Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Nuclear Posture and Redrafting.
Despite the reset in U.S.-Russian relations that
largely took place in the fall of 2009 around the ongoing
START talks, senior Russian security officials
not only implied that consideration was being given
to lowering the nuclear threshold, but also to the extension
of nuclear deterrence to involve local conflicts.
Although he was not intending to promote an image
of continued conventional military weakness, Secretary
of the Security Council and former Director of the
FSB, Nikolai Patrushev, revealed details of changes to
the draft military doctrine in relation to the country’s
nuclear posture. In an interview with journalists in
Novosibirsk on October 8, 2009, Patrushev signaled
that the doctrine was being “fine-tuned,” and may include
the right to use a “preventative nuclear strike.” 60
He also stated that Moscow’s greatest priority was to
“keep its nuclear state status” and that “conditions of
the deployment of nuclear weapons” were corrected
to allow their use “not only in global but also regional
and even local conflicts.” He also said: “The conditions
for the use of nuclear weapons to repel aggression
with the use of conventional weaponry in largescale,
but also in regional and even in a local war have
been corrected. Moreover, in situations critical for national
security, the inflicting of a preventive nuclear
strike upon an aggressor is not excluded.” However,
his meaning was clear, since during his interview he
left little scope for doubt, using the word preventivnyy
(preventive) several times and only once using the
term uprezhdayuschiy (preemptive). 61 It is also important
to note that General Baluyevsky provided tacit
support for these comments, confirming on October
64