Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

United States, Russia is in a different regional situation.”
Yesin also supports such a position, arguing
that Moscow must set as a pre-condition to any talks,
that all strategic and TNW must be located exclusively
on the national territories of those states possessing
them. 86 Dvorkin implied that any policy designed to
“place the onus on Russia” would be doomed from
the outset.
On April 21, 2010, prior to traveling to Washington
for talks on a range of security issues, CGS General
Makarov indicated that this represents official policy,
stating that any future negotiation must be preceded
by withdrawing U.S. weapons from Europe. He also
argued that given the conventional imbalance in Europe
between NATO and Russian forces, including
precision weapons, TNW play an important role for
Russia. 87
Due to the lack of official transparency on these
weapons, estimates as to the precise numbers in the
Russian inventory vary widely from 2,000 to 6,000,
with the lower figure concentrated more on deployed
weapons, while others are stored. One estimate claimed
the ground forces still have access to more than 1,100
tactical warheads with more than 2,200 available for
naval deployment. By 2007, GUMO reported that all
tactical weapons reductions among those assigned to
the ground forces had been completed. 88 In late 2003,
senior Russian military officials suggested that such
weapons were needed to counter possible development
of new types of U.S. weapons, and in late 2008,
CGS Makarov said these were required as long as
the European continent was unstable and so heavily
armed. Sergei Karaganov, on the basis of available
reports commented: “According to unofficial information
(we usually do not provide official informa-
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