Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

The performance of the brigades, for instance, during
operational-strategic exercises in 2009 (Kavkaz,
Ladoga, and Zapad 2009) revealed that they were
heavy and cumbersome, consequently taking longer
than anticipated to move over large distances. Such
brigades, retaining the firepower of a division and in
many cases as much heavy artillery, seemed more like
small divisions. This “one size fits all” approach was
unsustainable. Senior commanders publicly admitted
that recalculation was required. Notably, the CINC
of the Russian ground forces, Colonel-General Aleksandr
Postnikov, appointed in January 2010, stated
that further refinements were needed in order to make
the forces more flexible and mobile. He particularly
recommended that instead of maintaining such heavy
brigades, three types were required: heavy, multirole,
and light. 40 Postnikov was effectively saying that a key
feature of the reform, rapidly conducted throughout
2009, now required refinement, or additional reform.
For critics of this reform, this appeared to admit inadequate
planning. Yet, the opposite is probably more
accurate: it showed that the planners were implementing,
assessing, re-evaluating, discussing, and where
necessary making corrections, even if that involved
altering key concepts. In other words, paradoxically,
it confirms that a real and systemic reform is in progress
with mistakes being made, adjustments demanded,
and new challenges encountered. Postnikov, in
fact, described the brigades as less than perfect, and
said that the defense ministry was actively working
to correct mistakes. He said the brigades were badly
equipped (after all, at the start of the reform, there was
only 10 percent modern weapons and equipment in
the TOE) and characterized readiness levels as “low.” 41
Postnikov was not isolated in holding such views, as
50