The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY
34 Edith Stein an()ther in sequence and "cetrtral" experierlces that are giverl as a unity revealing the unity of'the "1." We have a sequence at all levels in the sense that one actual experience ser,'ers artother. But s()me experiences disappear as soon as they have faded out (a sensory pain, a serrsory delight, an act of perception), while others c()lttinue to endure in the mode of non-actrrality. The latter lirrm those unities that enable us to glance perceptually back into the past (at a love, a hatred, a friendship), and they constitute the complex structurc that can comc lo givettness 1o us in an intuitive act, sr.lch as my childhood, my student days, etc.(ir I hope this exhibits the difference between reflection in which actual experience is given treign experience facing me. -I'he level where I am at the fi;reign "1" and explain its cxperience bv living it a{ter the other seems to be much rrore parallel to the primorclial experience itself than to its givenness in inner perception. The Essence of .\cts of Enpathl 35 7. Miinsterberg's Theory of the Experience of Foreign Consciousness It is still n.rore diffictrlt fbr me to sift the phettomenal contetrt ()rrt of'Miinsterberg's theory than it was in Stheler. Our exper.ience of lirreign subjects is t() cortsist of the underscanding of tbreign acts of rvill. He agrees with our analysis bl characteriz.ing this act o{'trtrderstanding as all act in rvhich the "filreign rvill eltters into mine" and still remaitrs that
Chapter III The Constitution of the P sy cho-Phy sical Indiaidual e have now achieved an essential description of the empathic act and a critique of historical theories of foreign consciousness from the point of vielv of our description. We still have a far greater undertaking before us. We must treat empathy as a problem of constitution and answer the question of how the objects in the usual theories, such as the psycho-physical individual, personality, etc., arise within consciousness. Within the framework of a short investigation we cannot hope even to approach the ansn'er to this question. We shall have fulfilled our purpose if u'e succeed in showing the paths to this goal and that the investigations of empathy so far could not be satisfactory because, except for a very few attempts, these thinkers have overlooked these basic questions. This is very clear in Lipps, who has certainly achieved the most progress toward our goal. He seems to be bound by the phenomenon of the expression of experiences and repeatedly comes back to that from which he also wants to begin. With a few words he lays aside the profusion of questions present in the treatment of this problem. For instance, he says about the bearer of these phenomena of expression, "lVe believe a conscious life to be bound to certain bodies by virtue of an 'inexplicable adjustment of our spirit' or a 'natural instinct."' 'f his is nothing more than the proclamation of wonder, declar- it
- Page 1 and 2: The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN
- Page 3 and 4: vi Edith Stein 4. -I'he Controversy
- Page 5 and 6: l,,,n .n. undersrandi ,r,rlno.u.!r,
- Page 7 and 8: xiv Edith Stein problem of empathy
- Page 9 and 10: xvlll Edith Stein enological standp
- Page 11 and 12: xxii Edith Stein Tr an s I ato r' s
- Page 13 and 14: ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY Foreword
- Page 15 and 16: 4 Edith Stein What t an be leli if
- Page 17 and 18: 8 Edith Stem primordially given, i'
- Page 19 and 20: I2> 12 Edith Stein physical individ
- Page 21 and 22: 16 Edith Stein Br.rt it seenls to m
- Page 23 and 24: 20 Edith Stein The Essence of Acts
- Page 25 and 26: 24 Edith Stein cheer me up.) Here,
- Page 27 and 28: 28 Edith Stein experiences we only
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- Page 41 and 42: Edith Stein Constitution of the P s
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- Page 63 and 64: 98 Edith Stein 3. The Constitution
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34<br />
Edith Stein<br />
an()ther in sequence and "cetrtral" experierlces that are giverl as a<br />
unity revealing the unity <strong>of</strong>'the "1." We have a sequence at all<br />
levels in the sense that one actual experience ser,'ers artother. But<br />
s()me experiences disappear as soon as they have faded out (a<br />
sensory pain, a serrsory delight, an act <strong>of</strong> perception), while others<br />
c()lttinue to endure in the mode <strong>of</strong> non-actrrality. <strong>The</strong> latter lirrm<br />
those unities that enable us to glance perceptually back into the<br />
past (at a love, a hatred, a friendship), and they constitute the<br />
complex structurc that can comc lo givettness 1o us in an intuitive<br />
act, sr.lch as my childhood, my student days, etc.(ir I hope this<br />
exhibits the difference between reflection in which actual experience<br />
is given treign experience facing me.<br />
-I'he level where I am at the fi;reign "1" and explain its cxperience<br />
bv living it a{ter the other seems to be much rrore parallel to<br />
the primorclial experience itself than to its givenness in inner<br />
perception.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Essence <strong>of</strong> .\cts <strong>of</strong> Enpathl 35<br />
7. Miinsterberg's <strong>The</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> the Experience <strong>of</strong> Foreign<br />
Consciousness<br />
It is still n.rore diffictrlt fbr me to sift the phettomenal contetrt<br />
()rrt <strong>of</strong>'Miinsterberg's theory than it was in Stheler. Our exper.ience<br />
<strong>of</strong> lirreign subjects is t() cortsist <strong>of</strong> the underscanding <strong>of</strong><br />
tbreign acts <strong>of</strong> rvill. He agrees with our analysis bl characteriz.ing<br />
this act o{'trtrderstanding as all act in rvhich the "filreign rvill<br />
eltters into mine" and still remaitrs that
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