Syrian Civil War 2011-2012 - Societa italiana di storia militare

Parties in the conflict
Syrian National Council Main article: Syrian National Council The Syrian opposition met several times in conferences held mostly
in Turkey and formed a National Council. The Federation of Tenseekiet Syrian Revolution helped in the formation of a Transitional
National Assembly on 23 August in Istanbul "to serve as the political stage of the Revolution of the Syrian people". The creation of
the Syrian National Council was celebrated by the Syrian protestors since the Friday protest following its establishment was dubbed
"The Syrian National Council Represents Me". [241][242] The Syrian National Council gained the recognition of a few countries,
including "sole legitimate interlocutor" by the United States. [243] The SNC is said to have developed a debilitating democratic deficit,
and some opposition actors on the ground in Syria subsequently refuse to work with it. [244]:5–9
Local coordination committees Main article: Local coordination committees of Syria The networks of anti-government protest
organizers formed decentralized "Local Coordination Committees" which drew together the young, unorganized protesters. The
Committees are used to document protests and spread anti-government messages throughout Syria. Though they have only a few
hundred members, the Local Coordination Committees rose to prominence as the core of the protest movement on the ground,
separate from the organized political opposition. The Committees are also noted for trying to reach out to minority groups and
diversify the demonstrations. [245] The Committees receive support from initiatives such as "Adopt a Revolution".
Free Syrian Army and other armed opposition groups Main article: Free Syrian Army In late July 2011, a web video featuring a
group of uniformed men claiming to be defected Syrian Army officers proclaimed the formation of a Free Syrian Army (FSA). In the
video, the men called upon Syrian soldiers and officers to defect to their ranks, and said the purpose of the Free Syrian Army was to
defend protesters from violence by the state. [7] Many Syrian soldiers subsequently deserted to join the FSA. [246] The actual number of
soldiers who defected to the FSA is uncertain, with estimates ranging from 1,000 to over 25,000 as of December 2011. [247] Nir Rosen,
who spent time with the FSA in Syria, claims the majority of its members are civilians rather than defectors, who had taken up arms
long before the formation of the FSA was announced. He also stated they have no central leadership. [248] The FSA functions more as
an umbrella organization than a traditional military chain of command, and is "headquartered" in Turkey. As such, it cannot issue
direct orders to its various bands of fighters, but many of the most effective armed groups are fighting under the FSA's banner. [249] As
deserting soldiers abandoned their armored vehicles and brought only light weaponry and munitions, FSA adopted guerilla-style
tactics against security forces inside cities. Its primary target has been the shabiha militias. Most FSA attacks however are directed
against trucks and buses that are believed to bring security reinforcements. Sometimes the vehicle occupants are taken as hostages, in
other cases the vehicles are attacked either with roadside bombs or through hit-and-run attacks. The FSA has also targeted power lines
and water mains in "retaliation against Hezbollah’s provocations." [250] To encourage defection, the FSA began attacking army patrols,
shooting the commanders and trying to convince the soldiers to switch sides. FSA units have also acted as defense forces by guarding
neighborhoods rife with opposition, guarding streets while protests take place, and attacking shabiha members. However, the FSA
engaged in street battles with security forces in Deir ez-Zor, Al-Rastan, and Al-Bukamal. Fighting in these cities raged for days, with
no clear victor. In Hama, Homs, Al-Rastan, Deir ez-Zor, and Daraa, the Syrian military used airstrikes against them, leading to calls
from the FSA for the imposition of a no-fly zone. [251] The Free Syrian Army numbers about 15,000 men according to a statement its
leader Riad al-Asaad made on Al Jazeera, and he added that these were almost exclusively reserve troops that defected from the
Syrian army, and thus were no match against the government's highly trained active-duty troops. More than 3,000 members of the
Syrian security forces have been killed, which the Syrian government states is due to "armed gangs" being among the protesters, yet
the opposition blames the deaths on the government. [252] Syrians have been crossing the border to Lebanon to buy weapons on the
black market since the beginning of the protests. [253] Clan leaders in Syria claim that the armed uprising is of a tribal, revenge-based
nature, not Islamist. [254] On 6 June, the government said more than 120 security personnel were killed by "armed gangs"; 20 in an
ambush, and 82 in an attack on a security post. [255] The main centers of unrest – Daraa near Jordan, where the uprising began,
Talkalakh, Homs, Talbiseh, and Al-Rastan near Lebanon, and Jisr ash-Shugur near Turkey – have been described as being
predominately Sunni Muslim towns and cities close to the country's borders where smuggling has been common for generations, and
thus have more access to smuggled weapons. [256] In September 2011, the Syrian government claimed to have killed a total of 700
insurgents. [257] Daniel Byman believes the political and military opposition are each worryingly divided and disconnected from each
other, [258] and thus uniting, training and pushing the armed opposition to avoid religious sectarianism is crucial. The latter is
important, for otherwise the Alawites and other minorities will fight all the harder, and make post-Assad Syria more difficult to
govern. [259] Others would say that part of Byman's analysis represents a failure to understand that the leadership within Syria is
decentralised out of necessity, that this is a good thing, and that decentralisation is not the same thing as fragmentation, and certainly
does not represent an absence of strong leadership. [260] Whichever view one accepts, there are undeniably rivalries between different
strands and disagreement between those advocating peaceful protests and those backing armed struggle. [261][262]
Kurdish stance Main article: Kurdish participation in the Syrian civil war Syrian Kurds represented 10% of Syria's population at the
start of the uprising. They had suffered from decades of discrimination and neglect, being deprived of basic civil, cultural, economic
and social rights. Additionally, since 1962, they and their children had been denied Syrian nationality, a situation that led to other
problems relating to personal status and an inability to seek employment in the public sector. [97]:7 When protests began, Assad's
government, in an effort to try and neutralise potential Kurdish opposition, finally granted citizenship to an estimated 200,000
stateless Kurds. [263] This concession on citizenship, combined with Turkish endorsement of the opposition and Kurdish
underrepresentation in the Syrian National Council, has meant that Kurds have participated in the 2011–2012 Syrian uprising in
smaller numbers than their Syrian Arab counterparts. [263][264] Consequently, violence and repression in Kurdish areas has been less
severe. [263][265] According to Ariel Zirulnick of the Christian Science Monitor, the Assad government "has successfully convinced
many of Syria's Kurds and Christians that without the iron grip of a leader sympathetic to the threats posed to minorities, they might
meet the same fate" as minorities in Lebanon and Iraq. [266] In terms of a post-Assad Syria, Kurds reportedly desire a degree of
autonomy within a decentralised state. [267] In 2012, several cities with large Kurdish populations, such as Qamishli and Al-Hasakah,
began witnessing protests of several thousand people against the Syrian government, which responded with tanks and fired upon the
protesters. [268] Senior Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Cemil Bayik stated that if Turkey were to intervene against Assad, the
PKK would fight on the Syrian side. The PKK's Syrian branch is alleged to be involved in the targeting of Kurds participating in the
uprising. [269] In May 2012, a delegation of the Kurdish National Council of Syria (KNCS), a coalition of ten Syrian-Kurdish parties
established in October 2011, was invited to Washington for talks. Amongst others the delegation met Robert Ford, the former U.S.
ambassador to Syria. [270] On 15 June, it was reported that Kurds had helped government soldiers defeat FSA fighters in the town of