Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Tactical Nuclear Reduction Talks as a Risk to
Russian Military Reform.
Sergey Karaganov, the Chairman of the Presidium
of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, in an
article published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta on April 23,
2010, argued strongly against Russia entering such
negotiations on the basis that they would serve to undermine
Serdyukov’s military reform. Placing TNW
on the agenda, in his view, would strengthen the hand
of those opposed to the radical conventional reform
underway in Russia, which he said was geared toward
shifting these forces away from their traditional
fixation on NATO toward enhancing their capabilities
to deal with “more plausible threats and challenges.”
Karaganov continued:
Withdrawal of American TNW (token arsenals as they
are) from Europe will weaken the U.S.-Europe link. A
good deal of Europeans—and particularly in the socalled
New European countries—will start clamoring
for better defense from the mythical Russian leviathan.
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While noting that he also assumed a unilateral American
withdrawal as a precursor to joining this process,
he emphatically characterized it as a highly dangerous
step leading to strategic confusion and what Karaganov
viewed as opening Pandora’s Box: “Euphoric
over the Prague treaty signing, so called experts insist
on tactical nuclear arms reduction talks. Left to their
own devices, they will open this Pandora’s Box in no
time at all.” 96 This was not the first time he used the
Pandora’s Box argument, but here he was clearly signaling
that the delicate balance that exists within the
Russian defense and security elite over the current
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