The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY

50 Edith Stein
Constitution of the Psycho-Phlsical IndiuiduaL
5l
enon of "psycho-physical causality" we have delineated and in the
nature of sensations. And the soul together with the living body
forms the "psycho-physical" individual.
55> Now we must consider the character of so-called "spiritual
feelings." 'fhe term already indicates to us that spiritual feelings
are accidentally psychic and not body-bound (even if psychologists
would not like to ackno$'ledge this consequence.) Anyone
who brings the pure essence of a bodiless subject to givenness
would contend that such a subject experiences no pleasure, grief,
or aesthetic values. By contrast, many noted psychologists see
"complexes of organic sensations" in feelings. As absurd as rhis
de{inition may seem as long as we consider feelings in their pure
essence, in concrete psychic contexts we actually do find phenomena
which do not ground feelings, to be sure, though they can
make them intelligible. "Our heart stops beating" for joy; u'e
"wince" in pain; our pulse races in alarm; and we are breathless.
Examples which all deal with psycho-physical causality, with effects
of psychic experience on body functions, can be multiplied
at will. When we think the living body away, these phenomena
disappear, though the spiritual act remains. It must be conceded
that God rejoices over the repentance of a sinner u'ithout feeling
His heart pound or other "organic sensations," an observation
that is possible whether one believes in God or not. People can be
convinced that in reality feelings are impossible rn,ithout such
sensations and that no existing being experiences them in their
purity. However, feelings can be comprehended in their purity.
and this appearance of accompaniment is experienced exactly as
such, as neither a feeling nor a component of one. The same
thing can also be shown in cases of purely psychic causality. "I lose
my wits" for fright, i.e., I notice my thoughts are paralyzed. Or
"my head spins" for joy so that I do not know what I am doing
and do pointless things. A pure spirit can also become frightened
but it does not lose its wits. IIts understanding does not stand still.]
It feels pleasure and pain in all their depth u'ithout these feelings
exerting any effect.
I can expand these considerations. As I "observe" myself, I also
56> discover causal relationships betu'een my experiences u'ith their
announced capacities and the attributes of my soul. Capacities can
ber developed and sharpened by use as well as \vorn ()ut and
ciulled. 'fhus my "power of observati