The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY

Edith Stein
the speaker is not comprehended in the u'ords. Rather, he is
prehended at the same time as they. Nor does this at first play
ry role in the words' meaning, but only when it points toward
eir intuitive fulfillment. For example, in order to fulfill the
eaning of a perceptual statement, I must put myself into the
ker's orientation. 'Ihus the words can be considered entirely
rhemselves without regarding the speaker and all that is going
in him.
Now what distinguishes the word from the signal? On the one
nd, rve have the signaling thing, the circumstances of the pro-
, the bridge that convention has thron'n betn'een them and
t is perceivable as this "ought to indicate." The circumstances
mselves remain entirely undisturbed by the fact that the signal
esignates them. On the other hand, there is first of all no verbal
hysical body fWortkiirperf corresponding to the signaling physirl
body lSignalhArperl, only a verbal living body fWortleibl. The
I expression could not exist by itself, and neither has it
eived the function of a sign from the outside in addition to
it is. Rather, it is ahvays the bearer of meaning in entirely the
me manner n'hether the meaning is really there or whether it is
vented. On the contrary, the signal is real. lf it is invented, its
nction as a sign is merely invented, too, whereas there is no such
ing as an invented meaning of u'ords. The living body and the
I of a word form a living unity, but one permitting to both a
latively independent development.l0T A signal cannot develop.
nce it has received its designation it continues to convey it
nchanged: and the function an act ofchoice has assigned to it, an
t of choice can take au'ay again. Further, it only exists by reason
f a creative act completed in it. But as soon as it exists it is
vered and independent from this act like any product of human
rtistry. lt can be destroyed and cease functioning u'ithout its
creator" knou'ing anything about it. If a storm u'ashes au'ay all
rail markers in the Riesengebirge, hikers will get lost. This can
appen without the Riesengebirge Association, the creator of this
1'stem of signs, being responsible for this, since it believes they
re still in the best condition. This cannot happen rr.ith a word,
or it is alrvavs borne by a consciousness (which is naturally not
hat of'him *,h,, i. speaking here and nou,). It lives "by the grace"
C onstitution of the P sycho-Physical Indiuidual
of a spirit (i.e., not by reason of the spirit's creative act, but in
living dependence on it). The n'ord's bearer can be an individual
subject but also a group of possibly changing subjects bound into
one by a continuity of experience. Finally, we have the main
difference: Words point to the object through the medium of
meaning, while the signal has no meaning at all but only the
function of being significant. And u'ords do not simply point to
the circumstances as the signal does. What goes into them is not
the circumstance, but its logico-categorical formation. Words do
not signify, but express, and $'hat is expressed is no longer what it
u'as before.l08
Naturally, this also applies when something psychic is expressed.
Should someone say to me that he is sad, I understand
ihe meaning of the words. The sadness I now knolv of is not an
"alive one" before me as a perceptual givenness. It is probably as
little like the sadness comprehended in the symbol as the table of
u'hich I hear spoken is like the other side of the table which I see'
ln one case I am in the apophantic sphere, the realm of propositions
and meanings, in the other case in immediate intuitive contact
with the objective sphere.
Meaning is always a general one. In order to comprehend the
object intinded right no'w, we always need a givenness of the
intuitive basis of the meaning experiences. There is no such intermediate
level between the expressed experience and the expressing
bodily change. But meaning and symbol have something in
common which forces them both to be called "expression" repeatedly.
This is the fact that together they constitute the unity of
an object, that the expression released from the connection $'ith
r"hat ls expressed is no longer the same object (in contrast with
the signaling physical body), that the expression proceeds out of
the experiencer0e and adapts itself to the expressed material.
These relationships are present in simple form in bodily expression;
they are doubled in a certain sense in verbal expression:
rvord, meaning, ob.ject; and, correlatively, having of the object,
logical intention or meaning, and linguistic designation. The
function of expressing, through u'hich I comprehend the expressed
experience as the expression, is always fulfilled in the
experiencein which expression proceeds from what is expressed'
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