Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

identifying the intentions and forecasting the practical
actions of numerous international and transnational
forces, particularly the western think tanks producing
closed work for government. “This is why many important
processes end up outside our field of view,”
he asserted. However, he noted forms of opposition,
economic, information-based, and psychological, having
a substantial impact on the nature of warfare and
the development and training of armed forces. Stressing
that nuclear weapons remain the most important
and reliable means to ensure the security of the Russian
state, he said that with the nature of new threats
nuclear weapons could not be regarded in absolute
terms. Gareev noted:
Having a mindset that Russia’s security is guaranteed
as long as there are nuclear weapons do not conform
fully to the new realities. We know the Soviet Union
had nuclear weapons, but nuclear weapons remain
and there is no union state. 75
Moreover, he emphasized that such weapons cannot
be general-purpose, stressing their use is futile
in local situations such as Chechnya or to neutralize
economic and information threats or all types of
subversive activity. Drawing on the experience of the
Great Patriotic War, Gareev said it was time to assess
the merits of the decisive importance not only of the
initial period of war, but above all the first strategic
strike. Reminding his audience of the difficulties the
Red Army faced in the first few months following the
German invasion in 1941, then referring to more recent
conflicts in the Persian Gulf and Yugoslavia (1991 and
1999 respectively), he said in modern conditions it is
impossible to withstand a massive first strike. “Therefore,
as in the fight against terrorism, more aggressive
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