The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY

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Transl ator' s I ntro duction Translator's I ntroduction sciousness remains, a consciousness which is in contrast with individual consciousness in the natural world. This transcendental or pure consciousness includes a subject, an act, and an object. Husierl emphasizes that consciousness is always active and always direcred toward something. This active directedness he calls jntentionality. The subject of consciousness is what wills, perceives, remembers, knows, evaluates, fantasizes. 'fhe act is the willing, perceiving. etc. The object, called "intenrional object" '.phin()menon, is what is willed, perceived. ln order to talk in this or rnay, it is not necessary to state that the phenomenon exists any_ where but in consciousness. Furthermore, Husserl intends the designation "transcendental" to indicate that this consciousness is fundamental to any natural scientific effort because it prescribes what knowledge of the narural world must include. It is intersub_ jective in the same sense that natural science is. In other words, the phenomenologist's description of consciousness is verifiable by other people who are employing his method. Husserl clearly is referring to Descartes' "Cogito, ergo sum,' in stating that pure consciousness is what is known indubitably. -I.he area of'certain knowledge is that of consciousness. It now becomes important not to confuse Husserl's ,,phenomenon" with the usual designation of phenomena as appearances or rellections from objects. Husserl has no such intentions. pure consciousness is concerned with a realm of objects which are the same objects existing in the natural world. It only has a different "standpoint" in regard ro them. Answering the question of frow knon,ledge is possible in the most general sense, Husserl maintains that a reduction to phe_ nomena in an orderly manner is necessary. phenomenologists must intuit the field of investigation so that the exact nature of the radical change from the nitural standpoint and of the limits of'the descriptive undertaking may become perf'ectly clear. Husserl calls this a methodological necessity and ihus thereduction is called the phenomenological reduction. When this reduction has Decn made, the phenomenologist is in a position to intuit the esse_lce or eidos of phenomena. Husserl calls this special kind of act Wesenschauung (intuition of essence). E. Stein in the dissertation here presented takes the phenom_ xvll he radical viewpoint of phenomenology is presented by .I'his Edmund Husserl inhis ldeas.:' viewpoint seems quite simple at first, but becomes exceedingly complex and involves intricate distinctions when attempts are made to apply it to actual problems. Therefbre, it may be well to attempt a short statement of this position in order to note the general problems with which it is dealing as well as the method of solution which it proposes. I shall emphasize the elements of phenomenology which seem most relevant to E. Stein's work. Husserl deals with two traditional philosophical questions, and in answerin€i them, develops the method of phenomenological reduction which he maintains is the basis of all science. -fhese questions are, "What is it that can be known without doubt?" and "How is this knowledge possible in the most general sense?" In the tradition of idealism he takes consciousness as the area to be investigated. He posits nothing about the natural world. He puts it in "brackets," as a portion of an algebraic formula is put in brackets, and makes no use of the material within these brackets. 'I'his does not mean that the "real" world does not exist, he says emphatically; it only means that this existence is a presupposition which must be suspended to achieve pure description. It should be noted that the existence of most essences as well as that of things or facts is suspended in this bracketing. Clear knowledge of'the existence of the idea of a thing transcendent to consciousness is just as impossible as clear knowledge of the existence of natural objects, Husserl maintains.'' But what can pclssibly remain when things and essences have been suspended? Husserl says that a realm of'transcendental conxvl
xvlll Edith Stein enological standpoint. She claims that the description o{'emPathy withiri cor-rsciousness afier the suspensior.r of the existence of empathy must be the basis {or any other dealings with the problem ty psy.hologists, sociologists, or biologists' 'I'he description she n-rakes is a description of the pure transcel)dental phenomenou as it is observed from the special standpoint described above' It is impm the zero poinr of orientation (i.e., from me) than the hand itself. In this case, the living body itself is rhe cenrer of orientation and the stone is at a distance from it. T'his means that the distance of the parts of my living body from me is completely trtcomparable with the distance of'foreign physical bodies from me.lo Let us consider for a moment the lrroblem that this notion of a zero point of'
Page 1 and 2: The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN
Page 3 and 4: vi Edith Stein 4. -I'he Controversy
Page 5 and 6: l,,,n .n. undersrandi ,r,rlno.u.!r,
Page 7: xiv Edith Stein problem of empathy
Page 11 and 12: xxii Edith Stein Tr an s I ato r' s
Page 13 and 14: ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY Foreword
Page 15 and 16: 4 Edith Stein What t an be leli if
Page 17 and 18: 8 Edith Stem primordially given, i'
Page 19 and 20: I2> 12 Edith Stein physical individ
Page 21 and 22: 16 Edith Stein Br.rt it seenls to m
Page 23 and 24: 20 Edith Stein The Essence of Acts
Page 25 and 26: 24 Edith Stein cheer me up.) Here,
Page 27 and 28: 28 Edith Stein experiences we only
Page 29 and 30: \JUl clearlt conscious motive for
Page 31 and 32: Chapter III The Constitution of the
Page 33 and 34: 40 Edith Stein soul. But, as we alr
Page 35 and 36: 44 Edith Stein usually comes up in
Page 37 and 38: 48 Edith Stein The psychic is in es
Page 39 and 40: 2 Edith Stein f unloading very well
Page 41 and 42: Edith Stein Constitution of the P s
Page 43 and 44: Edith Stein by empathic presentatio
Page 45 and 46: 62 Edith Stein as a physical bocly
Page 47 and 48: 66 Edith Stein (h) The Foreign Liui
Page 49 and 50: 7() 7'dith Stein n o n - p sy c h i
Page 51 and 52: 74 Edith Stein C onstitution of the
Page 53 and 54: 78 Edith stein Constitution of the
Page 55 and 56: 82 Edith Stent Wehavealreadyportray
Page 57 and 58: Edith Stein C onstitution of the P
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Chapter IV Empathy as the Understan
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105> Edith Stein absolutely as the
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98 Edith Stein 3. The Constitution
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02 Edith Stein Empathy as the Under
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106 Edith Stein center or the "1" k
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I l0 Edith Stein teristic:s to be d
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ll4 Edith Stein Empatfu as the Unde
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l 18 Edith Stein taken so literally
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1r, Edith Stein l{otes t23 phenomen
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2b Edith Stein ?q na cit..p.57f. '
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130 Edith Stein experiences is plai
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134 phenomenological reduction xiv,
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The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY

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