Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

an interview by the Deputy Defense Minister for Armament,
Vladimir Popovkin, confirmed. On February
20, 2010, Popovkin told Ekho Moskvy that the new
brigade structure had turned out to be “cumbersome,
they are all heavy.” He added that “light brigades with
light equipment” were needed in order to correct this
imbalance. In turn, this would demand a diverse approach
toward training, adopting new combat training
models, and might also add to the procurement
needs of the brigades. 42
Such calls to further fine tune the brigade structure
were also present in work by highly respected military
theorists such as Major-General (Retired) Ivan
Vorobyev, co-writing in Voyennaya Mysl, (along with
Colonel Valeriy Kiselev) in the spring of 2010, advocating
three brigade types based on enhancing their
maneuverability. The co-authored article began with
a brief overview of brigade development in the U.S.
armed forces and then turned to the history of Soviet
brigades during the Great Patriotic War. It highlighted
the fact that deficiencies within the TOE can result
in military defeat and noted in passing the five TOE
reorganizations during the first 6 months of the Great
Patriotic War. The article then recommended adopting
three types of brigade (heavy, medium, and light)
depending on the operational axis. 43 They also stressed
that the restructuring of the TOE was no panacea, and
the effectiveness of these brigades would depend on
several factors:
Much will depend on technical outfitting, the quality
and combat effectiveness of arms and military equipment,
brigade manning, the personnel’s proficiency
and moral-psychological and combat qualities, materiel
support, and above all the officers’ professional
training, which cannot be improved overnight. Brigade
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