Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

military reform would be upset by playing the tactical
nuclear card, a balance reflected in the compromise
that led to the new military doctrine in February 2010
and one that appeared vulnerable as discussions continued
in Moscow on the future shape of the manning
system in the armed forces. Should this unpredictable
process be unleashed, the likely key indicator that the
opponents of military reform have gained the upper
hand would be signaled by an increase in the term of
conscript service from 1 year back to 2 years, representing
political and psychological defeat for Serdyukov’s
reform.
The bedrock of Karaganov’s argument, however,
is rooted in the traditionally sacrosanct position of
nuclear weapons in Russian security strategy, which
underlies his utter opposition to what he sees as the
senseless and idealistic call for global zero in nuclear
arms reduction advocated by the Obama administration.
His assessment of Russia’s geopolitical position
is bleak: with its modernization impaired by corruption.
Russian security is guaranteed by its nuclear capability,
which is also the main source of its political
economic weight in the world. In this context, Karaganov
believes that any move toward abandoning
these weapons would prove suicidal for the Russian
state. The only purpose arms control talks serve for
Moscow, he claimed, is to build trust and transparency
between the world powers, “This is all Russia
needs arms control talks for.” 97
Karaganov’s influential work in this area cannot
be separated from wider strategic issues and areas
of divergence within the complex and evolving U.S.-
Russian bilateral relationship. These include the precise
nature and trajectory of the reset and how this is
interpreted both in Washington and Moscow as well
79