have a domestic role in 

support of AFP operations and as a redundancy 

to State and Territory jurisdictions. In order to 

respond to high risk incidents the ORG spends a 

high percentage of their time maintaining their 

skill level. This group have undertaken rapid 

deployments both domestically and internationally 

and maintain an ability to deploy at a moments 

notice. 

Canada 

4.27 Canada has a multi-layered police service 

with municipal, provincial and regional forces, 

and the national Royal Canadian Mounted Police 

(RCMP). A total of 64,000 serving police officers 

work in approximately 450 separate forces, 

varying in size from single figures to the RCMP 

which has a strength of 17,000 officers. Although 

primarily a national/federal force the RCMP also 

provides policing services to territories, provinces, 

municipalities and native communities throughout 

Canada. 

4.28 Canada has contributed to international 

conflict related policing for 20 years, but has 

recently brought more structure, transparency 

and coherence to the governance and control of 

their contributions. Canada does not operate a 

standing capacity like the Australians, but “recruits 

21

to deploy” similar to the UK. Canada does however 

train officers in advance in order to develop a pool 

of officers ready to deploy. 

The Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA) 

4.29 In 2006 the RCMP established a centrally 

funded five year programme - the International 

Police Peacekeeping and Peace Operations 

Program (IPP). At the same time a memorandum of 

understanding - the CPA - was drawn up between 

the Department for Foreign Affairs & International 

Trade (DFAIT), the Canadian International 

Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of 

Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness (PSEP) 

and the RCMP. (The RCMP sits within the PSEP 

department but is a separate signatory to the 

MOU). 

4.30 The CPA is designed to enable the RCMP 

and its policing partners to plan and manage 

international deployments for the long term, rather 

than reacting to requests on an ad hoc, mission-tomission 

basis. DFAIT, CIDA, PSEP and the RCMP are 

jointly responsible for the implementation of the 

CPA, working as an inter-departmental association 

with governance structures consisting of a Steering 

Committee and a Working Group, both of which 

are chaired by members from DFAIT. The Steering 

Committee is responsible for deciding whether to 

contribute Canadian police officers to a particular 

international operation and does so against an 

established set of key criteria. 

4.31 Within the CPA model DFAIT provides foreign 

policy expertise and leadership, and identifies 

activities where police can contribute to local peace 

support and capacity building consistent with 

Canadian foreign policy objectives. CIDA provides 

knowledge of country and cultural circumstances 

and linkages between police interventions and the 

wider development of work of the Agency and its 

partners. 

4.32 The RCMP is responsible for selecting officers 

in accordance with operational requirements, 

managing their training and logistical support 

and providing advice based on Canadian policing 

expertise. 

4.33 The CPA responds to both the Government of 

Canada’s international peace and security objective 

of building a more secure world and the objectives 

of the Canadian Official Development Assistance 

(ODA) policy. 

International Peace Operations Branch (IPOB) 

4.34 The IPOB sits within the Federal and 

International Operations Directorate of RCMP 

Headquarters in Ottawa and is responsible for 

delivery of the IPP programme and the policing 

elements of the CPA. The current structure of the 

IPOB was approved by the Canadian Cabinet in 

2006 with an initial five year funding allocation. 

Originally established with 34 staff, IPOB now has 

approval to use existing funding to expand to 54 

staff, and following a recent staffing evaluation is 

seeking approval and funding for a further increase 

to 83 staff. 

4.35 IPOB manages and supports all aspects of 

police deployments including pre-deployment 

recruitment, selection and training activities, 

operational support in mission and reintegration on 

return from mission. IPOB is mandated by the CPA 

to build a rising pool of pre-trained officers, who 

will remain with their parent services until called 

upon to deploy. 

4.36 Training is delivered through a two week 

briefing (rather than scenario) course covering 

22


operational training (executive policing and criminal 

intelligence), health, administrative briefings, cultural 

awareness and specialised training (mission specific 

issues). 

4.37 IPOB includes a Health Services Unit (HSU) 

which provides physical and psychological health 

care advice and support at all stages of operations, 

including mission assessments and reconnaissance, 

recruitment, selection and training, support in 

mission and re-integration on return. Within the 

HSU is an employee assistance and family support 

coordinator. Available 24/7, the coordinator 

provides short-term peer support counselling and 

referral services to deployed officers and their 

families prior to, during and post deployment. IPOB 

also includes a Logistics Unit which manages the 

provision of all uniform, equipment and logistical 

support. 

4.38 Currently IPOB negotiates individually with 

other police services for the release of their officers, 

there is no single national model. As with the 

Australian model, IPOB provides additional funding, 

over and above the actual costs of salary and 

allowances, allowing police services to back-fill 

posts or fund other initiatives. 

Funding 

4.39 The IPP is funded through two mechanisms. 

Firstly a 5 year funding programme is negotiated 

and agreed with the Treasury Board (TB) by the 

respective CPA Ministers. This funding is paid 

quarterly to the IPOB to enable it to deliver the IPP 

and build a permanent and sustainable capacity 

of deployable police officers for international 

peace support operations. Essentially this funds 

all Canadian based aspects of the IPP including 

hiring recruits to back-fill the shortfall created by 

international deployments. Currently this is set at 

CAN$37 million (£20 million). 

4.40 In addition an Annual Plan is produced 

by DFAIT, in consultation with all CPA partners, 

which includes approved and anticipated police 

participation in operations with an estimate of 

incremental costs. The Annual Plan is submitted to 

the Steering Committee for approval by 31 March 

for the coming fiscal year. This funding derives from 

DFAIT’s Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF), and 

essentially pays for all mission based costs. Currently 

this is set at CAN$11million, (£6.09 million). 

Future Plans 

4.41 IPOB have developed a draft Strategic Plan 

for development over the next five years, the key 

outputs of which are; 

> The increase the capacity to deploy Canadian 

police officers to 500 within the next 5 years. 

> To develop a new IPOB business model and 

organisational structure. 

> To develop a law enforcement capacity building 

capability. 

> To develop the capacity to contribute to formed 

police units. 

> To develop a rapid deployment capacity. 

4.42 Three strategic priorities are also identified in 

the draft Strategic Plan; Building Human Capacity 

- providing the necessary quality and quantity 

of police officers to peace operations in a timely 

manner; Horizontal Relationships - providing 

more effective and integrated management and 

support to international peace operations, and; 

a Responsive and Holistic Approach - ensuring 

integrated and coordinated deployments 

throughout the spectrum of conflict. 

4.43 IPOB is currently mandated under the CPA 

to deploy up to 200, drawn from a pool of 600 

pre-trained officers. In 2008 Canada deployed a 

23

little over 100 officers to missions in Afghanistan, 

Bosnia, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Sierra Leone, 

Sudan, East Timor and Krygystan. Of these 44% 

were RCMP officers with 56% from other police 

services. 

4.44 Under the draft Strategic Plan numbers will 

increase year on year (with retired officers being 

brought into the pool from 2010), until 2013 when 

a pool of 1500 pre-trained officers will allow the 

deployment of 500 officers, 30% from the RCMP, 

50% from other police services and 20% retired 

officers. 

4.45 However the Canadians are not currently 

deploying up the CPA mandated numbers and 

they recognise that a number of hurdles which 

will have to be overcome if their aspirations are 

to be met. Better marketing of international 

policing is required to gain the buy-in of provincial 

governments and increase the number of other 

police services which participate. A communications 

strategy to achieve this required. 

4.46 The diversity of Canada’s police service has 

resulted in a lack of commonality in recruitment, 

selection and reintegration procedures. Individual 

police services have negotiated their own unique 

arrangements with the RCMP, and the need to 

incorporate trade union protocols has added to the 

complexity. Adverse results of this have included 

both the quality of officers selected to deploy, and 

the ability of police services to make best use of the 

officers on their return from deployments. 

selection and management tools are required. 

4.48 The current infrastructure and some of the 

related processes are not sufficient to deal with 

such a large scale increase over the next 5 years. 

However, these issues have been recognized by 

IPOB and its police partners and they are being 

addressed in a priority order. 

4.49 IPOB cannot currently recruit retired officers 

due to national internal bureaucratic issues such 

as the provision of life insurance. These issues will 

have to be overcome if retired officers are to form 

up to 20% of Canadian deployments by 2013. 

4.50 All of the above represent major issues which 

the IPOB and partners have recognised, and they 

are developing programmes and work streams to 

address them. 

Other Countries 

4.51 In addition to Australia and Canada this 

review gathered information on a number of other 

countries’ models of conflict related international 

policing, primarily through interviews of national 

policing attaches and advisors attached to national 

missions at the UN in New York. The countries 

studied were Germany, Norway, Sweden, Italy and 

the United States, and details of their models of 

international policing are contained at Annex C. 

4.47 The drive to increase numbers together with 

insufficient professional HR resources has resulted 

in the drafting of general job requirements largely 

based on UN models. These have failed to ensure 

competency requirements are always met during 

recruitment and selection. New competency based 

24


V. UK Capacity and Future Options 

UK Capacity 

5.1 International capacity for conflict related 

policing, is built on national capacities. Contributors 

recognise that whilst international organisations are 

improving their capacities, equally important is the 

development of effective national models. 

5.2 Contributors also agree that the UK police 

service has the necessary capabilities to address 

many of the capacity gaps identified previously. UK 

policing is highly regarded and in demand overseas, 

particularly in the areas of leadership, community 

based policing and training. The service has an 

extensive range of professional skills and expertise 

capable of carrying out most of the roles now 

required in international missions and operations. 

5.3 There are two apparent exceptions to 

UK capabilities. The police service has no 

operational experience of para-military policing, 

(a fundamentally different model of policing), 

and limited capacities in armed executive policing 

(which is either a specialised function for individual 

officers - in high demand nationally - or a general 

mandate of only a few forces such as the Police 

Service of Northern Ireland of the Ministry of 

Defence Police(MDP)). Outside of these two areas 

the UK should be able to contribute highly skilled 

and experienced officers to virtually all other 

required roles. 

5.4 The UK also has a potential comparative 

advantage over many countries, as UK officers 

typically retire earlier after 30 years service (rather 

than at 60/65) and it should be possible to build a 

highly skilled cadre of retired officers. 

5.5 Over the last five years we have increased 

the resources, and improved the structures 

and practises which manage and support our 

contributions. Dedicated units in the Foreign and 

Commonwealth Office, Home Office, the MDP 

and Stabilisation Unit, working together with the 

Associations of Chief Police Officers, the wider 

police service and the international organisations, 

have effectively managed the deployment of officers 

to all missions and operations which the UK regards 

as strategic priorities. There remain however, factors 

which limit the UK’s capacity. 

5.6 Conflict related international policing as a 

function, is not yet regarded and treated as a core 

responsibility of the police service. Outside of the 

MDP, it remains a role which individual officers 

volunteer to undertake, leaving their forces to do 

so. The structures and systems which manage and 

deliver our contributions are not police owned and 

led (albeit that we employ officers to carry out these 

functions alongside civil servants), which reinforces 

the perception that this is a niche government 

activity rather than a core role of the police service. 

Additionally the tension between domestic policing 

priorities and international activities has not been 

resolved. 

5.7 This lack of police service responsibility for the 

function, and ownership of the operational delivery, 

and the continuing tension between domestic and 

international priorities, inhibits individual officers 

from volunteering, for fear that participation may 

not benefit (may even damage) their ongoing police 

career. Whilst overall numbers have been sufficient 

to meet government aspirations (and available 

funding) for deployments - this does not mean that 

we always have officers with the right skills, rank 

and experience available for the roles we wish to fill. 

5.8 Training has concentrated on duty of care 

issues and, to varying degrees, specific mission 

“awareness” training. On the assumption that 

officers’ core policing skills and specialisations are 

25

sufficient, not enough has been done to provide 

them with additional skills, e.g. in mentoring, 

reform and development, which would allow them 

to achieve greater impact in their mission roles. 

5.9 As policing missions have become more 

complex and multi-faceted, there has been a 

requirement for the parallel development of 

new doctrine and operational practise. This has 

particularly been the case where we have engaged 

in coalition or bilateral missions - where officers are 

deploying into a UK led operation rather than under 

the umbrella of an EU or UN mission, and where 

they are working very closely alongside the military, 

often in hostile or very challenging environments. 

5.10 Whilst we have improved our capacities (e.g. 

the 2007 manual of information and guidance, the 

establishment of the APG, the development of new 

operational practise by MDP in Helmand province), 

insufficient resources have been applied to this 

area. There is for example no dedicated police 

planning, research and programme capability within 

our structures. Instead we are reliant upon reserve 

capacities such as the APG, or ad hoc tasking 

of resources from within our policy, operational 

management and support structures. 

Future Options 

5.11 Options for more effective UK support for 

conflict related international policing, can be 

developed by assessing the current UK model 

against the capacity gaps which have been 

identified and the models developed by other 

countries. 

5.12 Improving our effectiveness will require the 

commitment of additional resources. The overall 

resource and funding requirements will in large 

part be determined by the scale of ambition for 

deployments (100, 200, 500 etc.), but many of the 

developments required to improve effectiveness will 

depend on providing more resources to UK based 

operational management and support activities - 

which up to now have been sparsely resourced. 

5.13 There are approximately 15 staff across 

departments and agencies that work solely, or 

mostly, on managing and supporting conflict 

related policing. Over the last five years this has 

resulted in a ratio of “UK based” to deployed staff 

varying between 1:10 and 1:20. Compared to 

the Canadian and Australian models, where the 

ratios (once their models reach full strength) will 

be approximately 1:6 and 1:3 respectively, the UK 

operation has been relatively lean. 

5.14 The various options which are set out below, 

are not fully formed recommendations - more 

work will need to be commissioned to consult with 

key partners and develop fully costed models. The 

International Police Assistance Board (IPAB) as a 

strategic body representing all interested partners, 

is well placed to commission the work necessary to 

develop these options into recommendations for 

Ministers. 

Operational Delivery 

5.15 All models essentially consist of two core 

elements, which respond to governments’ 

international policy priorities - the method of 

operational delivery and the capacity delivered - 

and both of these are shaped by the structures and 

roles of their policing services. The existence of a 

national or federal policing capacity, with a preexisting 

international operational responsibilities, 

is undoubtedly advantageous to the development 

of conflict related capacity. Centrally funded and 

directly responsive to government priorities, rather 

than primarily to local policing priorities, a national 

26


body also provides a more or less “natural home” 

for the management of international activities. 

5.16 Fundamental to Australia’s ability to develop 

a standing capacity was the pre-existence of a 

national, operational policing capacity (the AFP) 

where the International Deployment Group 

could be formed and developed. Countries such 

as France and Italy have essentially added new 

roles in conflict related policing, to pre-existing 

national standing capacities (Gendarmerie, 

Carabinieri) which were already responsible for 

policing in overseas territories or alongside military 

deployments. 

5.17 The UK now has national law enforcement 

bodies with international responsibilities (such 

as the National Police Improvement Agency 

(NPIA), and the Serious Organised Crime Agency), 

although not a national, operational policing body, 

comparable to the AFP or RCMP. With a police 

service composed of over 50 separate forces, and 

without an obvious “natural home”, the UK has 

developed a model where in addition to driving 

policy, government departments and agencies 

have taken the lead on operational delivery. 

5.18 The UK’s current operational delivery 

structures have developed considerable expertise 

in most aspects of deployment management, as 

have various elements of the police service which 

undertake other aspects of international policing 

activities (for example the NPIA and individual 

forces such as the Metropolitan Police Service). 

5.19 Nevertheless, this aspect of the UK model 

is unusual in comparison to the other countries 

studied for this review, where in every case there 

is greater police ownership of operational delivery. 

This is a major factor in the perception in the UK, 

that conflict related policing is not a core role and 

responsibility of the police service, which in turn 

inhibits the ability to recruit officers with the skills 

and expertise required. 

5.20 A key step in changing this perception and 

its side effects is therefore to achieve police 

ownership over operational delivery. The 

police service (with clearly defined structures and 

command chains culminating in national police 

leadership represented on the IPAB) would take on 

responsibility for all aspects of deployment 

planning, management and support, working 

closely with government policy leads and 

military and other civilian deployment 

structures. 

5.21 Options to achieve this increased ownership 

and identify which parts of the police service 

could take on the roles and responsibilities, 

have been under consideration for some time 

and are now being taken forward by the IPAB. 

The recent Cabinet Office review of stabilisation 

and civil effect has also considered and made 

recommendations on operational delivery. Current 

funding considerations may mean that substantially 

increased police ownership is not achievable 

in the short term, and that interim measures 

involve operational delivery remaining a role for 

central government. It should nevertheless remain 

the target - only when the police service is 

fully responsible for delivery is it likely to 

recognise this as a core role. 

Funding 

5.22 Allied to the question of ownership, is that of 

funding. The current UK model funds operational 

delivery together with actual mission costs from 

the various conflict related budgets, with additional 

resources provided by departments. A funding 

model such as that in Canada, where the delivery 

27

structures have a discreet budget assured 

over a number of years, and mission costs 

are assessed and funded separately, would 

allow the development of more durable delivery 

structures and of longer term strategic planning to 

increase and improve capacities. 

5.23 A further step, should police ownership 

be achieved, would be to follow the example of 

countries such as Australia, Canada and Norway 

where funding for the delivery structures 

would be allocated to, and paid from, the 

overall budget(s) of the police body(ies) 

responsible. Budget ownership would be 

another step in increasing the police service’s core 

responsibility for conflict related policing. 

Staff Generation 

5.24 Police ownership of operational delivery 

and clearer funding mechanisms will not by 

themselves resolve the tension that exists between 

international and domestic policing priorities. 

Budget and establishment limitations will 

continue to determine the ability and willingness 

of individual Chief Officers to release their staff. 

A number of countries address this by offering 

police leaders incentives to release staff, 

funding full, or partial, back-filling and 

allowing corresponding increases in their 

establishments. 

5.25 Adopting this model would obviously increase 

the per capita costs of deploying officers, reducing 

the overall numbers that could be deployed within 

any particular funding envelope. However it would 

be a crucial step in increasing our ability to recruit 

and deploy officers with specialist skills, expertise 

and command experience - in effect increasing the 

quality of our deployed officers. 

Enhanced Capabilities 

5.26 Enhancing our training will provide 

officers with additional skills and knowledge 

enabling them to achieve more impact in 

their roles in missions. Additional investment 

will be required to achieve this, both for the 

development of new curricula and for training 

delivery. We should look to emulate best practise 

from other countries (e.g. Australian IDG scenario 

based training), and to develop more opportunities 

for integrated training, with police officers training 

alongside UK and international military and civilian 

staff. We should also build robust assessment 

and selection elements into our training, to help 

ensure that the officers we do deploy have the 

right professional and personal qualities to achieve 

significant impact and enhance the reputation of 

the UK police service. 

5.27 More effective UK support also requires the 

development of new, and the enhancement of 

existing, capabilities. Our capacity for police 

led doctrine development (i.e. operational 

policy and practise), and strategic and 

operational planning and research should be 

strengthened. Although the APG provides a pool 

of senior officers with increasing expertise in these 

areas, we should also invest in a permanent 

capability with dedicated staff, whose work 

would continue to be supported by the APG on 

a reserve basis. This capability would exercise, 

train and work closely with military and other 

civilian planners, both national and international, 

to increase our ability to deliver a comprehensive 

approach to security sector and rule of law reform. 

5.28 Various aspects of our human resource 

management can also be enhanced. Strengthening 

our current systems of physical healthcare support, 

to also cover psychological, welfare, counselling 

28


and peer support services for officers and their 

families (as in the Canadian model) will help to 

ensure that we select officers who are well suited 

to work of this nature and capable of dealing 

with the challenges they will face throughout the 

deployment cycle. 

5.29 Professional and career development factors 

affecting recruitment and re-integration also need 

to be addressed. The IPAB will play a key role in 

this, better communicating the professional 

benefits of conflict related policing to 

the police service. Police service ownership 

of operational delivery, together with national 

leadership from the IPAB, will also better enable 

the professional experience gained on deployments 

to be harmonised with the national policing 

framework of career and leadership development. 

5.30 The long term aim should be the ongoing 

professional development of officers, so that they 

can seamlessly combine periodic deployments 

to international missions with their regular 

national policing roles, throughout their 

careers. In this way the UK can build a sustainable 

cadre of officers with genuine expertise in conflict 

related policing and capable of leading missions. 

Duty of Care 

5.31 Despite the complexity of the issues which 

surround duty of care, there are general 

principles which should be adhered to. 

Contributing countries should be responsible for 

ensuring that officers they deploy are aware of 

the threats and risks and are appropriately 

trained and equipped to live and work in the 

environment of the mission. Mission authorities 

should be responsible for providing security 

and life support resources and systems, 

which are sufficient to create an environment 

suitable for civilian personnel to live and 

work in (accepting that levels of permissiveness 

may vary – e.g. para-military police such as 

Gendarmerie may be capable of levels of selfprotection 

unavailable to civilian police). Mission 

authorities should also provide contributing 

countries with information or assistance allowing 

them to assess security and life support systems 

planned or in place. 

5.32 Contributing countries should also ensure that 

all relevant domestic authorities are satisfied that 

the security and life support regimes within which 

officers will operate, are such that it is reasonable 

to approve deployments. In the case of the UK 

this means the Home Departments for England 

and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland and the 

respective Associations of Chief Police Officers, and 

the Ministry of Defence in respect of MDP officers. 

5.33 There are of course funding implications in 

the provision of force protection, security and life 

support resources and in hostile or challenging 

environments these costs can be substantial. It is 

therefore essential that duty of care, security 

and life support issues are factored into 

mission planning from the outset, and that 

there is political will to ensure that overall 

funding is sufficient to account for these 

elements, as well as the more direct delivery aspects 

of a mission. 

Capacity 

5.34 Whilst a police led, durable, structured and 

sufficiently resourced operational management 

capability is a pre-requisite for more effective 

delivery of UK capacities to conflict related policing, 

the actual capacities which are delivered could take 

a number of forms. Policy ambition and funding 

29

availability will be key factors in deciding which 

capacities the UK should aim to deliver. Whichever 

type of capacity is developed, we should consider 

making use of our comparative 15 advantage to 

ensure that a percentage of the officers we 

deploy are retired. 

Standby Capacity 

5.35 It would be possible to develop a cadre, 

similar to the Canadian model, of pre-trained 

and equipped officers, who would return 

to force duties but remain on standby to 

deploy, within agreed time frames. The 

advantages of such a standby pool would include 

a more assured and timely deployment capacity 

and the ability to develop comprehensive and 

complimentary skill sets and experience within the 

pool. 

5.36 Currently we only train and equip officers 

when it is known they will deploy, so front loaded 

costs would be higher under this model, and there 

would be financial risks - training investments 

could be lost if officers subsequently declined, 

or for operational reasons were not released, to 

deploy. 

5.37 However these risks would be mitigated if 

Chief Officers were provided with the additional 

incentives described previously and agreements 

reached on deployment timeframes. It would be 

important to work towards nationally applicable 

terms and conditions for a standby pool, rather 

than reach separate agreements with individual 

forces - and the IPAB could take the lead in this. 

15 See para. Above 5.4 above and Canadian plans for use of retired 

officers at para. 4.50 

5.38 The additional investment in creating a 

standby pool would need to be matched by the 

development of more effective and longer term 

predictive planning of deployments. 

The size of the pool and the time officers would 

spend in it, would need to be determined by assured 

deployment and funding strategies. Management 

of officers’ expectations, and critically the credibility 

and reputation of the operation, would be severely 

compromised if deployments remained essentially 

reactive and ad hoc. 

Standing Capacity 

5.39 Above a standby pool would be a standing 

capacity. It is important when assessing the 

Australian model to recognise that fundamental 

to the development of the IDG has been the 

requirement to provide the bulk, or at least the core, 

of operational and developmental policing capacity 

to failed or failing states in their neighbourhood. 

5.40 With no comparable imperative, it is 

questionable whether such a model provides 

an efficient and cost effective method for the 

UK’s support to conflict related policing. It can 

be seen from the Australian model that funding 

requirements are substantial (and a UK standing 

capacity would have to be developed from scratch, 

unlike the IDG which was a development of a 

role and capacity which the AFP was already 

undertaking), as are the staffing requirements – 

approximately 300 Australia based staff supporting 

a maximum of 900 deployable staff. 

5.41 Beyond issues of funding and political 

imperative however, is the question of whether the 

UK police service could support a standing capacity 

of this nature. Significantly the Associations of Chief 

Police Constables, believe that the structures of the 

UK police service mean that a standing capacity 

would be unworkable and unsustainable. 

30


5.42 If a standing capacity is not viable as the The police service are clear that under current 

overall model, is there a need for a standing resource and establishment conditions, such 

element to the UK’s capacity? Consideration of numbers would be unrealistic for the UK. 

this requirement has been ongoing for some time Nevertheless recent recruitment drives have resulted 

by the MOD, MDP and partners, particularly in in far more volunteers than policy priorities and 

regard to a capacity to work alongside UK military funding limits allow to be deployed (albeit that 

components in operations such as the ongoing UK large numbers of officers do not meet the skills 

effort in Helmand. 

and rank requirements for the many of roles we 

currently support). 

5.43 The IDG Operational Response Group could 

provide a model for such an element, but key to 5.46 In short, although all contributors are agreed 

consideration of this would be the required role, that quality is more important than quantity, 

capacities and size of the element and the likely the UK could deploy more officers to more 

sustained demand for its deployment. Funding, missions, given the demand, political direction and 

training and equipping requirements would be funding availability. 

substantial, and could be called into question 

if sustained demand to deploy the element did 

International Capacities 

not arise. Equally the costs of establishing and 5.47 Recent research papers from the Institute for 

maintaining such a capacity (the current annual Public Policy Research 17 and the Henry L. Stimpson 

cost of the Operational Response Group 16 is Centre 18 have proposed the development of new 

approximately equivalent to our current total reserve (standby) and standing capacities for the 

annual spend on conflict related policing 

EU and UN respectively. The first of these proposes 

deployments) would have to be balanced within the creation of an EU reserve capacity of 2,000 

the resource envelope for the overall conflict trained civilian specialists who would operate much 

related policing capacity. 

like military reservists. Police expertise is recognised 

as a key functional area of such a reserve, but the 

Scale of UK Capacity 

paper does not indicate what proportion of the 

5.44 The number of officers we deploy and the 

2,000 would be police. Neither does it indicate 

number of missions in which we engage, will 

how national police would be recruited and kept 

continue to be determined by political priorities, 

within the reserve, although it does recognise 

overall conflict related funding limits and resource 

that different arrangements would be required 

availability within the police service. 

compared to the private sector experts who might 

join. 

5.45 Some countries have set a target of 1% of 

their police service establishment available for 

5.48 The Stimpson Centre paper proposes three 

conflict related international policing, which would 

new capacities for the UN: A Standing Rule of Law 

equate to over 1,400 officers in UK terms. 

Capacity (ROLCAP) of 400 experts (275 police) to 

plan, deploy and lead new missions, and support 

16 other ongoing missions; a UN Police Reserve (UNPR) 

See para 4.27 above 

of 16,200 officers, allowing for 5,000 deployed 

and 11,200 on reserve at any given time, with 

31

contributing states given financial incentives for 

placing officers on reserve, and; a Senior Reserve 

Roster (UN SRR) of variable size providing senior 

(retired) police and rule of law experts willing to 

deploy at short notice in return for a small annual 

stipend. 

5.49 The UN is currently considering options to 

expand the existing Standing Police Capacity from 

it’s current 25 staff, to either 54 or 76, to provide a 

more robust mission planning and start up capacity. 

Also under consideration are proposals to expand 

the UN Police Division to provide more mission 

planning, management and support capacity. 

5.50 Over the last five years the UK has been 

closely involved in the development and 

establishment of new EU and UN capacities, (the 

EU Civilian Response Teams and Civilian Planning 

and Conduct Capacity, the UN Police Division and 

Standing Police Capacity) and we have seconded 

senior officers to their headquarters to work 

within these units. These roles are in effect 

force-multipliers and small numbers of high 

quality officers can have great impact on 

the development and management of more 

effective missions and the UK should prioritise 

opportunities to second officers to these types of 

roles, regardless of the scale of our deployments to 

missions. 

17 Korski, Daniel. Time for European Civilian Reserve - A submission 

to the ippr Commission on National Security for the 21st Century. 

Institute for PUblic Policy Research. London, October 2008. 

18 Joshua G.Smith, Victoria K. Holt and William J, Durch. Enhancing 

United Nations Capacity to support Post- Conflict Policing and 

Rule of Law. Henry L. Stimpson Center. Washington, November 2007 

5.51 Whether or not the EU and UN move towards 

development of international standby or standing 

forces, it should be recognised that they will not 

automatically address the issues of quality, quantity 

and availability identified earlier. International 

capacity will remain predicated on national 

capacities to release officers with the right skills 

within reasonable time frames. For the UK to 

contribute effectively to any future international 

capacity it must first develop more effective national 

systems and structures. 

Other Initiatives 

5.52 Recent developments in conflict related 

international policing have included an increased 

effort in partnership capacity building 

amongst police contributing countries. The 

UK, for example, has provided bilateral assistance 

to Bangladesh through training programmes for 

Bangladesh National Police deploying to Sudan. 

5.53 These bilateral initiatives are also potential 

force-multipliers, with the potential to provide 

better trained, equipped and regionally based 

officers to missions. The UK police service is a world 

leader in police training and development and our 

UK model of conflict related international policing 

should seek further opportunities to deliver this type 

of capacity. 

Concluding Matters and Recommendation 

5.54 Some of the options above are obviously 

alternative choices, for example the choice between 

developing standby or standing cadres. However, 

the majority would need to be implemented 

comprehensively to improve the effectiveness of the 

UK’s contribution to conflict related international 

policing. Selective implementation of individual 

measures would be unlikely to address the gaps which 

currently limit the effectiveness of the UK model. 

32


5.55 Currently there are severe constraints on 

conflict related funding, and it is apparent that 

many of the options identified above have financial, 

and broader resource implications. As such 

implementation of options which require additional 

funding and resources may not be feasible in the 

immediate term. However, that should not prevent 

work being initiated to fully develop those options. 

In the IPAB the UK has, for the first time, a body 

which brings together all police and government 

partners involved in conflict related policing, and 

it is therefore recommended that the IPAB is 

requested to commission work to further 

develop the options set out above. 

5.56 Once all options are fully developed Ministers 

will be able to direct implementation of measures 

to improve the effectiveness of UK support once 

resources are available, or alternatively to direct 

that resources should be made available more 

immediately to implement those measures. 

33

ANNEX A 

List of Contributors 

Tony Anderson, Programme Manager, Peace 

Keeping & Operations Group, Canadian Department 

of Foreign Affairs & International Trade 

Phil Batson, Europe Directorate General, FCO 

Chief Superintendent David Beer, Director 

General International Policing, Royal Canadian 

Mounted Police 

Inspector (Ret) Alan Birtwhistle, Former 

Secondee UN Police Division and UNAMID 

Dr Sylvie Bourgois, Head of Health Services, 

International Peace Operations Branch, Royal 

Canadian Mounted Police 

Assistant Chief Constable Maureen Brown, 

Strategic Advisor, EU Civilian Planning and Conduct 

Capability 

Mr Angus Campbell, Under Secretary of State, 

Australian Department of the Prime Minister and 

Cabinet. 

Andrew Carpenter, Chief of Strategic Policy and 

Development Section, Police Division UN DPKO 

Assistant Chief Constable Robert Chidley 

Ministry of Defence Police 

Dr. Michael Clark, Assistant Head of Defence 

Security, Physical Security and Policing Policy 

Ministry of Defence 

Doug Coates, Director, International Peace 

Operations Branch, Royal Canadian Mounted Police 

Keith Colver, Manager of Secondees, Victoria 

State Police. 

Assistant Chief Constable Geoffery Cooper 

Chief Police Advisor Iraq 

Mr. Jason Cresswell, Programme Analyst, 

International Deployment Group, Australian Federal 

Police 

Gillian Dare Conflict Advisor Liberia FCO 

Assistant Chief Constable Ken Deane Head of 

Operations EU CPCC and former Deputy Head of 

Mission EUPOL Afghanistan 

Superintendent (Ret) Brian Donley Chief Adviser 

to SIPA and UK Contingent Commander 

EUPM Bosnia 

Birgitta Ekelund Police and Justice Adviser , 

Sweden Mission to the UN 

Kurt Eyre Head of International Academy, National 

Police Improvement Agency 

Superintendent Colin Farquhar, Police Adviser, 

Canadian Mission to the UN 

Major General Giuliano Ferrari Police Adviser, 

Italian Mission to the UN 

Inspector Pat Flanagan Operations Support Dept, 

International Peace Operations Branch 

Sir Ronnie Flanagan Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector 

of Constabulary 

Roy Fleming Police and Justice Advisor, 

Stabilisation Unit 

Mr David Freeman, Planning and Development, 


Police 

34


Superintendent Ian Grant, Her Majesty’s Chief 

Inspectorate of Constabulary 

Sergeant Geoff Halmarick, Victoria State Police. 

Nick Harvey, UK Mission to the UN, FCO 

Mr. John Hawkins, IDG Human Resources, 


Police 

Sue Hay, Head of International Police Assistance, 

Home Office 

Superintendent Peter Henningsen, Coordinator 

Learning and Development, International 

Deployment Group Australian Federal Police 

Superintendent Michael Jarratt, Australian 

Defence College 

Chief Inspector Paul Jordan, Ministry of Defence 

Police 

Commander Jo Kaye, Her Majesty’s Chief 

Inspectorate of Constabulary 

Mr. Nicholas Kean Police Operations and 

Doctrine, International Deployment Group, 

Australian Federal Police 

Chief Constable Ian Latimer, International Affairs 

Portfolio Holder, Association of Chief Police Officers 

of Scotland 

Deputy Commissioner (Ret) Odd Malme, Police 

Adviser, Norwegian Mission to the UN 

Richard McCurry, Police Adviser , USA Mission to 

the UN 

Superintendent Tim Meaklim, International 

Academy, National Police Improvement Agency 

Chief Superintendent (Ret) Bill Morrell former 

Commissioner Solomon Islands Police former Senior 

Advisor Republika Srpska EUPM, former Head of 

Mentors EUPOL Afghanistan 

Mr Allen Mortensen, Manager, International 

Deployment Group, Australian Federal Police 

Dr Tony Murney, Rule of Law, International 

Deployment Group, Australian Federal Police 

Ann- Marie Orler, Deputy Police Adviser, Police 

Division UN DPKO 

Lou Perrotta, Rule of Law Advisor, Stabilisation 

Unit 

Chief Constable Colin Port, International Affairs 

Portfolio Holder Association of Chief Police Officers 

and Chair of the International Police Assistance 

Board 

Assistant Commissioner Frank Prendergast, 

National Manager, International Deployment Group 


Commander Justine Saunders, Police Attache, 

Australian Mission to the UN 

Commander Alan Scott, Melbourne Office, 


Inspector Chris Sharwood-Smith, UNAMID 

Police Training Coordinator, UK Mission to the UN 

Lt Colonel Nick Slinger, Assistant Military 

Attache, UK Mission to the UN 

35

ANNEX B 

Select Bibliography 

Assistant Chief Constable (Ret) Colin Smith, 

Head of EUCOPPS Palestine and Former Chief Police 

Advisor Iraq 

Lt Colonel Ulrich Spannuth, Deputy Military 

Adviser, German Mission to the UN 

Keith Staniforth, Coordinator Operational 

Response Group, International Deployment Group 


Jeanette Stovell, Deputy Director, Peace 

Operations Policy Canadian Department of Foreign 

Affairs & International Trade 

Mr Dave Turner, A/Manager Corporate Services, 


Police 

Chief Superintendent K.H. Weidner, Police 

Adviser, German Mission to the UN 

Ata Yenigun, Specialist Assistant, Police Division 

UN DPKO 

Baker, Bruce. The African post-conflict policing 

agenda in Sierra Leone?. Conflict, Security & 

Development, 6, 1, 25-50. International Policy 

Institute King’s College London. London, 2006. 

Baker, Bruce. Conflict and African Police Culture: 

The Cases of Uganda, Rwanda, Sierra Leone. Book 

chapter, M. O’Neil and M. Marks, (eds.) Police 

Occupational Culture: New Debates and Directions, 

2007, Oxford: Elsevier Science. 

Bayley, David H. Democratizing the Police 

Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It. U.S. 

Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, 

National Institute of Justice. Washington, DC, 2001. 

Collantes, Celador, G. Police Reform: 

Peacebuilding through Democratic Policing?. 

International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 364- 

376, 2005. 

Center for Excellence in Stability Police 

Units. The Future Roles for Stability Police Units. 

Workshop Report. Washington, DC., April 2005. 

Challenges Project. Meeting the Challenges of 

Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination. 

Folke Bernadotte Academy. Stockholm, 2005. 

Creating safer communities, Lessons from 

South Eastern Europe. Balkan Youth Union, 

Centre For Security Studies, Civil, Forum For Civic 

Initiatives and Saferworld. London, 2006. 

Cutillo, Alberto. International Assistance To 

Countries Emerging From Conflict: A Review of 

Fifteen Years of Interventions and the Future of 

Peacebuilding. International Peace Academy. New 

York, 2006. 

36


Dahrendorf, Nicola et. al. A Review of 

Peace Operations: A Case for Change Overall 

Introduction and Synthesis Report. Conflict, 

Security and Development Group, King’s College 

London. London, March 2003. 

Daniel, Donald C. F. Whither Peace Operations? 

United States Institute of Peace. Washington, DC, 

2008. 

Durch, William J. et. al. The Brahimi Report 

and the Future of UN Peace Operations. Henry L. 

Stimpson Center. Washington, DC, 2003. 

Durch, William J and Berkman, Tobias C. Who 

Should Keep the Peace? Providing Security for 

Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations. Henry L. 

Stimpson Center. Washington, DC, 2006. 

Earle, Caroline R. European Capacities for Peace 

Operations: Taking Stock. Henry L. Stimpson 

Center. Washington, DC, 2004. 

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Peace 

support operations. Information and guidance 

for UK police personnel. London, 2007. 

Fullilove, Dr. Michael. The Testament of 

Solomons: RAMSI and International State- 

Building. Lowy Institute for International Policy. 

Sydney, NSW, 2006. 

Groenewald, Hesta and Peake, Gordon. Police 

Reform through Community-Based Policing- 

Philosophy and Guidelines for Implementation. 

Report of a Conference hosted by International 

Peace Academy and Saferworld. New York, 

September 2004. 

Hansen, Annika S. and Wiharta, Sharon. 

The Transition to a Just Order –Establishing 

Local Ownership after Conflict. Folke Bernadotte 

Academy. Stockholm, 2007. 

Hurwitz, Agnes and Studdard, Kaysie. Rule of 

Law Programs in Peace Operations. International 

Peace Academy. New York, 2005. 

International Crisis Group. Reforming 

Afghanistan’s Police. Asia Report N°138, 2007. 

Jones, Seth G., Wilson, Jeremy M., Rathmell, 

Andrew and Riley, K. Jack. Establishing Law and 

Order After Conflict. Rand Infrastructure, Safety, and 

Environment (Organization). Virginia, 2005. 

Khadiagala, Gilbert M. Eastern Africa: Security 

and the Legacy of Fragility. International Peace 

Institute. New York, 

2008 

Korski, Daniel. Time for a European Civilian 

Reserve - A submission to the ippr Commission on 

National Security for the 21st Century. Institute for 

Public Policy Research. London, October 2008. 

Levine, Daniel H. African Civilian Police Capacity 

For International Peacekeeping Operations. Henry 

L. Stimpson Center. Washington, February 2008. 

Mani, Dr. Rama. Policing in Post-Conflict 

Situations. Concept Paper for Whitehall Policy 

Seminar. London, 2003. 

Marenin, Otwin. Restoring Policing Systems 

in Conflict Torn Nations: Process, Problems, 

Prospects. Geneva Centre for the Democratic 

Control of Armed Forces. Geneva, 2005. 

McFate, Sean. Securing the Future. A Primer on 

Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries. United 

States Institute of Peace. Washington, DC, 2008. 

37

Mobekk, Eirin. Identifying Lessons in United 

Nations International Policing Missions. Geneva 

Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. 

Geneva, 2005. 

Monk, Richard. End-of-Mission Report of the 

Seventh Police Commissioner 

of the United Nations’ International Police in 

Kosovo and the Kosovo Police Service. United 

Nations. Pristina, 2008. 

Muharremi, Robert et. al. Administration and 

Governance in Kosovo - Lesson learned and 

lessons to be learned. Kosovar Institute for Policy 

Research and Development. Prishtina/Geneva, June 

2005. 

O’Neill, William G. Police Reform in Post-Conflict 

Societies: What We Know and What We Still 

Need To Know. International Peace Academy. New 

York, 2005. 

Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William 

J. Durch. From Timor-Leste to Darfur: New 

Initiatives for Enhancing UN Civilian Policing 

Capacity. Henry L. Stimpson Center. Washington, 

DC, August 2007. 

Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William 

J. Durch. 

Henry L. Stimpson Center. Washington, DC, 

November 2007. 

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Capacity in Peacebuilding. United Nations. New 

York, 2006. 

Wilder, Andrew, Cops or Robbers? The Struggle 

to Reform the Afghan National Police, Afghan 

Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, July 2007. 

Perito, Robert M. The Coalition Provisional 

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Samuels, Kirsti. Rule of Law Reform in Post- 

Conflict Countries Operational Initiatives 

and Lessons Learnt. Conflict Prevention & 

Reconstruction, Social Development Department, 

The World Bank. Washington, DC, 2006. 

38


ANNEX C 

Conflict Related Policing Models 

in Other Countries 

Germany 

1. Germany has a tiered policing structure 

consisting of Federal and State police services, 

with a total policing strength of approximately 

270,000 officers. According to the constitution 

of the Federal Republic of Germany the states 

(Länder) have sovereignty in police matters within 

their territory. The constitution also provides central 

areas of law enforcement for original Federal 

authority. Due to this division of authority, Germany 

has 16 State police forces and two Federal law 

enforcement agencies, the Federal Criminal 

Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt) and the Federal 

Police (Bundespolizei). Germany participates in 

international police missions with both Federal as 

well as State police officers. 

2. At the Federal level the Bundeskriminalamt 

(approx. 5,000 staff) is Germany´s central agency 

for criminal investigation. In close cooperation with 

the State Authorities in Criminal Police Matters its 

functions are grouped into the areas as a central 

agency, investigation, protection and security and 

international cooperation. The Bundespolizei, with 

40,000 staff, including 32,000 police officers, 

carry out a wide range of Federal police tasks, in 

particular in the fields of the protection of borders, 

aviation security and railway policing. 

3. Each of the sixteen German States (Länder) 

have their own police service (Landespolizei) 

covering areas such as uniform and plainclothes 

operations, minor and serious crime investigations, 

operational support, special weapons and tactics, 

highway patrol and marine policing. Landespolizei 

officers are eligible to volunteer for international 

missions subject to the approval of their force. 

4. According to a decision of the Permanent 

Conference of the Ministers and Senators of the 

Interior in 1994, an “International Police Missions” 

common working group was installed between the 

Federal and State Ministries. This working group, 

chaired by North Rhine-Westphalia, created an 

“Office for Coordination of International Police 

Missions” located in the Federal Ministry of the 

Interior, and responsible for conceptual and 

coordination work. In March 2008 all aspects 

of policing deployments at the working level 

were rolled out to a new unit, the “Office for 

Coordination of International Police Missions” 

located at the Bundespolizei Headquarters in 

Potsdam. As a whole, thirteen officers work in this 

office (five in Federal Ministry of the Interior and 

eight at Bundespolizei Headquarters). 

5. Due to the constitution in Germany 

international relations, including international police 

missions, are Federal affairs. Deployments to peace 

operations require a formal decision of the Federal 

Government. The decision making is incumbent in 

the portfolio of Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

(Auswärtiges Amt). The German Parliament has to 

be informed about the forthcoming deployment. In 

advance of every engagement of Police in a peace 

mission the Federal authorities will contact the State 

authorities if determine whether they intend to 

participate. 

6. Both Federal and State officers are deployed on 

a volunteer basis. The latter are seconded to the 

Federal police for the duration of their deployment 

but continue to be paid by their own force. Federal 

authorities cover some of the additional costs 

Pre-deployment training is delivered at three police 

centres across Germany and consists of two weeks 

generic training, followed by one week of mission 

specific training. 

7. Germany does not maintain pool of pretrained 

officers, but recruits to deploy according 

39

to a general profile. Officers are deployed for a 

maximum of one year and must return to force for 

at least a year before they may be deployed again. 

Germany currently has approximately 280 officers 

deployed overseas to thirteen missions including 

Afghanistan, Kosovo, Sudan and Liberia. 

8. Domestic priorities mean there are difficulties 

in recruiting officers and there are no current plans 

for an extraordinary increase in numbers deployed. 

Instead there is a focus on developing quality over 

quantity, particularly in the area of capacity building 

and development skills. Two other key themes are 

bilateral capacity building with partners (particularly 

in Africa) to assist other contributing countries to 

deploy more/better, and the building of a more 

comprehensive approach on the ground. 

Norway 

9. Norway has a single police service led by 

a National Commissioner and National Police 

Directorate (NPD) within the Ministry of Justice and 

Police (MJP). The police service consists of 27 Police 

Districts, each led by a Chief of Police and several 

specialist national units, and has a total of 12,000 

employees. 

10. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and 

MJP, advised by the NPD, have joint policy lead for 

international policing contributions, and Deputy 

Ministers from these departments meet at least 

once a year to set strategic policy and decide on 

engagements. Norway’s strategic priorities focus on 

countries which may impact on its national interests 

- e.g. the Balkans and Afghanistan - and countries 

where humanitarian issues dictate engagement - 

e.g. Sudan. Norway prioritises engagement with 

UN operations over third country engagement in 

EU missions, due to its limited ability to influence 

EU policy. 

11. Operational policy, based on the advice of 

the NPD, is to focus resources on priority missions, 

rather than spread officers thinly across numerous 

missions, in order to have more impact. An earlier 

policy decision determined that Norway would 

deploy up to a maximum of 1% of its police 

establishment (at the time total police strength 

was 8,500) meaning that the country will deploy 

a maximum of 85 officers. Currently 72 officers 

are deployed to missions including Afghanistan, 

Kosovo, Sudan, Liberia, East Timor, EU missions, 

OSCE and TIPH Hebron. 

12. Deployments are managed and supported by 

a dedicated “Civpol” unit within the International 

Department of the NPD (the International 

Department also deals with non-conflict related 

capacity building). The unit consists of five officers 

and is funded from the regular police budget. The 

MFA owns the police deployments budget (currently 

set at approximately £10 million) and the “Civpol” 

unit is allowed to use up to 1% of this to cover 

additional administrative costs. 

13. The unit runs once yearly recruitment 

campaigns, and interviews and selects volunteers 

centrally. Successful volunteers receive a two week 

training course, based on UN standard training 

modules, and are then placed in a deployment pool 

for a maximum of one year before deployment, 

remaining in post until called on to deploy. 

14. Costs and salaries for deploying officers are 

paid from the MFA owned deployments budget. 

District Chiefs of Police can use the vacancy 

fundings to employ others or use it for other means. 

15. Norway experiences some problems recruiting 

senior officers for deployment, and recognise that 

they need to better communicate the professional 

benefits of deployments to Chiefs of Police. They 

40


are seeking opportunities to develop international 

leadership and crisis management skills in their 

police service, including through short term 

secondments to international organisations. They 

believe that contributing countries should do more 

to develop a stronger community of international 

policing expertise, for example by posting police 

advisors/attaches to their UN permanent missions. 

Sweden 

16. Sweden also has a single police service 

consisting of the National Police Board (NPB) 

led by a National Commissioner and 21 County 

Police Departments each headed by a County 

Police Commissioner. The Swedish Police service is 

expanding from approximately 18,500 officers at 

present to a target of 20,000 by 2010. 

17. The NPB, an agency of the Ministry of Justice 

(MOJ), is the central administrative body for the 

police service, and also hosts the National Criminal 

Investigation Department, the Swedish Security 

Service and the National Laboratory of Forensic 

Science. County Police Departments have a large 

degree of independence, each with a County Police 

Authority consisting of the Commissioner and local 

policitians appointed by the Swedish Government. 

18. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs owns the 

budget for the deployment of police officers to 

international missions, and works on a continuing 

basis to agree policy and priorities with the MOJ, 

which has responsibility for administrative and 

operational delivery of deployments. Although there 

is a policy decision to deploy up to 1% of the police 

service on international duties, the average number 

of officers deployed over the last 5 years has been 

approximately 100. 

19. Swedish officers are currently deployed to 

18 UN, EU and OSCE missions. The largest single 

deployment is to Kosovo, and over a third of all 

deployments are to African missions. Officers are 

also posted to the permanent missions to the UN 

and EU. Swedish officers currently occupy the posts 

of Deputy Police Advisor in the UN Police Division 

and Police Commissioner in the UN mission in 

Liberia. 

20. Sweden does not have a standing capacity, but 

recruits volunteers from across the police service 

on an annual basis. Operational management 

and support of all aspects of deployments is 

carried out by a unit within the National Criminal 

Investigation Department - the Swedish Police 

Support Operations (SPSO), with 18 staff, funded 

from the regular police budget. Actual deployment 

and mission costs are funded from the MFA budget 

for deployments. 

21. County Police Commissioners, whose authority 

is required for the release of officers, are not paid 

to backfill posts vacated by deployed officers. 

This together with a focus on domestic policing 

issues and a view amongst individual officers 

that international policing does not advance 

careers, leads to recruitment difficulties. Better 

communication strategies are being developed to 

overcome these difficulties. Others areas under 

consideration are the development of mission 

assessment and planning capabilities and policy on 

duty of care issues. 

Italy 

22. Policing in Italy is carried out by a number of 

separate services, at national, regional, provincial 

and municipal levels, with a total of over 320,000 

police officers. At the national level the principal 

police services are the Carabinieri, the State Police 

(Polizia di Stato) and the Financial Guards (Guardia 

41

di Finanza). The Carabinieri and State Police each 

contain approximately 110,000 officers and the 

Financial Guards 68,000. 

23. Often referred to as para-military, the 

Carabinieri is in fact a full military force and one 

of the four branches of the Italian Armed Forces, 

alongside the Army, Navy and Air Force. In 

addition to its military and military policing duties, 

the Carabinieri also has a civilian policing role 

throughout Italy, with territorial responsibilities at 

regional and provincial levels. The force falls under 

the Ministry of Defence, although it also reports to 

the Ministry of Interior concerning civilian policing 

issues. 

24. The State Police is a civilian force under the 

Ministry of Interior, organised on a regional and 

provincial basis. Both the Carabinieri and State 

Police undertake a full range of policing roles 

throughout the country, although approximately 

two thirds of all domestic police activities in Italy 

are performed by the Carabinieri, thanks to their 

territorial organization, based on more than 4,700 

Carabinieri stations. The Financial Guards are 

responsible for investigating economic crimes, and 

for border policing and customs functions. The 

Financial Guards are a military force, with a military 

organization but except in times of war, they report 

directly to the Minister of Economic Affairs rather 

than the Defence Ministry. 

25. Strategic coordination between the various 

police forces is achieved through a national 

Committee for Public Order and Security, and this 

committee is replicated at provincial level. 

Ministries fund the police forces under their 

respective command, including for international 

duties. Deployment priorities are agreed between 

Ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

26. The majority of Italian police deployments to 

conflict related missions have been Carabinieri units 

operating under military command and control, 

with a range of military and policing tasks. Up 

to 1,000 Carabinieri have been deployed in the 

past, and as of March 2009 approximately more 

than 450 Carabinieri are deployed under military 

command to NATO or EU missions, with 250 

more deployed in civilian policing missions (EU, 

UN, multilateral and bilateral missions). In addition 

about 100 more police officers from the Financial 

Guards and from the State Police are deployed in 

these civilian policing missions. 

27. Italy does not currently have a central unit 

coordinating and managing deployments, each 

Ministry and police force manages their own 

operations, but the establishment of such a unit is 

now under consideration. 

USA 

28. Policing in the United States is carried out by 

forces at federal, state, city/municipal and county 

levels and by specialised agencies. According 

to figures for 2004, over 17,000 state and 

local agencies, and nine major federal agencies 

employed over 800,000 sworn law enforcement 

officers. No policing agency, federal or otherwise, 

has been given responsibility for conflict related 

policing, and in fact the country has developed 

a unique model of contracting out policing 

contributions to the private sector. 

29. The US State Department leads on policy 

and funding. No overarching deployments or 

“peacekeeping” fund exists, instead funding is 

allocated on a country by country basis, and is 

subject to congressional approval. Once policy for 

engagement has been decided, and congressional 

funding approval obtained, State Department issues 

42


contract tenders for the recruitment, deployment 

and management of police officers. Typically these 

contracts have been taken up by large corporations 

such as DynCorp and SAIC. 

30. Most recruits are retired officers, or officers on 

leave of absence, or who have resigned from their 

parent agencies. The State Department exercises 

quality control by vetting staff put forward by 

the contractors, to ensure for example that they 

have been out of active service for no more than 

5 years. Candidates’ details are then passed on to 

the mission organisation (e.g. UN) for interview 

and selection. Successful candidates are given 

pre-deployment training, equipment and logistical 

support immediately prior to deployment, by the 

contracting company. 

31. Funding and contracting mechanisms are such 

that the US cannot rapidly deploy officers, however 

they have deployed large numbers to UN missions 

and other operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan 

- until the drawdown of the UN mission in Kosovo 

the US was amongst the top ten contributors of 

police to UN missions. 

43

ANNEX D 

2005 Strategic Task Force Outcomes 

INTERNATIONAL POLICING: ‘GUIDING 

PRINCIPLES’ 

Preventing and resolving conflict and supporting 

peace are central to the UK’s ability to guarantee 

its security and to help reduce suffering and 

bring stability to some of the most volatile places 

on earth. The UK works with the international 

community to achieve these objectives, most visibly 

by contributing to peace support operations in 

places like Iraq, Sudan and Kosovo. 

The evolution of peace operations over the past 

twenty years has seen significantly increased 

recognition of the role of law and order in 

reducing the chance of conflict in fragile states 

and supporting the transition from conflict to 

peace elsewhere. The policing, and by extension 

rule of law, element of such missions has, as 

a consequence, become ever more vital to 

the success or otherwise of the international 

community’s efforts. 

For that reason, the UK has re-examined its 

commitment to providing a scarce but highly 

regarded resource - British police officers – and 

sought to capture some principles that will 

guide our policing engagement in international 

operations now and over the next five years: 

> We will make an enduring commitment to 

international policing. It has become an integral 

part of conflict management and provides us 

with an opportunity to tackle new threats to our 

security – from terrorism and organised crime in 

particular – where they are created 

We will make available up to 475 police personnel 

to take part in international missions and to plan 

ahead – to create a rolling two-year estimate of the 

UK’s likely future commitment 

> We will work directly with policing experts 

in the UN, EU and other organisations to 

build their capacity to respond to the growing 

complexity of conflicts around the world, to plan 

effectively, and to ensure mission mandates and 

structures take full account of the importance of 

security sector reform 

We will create an assessment and planning team, 

with expertise in policing and security sector 

reform, which will anticipate and prioritise future 

needs, undertake joint planning with military 

and civilian actors, and support the efforts of 

international organisations accordingly 

> We will reflect the changing nature of 

policing in peace support operations – the 

doctrinal shift from observing and reporting to 

building institutional police capacity. In effect, a 

move to a response based on quality rather than 

quantity 

We will seek to make available more senior officers 

who can provide strategic leadership and influence 

the direction of missions in the field. We will source 

more expert officers who can mentor, reform and 

train indigenous forces in specific skills 

> We will maximise the benefits to the UK of 

overseas deployments, in terms of enhanced 

security, better intelligence, and greater 

relevance to domestic policing priorities 

We will create an International Police Steering 

Committee which will oversee and evaluate the 

UK’s contribution to peace support operations. It 

will seek the opinions of Chief Constables on the 

usefulness in operational terms of information 

gathered on missions 

44


> We will seek to maximise the benefit to 

individual officers of overseas deployments 

thereby ensuring that the additional skills and 

command experience gained overseas are 

properly recognised and used to full advantage 

wherever possible on return 

We will reflect service overseas in the police 

competence framework (critical to promotion and 

job moves), and explore the option of a guaranteed 

interview for posts for which officers are qualified 

on their return. We will also give a standard award 

to all officers in recognition of the often difficult 

and dangerous conditions in which they work 

and the value attributed to participation in peace 

support operations 

> We will raise the profile of international 

policing within the UK to improve 

recognition and understanding among key 

stakeholders 

We will communicate the practical achievements 

of UK officers in missions to a wide audience, 

including other Government Departments, Chief 

Constables, interested politicians, and relevant 

media 

> We will develop further diversity in the police 

personnel we deploy, and quantify the value 

to officers of the challenging environments in 

which they work overseas 

We will build on the existing relationship with 

police forces’ human resource departments to 

widen further the pool of volunteers. We will also 

ensure the lessons learnt from working in majority 

Muslim, African or other societies and in a range of 

demanding environments and situations are fully 

applied and shared on return to the UK. 

45

Stephen Chambers 

Head of International Policing Policy Conflict Group 

Foreign and Commonwealth Office © 2009 United Kingdom 

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. All rights reserved. 

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in 

a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any 

means, mechanical, electronic, recording or otherwise 

without prior written permission of the publisher, the United 

Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Permission 

can be obtained by emailing cig-enquiries@fco.gov.uk or by 

telephoning +44 (0)20 7008 6227 / 3721. 

www.fco.gov.uk

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