Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

ministry working group. Army-General Makhmut
Gareev, President of the Academy of Military Sciences
and one of the country’s foremost military theorists,
also played a key role in drafting the doctrine. Thus,
the most significant players leading the process shared
a military background and probably brought military
interests to the fore. What is remarkable is that the
reporting on the drafting in 2007-08 bears a striking
resemblance to the final content of the 2010 military
doctrine. 57
A key paper in the January 2007 conference entitled
“Doctrinal Views of NATO on the Nature of
Wars and on Security” presented by an unnamed
Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) officer, reportedly
stressed the issue of NATO expansion. Another
paper, “The Role and Place of Strategic Nuclear Arms
in Russia’s Military Doctrine,” asserted that the security
of the Russian state is 90 percent dependent upon
nuclear deterrence. Colonel-General Aleksandr Rukshin,
the then Chief of the General Staff’s Main Operations
Directorate, covered the organizational development
and use of Russia’s armed forces. Papers
were given in order of importance, with air and space
defense placed above naval aspects of doctrine. Papers
on international terrorism were therefore given
less priority, in part since the armed forces saw this
as a function of the interior ministry and intelligence
services, while a paper on military education failed
to reach the top 10. Yet, Baluyevsky emphasized that
the main threat was hidden in the fact that the conduct
of hostile information activity against Russia has
incommensurately grown, the initiator of such activity
appeared clear to all military chiefs assembled in
the hall. Critically, following the conference, Major-
General (Retired) Vladimir Belous, Professor in the
Academy of Military Sciences, said that he saw few
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