Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

actions are needed and preemptive actions as well, if
necessary,” he concluded. 76 His appeal seemed less
nuclear than it did conventional. An aspect later taken
up in April 2010 by Andrei Kokoshin, a member of the
Russian Academy of Sciences and former member of
the Security Council: “The new Russian-U.S. treaty on
strategic offensive armaments lays the basis for strategic
stability for the foreseeable future. However, this is
not an automatically achievable objective. It can only
be achieved if Russia continues to carry out a whole
range of improvements to its strategic forces.” He explained
that Russia should keep its strategic forces secure
against attacks and increase their capacity to penetrate
any potential missile defense, adding: “Strategic
stability will largely depend on precision weapons
with conventional warheads, to which a great deal of
attention should also be paid, providing Russia with
a potential for non-nuclear or pre-nuclear deterrence.” 77
“The latter by the way, is prescribed by the new Russian
military doctrine,” he said. 78 His reference to prenuclear
deterrence drew upon Gareev’s thinking, but it
is still a long way off, as the conventional modernization
of the Russian armed forces faces technological
and defense industry-related challenges. In any case,
Gareev’s was a voice of reason: nuclear weapons cannot
be considered as general-purpose options.
Patrushev’s leaks were ultimately absent from the
new military doctrine which, if anything, assumes a
more cautious stance on the nuclear issue than did its
previous version in 2000. There is no commitment to
preventive or preemptive strikes, or reference to local
conflict. Its comment on the issue, briefer than in 2000,
describes nuclear use “when the very existence of the
state is under threat,” instead of the earlier: “in situations
critical to the national security of the Russian
Federation.”(Section III.22). 79
69