Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE 2010:
“STRATEGIC DISCONNECT”
The long awaited new Russian military doctrine,
first mooted by the then President Vladimir Putin in
the spring of 2005 and intended to replace its previous
version in 2000, was finally signed by President
Medvedev on February 5, 2010. 46 Although western
and Russian analysts focused their speculation on the
nuclear elements of the doctrine, there was no explicit
move toward lowering the nuclear threshold, though
as many noted there can be no certainty on the issue
since further detail on the nuclear posture was contained
a classified addendum (The Foundations of State
Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence to 2020). The
military doctrine, tactically released during the ongoing
START negotiations and sandwiched between the
publication of the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review and
the 46th Munich Security Conference, appeared balanced,
encapsulating a compromise between hawks
and doves and really offering something in its text for
everyone, avoiding being either too provocative or
controversial. Little in its content fitted with the image
of a “resurgent Russia.” 47
Nonetheless, as many Russian analysts and commentators
noted, the doctrine is remarkable for a
number of less positive reasons. First, and perhaps
most striking, it bears no resemblance to the new look
armed forces. In fact, it is quite the opposite since it
is almost entirely divergent from the actual ongoing
military reform. 48 The gap between official theory and
practice is therefore staggering by any rational measurement.
Moreover, the doctrine occasionally contradicts
the May 2009 National Security Strategy (NSS) and
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