Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

that the conventional transformation had resulted in
achieving the capability to deploy brigades within “1
hour,” it seems that a tenuous consensus was reached
amounting to recognition that the reforms had not
damaged readiness levels (which were very low prior
to launching Serdyukov’s reform). 73 An additional
area of widespread disagreement related to abandoning
Russia’s traditional self-reliance on its defense
industry for its procurement needs. The admission in
September 2009 that talks were underway between
Moscow and Paris on the possible procurement of the
Mistral class amphibious assault ship brought the controversy
over seeking foreign armaments and equipment
to the fore and this internal tussle most likely
carried over into the issue of finalizing the military
doctrine. 74 The reformers also knew the draft paid
scant regard to the new look and had to brace themselves
to press ahead with the reform despite the impending
publication of a doctrine that seems at odds
with the agenda.
While nuclear preemption and lowering the threshold
was clearly on the agenda, an event in early December
2009 in Moscow may well have proven to be
an opportunity to move a voice of reason center stage.
On December 8, 2009, an assembly of the Academy
of Military Sciences held in Moscow examined urgent
problems in the development of military science and
improving the country’s defense. In the presence of
many of the military top brass, the keynote speech was
given by the President of the Academy, Army-General
(Retired) Makhmut Gareev. His wide-ranging speech
covered the situation in Afghanistan, the expansion of
NATO, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, transnational
threats, and changes in the strategic environment.
Gareev said that insufficient attention was given to
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