The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY

44 Edith Stein
usually comes up in other contexts. we usually look at sensations
as whar ,.give" us the outer n'orld, and in this sense we separate
.,sensatioi" from "what is sensed" or "content of sensation"
fiom ..sensatlon as function" in stumpfs sense. we separate, for
example, the seen red and the possessing of this red.65 I cannot
agree with him.'fhe object's redis "perceived" and I must distingi,irh
b.t*.en perception and what is perceived. The analysis of
4g> p.r..pti.rn leais me to "sensory dara" so that I can look at the
p..."ptio,-'ofqualitiesas-an..objectificatiorrofsensorydata,''But
thisdoesnotmakequalitiesintoperceptionsnorperceptionsinto
qualities or giving aits. As constitu.ents of outer perception, both
are elements not further anall'zable'
Non,if we consider sensation in terms of the side turned torvard
the living body, we find an entirely analogous phenomenal state
of affairs. I can speak of a "sensed" living body as little as of a
,.sensed" object in the outer world. However, this also requires an
objectifyingapprehension.Ifmyfingertipscontactthetable,I
ha"ve to clisiing.rirh, first, the sensation of touch' the tactile datum
nor further divisible. secondly, there is the hardness of the table
with its correlative act of outer perception and, thirdly, the touching
fingertip and the correlative act of ..bodlly percePtion.,' What
mikes'the connection betrveen sensation and bodilv Perceptioll
particularly intimate is the fact that sensations are given at the
iiving body to the living body as senser'
An investigation of all kinds of sensations in their meaning for
bodilvperceptionwouldbebeyorrdthescopeofthiswork.Butwe
must discuss one more point. We said that the ..outer', and
,.bodily perceived" living body is given as the same. This requires
still further elucidation. I not only see my hand and bodily perceive
it as sensing, but I also "see" its {ields of sensation corlstitured
for me in bodily perception. on the other hand, if I consciousll
emphasize certain parts of mv living body, I have an
,,image" of itris part of the physical body. 'fhe one is give' rvith
the oiher, thougir rhey are not perceived together. This is exactly
analr_rgous to the province of outer percePtion. we n9t only see
the taLle and feel its hardness, but n'e also "see" its hardness. The
robes in Van DVck's paintings al.e not only as shiny as silk but also
as smooth and as sofi as silk. Psychologists call this phenomenon
Constitution of the Psycho-Phlsical Indiuidual 45
fusion and usually reduce it to "mere association." This "mere"
indicates psychology's tendency to look at explanation as an explaining
away, so that the explained phenomenon becomes a
"subjective creation" without "objective meaning'" We cannot
accept this interpretation. Phenomenon remains phenomenon'
An explanation is very desirable, but this explanation adds nothing
to or subtracts nothing from it. Thus the certainty of tactile
qualities would continue to exist and lose none of its merit
whether or not association can explain it.
'fo be sure, we do not think such an explanation possible because
it contradicts the "phenomenon" of association. Association
is tlpicallv experienced as "something remindirrg me ol
something." For example, the sight of the table corller reminds
me I once bumped myself on it. However, this corner's sharpness
is not remembered, but seen. Here is another instructive example:
I see a rough lump clf'sugar and know or rememtrer that it is
sweet. I do not remember it is rough (or only incidentally), nor
see its sweetness. By contrast, the flower's fragrance is really
sweet and does not remind me ol'a s\^/eetaste. This begins to
()pen up perspectives for a phenomenology of the senses and of
sense perceptions that, of course, we cannot go into here. At this
point we are only interested in applving these insights to our case'
-I'he seen living body does not remind us it can be the scene of
manifold sensations. Neither is it merely a physical thing taking
up the same space as the living body given as sensitive in bodily
perception. It is given as a sensing, living body.
So far we have only considered the living body at rest. Now we
can go a step farther. Let us suppose that I (i.e., my living body as
a rvhole) nrove through the ro()m. As long as we disregarded the
constitution of the living body, this was not a peculiarly characterized
phenomenon. It was no different than the kaleidoscopic
shifting ol-the surrounding outer world. Nou' the experience that
"I mr>ve" becomes entirely new. It becomes the apperceptior.r of
our own movement based on manifold sensations and is entirely
different from the outwardly perceived movement of physicaL
b