The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY

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l g Edith Stein hend empathically. I empathicalry arrive at the "sides" of'joyfurness obstructed in my own joy. 'fhis ignites my.ioy, ar,d oniv now is there complete coincidence with what is empathized. If the same thing happens to the others, we empathiially enrich our {eeling so that "we" now f'eel a different joy from ..I,i' ..you,', and "he" in isolation. But "I," ,.you," a.d .,he;' are retainei in .,we.,, A "we," nor an "I," is the subject of the empathizin€i. Ne_t through the feeling of'oneness, but through empathizing, dot; experience others. 'I'he fbeling of orrenessind the enrichment of our own experience become possible through empathy. (fl Reiteration of Empathy-Refexiue Sympathy I would like t' call attentic-rn to.iust one more concept from Lipps'description: that which he designates as .,reflexive sympa_ thl'" and which I wourcr rike ro calr tte ireiterarion of empathyf more exactly, a particular case Of'reiteratin wirh many kinds of'acts. fhcre is not only reflection, but also reflecrion on reflection, etr.. as.an ideal possibility ad infnitum. simirarry, there is a wiiling of willing, a liking of liking, itc. ln fact, all represenrarions can be rerterated. [ can remember a memory, expect an expectation, ranrasy a fanrasy' And ro I can arso emparhize rhe enipathized, u-ong the l:.., acts of anorher that I comprehend empathically lhere can be empathic acts i. *,hich the 'rther's oth., .o-pr.h..d, or,_ acts. This "other" can be a third person o. -. the myself. In second case we have "reflexive s) mpathJ " ..xperiencereturl)s..,'.,.,.7,u,.'@,n..:rn..i/.ln.in.. where my originar this pheromenon "f in the give ur-rd tok. be*veen 'rot i.diviitrars does .eed to concern us here because we are onrl'dealing with the {eneral essence of'empathy and not u,ith its effect. 4. The Controversy Between the View of Idea and That of Actuality from the viewpoint of ,,_._t..nupr our 'r'rts' description of empathic we ca' find access to the \''herher much-cliscussed questir>n 'f empathy has the character of an ipea lvorsteirungl
20 Edith Stein The Essence of Acts of Empathy 2l And from his experience I once more have an experience, i.e., I comprehend the grief empathically. A further analysis of the relationship of'"ernpathy" to "know'ledge of foreign experience" is not required at this point. It is enough that we have reciprocally limited them. The crlnclusion from t>ur discussion is that the original controversial question was badly put. Thus no answer to it could be correct. For example, Witasek, a particularly energetic defender of the vierv of idea.:'0 does not take our distinctions into consideration at all. He takes the objective character of empathy to be proved along with its representational character. By a further ecluivocation of idea (which is an intellectual experience in contrast with an em()tional one), he arriv'es at the absurd consequence of denying that empathized feelings involve em()tion. He even bases his conclusion on a special argument: Empathy cannot involve feelings because the "assumption of f-eeling" is missing (the "something" to which feeling could be related). The empathizing subject would only assume feeling in the subject having the feelings if he were dealing with a projection fHineinuersetzenl. Witasek lrroves that the subject cannot be dealing with a projection, not by analysis of the experience of empathy, but by a logical cliscussion of'possible meanings of pro-jection. It could be a judgment, an assumpti()n, or even a fiction that the empathizing sub- -ject is identical with the subject under consideration. Aesthetic empathy does not demonstrate all this and so it is not projection. Unfortunately, the dis.junction is not complete, exactly the possibility applying to the present case being missing. To pro.ject oneself into another means to carry out his experience with him as we have described it. Witasek's contention that empathy is an intuitive idea of another's experience only applies to the stage where empathized experiences are made into objects, not to the stage of fulfilling explication. And fbr this last case we cannot answer the question Of whether it is "intuitive in terms of perception or in terms of idea (i.e., non-primrirdially)" because, as rve have shown, empathy is neither one in the usual sense. In fact, it refuses to be classified in one of the current pigeonholes of psychologv but u'ill be studiecl in its own essence. 5. Discussion in Terms of Genetic Theories of the Comprehension of Foreign Consciousness As we have seen, philosophicaI investigation has already often come to grips with the problem of foreign consciousness. But its question of'hqw we perceive fbreign consciousness has usually taken the turn of how in one psycho-physical individual the perception of another such individual occurs. 'I-his has led to'the origination of theories of imitation, of inference by analogy, and ,rf cnrpathl by association. (a) On the Relationship of Phenomenology to Ps2chology It may not be superfluous to elucidate the relationship of psychological investigations to what we are doing. Our position,is that there is the phenomenon o{'"foreign experience" and correlatively the "perception of foreign experience." For the present we may leave undecided whether there really is such a fbreign experience or rvhether this perception is authentic. "I'he phenomenon in which all knowledge and certainty must finally be anchored is indubitable. It is the genuine object of nqdq q'Aoooq ia. 'fhus the first task in this domain, as in all domains, is to comprehend the phenomenon in its pure essence, freed frorn all the accidents of appearance. What is foreign experience in its gi'l'enness? How does the perception of foreign experience look? We must know this before we can ask how this perception occurs. It is self-evident rhat this first question cannot in principle be ansn'ered by a genetic-psychological investigation of cause,3r for such an investigation actually presupposes the being whose development it is seeking to ground-its essence as well as the existence, its "what" as well as its "that." Not only the investigation of the nature of the perceprion of foreign experiencing but also the .justification of this perception must thus precede genetic psychology. And if this psychology alleges ro accomplish both of these thirrgs itself, its claim must be re-jected as rhoroughly unjustilied. -I-his is not to dispute its title tcl existence in any way. On the contrary, it has its task already very definitely and unequivocally formulated. It is to investigate the orip;ination of'the knowledge
Page 1 and 2: The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN
Page 3 and 4: vi Edith Stein 4. -I'he Controversy
Page 5 and 6: l,,,n .n. undersrandi ,r,rlno.u.!r,
Page 7 and 8: xiv Edith Stein problem of empathy
Page 9 and 10: xvlll Edith Stein enological standp
Page 11 and 12: xxii Edith Stein Tr an s I ato r' s
Page 13 and 14: ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY Foreword
Page 15 and 16: 4 Edith Stein What t an be leli if
Page 17 and 18: 8 Edith Stem primordially given, i'
Page 19 and 20: I2> 12 Edith Stein physical individ
Page 21: 16 Edith Stein Br.rt it seenls to m
Page 25 and 26: 24 Edith Stein cheer me up.) Here,
Page 27 and 28: 28 Edith Stein experiences we only
Page 29 and 30: \JUl clearlt conscious motive for
Page 31 and 32: Chapter III The Constitution of the
Page 33 and 34: 40 Edith Stein soul. But, as we alr
Page 35 and 36: 44 Edith Stein usually comes up in
Page 37 and 38: 48 Edith Stein The psychic is in es
Page 39 and 40: 2 Edith Stein f unloading very well
Page 41 and 42: Edith Stein Constitution of the P s
Page 43 and 44: Edith Stein by empathic presentatio
Page 45 and 46: 62 Edith Stein as a physical bocly
Page 47 and 48: 66 Edith Stein (h) The Foreign Liui
Page 49 and 50: 7() 7'dith Stein n o n - p sy c h i
Page 51 and 52: 74 Edith Stein C onstitution of the
Page 53 and 54: 78 Edith stein Constitution of the
Page 55 and 56: 82 Edith Stent Wehavealreadyportray
Page 57 and 58: Edith Stein C onstitution of the P
Page 59 and 60: Chapter IV Empathy as the Understan
Page 61 and 62: 105> Edith Stein absolutely as the
Page 63 and 64: 98 Edith Stein 3. The Constitution
Page 65 and 66: 02 Edith Stein Empathy as the Under
Page 67 and 68: 106 Edith Stein center or the "1" k
Page 69 and 70: I l0 Edith Stein teristic:s to be d
Page 71 and 72: ll4 Edith Stein Empatfu as the Unde
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l 18 Edith Stein taken so literally
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1r, Edith Stein l{otes t23 phenomen
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2b Edith Stein ?q na cit..p.57f. '
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130 Edith Stein experiences is plai
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134 phenomenological reduction xiv,
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The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY

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