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Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

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on states; individual states violating international accords<br />

<strong>and</strong> noncompliance with existing treaties; the<br />

use of military force close to Russia in violation of the<br />

United Nations (UN) Charter or other norms of international<br />

law; the emergence of armed conflict <strong>and</strong><br />

possible escalation of such conflicts on the territories<br />

of states close to Russia <strong>and</strong> its allies; the spread of<br />

international terrorism; <strong>and</strong> the emergence interfaith<br />

tension, international armed radical groups in areas<br />

adjacent to <strong>Russian</strong> borders <strong>and</strong> those of its allies, <strong>and</strong><br />

the growth of separatism <strong>and</strong> religious extremism in<br />

various parts of the world. Internal dangers stem from<br />

efforts to compel change to the constitution; undermine<br />

the sovereignty, unity, <strong>and</strong> territorial integrity<br />

of the state; <strong>and</strong> disrupt the functioning of the organs<br />

of state power, state <strong>and</strong> military facilities, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

information infrastructure of Russia (Section II.8.a-k;<br />

9.a-c). 53 The proliferation of WMD <strong>and</strong> the increase in<br />

the number of states with nuclear weapons as well as<br />

international terrorism, according to the military doctrine,<br />

pale in comparison with NATO.<br />

As noted, the reference to NATO is not new. What<br />

is new is the way it is presented more exactly as a<br />

“danger,” which probably also reflects dissatisfaction<br />

with the lack of western interest to date in Medvedev’s<br />

European security architecture initiative. The<br />

second seems to be an insertion that fails to make clear<br />

to what it might refer, while the next appears a more<br />

nebulous variant on a similar statement in the previous<br />

doctrine. An additional new danger appears to<br />

relate not only to Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) but<br />

also obliquely to U.S. “global strike” planning. Reference<br />

to territorial claims against Russia has been condensed<br />

in the new doctrine, since the old formula had<br />

an additional element concerning a multipolar world.<br />

The next two dangers were absent in the old doctrine:<br />

58

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