The Collected Works of EDITH STEIN ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY

8
Edith Stem
primordially given, i'e'' it is. possible for the reflecting glance of
in. ,.t,, in the experience ro be there bodily itself. Furthermore, it
is possible fbr our olvn exPerlences to b-e given non-primordially
inhmory' expectation' or fantas;'
Now we ugii,-t tuk" up the questi;n of whether empathy is
Primordial and in what sense'
(c) Memorl, Expectation, Fantasl' and Empathy
There is a well-known analogy between acts of empathy and
acts in which our own expfrlglrces 4Ie€!v9! qon-primordially'
The memory of a joy is primordial as a representallonal act now
being carried out, tiro"gn its co^ntent of joy is non-primordial'
fhis act has the iotal character ofjoy which I could study' but the
joy is not primordially and bodily there' rather "been ":-liil:g ""t'
aliueland this "once," the time of the past expe.ence' can
be definite or indefinite)'lThe present non-primordiality points
back to the past primordii[iiy' htlit past has th.e character o[a'
forrner ".to*." Accordingly' memory posits' and what'is rerlgmbered
has being'
Further, theie are two possibilities: The "1" as the subject of
the act of'remembering, in this act of representation, can look
back at the past joy'-fhen the pastjoy is th.e intentional object of
the .,1,,, its sublelt being with and in the "I" of the past. fLr.us tle
present.:'I" -l'd the puti"t" face.each other as subject and objegt'
They do not coinciie, though there is a consciousness of sameness.Butthisisnotapositiveidentificationand'moreover'the
distinction between th-e primordially remembering "I" and the
"I" non-primordiall,v remembered persists' Memory can also be
accomplished in other modes' The same act of representation in
which what is remembered emerges before me as a whole implies
certain tendencies. When these unfold, they expose "traits" in
their temporal course, how the whole remembered experience
was once prlmordially constituted'22
.l.hisprocesscanoccurpassively..inme''orlcandoitactively
step by itep. I can even carry out the passive' as well asthe active'
course o{'memory rt'ithout reflecting' without having the present
"1," the sub-iect of th. utt of memory, before me in.any way' Or I
.url .*pr"rriy set mvself back to that time in a continuous stream
The Essence of Acts of Empathy
of'experiences, allowing the past experiential sequence to reawaken,
living in the ryrqgrnLelgd glpg{ence instead of turning
to it as an object. Honever, the.memory always remains a representation
ylllqq-prlinordralsubject which is in contrast with
the subject dqing -the, remqpqbering. 'I'he reproduction of the
lormer experience is the clarification of what was vaguely intended
at first.
At the end of the process theqis a new_ gpjgqqlicatign. I now
unite the past eap6iience, which first arose before me as a whole
and which { tbS. fpt'apj=rr-t while projec'tjng myself into it, in an
"appercepti\grfp \trnelle-for-miof memory can have a variety
of'gaps. '['hus tt is poisible for me to represent a past s-ituation to -
myself and be unable t9 repember rny iqner behavilr in this tl
situation. As I transfer myself back into this situa,tiop;f,'surrogata
;
frrr the missing memory comes into focus. 'I'his image of the past
behavior is not, however, a representation of what is past. Rather,
it is the of'the memory image to get the
"€-qursltejg-lrpletion
- n i'r g,,1' i he * ht lE-ii canTave t he cha;;aFioad;ubt,cbnjecture,
or possibility, but never the character of being.
",
It is hirdly necessary t6 go into the case of expectatron. since it
is so parallel. But something can still be said about free fhntasy.
Fantasy, too, can be accomplished in various ways: An experience
of'fantasy can arise as a whole and the tendencies implied in it
fulfilled step by step. In faplasy there is no temporal distance,
filled by continuous experiences, between the fantasizing and the
fantasized "l," provided I do notjust happen to be dealing with a
larrtasized memory or expectation.
But there is also a distinction here. 'l'he "I" producing lhe
lantasized world is primogdial: the "I" living in it is non-primo,rdial.
The fhntasized experiences are in contrast with memory
hecause they are rrot given as a representalion ofactual experiettces
but as the non-primordial form of present experiences.
-l'his "present" does not indicate a present of'objective time but
an experienced present which in this case can only be objectified
ttt a "neutral"::r present of fantasized time. 'I-he neutralized or
tton-posited firrm of'the present memory (the representation of'a
sivenness now real but not possessing a body) is in contrast with a
tteutralized pre- and post-memory. That is to say, it is in contrast
I