Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

adoption of network-centric warfare capabilities, and
as this is introduced and experience is gained, it may
well elicit further adjustments. In short, having successfully
abandoned the mass mobilization principle,
jettisoning cadre units, and forming the new brigadebased
structure, the leadership is now reviewing the
reform concept itself in order to correct weaknesses
discovered after assessing these new structures. The
timescale to complete this process is likely to be between
2012 to 2016, while more significant challenges
lie ahead in relation to developing the officer corps,
educating and training brigade commanders, forming
professional NCOs and modernizing the TOE. Despite
the officially declared target of reaching a 70:30 ratio
of modern equipment and weapons by 2020, progress
to date has proved much slower than expected. Rather
than the 9-11 percent modernization per annum, the
rate appears to be closer to 2 percent. How will this
mismatch be corrected? Will the defense ministry opt
for more upgrades? Will there be a greater appetite
for foreign procurement? Can the problems facing the
Russian defense industry be overcome?
Analyzing and assessing foreign military experience
and calibrating these features into reform planning,
however, will only take Russian defense reform
so far. They may understand, often quite thoroughly,
the principles involved, but without practical experience
they will not appreciate why it works or exactly
how. The reform processes could be cut short or facilitated
by asking for foreign defense reform assistance,
even though such a step is potentially controversial,
especially if that assistance were to be provided by
NATO or Alliance members, it is nonetheless possible
at least in theory, and could form part of intensified
trust building measures.
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