The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY

Edith Stein
C onstitution of the P slcho-P hlsicaL I ndiuidual 87
ligible to me, including those unfamiliar up to rhar point. For
example, I can understand a furious laugh. Thus, too, I can
understand the tail rvagging of a dog as an expression of.joy if its
appearance and its behal'ior othenvise disclose such {'eelinqs and
its situation warrants them.
(n) The Constitution of the Psychic Indiaidual and lts Signifcance
for the Correction of Empathl
But the possibility of correction goes furtl'rer. I not only interpret
single experiences and single-meaning contexts, but I take
them as announcements of individual attributes and their bearers,
just as I take my own experiences in inner perception. I not
only con'rprehend an actual feeling in the friendly glance, but
Iriendliness as an habitual attribute. An outburst of anger reveals
a "vehement temperament" to me. In him who penetrates an
intricate association I comprehend sagacity, etc. possibly these
attributes are constituted for me in a whole series of corroborating
and correcting empathic acts. Bur having thus gotren a picture
ofthe foreign "character" as a unity of these attributes, this
itself serves me as a point of departure for the verification of
further empathic acts. If someone tells me about a dishonest act
by a person I have recognized as honest, I u'ill not believe him.
And, as in single experiences, there are also meaning contexts
among personal attributes. There are essentially congenial and
essentiallt, uncongenial attributes. A truly' good man cannot be
vindictive; a sympathetic person, not cruel; a candid person, not
"diplomatic," etc. Thus rve comprehend the unity of'a character
in each attribute, as \4'e comprehend the r.rnity of a thirrg in every
material attribute. Therein we possess a motivation for futtrre
experiences. This is how all the elements of the individual are
constituted fcrr us in empathic acts.
(o) Deceptions of Empathl
As in every experience, deceptions are here also possible. But
here, too, they can only be unmasked by the same kind of experiential
acts or else by inferences finally leading back to such acts as
their basis. Many instances have already shown us what sources
such deceptions can have. We come to false conclusions if'we
empathically take or-rr individual characteristic as a basis instead
of our typ.."' Examples are: if r.r'e ascribe our impressions of
color to the color-blind, our ability to judge to the cl-rild, our
aesthetic receptiveness to the uncultivated. If' empathy onll'
meant this kind of interpretation of foreign psychic life, one
would justifiably have to reject it, as Scheler does. But here he is
confronted with what he has reproached in other theories: He
has taken the case of deception as tl-le normal case.
But, as rve said, this deceptior) can only be removed again bv
empathv. If I empathize that the unmusical person has my enjoyment
of a Beethoven symphony, this deception will disappear as
soon as I look him in the face and see his expression o{'deadlv
boredom. \4Ie can make the same error, in principle, rvhen we
infer by analogy. Here our own actual, not typical, characteristic
fbrnrs the starting point, too. If I logically proceed from this, I do
not reach a deception (i.e., a supposed primordial givenness of
u'hat is r-rot actually present), but a false inference on the basis of'
the false premise. The result is the same in both cases: an absetrce
of what is really present. Certainly "common sense" cloes not take
"infererrce from oneself to others" as a usable means of reaching
knowledge of foreign psychic life.
In order to prevent such errors and deceptions, we need to be
constantly guided by ernpathy through outer perception. The
constitution of the fbreign individual is founded throughout on
the constitution of the physical body. 'Ihus the givenness in outer
perception of a physical body of a certain nature is a presupposition
for the givenness of a psvcho-physical individual. On the
other hand, we cannot take a single step beyond the physical body
through outer perception alone, but, as we saw, the individual is
only possible for a subject of the same tvpe. For example, a Irure
"I," for which no living body of its own and no psycho-physical
relationships are cor-rstituted primordially, could perhaps have all
kinds of objects given, but it could not perceive animated, living
bodies-living individuals. It is, of course, very difficult to decide
what is here a matter of fact and rvhat is necessary essentially.
This rerluires its oult investigation.