84 Edith Stein if . . . then, so that the givenness <strong>of</strong> one occurrence (be it psychic or physical) motivates a progressi
Edith Stein C onstitution <strong>of</strong> the P slcho-P hlsicaL I ndiuidual 87 ligible to me, including those unfamiliar up to rhar point. For example, I can understand a furious laugh. Thus, too, I can understand the tail rvagging <strong>of</strong> a dog as an expression <strong>of</strong>.joy if its appearance and its behal'ior othenvise disclose such {'eelinqs and its situation warrants them. (n) <strong>The</strong> Constitution <strong>of</strong> the Psychic Indiaidual and lts Signifcance for the Correction <strong>of</strong> Empathl But the possibility <strong>of</strong> correction goes furtl'rer. I not only interpret single experiences and single-meaning contexts, but I take them as announcements <strong>of</strong> individual attributes and their bearers, just as I take my own experiences in inner perception. I not only con'rprehend an actual feeling in the friendly glance, but Iriendliness as an habitual attribute. An outburst <strong>of</strong> anger reveals a "vehement temperament" to me. In him who penetrates an intricate association I comprehend sagacity, etc. possibly these attributes are constituted for me in a whole series <strong>of</strong> corroborating and correcting empathic acts. Bur having thus gotren a picture <strong>of</strong>the foreign "character" as a unity <strong>of</strong> these attributes, this itself serves me as a point <strong>of</strong> departure for the verification <strong>of</strong> further empathic acts. If someone tells me about a dishonest act by a person I have recognized as honest, I u'ill not believe him. And, as in single experiences, there are also meaning contexts among personal attributes. <strong>The</strong>re are essentially congenial and essentiallt, uncongenial attributes. A truly' good man cannot be vindictive; a sympathetic person, not cruel; a candid person, not "diplomatic," etc. Thus rve comprehend the unity <strong>of</strong>'a character in each attribute, as \4'e comprehend the r.rnity <strong>of</strong> a thirrg in every material attribute. <strong>The</strong>rein we possess a motivation for futtrre experiences. This is how all the elements <strong>of</strong> the individual are constituted fcrr us in empathic acts. (o) Deceptions <strong>of</strong> Empathl As in every experience, deceptions are here also possible. But here, too, they can only be unmasked by the same kind <strong>of</strong> experiential acts or else by inferences finally leading back to such acts as their basis. Many instances have already shown us what sources such deceptions can have. We come to false conclusions if'we empathically take or-rr individual characteristic as a basis instead <strong>of</strong> our typ.."' Examples are: if r.r'e ascribe our impressions <strong>of</strong> color to the color-blind, our ability to judge to the cl-rild, our aesthetic receptiveness to the uncultivated. If' empathy onll' meant this kind <strong>of</strong> interpretation <strong>of</strong> foreign psychic life, one would justifiably have to reject it, as Scheler does. But here he is confronted with what he has reproached in other theories: He has taken the case <strong>of</strong> deception as tl-le normal case. But, as rve said, this deceptior) can only be removed again bv empathv. If I empathize that the unmusical person has my enjoyment <strong>of</strong> a Beethoven symphony, this deception will disappear as soon as I look him in the face and see his expression o{'deadlv boredom. \4Ie can make the same error, in principle, rvhen we infer by analogy. Here our own actual, not typical, characteristic fbrnrs the starting point, too. If I logically proceed from this, I do not reach a deception (i.e., a supposed primordial givenness <strong>of</strong> u'hat is r-rot actually present), but a false inference on the basis <strong>of</strong>' the false premise. <strong>The</strong> result is the same in both cases: an absetrce <strong>of</strong> what is really present. Certainly "common sense" cloes not take "infererrce from oneself to others" as a usable means <strong>of</strong> reaching knowledge <strong>of</strong> foreign psychic life. In order to prevent such errors and deceptions, we need to be constantly guided by ernpathy through outer perception. <strong>The</strong> constitution <strong>of</strong> the fbreign individual is founded throughout on the constitution <strong>of</strong> the physical body. 'Ihus the givenness in outer perception <strong>of</strong> a physical body <strong>of</strong> a certain nature is a presupposition for the givenness <strong>of</strong> a psvcho-physical individual. On the other hand, we cannot take a single step beyond the physical body through outer perception alone, but, as we saw, the individual is only possible for a subject <strong>of</strong> the same tvpe. For example, a Irure "I," for which no living body <strong>of</strong> its own and no psycho-physical relationships are cor-rstituted primordially, could perhaps have all kinds <strong>of</strong> objects given, but it could not perceive animated, living bodies-living individuals. It is, <strong>of</strong> course, very difficult to decide what is here a matter <strong>of</strong> fact and rvhat is necessary essentially. This rerluires its oult investigation.
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The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN
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vi Edith Stein 4. -I'he Controversy
- Page 5 and 6: l,,,n .n. undersrandi ,r,rlno.u.!r,
- Page 7 and 8: xiv Edith Stein problem of empathy
- Page 9 and 10: xvlll Edith Stein enological standp
- Page 11 and 12: xxii Edith Stein Tr an s I ato r' s
- Page 13 and 14: ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY Foreword
- Page 15 and 16: 4 Edith Stein What t an be leli if
- Page 17 and 18: 8 Edith Stem primordially given, i'
- Page 19 and 20: I2> 12 Edith Stein physical individ
- Page 21 and 22: 16 Edith Stein Br.rt it seenls to m
- Page 23 and 24: 20 Edith Stein The Essence of Acts
- Page 25 and 26: 24 Edith Stein cheer me up.) Here,
- Page 27 and 28: 28 Edith Stein experiences we only
- Page 29 and 30: \JUl clearlt conscious motive for
- Page 31 and 32: Chapter III The Constitution of the
- Page 33 and 34: 40 Edith Stein soul. But, as we alr
- Page 35 and 36: 44 Edith Stein usually comes up in
- Page 37 and 38: 48 Edith Stein The psychic is in es
- Page 39 and 40: 2 Edith Stein f unloading very well
- Page 41 and 42: Edith Stein Constitution of the P s
- Page 43 and 44: Edith Stein by empathic presentatio
- Page 45 and 46: 62 Edith Stein as a physical bocly
- Page 47 and 48: 66 Edith Stein (h) The Foreign Liui
- Page 49 and 50: 7() 7'dith Stein n o n - p sy c h i
- Page 51 and 52: 74 Edith Stein C onstitution of the
- Page 53 and 54: 78 Edith stein Constitution of the
- Page 55: 82 Edith Stent Wehavealreadyportray
- Page 59 and 60: Chapter IV Empathy as the Understan
- Page 61 and 62: 105> Edith Stein absolutely as the
- Page 63 and 64: 98 Edith Stein 3. The Constitution
- Page 65 and 66: 02 Edith Stein Empathy as the Under
- Page 67 and 68: 106 Edith Stein center or the "1" k
- Page 69 and 70: I l0 Edith Stein teristic:s to be d
- Page 71 and 72: ll4 Edith Stein Empatfu as the Unde
- Page 73 and 74: l 18 Edith Stein taken so literally
- Page 75 and 76: 1r, Edith Stein l{otes t23 phenomen
- Page 77 and 78: 2b Edith Stein ?q na cit..p.57f. '
- Page 79 and 80: 130 Edith Stein experiences is plai
- Page 81 and 82: 134 phenomenological reduction xiv,