The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY

More documents

Recommendations

Info

29> 26 Edith Stein shall return to this phenomenotl and see that this viewpoint clarifies the origin of certain empathic experiences':r8 This clarification is certainly far tiom the t
28 Edith Stein experiences we only perceive rvhat moves along prescribed courses, especially those objecrs for which we already have a previous term.{{ -I'his bold rheory, starrdir-rg in opposition to all theories up to now, has something extremelv seductive about it. Nevertheless, to get some clarity, we must examine precisely all the concepts used here. f'hus we first ask l'hat inner perception is. scheler answers that inner perception is not the perception of self, for ye can perceive ourselves as our bodies outwardly, too. Rather, inner perceprion is distinguished from outer perception by beirft directed roward acrs. It is the type of act giving us rhe psychic. These nvo modes of perception are not to be disti'guished on the basis of a difference of objects. Conversely, the physical is ro be distinguished from the psychic because, in principle, it is differently given.a5 Nevertheless, Scheler's critique does not seem to corroborare earlier attempts r() reciprocally timit psychic and physicala6 by distinguishing criteria. It deals solely with an essen_ tial difference of givenness and not rvirh the distinction between objects having different modes of being. To such objects a different mode .f givenness would essentially fwesensgezetslichl correspond. \4'e could accept "inner perception" in this sense of a definitely constituted act without creating a conflict r.r,ith our doctrine of empathy. (A more precise explication follows immediately.) It is possible to differentiate within this species of "inner perception" acts in which our own and foreign experience are given. But this is still not sufficiently clear. What do ..on,n" and ,.for_ eign" mean in the context in rvhich Scheler uses them? If we take his discussion of a neutral stream of experience seriously, we cannot conceive of how a differentiation in this stream can occur. But such a stream of experience is an absolutely impossible notion because every experience is by nature an ,.I's" experience that cannot be separated phenomenally from the .,I" itself. It is only because scheler fails to recognize a pure "I," alwavs raking "I'l as "psychic individual," that he speaks of an experience presenr before "I's" are constituted. Naturally, he cannot exhibit such an "I-less" experience. Every case he brings up presupposes our own as well as the foreign "I" and does not verify his theory at all. The Essence of Acts of Empathy 29 Onll if we leave the phenomenological sphere do these terms nrake good sense. "Own" and "foreign" then mean: belonging to different individuals, i.e., different substantial, qualitatively elaborated, psychic subjects. Both these individuals and their experiences would be similarly accessible to inner perception. Suppose that I do not feel mine, but foreign feelings. Accordingly, this means that feelings have penetrated my individual from the foreign individual. I am initially surrounded by a world of psychic ()ccurrences, that is to say, at the same time as I discover that my body is in the world of my outer experience against the background of the spatial 'world spread out boundlessly on all sides, I also discover that my psychic individual is in the rvorld of inner experience, a boundless world of psychic individuals and psychic lif'e. All this is certainly incontestable. But the basis here is altogether different from ours. We have excluded from t}le field of our investigation this whole world of inner perception", our own individual and all others, together with the outer world. -fhey are not within, but t.ranscend, the sphere of absolute givenness, of pure consciousness. Tha "I" has another meaning in this sphere of absolute consciousness, being nothing but the subject of experience living in experience. In these terms, the question_ of whether an experience is "mine" or another's becomes senseless. What I primordially feel is precisely rvhat I feel irrespective of this f'eeling's role in the sum total of my individual experiences or of lrorv it originates (perhaps by contagion of feeling or not).17 These experiences of my on,n, the pure experiences of the pure "I," are given to me in re flection. This means that the "I" turns back and arvay from its object and looks at the experience of this object. Now wf at distinguishes reflectionlp:"InrugMp,'9n. moren exacr|y.t;@,T;il1.r ( actual turning toriErclan'---actual experien-ce, while inner perception itself can be non-actual. In principle, it can also encompass the fringe of non-actualities that form m)' present experietrce together rvith perception. Further, I may vien'my experiences in such a lvay that I no longer consider them as such, but as evidence of the transcendence of my individual and its attributes. My recttllections announce my memory to me; my acts of outer percep-
Page 1 and 2: The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN
Page 3 and 4: vi Edith Stein 4. -I'he Controversy
Page 5 and 6: l,,,n .n. undersrandi ,r,rlno.u.!r,
Page 7 and 8: xiv Edith Stein problem of empathy
Page 9 and 10: xvlll Edith Stein enological standp
Page 11 and 12: xxii Edith Stein Tr an s I ato r' s
Page 13 and 14: ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY Foreword
Page 15 and 16: 4 Edith Stein What t an be leli if
Page 17 and 18: 8 Edith Stem primordially given, i'
Page 19 and 20: I2> 12 Edith Stein physical individ
Page 21 and 22: 16 Edith Stein Br.rt it seenls to m
Page 23 and 24: 20 Edith Stein The Essence of Acts
Page 25: 24 Edith Stein cheer me up.) Here,
Page 29 and 30: \JUl clearlt conscious motive for
Page 31 and 32: Chapter III The Constitution of the
Page 33 and 34: 40 Edith Stein soul. But, as we alr
Page 35 and 36: 44 Edith Stein usually comes up in
Page 37 and 38: 48 Edith Stein The psychic is in es
Page 39 and 40: 2 Edith Stein f unloading very well
Page 41 and 42: Edith Stein Constitution of the P s
Page 43 and 44: Edith Stein by empathic presentatio
Page 45 and 46: 62 Edith Stein as a physical bocly
Page 47 and 48: 66 Edith Stein (h) The Foreign Liui
Page 49 and 50: 7() 7'dith Stein n o n - p sy c h i
Page 51 and 52: 74 Edith Stein C onstitution of the
Page 53 and 54: 78 Edith stein Constitution of the
Page 55 and 56: 82 Edith Stent Wehavealreadyportray
Page 57 and 58: Edith Stein C onstitution of the P
Page 59 and 60: Chapter IV Empathy as the Understan
Page 61 and 62: 105> Edith Stein absolutely as the
Page 63 and 64: 98 Edith Stein 3. The Constitution
Page 65 and 66: 02 Edith Stein Empathy as the Under
Page 67 and 68: 106 Edith Stein center or the "1" k
Page 69 and 70: I l0 Edith Stein teristic:s to be d
Page 71 and 72: ll4 Edith Stein Empatfu as the Unde
Page 73 and 74: l 18 Edith Stein taken so literally
Page 75 and 76: 1r, Edith Stein l{otes t23 phenomen
Page 77 and 78:
2b Edith Stein ?q na cit..p.57f. '
Page 79 and 80:
130 Edith Stein experiences is plai
Page 81 and 82:
134 phenomenological reduction xiv,
show all

The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?