Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

in extending such discussions to include TNW, nor an
appetite to hold such talks in perpetuity. Fyodor Lukyankov,
for instance, rightly characterized the April 8,
2010, signing of START III as a political-military compromise
allowing both sides to claim success without
undermining the claims by either side, though he also
placed the treaty in the category of the last of the Cold
War model agreements, pursued by Washington as an
instrument rather than for its intrinsic value or merit.
That process, underway since the 1960s, had drawn
to a close. A similar approach was unworkable in the
realm of TNW, since it could “bring about the absurd
remilitarization of the political debate in Europe, but
will do nothing to create a stable security system
there.” 107
Policy Implications.
As the obsessional phrase in the Russian security
lexicon has evolved from “star-wars,” to “missile
defense,” so it is likely that we are already witnessing
that progression to include over the course of the
next decade “U.S. global strike,” and if compromise
is reached on BMD or Russian concerns are allayed,
the more pronounced the global strike phrase will become.
This reflects sensitivity within the Russian security
elite about future strategic parity, the potential
for conventional capabilities in the hands of the U.S.
Global Strike Command to strike anywhere globally,
coupled with an acute awareness of the crisis in the
domestic defense industry and possible downward
spiral for the Russian economy.
A “straight” horse trading over TNW would most
likely fail. Its potential appears more rooted in the
policy being linked to a range of other issues as part
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