Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Chechen war and instances of domestic terrorism in
Russia such as the Nord Ost theater attack in Moscow
in October 2002 or the Beslan school siege in September
2004 appeared to necessitate revision of the military
doctrine passed in 2000. Adjustment to the post-9/11
security environment, enhanced for a time by Moscow’s
willingness to pursue international counterterrorist
cooperation, finally resulted in the then President
Vladimir Putin ordering a new military doctrine
in June 2005. That the gestation period for this new
doctrine was so long, almost 5 years, requires some
explanation. In seeking that bureaucratic insight, it is
necessary to scrutinize, as far as possible, features of
the drafting process to understand how the “balance”
represented in the new doctrine was achieved and
where the sensitivities were located.
On January 20, 2007, a consultative conference was
held in Moscow to examine the issue of formulating a
new military doctrine. Those attending the conference
were representative of the bodies with vested interests
in the military doctrine: the presidential staff, government,
Duma, Federation Council, Security Council,
Ministry of Defense, Interior Ministry, Emergencies
Ministry, the Federal Security Service, Federal Protection
Service, Academy of Sciences, and Academy of
Military Sciences. In January 2008, the Academy of
Military Sciences held an additional conference that
also paid close attention to such issues. In December
2008, more formal plans for a new military doctrine
were announced. During a meeting of the Russian
Security Council a working group was formed consisting
of delegates from state bodies and civilian
and military academic experts and led by the Deputy
Secretary of the Security Council, Army-General Yuri
Baluyevsky (former Chief of the General Staff). Colonel-General
Anatoliy Nogovitsyn headed the defense
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