The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY

24 Edith Stein
cheer me up.) Here, too, the difference between comprehendirrg
and taking on a feeling is clearly apparent.
Finally, in all cases there is a distinction between the transference
of feeling and ngl only empathl', but also $yrnpathy and a
feeling of oneuess, these latter being based on an empathic subnersion
i-n the fbreign gxpgrielrc.e.3a From rvhat u'e have said, it
should be sufficiently clear that the theory of imitation cannor
serve as agenetic explanation of'empathy.
(c) The Theory of Association
The theory of association is a rival of the lheory of imiration.
The optical irnage of foreign gestures reproduces the optical
image of our o\\,'n gestures. This reproduces the kinesthesis and
this, in turn, the feeling with u'hich the kinesthesis was linked
earlier. 'Ihis feeling is norv experienced not as our own, but as
foreign, because (l) ir faces us as an objecr, (2) it is nor motivared
by our own previous experiences, and (3) it is not expressed by a
gesture.
Here, again, we want to raise the question of whether the
phenomenon of empathy stands at the end of this process of
development. And again the answer is no. By the proposed course
we arrive at a feeling of our own and we have grounds for viewing
it not as one of our o\\'n feelings, but as a foreign one. (At this
point we can waive the refutation of these claims.) Now, on these
grounds we could conclude that this is another's experierrce. But
in empathy we draw no conclusions because the experience is
given as foreign in the character of perceprion.
Let us illustrate this opposition in a typical case of comprehending
foreign psychic life in terms of the theory of associatior-r. I see
someone stamp his feet. I remember how I myself once stamped
my fe.et at the same time as my previous fury is presented to me.
Then I say to myself , "This is how furious he is now." Here the
other's fury itself is not given but its exisrence is inferred. By an
intuitive representation, my own fury, I seek to draw it near.3:, By
contrast, emparhy posits being immediately as a perceived act,
and it reaches its object directly withor,rt representarion.
'I'hus the
theory of association alsp fails to reveal the genesis of empathy.
The Essence of Acts of Empathy 25
I realize that this type of associative explanation (prandtl,s)
probably does not include all associational psychologists. Accordirrg
to Paul Stern, for example, association is not merely the
linking of single ideas, one reproducing anorher, but is the unity
trf a perceptual conrext lErfahrungszusammenhanrj in which this
context is always before us as a whole. Such a perceptual context
is both outside of and within an individual.
But this raises more questions. Certainly association should
mean more than the descriptive unity of a perceptual context. It
should certainly explain how it arrives at this unity. Thus perhaps
all that is given to consciousness at the same time is linked to a
u'hole reproduced as such. But then what distinguishes the unity
of the objects of my visual field (that can again arise before me as
a whole), from the unity of one object? We cannot do everything
in this case with the one word "association." Further, for such a
perceptual context to originate, certainly at some time its parts
must be given together. But when do I have a person's inner and
outer sides given together?
Actually, such cases do occur. Someone has an expression at
first unintelligible to me, for instance, he may put his hand over
his eyes. On inquiry, I learn that he is meditating deeply on
something just now. Now this meditation that I empathize bec()mes
"connected by association" with the perceived pose. When
I see this pose again, I see it as a "meditative" pose. Then in this
repeated case empathy is, as a matter of fact, based on association.
But this association itself requires an empathic act, thus does not
suffice as a principle to explain empathy.36 Furthermore, association
only mediates knowledge, for we say to ourselves that this is
how he looks when he is meditating. Association does not mediate
our understanding of this pose as the expression of an inner
condition. This I gain in empathic projection as follows: He is
meditating: he has his mind on a problem and wanrs to shield his
train of thought from disturbing distractions; therefore he is
covering his eyes and cutting himself off from the outer world,32
We must distinguish Volkelt's theory of fusion from this theory
,rf association. Volkelt says lhar rhe feit conrent is nr>t linked wirh
tntuition but fused u'ith it. Of course, this is r-rot a genetic explanation
but only a description of the empathic experience. Later we